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Trump Is Threatening to Unwind AI Progress

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2024 › 10 › trump-ai-policy › 680476

If the presidential election has provided relief from anything, it has been the generative-AI boom. Neither Kamala Harris nor Donald Trump has made much of the technology in their public messaging, and they have not articulated particularly detailed AI platforms. Bots do not seem to rank among the economy, immigration, abortion rights, and other issues that can make or break campaigns.

But don’t be fooled. Americans are very invested, and very worried, about the future of artificial intelligence. Polling consistently shows that a majority of adults from both major parties support government regulation of AI, and that demand for regulation might even be growing. Efforts to curb AI-enabled disinformation, fraud, and privacy violations, as well as to support private-sector innovation, are under way at the state and federal levels. Widespread AI policy is coming, and the next president may well steer its direction for years to come.

On the surface, the two candidates couldn’t be further apart on AI. When AI has come up on the campaign trail, the focus has not been on substantive issues, but instead on the technology’s place in a supposed culture war. At a rally last winter, Trump railed against the Biden administration’s purported “use of AI to censor the speech of American citizens” (a contorted reference, perhaps, to an interview that week in which Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas denounced the “politicization” of public education around the dangers of AI, including misinformation). Trump also said he would overturn Joe Biden’s executive order on AI—a sprawling document aiming to preserve consumer and civil rights while also spurring innovation—“on day one.” Then, over the summer, the GOP platform lambasted the “dangerous” executive order as slowing innovation and imposing “Radical Leftwing ideas” on the technology, perhaps referring to the order’s stated “dedication to advancing equity.” Elon Musk, now the most powerful Trump surrogate in the world, recently invited his followers to “imagine an all-powerful woke AI.” Harris, for her part, hasn’t discussed AI much as a candidate, but she is leading many of Biden’s AI efforts as vice president, and her economic platform mentions furthering “the commitments set forth in the 2023 AI Executive Order.”

[Read: The real AI threat starts when the polls close]

Such rhetoric is par for the course this election cycle: Trump in particular has never been known for nuance or gravity, and tearing down Biden is obviously his default position. What no one seems to remember, though, is that Biden’s “dangerous” executive order echoes not one but two executive orders on AI that Trump himself signed. Many of the policies around AI that President Biden and Vice President Harris have supported extend principles and initiatives from Trump’s term—such as efforts to establish federal funding for AI research, prepare American workers for a changing economy, and set safety standards for the technology. The two most recent presidential administrations even agreed on ensuring that federal AI use is nondiscriminatory. Trump’s approach to the technology, in turn, built on foundations laid during Barack Obama’s presidency.

In other words, despite how AI has been approached by their campaigns (that is, barely, or only in the shallowest terms), both candidates have real track records on AI, and those records are largely aligned. The technology appeared to be a rare issue driven for years by substance rather than partisanship, perhaps because prior to the launch of ChatGPT, it wasn’t on many Americans’ minds. With AI now assuming national importance, Trump has promised to tear that consensus down.

Still, there’s a good chance he won’t be able to—that reason and precedent will prevail in the end, if only because there’s already so much momentum behind what began during his own administration. “To the extent that the Trump administration worked on issues of science and technology policy, it worked on AI,” Alondra Nelson, a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study who previously served as the acting director of Biden’s Office of Science and Technology Policy, told me. And in doing so, it was inheriting priorities set under a man Trump has called “the most ignorant president in our history.” Near the end of his second term, Obama directed several federal agencies to study and plan for the growing importance of “big data” and AI, which culminated at the end of 2016 with the publication of a report on the “future of artificial intelligence,” as well as a national strategic plan for AI research and development. Those included broad suggestions to grow the federal government’s AI expertise, support private-sector innovation, establish standards for the technology’s safety and reliability, lead international conversations on AI, and prepare the American workforce for potential automation.

A few years later, Trump began to deliver on those recommendations through his executive orders on AI, a 2019 update to that strategic plan, and his White House’s guidance to federal agencies on using AI. “The Trump administration made AI a national technology priority,” Michael Kratsios, who served as the country’s chief technology officer under Trump and helped design his AI strategy, told Congress last October. In that testimony, Kratsios, who is currently the managing director of the start-up Scale AI, lauded much of Obama’s previous and Biden’s current work on AI—even criticizing Biden for not doing enough to implement existing policies—and noted the continued importance of supporting “high-quality testing and evaluation” of AI products.

Biden and Harris have since taken the baton. Trump’s first executive order in particular did “have a lot of the ingredients that got much more developed in Biden’s EO,” Ellen Goodman, a professor at Rutgers Law School who has advised the National Telecommunications and Information Administration on the fair and responsible use of algorithms, told me. “So when Trump says he’s going to repeal it with a day-one action, one wonders, what is it exactly that’s so offensive?” Even specific policies and programs at the center of Biden and Harris’s work on AI, such as establishing national AI-research institutes and the National AI Initiative Office, were set in motion by the Trump administration. The National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource, which Harris’s economic plan touts by name, originated with AI legislation that passed near the end of Trump’s term. Innovation, supporting American workers, and beating China are goals Harris and Trump share. Bluster aside, the candidates’ records suggest “a lot of similarities when you get down to the brass tacks of priorities,” Alexandra Givens, the president of the Center for Democracy & Technology, a nonprofit that advocates for digital privacy and civil rights, told me.

[Read: The EV culture wars aren’t what they seem]

To be clear, substantive disputes on AI between Harris and Trump will exist, as with any pair of Democratic and Republican presidential candidates on most issues. Even with broad agreements on priorities and government programs, implementation will vary. Kratsios had emphasized a “light touch” approach to regulation. Some big names in Silicon Valley have come out against the Biden administration’s AI regulations, arguing that they put undue burdens on tech start-ups. Much of the Republican Party’s broader message involves dismantling the federal government’s regulatory authority, Goodman said, which would affect its ability to regulate AI in any domain.

And there is the “Radical Leftwing” rhetoric. The Biden-Harris administration made sure the “first piece of work out the public would see would be the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights,” Nelson said, which outlines various privacy and civil-rights protections that anyone building or deploying AI systems should prioritize. Republicans seem to have a particular resistance to these interventions, which are oriented around such concepts as “algorithmic discrimination,” or the idea that AI can perpetuate and worsen inequities from race, gender, or other identifying characteristics.

But even here, the groundwork was actually laid by Trump. His first executive order emphasized “safety, security, privacy, and confidentiality protections,” and his second “protects privacy, civil rights, [and] civil liberties.” During his presidency, the National Institutes of Standards and Technology issued a federal plan for developing AI standards that mentioned “minimizing bias” and ensuring “non-discriminatory” AI—the very reasons why the GOP platform lashed out against Biden’s executive order and why Senator Ted Cruz recently called its proposed safety standards “woke.” The reason that Trump and his opponents have in the past agreed on these issues, despite recent rhetoric suggesting otherwise, is that these initiatives are simply about making sure the technology actually functions consistently, with equal outcomes for users. “The ‘woke’ conversation can be misleading,” Givens said, “because really, what we’re talking about is AI systems that work and have reliable outputs … Of course these systems should actually work in a predictable way and treat users fairly, and that should be a nonpartisan, commonsense approach.”

In other words, the question is ultimately whether Trump will do a heel turn simply because the political winds have shifted. (The former president has been inconsistent even on major issues such as abortion and gun control in the past, so anything is possible.) The vitriol from Trump and other Republicans suggests they may simply oppose “anything that the Biden administration has put together” on AI, says Suresh Venkatasubramanian, a computer scientist at Brown University who previously advised the Biden White House on science and technology policy and co-authored the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights. Which, of course, means opposing much of what Trump’s own administration put together on AI.

But he may find more resistance than he expects. AI has become a household topic and common concern in the less than two years since ChatGPT was released. Perhaps the parties could tacitly agree on broad principles in the past because the technology was less advanced and didn’t matter much to the electorate. Now everybody is watching.

Americans broadly support Biden’s executive order. There is bipartisan momentum behind laws to regulate deepfake disinformation, combat nonconsensual AI sexual imagery, promote innovation that adheres to federal safety standards, protect consumer privacy, prevent the use of AI for fraud, and more. A number of the initiatives in Biden’s executive order have already been implemented. An AI bill of rights similar to the Biden-Harris blueprint passed Oklahoma’s House of Representatives, which has a Republican supermajority, earlier this year (the legislative session ended before the bill could make it out of committee in the senate). There is broad “industry support and civil-society support” for federal safety standards and research funding, Givens said. And every major AI company has entered voluntary agreements with and advised the government on AI regulation. “There’s going to be a different expectation of accountability from any administration around these issues and powerful tools,” Nelson said.

When Obama, Trump, and Biden were elected, few people could have predicted anything like the release of ChatGPT. The technology’s trajectory could shift even before the inauguration, and almost certainly will before 2028. The nation’s political divides might just be too old, and too calcified, to keep pace—which, for once, might be to the benefit of the American people.

The Giant Asterisk on Election Betting

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2024 › 10 › political-betting-polymarket-disputed-election › 680473

On Election Night, millions of Americans will watch anxiously as the ballot counts stream in. Most will be worried about the political future of their country. Some will also have money on the line.

Over the past several months, election betting has gone mainstream. On Polymarket, perhaps the most popular political-betting site, people have wagered more than $200 million on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. The election forecaster Nate Silver recently joined the company as an adviser, and its election odds have been cited by media outlets including CNN, Bloomberg, and The New York Times. Polymarket is officially off-limits to U.S. users, but the website is still accessible using technical work-arounds. Americans can directly place bets on other platforms such as PredictIt and Kalshi, the latter of which was recently approved to offer legal election betting. Just this week, the investing app Robinhood launched its own presidential-election market.

In a sense, election betting is like sports betting: Think Donald Trump will win next week? Put money down on it, and profit if you’re right. But these sites present themselves as more than just a way to make a quick buck. They assert that how people bet, whether on the benign (who will be the next James Bond?) or the consequential (will Israel and Hamas reach a cease-fire before the end of the year?), can help forecast the future. Because there’s money involved, the thinking goes, these prediction markets leverage the collective wisdom of what people actually think will occur, not what they hope will. For example, this summer, prediction markets accurately forecast President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the race. If they are right about the election, Donald Trump has the edge: On Polymarket, for instance, Trump currently has roughly a 65 percent chance of winning the election.

But what will happen if the outcome is contested? Many Trump loyalists are already preparing for the next “Stop the Steal” campaign rooted in unfounded claims of a rigged election. A disputed election could plunge these betting sites into chaos. Prediction markets sometimes describe themselves as “truth machines.” But that’s a challenging role to assume when Americans can’t agree on what the basic truth even is.

Prediction markets have become popular among Trump supporters—no doubt because they show that Trump is favored to win even as the polls remain deadlocked. If Trump loses, election denialists may look to the betting markets as part of their evidence that the race was stolen. The groundwork is already being laid. “More accurate than polls,” Elon Musk recently tweeted to his more than 200 million followers on X, alongside an image displaying Trump’s favorable Polymarket odds. “You shouldn’t believe the polls,” J. D. Vance has agreed. “I think that chart’s about right,” he said in reference to Kalshi’s presidential odds. Even Trump himself has talked up his betting odds, both online and in real life. “I don’t know what the hell it means, but it means that we’re doing pretty well,” he recently said of Polymarket, during a speech in Michigan. Indeed, if you follow only betting markets, a Trump loss might even be surprising, potentially fueling claims of foul play.

Prediction markets have already received significant attention in the lead-up to the election, but this might be only the start. Strange activity could occur on these betting sites after the polls close. That’s because most of these markets will remain open for bets for weeks and months after the election, in some cases as late as Inauguration Day. A significant amount of money will likely be wagered after votes have been cast, and the market odds could diverge from election results.

That’s what happened during the previous presidential election. In 2020, even after an audit had confirmed Biden’s win in Georgia and his victory was certified, PredictIt still gave Trump a nontrivial chance of winning the state, at one point reaching as high as 17 percent. Putting money on a Trump win after he officially lost wouldn’t make much sense—unless, that is, you genuinely believed that the election was stolen or that Trump would be successful in an extralegal attempt to overturn results. This time around, with more money on the line and election denialism already in the air, a contested election could result in even more anomalous election odds after the polls close. In other words, betting markets can’t be disentangled from a reality in which a segment of the country does not believe the election results.

Especially on Polymarket, such a scenario could get weird fast. Polymarket runs on the blockchain—bets are made with cryptocurrency, and official decisions about who wins are made by the holders of a crypto token called UMA. If there is a disagreement over what occurred, UMA token-holders can vote to determine the official outcome. These are not lawyers scrupulously analyzing predefined rules, but people considering evidence posted to a Discord server. Although token-holders have strong incentives to vote honestly, the system is still vulnerable to manipulation. And in a highly contentious election, things could get messy.

Consider how the Venezuelan presidential election this summer played out on Polymarket. According to Polymarket’s rules, the winner was to be determined based primarily on “official information from Venezuela.” Given that the authoritarian incumbent Nicolás Maduro controlled the election, bettors initially favored him by a sizable margin—in part, because it seemed likely that he would stay in power, regardless of how Venezuelans voted. That’s what happened. Although the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, got more votes, Maduro stole the election. But the UMA arbiters declared González the winner, overriding Polymarket’s original rules. Some bettors defended the decision: Rubber-stamping Maduro’s fraudulent win, they argued, would be “very bad, even dystopian.” Others felt they had been scammed. “What happens next, if Trump doesnt recognize the election results,” wrote one user in the Polymarket comments section.

Venezuela is a unique case. Trump cannot steal the election like Maduro did—he’s not even currently in office. Still, UMA decision makers could go against official sources if the results are disputed. Even in the case of a contested election, such an outcome would be unlikely because it would be a massive blow to Polymarket’s credibility, Frank Muci, a policy fellow at the London School of Economics, told me. However, he added, “if there are Supreme Court rulings and dissenting opinions and Trump is saying that the election was really stolen, [then] politics may override the narrow bottom line.” Polymarket, which did not respond to multiple requests for comment, could always intervene and overrule UMA’s results. It didn’t do so after the Venezuela debacle, but earlier this year Polymarket refunded some users after UMA got a resolution wrong.

Other election-betting sites have more precautions in the case of a contested election. Both Kalshi and PredictIt determine market outcomes in-house. Xavier Sottile, the head of markets at Kalshi, said in an email that if Kalshi’s users have a credible reason to dispute who is declared the winner on the platform, the company has “an independent market outcome review committee” that includes “election-focused academics” to verify the resolution. But if people disagree on who won the election, some percentage of bettors are destined to be deeply unhappy, no matter how fairly these markets are resolved.

After the election, betting sites may look less like oracles than mirrors, reflecting the nation’s disunity back at us. In 2020, Trump’s outsize odds on prediction markets following Biden’s win led Nate Silver to write that that markets were “detached from reality.” So too is our country. Many Republicans falsely believe that Trump won the last election, a lie that Vance has repeated of late. In a way, prediction markets act as a microcosm of America’s political psyche, distilling the confusion of our political moment into tidy charts.

Democrats Are Treating a Big Win as a Liability

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2024 › 10 › democrats-electric-cars › 680472

Representative Elissa Slotkin, a Michigan Democrat in a tight race for a Senate seat, has been on the defensive about a manufacturing renaissance happening in her own backyard.

Thanks to incentives that President Joe Biden's administration has championed in the Inflation Reduction Act and other legislation, Michigan alone could see 50,000 or more new jobs by 2030 brought on by the boom in electric vehicles. And yet, in a new ad, Slotkin all but disavows EVs, telling voters, “I live on a dirt road, nowhere near a charging station, so I don’t own an electric car.”

“No one should tell us what to buy, and no one is going to mandate anything,” she says in the ad. “What you drive is your call—no one else’s.” Only in between such assurances does Slotkin allow that if an EV boom is happening, she’d rather those cars be built in Michigan than in China.

Normally, an economic explosion of this magnitude would be the kind of win that any politician would fight for and hinge reelections on. But Slotkin’s party is clearly not winning the information war over electric vehicles. The IRA is spurring General Motors, Ford, Volvo, BMW, and many others to retrofit old car plants and build new battery factories across the U.S., challenging China for control over the technology of the future. Economic stories like Michigan’s are playing out in Georgia, Nevada, North and South Carolina, and Tennessee, too. Yet, according to recent data from the nonprofit advocacy group American EV Jobs Alliance, more than 75 percent of the political messaging about EVs this election cycle has been negative. Donald Trump has been railing against what he and critics falsely call electric-vehicle “mandates” for drivers; Vice President Kamala Harris hasn’t exactly been on camera ripping hard launches in an electric Hummer the way Biden did in 2021. Instead, she too has been reassuring crowds that “I will never tell you what car you have to drive.” Democrats have decided to treat what should have been one of the biggest manufacturing and job wins of the past century as a political liability.

“I think the great, irritating tragedy to all this is the actual story of EVs and auto jobs is a very good one,” says Mike Murphy, a longtime Republican political consultant who co-founded the American EV Jobs Alliance and also runs the EV Politics Project, which is dedicated to pushing Republicans towards EV adoption. His group found that most political messaging about EVs references people being forced to drive electric someday under some kind of “gas car ban” that starts with layoffs now and will ultimately kill the American auto industry. None of that is true; nowhere in the U.S. has “mandates” that every person must drive an electric car. Trump has also repeatedly and misleadingly said that EVs “don’t go far” (their ranges can rival gas vehicles) and are “all going to be made in China” while comically overstating the cost of building electric-vehicle chargers. Somehow, it seems to be working. During this election, the narrative has spun out of control, particularly in Michigan, Murphy told me. Tens of thousands of new manufacturing jobs are coming to Michigan because of EVs, Murphy said. “The problem is that it’s the biggest secret of the campaign.”

The Biden administration did set a goal of increased EV sales—that 50 percent of all new cars sold in 2030 would have zero tailpipe emissions. Functionally, that means developing a robust local battery-manufacturing ecosystem after America and the rest of the world spent decades outsourcing it to China. And the IRA was meant to give carmakers and parts suppliers the teeth to actually do that work. Ample evidence suggests that the act’s plans are working as intended—especially in red and swing states. The Hyundai Motor Group has sped up the opening of Georgia’s biggest-ever economic-development project, its new $7.6 billion EV-making “Metaplant.” Last week, Scout Motors—a classic American brand revived by the Volkswagen Group—unveiled an electric truck and SUV that it aims to manufacture in South Carolina at a new $2 billion factory by 2027. Tennessee is becoming an epicenter for battery-making, thanks to some $15 billion invested for various EV projects. And Kentucky is also seeing billions in job-creating investments from Toyota, Rivian, and other companies as it seeks to become what Governor Andy Beshear has called “the EV capital of the United States.” Cleaner cars, manufactured at home, with battery technology no longer firmly in the hands of a geopolitical adversary—from an electoral perspective, what’s not to like?

Yet Democrats on the campaign trail are reluctant to talk about any of this. And so far, American car buyers simply aren’t as willing to buy EVs as policy makers and automakers hoped. EV sales have risen significantly since the early days of the Biden administration, but they haven’t taken off the way automakers believed they would. GM, for example, once projected 1 million EVs produced by 2025 but will have scored a major victory if it can sell 100,000 by the end of this year. Those slower-than-expected sales, plus the fact that automakers are getting crushed on still-high battery costs, have led several companies to cancel or delay new EV projects. Plenty of Americans have little to no personal exposure to cars outside the gas-powered ones they’ve been driving for a century, and still regard EVs as expensive toys for wealthy people on the coasts.

Democrats have not yet figured out how to square these two realities: American voters might support the jobs that EV manufacturing creates, but they can be fearful of or even hostile toward the product. Instead, the party has ceded rhetorical ground to Trump’s line of attack: that Biden’s (and presumably Harris’s) policies are meant to force Americans to someday buy a car they don’t want, or even “take away your car,” as the Heritage Foundation has put it. “The Republican Party in the Senate race has been pounding, pounding, pounding on the [internal-combustion engine] ban, which is a scary thing that tests pretty well if you want to scare voters, particularly in Michigan,” Murphy said. The GOP’s anti-EV sentiment has been helped along, too, by the fossil-fuel industry’s ad campaigns.

Meanwhile, the CEOs of Ford, General Motors, and the EV start-up Rivian have all expressed dismay about how politicized vehicle propulsion has become. The Tesla CEO Elon Musk doesn’t seem to be much help: Trump has repeatedly said that Musk has never asked him to go easier on EVs, something Musk cheerfully reaffirmed on X. Trump has vowed to repeal Biden’s EV “mandate” on day one of his presidency; whether he can without an act of Congress is the subject of intense speculation in the auto industry. Then again, a Trump sweep could mean he’d get the firepower to do exactly that, by targeting the tax breaks to buy EVs, the incentives to manufacture them, or both. Trump is unlikely to be able to halt a transition happening at car companies all over the world, but he could delay it or put the U.S. further behind the curve.

In theory, no red-state governor or member of Congress should want to give up the jobs that the EV boom is creating. (Trump’s running mate, J. D. Vance, has contended that EV manufacturing will mean job losses for the auto industry overall, even though Honda and LG Energy Solution are committing some $4 billion to its future electric “hub” in Vance’s home state of Ohio.) But the success of this manufacturing boom in Georgia or Michigan does hinge on people actually buying those products. One recent survey by an automotive research group found that a person’s political identity has become less associated with EV acceptance. But Republican rhetoric could reverse that. Murphy pointed to one recent poll his group conducted showing that 62 percent of Michigan respondents said the government’s push to adopt more electric vehicles is a bad thing for the state. Until recently, he told me, he felt that the auto industry’s leaders weren’t spooked by the political push against EVs. Now, he said, “they ought to be.”

The Democratic Theory of Winning With Less

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › politics › archive › 2024 › 10 › kamala-harris-narrow-path › 680465

For years, the dominant belief in both parties has been that Democrats need to run up a big lead in the national presidential popular vote to win an Electoral College majority. But in the dead-heat election of 2024, that may no longer be true. The distinctive dynamics of the 2024 campaign could allow Kamala Harris to eke out an Electoral College win even if Donald Trump runs better in the national popular vote this time than during his previous two campaigns.

The belief that Democrats need a big popular-vote win to prevail in the electoral vote hardened in the course of those two previous Trump campaigns. In 2020, Joe Biden beat Trump by a resounding 4.5 percentage points in the popular vote but still only squeezed past him by relatively small margins in the three Rust Belt battlegrounds of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin that decided the race. In 2016, Hillary Clinton beat Trump by two points in the national popular vote but narrowly lost those same three states, and with them the presidency.

That history has weighed heavily on Democrats as a procession of recent polls has shown Trump shrinking or even erasing Harris’s national lead. But the pattern of differences among white, Black, and Latino voters found in most of those national surveys show how Harris could still potentially capture the 270 Electoral College votes needed for victory—even if she wins the nationwide popular vote by much less than Biden did in 2020, and possibly by only about the same margin that Clinton got in 2016.

The principal reason is that these recent polls show Trump making most of his gains in national support by performing better among Black and, especially, Latino voters than he did in either of those previous elections. Even the most favorable surveys for Trump consistently find Harris polling very close to Biden’s level of support in 2020 among white voters, which had improved over Clinton’s performance with that group by several points. In other words, Harris will likely rely a bit more on white voters than her party’s past two nominees did.

That subtle shift is the crucial distinction from the earlier contests. It could allow Harris to scrape a win by sweeping the predominantly white, former “Blue Wall” battlegrounds of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, even if Trump improves over his prior popular-vote results by gaining among Black and Latino voters (and Black and Latino men in particular).

[Read: Elon Musk wants you to think this election’s being stolen]

In each of his previous two races, Trump benefited because the decisive states leaned more Republican than the nation overall. In both 2016 and 2020, Wisconsin was the tipping-point state that provided the 270th Electoral College vote for the winner—first for Trump, then for Biden. In 2016, Trump ran about three percentage points better in Wisconsin than he did nationally; in 2020, he ran nearly four points better in Wisconsin than he did nationally, according to the University of Virginia Center for Politics.

The fact that Trump each time performed much better in the tipping-point state than he did in the national popular vote is central to the assumption that Democrats can’t win the Electoral College without a popular-vote majority. But as the Center for Politics research demonstrates, that hasn’t always been true.

The tipping-point states in the three presidential elections preceding 2016—Ohio in 2004 and Colorado in 2008 and 2012—each voted slightly more Democratic than the national popular vote. And in none of those elections was the disjunction between the tipping-point-state result and the national popular vote nearly as big as it was in 2016 or 2020. In fact, the gap between the national popular vote and the tipping-point state in Trump’s two races was considerably wider than in any election since 1948, the Center found.

Polling in the past few weeks, however, has indicated that this gap has shrunk to virtually nothing. Trump and Harris remain locked in a virtual tie both nationally and in the swing states. With polls that closely matched, none of the swing states appears entirely out of reach for either candidate.

Still, professionals on both sides with whom I’ve spoken in recent days see a clear hierarchy to the states. Both camps give Harris her best chance for overall victory by winning in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; Trump is considered stronger across the Sun Belt in North Carolina, Arizona, Georgia, and Nevada (ranked from most to least promising for him).

That separation reflects the race’s unexpected racial dynamics. If Trump’s polling gains among voters of color bear out in practice, that would benefit him the most in the Sun Belt battlegrounds. There, minority voters are such a large share of the electorate that even a small shift in their preferences—toward Trump—would greatly diminish Democrats’ chances.

Whatever happens in the Sun Belt, though, if Harris sweeps the Rust Belt big three, she would reach exactly the 270 Electoral College votes needed to win (so long as she held all of the other states that Biden carried by about three percentage points or more, which is very likely). All three of those major industrial states are much less diverse than the nation as a whole: In 2020, white people cast about four-fifths of the vote in Michigan and Pennsylvania, and roughly nine-tenths of it in Wisconsin, according to census figures.

“One of the potential outcomes here is that at the end of the day, Trump will have gained with Blacks and Latinos and it may not have decided the Electoral College, if we don’t need [the Sun Belt states] to win,” Paul Maslin, a Democratic pollster with long experience in Wisconsin, told me.

Obviously, Harris has no guarantee that she could survive a smaller national popular-vote margin than Biden: The polls showing national gains for Trump could be capturing a uniform uptick in his support that would deliver slim victories across most—and possibly all—of the seven decisive states. Even the most optimistic Democrats see marginal wins in the battlegrounds as probably Harris’s best-case scenario. But the prospect that she could hold the former Blue Wall states even while slipping nationally challenges the conventional wisdom that Democrats must amass a significant lead in the national popular vote to secure enough states to win the electoral vote.

“The Blue Wall states are the likeliest tipping point for either candidate,” Kyle Kondik, the managing editor of the Sabato’s Crystal Ball newsletter published by the Center on Politics, told me. “If the country moves two to three points to the right but those states only move a point or less, that’s where you start to get the tipping point looking pretty close to the popular vote.”

The Democratic strategist Mike Podhorzer, a former political director at the AFL-CIO, also believes that Harris could win the Electoral College with a smaller popular-vote advantage than most analysts have previously assumed. But he says the demographic characteristics of the swing states aren’t the primary cause of this possibility. Rather, the key factor is that those states are experiencing the campaign in an immersive way that other states are not thanks to huge advertising spends, organizing efforts, and candidate appearances.

That disparity, he says, increases the odds that the battleground states can move in a different direction from the many states less exposed to such campaigning. Both Podhorzer and Kondik note that the 2022 midterm elections supported the general thesis: Although broad dissatisfaction with Biden allowed Republicans to win the national popular vote in House elections, Democrats ran much better in statewide contests across the most heavily contested battlegrounds, especially in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Arizona.

“It is really the difference between how well you are doing outside the battlegrounds and inside the battlegrounds,” Podhorzer told me. Inside the battlegrounds, he pointed out, voters have for years now been exposed at blast-force volume to each party’s arguments on all the major issues. “The cumulative effect of it is that they have an awareness of what is at stake, a different worldview, than people living outside those states,” he said.

The analogue to 2022 this year would be whether general disappointment in Biden’s economic record increases Trump’s popular-vote total in less-contested blue and red states alike, but Harris holds on to enough of the battlegrounds where voters are hearing the full dimensions of each side’s case against the other.

[Read: How the Trump resistance gave up]

The same national polls that show Trump gaining among voters of color this year do not show much, if any, improvement for him compared with his 2020 performance among white voters. The latest aggregation of high-quality national public polls published by Adam Carlson, a former Democratic pollster, found that Harris is almost entirely preserving Biden’s gains among white voters; that means Harris is also exceeding Clinton’s showing with them from 2016.

The comparison with Clinton is instructive. Among voters of color, Clinton ran better in 2016 than either Biden in 2020 or how Harris is polling now. But Clinton lagged about three to four points below both of them among white voters. If Harris wins the popular vote by only about the same margin as Clinton, but more of Harris’s lead relies on support from white voters, the vice president’s coalition would be better suited to win the Rust Belt battlegrounds. In that scenario, Harris would assemble what political scientists call a more electorally “efficient” coalition than Clinton’s.

Biden’s margins of victory in the former Blue Wall states were so slim that Harris can’t afford much erosion with voters of color even there. But two factors may mitigate that danger for her. One is that in the Rust Belt states, most voters of color are not Latino but Black, and Democrats feel more confident that they can minimize losses among the latter than among the former.

The other key factor is a subtle change in those states’ white populations. Calculations from the latest census data provided to me by William Frey, a demographer at the nonpartisan Brookings Metro think tank, found that since 2020, white voters without a college degree—the demographic group in which Trump performs best—have declined as a share of eligible voters by about three percentage points in both Michigan and Wisconsin, and by about 1.5 points in Pennsylvania. In Michigan and Wisconsin, college-educated white voters, who now tilt mostly toward Harris, largely made up the difference; in Pennsylvania, the share of minority voters grew. In a typical election, these slight shifts in the electorate’s composition probably would not matter, but they could in a contest as close as this one.

“There is still room to grow in the suburbs [across the region], and two things are going to contribute to that growth: January 6 and the Dobbs decision,” Mike Mikus, a Pittsburgh-based Democratic consultant, told me, referring to the insurrection at the Capitol in 2021 and the 2022 Supreme Court ruling that overturned the constitutional right to abortion. The racist slurs against Puerto Rico at Trump’s Madison Square Garden rally last weekend could also cost him with Pennsylvania’s substantial Puerto Rican population.

Sweeping Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin with a smaller national-popular-vote lead than Biden’s is nonetheless a high-wire assignment for Harris. A significant concern for Democratic strategists is whether the party has plausibly declined since 2020 only among voters of color, without suffering material losses among white voters as well.

One strategist with access to a wide array of party polls, who asked for anonymity to discuss that private research, told me that although many Democrats are optimistic that surveys overestimate Trump’s strength among Black voters, a risk also exists that polls underestimate Trump’s strength with white voters (something that has happened before). That risk will rise if Trump turns out unexpectedly large numbers of the blue-collar white voters who compose the largest share of infrequent voters in the Rust Belt battlegrounds.

However, the Republican pollster Whit Ayres told me that he is seeing the same divergence between slipping non-white support and steady white backing for Harris in his surveys—and he sees good reasons for that pattern potentially persisting through Election Day. “The Hispanic and African American weakness [for Harris] is a function of a memory of the Trump economy being better for people who live paycheck to paycheck than the Biden-Harris economy,” Ayres said. “On the other hand, there are far more white voters who will be voting based on abortion and the future of democracy. There’s a certain rationale behind those numbers, because they are making decisions based on different issues.”

Democrats generally believe that they maintain a fragile edge in Michigan and Wisconsin, partly because many public polls show Harris slightly ahead, but even more because their party has built a better turnout operation than the GOP in those states. Pennsylvania looks like the toughest of the three for Harris and, in the eyes of many strategists in both parties, the state most likely to decide this breathtakingly close race.

“Looking statewide, I’ve always thought from the time she got in that Harris would do better in the suburbs and the cities than Biden, and Trump would do better in a lot of these redder counties, and the million-dollar question is what number is bigger and how much bigger,” Mikus, the Pittsburgh-based consultant, told me.

Biden carried the Keystone state by only 1.2 percentage points while winning the national popular vote by nearly 4.5 points. Whether Trump wins a second term to execute his dark vision of “retribution” against “the enemy from within” may be determined by whether Harris can hold Pennsylvania while winning the national popular vote by much less, if at all. It would be a fitting conclusion to this bitter campaign if the state that decides the future shape of American democracy is the same one where the nation’s Constitution was written 237 years ago.

A Future Without Hezbollah

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › international › archive › 2024 › 10 › israel-lebanon-iran-war › 680461

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At the end of September, when Israel’s campaign to destroy Hezbollah was reaching its height, I met one of the group’s supporters in a seaside café in western Beirut. He was a middle-aged man with a thin white beard and the spent look of someone who had not slept for days. He was an academic of sorts, not a fighter, but his ties to Hezbollah were deep and long-standing.

“We’re in a big battle, like never before,” he said as soon as he sat down. “Hezbollah has not faced what Israel is now waging, not in 1982, not in 2006. It is a total war.”

He talked quickly, anxiously. Only a few days earlier, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, had been killed in a bombardment of the group’s south-Beirut stronghold, and my companion—he asked that I not name him, because he is not authorized to speak on the group’s behalf—made clear that he was still in a state of shock and grief. Israeli bombs were destroying houses and rocket-launch sites across southern Lebanon, in the Bekaa valley, and in Beirut; many of his friends had been killed or maimed. He had even heard talk of something that had seemed unthinkable until now: Iran, which created Hezbollah around 1982, might cut off support to the group, a decision that could reconfigure the politics of the Middle East.

[Read: Hezbollah waged war against the people of my country]

When I asked about this, he said after an uneasy pause: “There are questions.” He said he personally trusts Iran, but then added, as if trying to convince me: “It’s as if you raised a son, he’s your jewel, now 42 years old, and you abandon him? No. It doesn’t make sense.”

He kept talking rapid-fire, as though seeking to restore his self-confidence. The resistance still had its weapons, he said, and the fighters on the border were ready. Israel’s soldiers would dig their own graves and would soon be begging for a cease-fire.

But his speech slowed, and the doubts crept back. He mentioned Ahmed Shukairi, the first chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who said shortly before the outbreak of the 1967 Six-Day War, “Those [Israelis] who survive will remain in Palestine. I estimate that none of them will survive.” Shukairi’s vain illusions were not something to emulate. “I don’t want to be like him,” the man said.

It took a moment for the historical analogy to register: He was telling me that he thought Hezbollah, the movement he was so devoted to, might well be on the verge of total destruction. We both paused for a moment and sipped our tea. The only noise was the waves gently washing the shore outside, an incongruously peaceful sound in a country at war.

“This tea we’re drinking,” he said. “We don’t know if it’s our last.”

A shop in eastern Beirut on September 23 (Myriam Boulos / Magnum)

Two months of war have transformed Lebanon. Hezbollah, the Shiite movement that seemed almost invincible, is now crippled, its top commanders dead or in hiding. The scale of this change is hard for outsiders to grasp. Hezbollah is not just a militia but almost a state of its own, more powerful than the weak and divided Lebanese government, and certainly more powerful than the Lebanese army. Formed under the tutelage of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, it has long been the leading edge of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance,” alongside Hamas, the Shiite militias of Iraq, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. Hezbollah is also the patron and bodyguard of Lebanon’s Shiite Muslims, with a duly elected bloc in the national parliament (Christians and Muslims are allocated an equal share of seats). Hezbollah smuggles in not just weapons, but billions of dollars from Iran. It runs banks, hospitals, a welfare system, and a parallel economy of tax-free imports and drug trafficking that has enriched and empowered the once-downtrodden Shiite community.

Hezbollah has long justified reckless wars against Israel with appeals to pan-Arab pride: The liberation of Palestine was worth any sacrifice. But the devastation of this conflict extends far beyond Hezbollah and cannot be brushed off so easily. Almost a quarter of Lebanon’s people have fled their homes, and many are now sleeping in town squares, on roads, on beaches. Burned-out ambulances and heaps of garbage testify to the state’s long absence. Many people are traumatized or in mourning; others talk manically about dethroning Hezbollah, and perhaps with it, Lebanon’s centuries-old system of sectarian power-sharing. There is a millenarian energy in the air, a wild hope for change that veers easily into the fear of civil war.

A few stark facts stand out. First, Israel is no longer willing to tolerate Hezbollah’s arsenal on its border, and will continue its campaign of air strikes and ground war until it is forced to stop—whether from exhaustion or, more likely, by an American-sponsored cease-fire that is very unlikely before the next U.S. president is sworn in. Second, no one is offering to rebuild the blasted towns and villages of southern Lebanon when this is over, the way the oil-rich Gulf States did after the last major war with Israel, in 2006. Nor will Iran be able to replenish the group’s arsenal or its coffers. Hezbollah may or may not survive, but it will not be the entity it was.

I heard the same questions every day during two weeks in Lebanon in September and October, from old friends and total strangers. When will the war stop? Will they bomb us too—we who are not with Hezbollah? Will there be a civil war? And most poignant of all, from an artist whose Beirut apartment was a haven for me during the years I lived in Lebanon: Should I send my daughter out of this country?

A café in Beirut on September 20 (Myriam Boulos / Magnum)

On a sunny morning in early October, I drove south out of Beirut on the highway that runs along the Mediterranean, toward the border with Israel. Just outside the city, dark smoke trails became visible on both sides of the road—last night’s air strikes. New ones appear every morning, like a visual scorecard of the war’s progress. There were other cars on the road at first, but beyond the coastal city of Sidon, the highway was empty.

My driver, visibly anxious, drove more than 90 miles per hour. Yellow Hezbollah banners fluttered in the breeze, alongside brand-new martyr billboards that read Nasrallah Aat (“Nasrallah Is Coming”)—a play on his name, which means “victory of God” in Arabic. We passed several charred and overturned cars. On the northbound side of the road, dozens of abandoned but undamaged vehicles were parked on the shoulder. These had been left by families fleeing the war in the south, my Lebanese fixer explained; they had run out of gas and apparently continued on foot. Her own family had fled the south in the same way.

After a little more than an hour, we reached the outskirts of Tyre, an ancient city in southern Lebanon. It is usually a lively place, but we found it eerily deserted, with shattered buildings marking the sites of bombings here and there. We passed some of the city’s Roman ruins, and for a moment, I felt as if I’d been transported into one of the Orientalist sketches made by 19th-century European travelers in the Levant, an antique landscape shorn of its people.

We had been directed by the Lebanese army—which maintains a reconnaissance and policing role in the south—to go to the Rest House, a gated resort. There, on a broad terrace overlooking a magnificent beach, we found a cluster of aid workers and TV journalists smoking and chatting under a tarp, with their cameras set on tripods and pointed south. This was as close as any observer could get to the war. Beyond us was an undulating coastline and green hills stretching to the Israeli border, about 12 miles away. There, just beyond our vision, Israeli ground troops were battling Hezbollah’s fighters, near villages that had been turned to rubble.

I was staring out at the sea, mesmerized by the beauty and stillness of the place, when a whooshing sound made me jolt. I looked to my left and saw a volley of projectiles shooting into the air, perhaps 200 yards away. They vanished into the blue sky, angled southward and leaving tufts of white smoke behind them. I felt a rush of panic: These must be Hezbollah rockets. Didn’t this mean Israel would strike back at the launch site, awfully close to us? But one of the Arab journalists waved my worries away. “It happens a lot,” he said. War is like that. You get used to it, until the assumptions change and the missiles land on you.

Not far away, camped out on the Rest House’s blue deck chairs, I found a family of 20 refugees who had left their village 11 days earlier. One of them was a tall, sweet-faced 18-year-old named Samar, dressed in a black shawl and headscarf, who sat very still as she described the moment when the war got too close.

“I saw a missile right above me—I thought it would hit us,” she said. “I felt I was blind for a moment when the missiles struck.” Everything shook, and a rush of dust and smoke made it hard to breathe. Five or six missiles had hit a neighboring house where a funeral was under way, killing one of the family’s neighbors and injuring about 60 others. “It was as close as that umbrella,” she said, pointing to the poolside parasol about 15 feet from us.

The whole family fled, then returned a few hours later to get some belongings, only to be blasted awake that night by another Israeli strike that shattered the remaining windows of the house. They all ran to the main square of the village and huddled there, praying, until dawn, when they drove to the Rest House. They have not been home since. They live on handouts from aid workers and journalists, and do not know if their house is still standing.

I heard stories like these again and again across Lebanon, from families who had fled their homes and some who were reduced to begging. The displaced are everywhere, and they have transformed the country’s demographic map. In the west-Beirut neighborhood of Hamra, a historically leftist and secular enclave, you now see large numbers of women in Islamic dress. I saw them in Christian neighborhoods, in the mountains, even in the far north. You can almost feel the suspicion that locals direct at them as you walk past.

Some locals have welcomed displaced people and offered them free meals; others have turned them away, and many landlords have ripped them off for profit. “Everybody is saying, ‘Why do you come and rent in our civilian neighborhoods? You are endangering everybody around you,’” a friend told me in the northern city of Tripoli. The danger was real, and it could be seen in the evolving pattern of Israeli strikes, which moved from Shiite enclaves to what had been considered safe areas in the mountains and the north. Hezbollah’s fighters appear to be leaking out of the danger zone, blending in with the refugees, and Israel has continued to track and strike them.

Some refugees have fled their homes only to stumble into even more dangerous places. Julia Ramadan, 28, was so frightened by the bombings in Beirut that she retreated to her parents’ apartment, in a six-story building on a hillside in Sidon. The area is mostly Christian, and dozens of southerners had also sought shelter there. Two days after she arrived, Julia spent several hours distributing free meals to other war refugees with her brother, Ashraf. She was home with her family when a missile slammed into the building.

[Hussein Ibish: Muslim American support for Trump is an act of self-sabotage.]

“With the second missile, the building started to shake,” Ashraf told me when I met him later. A powerfully built man who works as a fitness trainer, he had bandages on his foot and arm. “With the third and fourth, we felt the building starting to collapse.”

Ashraf instinctively turned and tried to use his body to shield his father, who was sitting next to him on a couch in the family’s living room. The building gave way, and father and son found themselves alive but trapped under the rubble. It took eight hours for rescuers to dig them out, and then they learned that Julia and her mother were among the dead. At least 45 people were killed, according to Lebanon’s health ministry (locals told me the number was 75). Israeli officials later said a local Hezbollah commander and several operatives were in the building.

One of the first to arrive on the scene was Muhammad Ahmed Jiradi, a 31-year-old whose aunt, uncle, and cousins lived in the building. He told me he could hear the screams of the people pinned under the wreckage. One of them was his uncle, saying that his wife and children were dead. Jiradi tried frantically to move the broken concrete and steel, but he had no tools, and could manage little. Many of the trapped people died before they could be rescued, their screams gradually fading.

“I saw my aunt pulled out,” Jiradi told me. “Her guts were spilling out; her head was gashed. This is the last image I have of her. I always thought of her as so beautiful. My mother wanted to see her. I said no. I told her, ‘Her face was smiling.’ But it’s not true.”

Jiradi told me these things in a listless monotone as we sat in armchairs in his spartan apartment. He had run out of money to pay for rent and food for his wife and children. He talked nonstop for an hour, periodically repeating, “I can’t take it anymore.” He said this not with any visible pain or emotion, but with the glazed look of someone who has lost all hope.

The Lebanese border with Israel as viewed from Ebel El Saqi, Lebanon, on September 10 (Myriam Boulos / Magnum)

Whom do the Lebanese blame for these horrors? When I asked, many of them gave me scripted answers: the Zionist enemy, of course. But some Lebanese told me that they did not want to die for the Palestinians. This was an indirect way of criticizing Hezbollah, which started this new round of fighting by launching rockets at Israeli civilian targets the day after the October 7 massacre, ostensibly to show solidarity with Hamas.

“I don’t know who started this war,” Jiradi told me. “I just want to live in peace.”

That may sound neutral, but in Lebanon, where Hezbollah has called for resistance to Israel at any cost, the absence of ideological fervor can be a tacit refusal to comply. People often voice fatigue in private, where they aren’t worried about being accused of siding with the enemy. But I even saw it on a few highway billboards. It’s Enough—We’re Tired, one of them read. Everyone in Lebanon knows what that means.

One afternoon, my driver, a 56-year-old man named Hassan from southern Lebanon, showed me a picture on his phone of a demolished house. It was his own, in the village of Bint Jbail, near the border with Israel. He had spent decades building it, and now the Israelis had bombed it into ruins. I expected him to erupt in anger at Israel, but then he told me why it had happened: Several Hezbollah fighters had sought shelter in his house, and Israel had targeted them there. He made clear that he held Hezbollah responsible for his loss.

Some Lebanese welcome the strikes on Hezbollah, despite the harm done to civilians. “The Israelis—it’s unfortunate that civilians are dying, but they are doing us a great favor,” a businessman from the north told me. He asked not to be named for fear of reprisal. “I was at a meeting today, and we were all saying, ‘It’s getting worse, but the worse it gets, the faster we will be out of this.’” In the same conversation, this man described his own close call with an Israeli air strike—an experience that did not lessen his hunger to see Hezbollah destroyed.

Hezbollah is keenly aware of its domestic vulnerabilities. In early October, its media wing made a bid for public sympathy by organizing a tour of the worst-hit parts of the Dahieh, the dense south-Beirut district that is home to its headquarters. By 1 p.m. that day, about 300 journalists, many of them European, were clustered together in the war zone, dressed in helmets and flak jackets, patiently waiting for their Hezbollah guides.

The Dahieh usually swarms with people, but the bombings had emptied it. We followed our Hezbollah minders through the cratered streets, many of the reporters excitedly snapping pictures of a place we’d been unable to see until now. At each bomb site, a Hezbollah official stood up and delivered a speech declaring that only civilians had been killed there, innocent women and children murdered by the Israeli “terrorists.” (They did not take us to the places where Hassan Nasrallah and other commanders had been struck.) Reporters thrust out microphones to record his every word. Some clambered over the mountains of rubble, still smoking in some places, greedily edging one another out to get the best shots.

At one site, I saw a man slip past the crowd to get into his auto-repair shop. I walked up and asked him if we could speak. He told me he’d chosen this moment to check on his shop after hearing about the Hezbollah media tour, “because I know the Israelis will not bomb you guys.”

He was right. The Israeli drone operators probably watched the whole weird show from the sky. You can hear the drones buzzing loudly overhead all day and all night in Beirut. Some people told me the noise kept them from sleeping. People jokingly call them Umm Kamel, or “Kamel’s mother,” a play on the name of the MK drone type. It is an effort to domesticate a reality that is very frightening to most Lebanese: Israel could strike them at any time. After the man from the Dahieh repair shop made his comment, I found myself looking up at the sky and wondering how I registered on the Israelis’ drone screens. Could they see my American phone number? Was I, as a U.S. citizen and a journalist, a moving no-kill zone?

Israel’s surveillance technologies have brought a new kind of intimacy to this war. In September, Israel detonated thousands of pagers it had surreptitiously sold to Hezbollah months earlier, wounding the group’s members as they went about their daily routines. Some of the victims were struck in their groins, perhaps even emasculated, because they had their pager on their hip. Others lost eyes and hands. I spoke to a doctor at one of Lebanon’s best hospitals, who described the chaos of that day, when dozens of young men were admitted without registering their names—a violation of the usual protocols, but Hezbollah was not going to give up its members’ identities. Another doctor told me he received several men wounded by pagers who were all listed only as “George,” a typically Christian name. He let it pass.

Even Israel’s efforts to minimize civilian casualties have created a weird closeness with the enemy. Most people I know in Lebanon watch the X feed of Avichay Adraee, an Arabic-speaking Israeli military official who posts warnings about upcoming strikes. But the Israelis also place calls to individual residents in endangered areas. I spoke with a 34-year-old woman named Layal who told me that many people in her southern village, including her parents, had received calls from Israeli officials telling them to evacuate. “But some people do pranks, pretending to be Israelis,” she told me, and that caused confusion. I must have looked baffled, because Layal added—as if to explain—that some of the pranksters were Syrian refugees. Many of the refugees loathe Hezbollah, which sent its fighters to bolster the Syrian regime during that country’s brutal civil war.

Layal told me that one of her neighbors, a woman named Ghadir, had gotten a phone call in late September from someone who spoke Arabic with a Palestinian accent. “You are Ghadir?” the voice said. She denied it. The caller named her husband, her children, the shop across the street. Every detail was correct. The caller told her to leave her apartment. Ghadir reluctantly did so, and that night her entire building was destroyed in an air strike. Layal fled soon afterward, without waiting for a phone call; when I met her, she was living in a rented house in the mountains.

That night, from the dark roof-deck of my Beirut hotel, I watched orange flames burst upward from the city’s southern edge, the aftermath of an air strike. It looked like a volcano erupting. Sounds of awe came from a cluster of young Lebanese at a table next to me; they held up their cellphones to capture the scene, posted their shots to social media, and went back to their cocktails.

A vendor from southern Lebanon selling fruit in Beirut on September 24 (Myriam Boulos / Magnum)

Hezbollah has a violent history inside Lebanon, and its domestic enemies are now sniffing the wind for signs of weakness. One of them is Achraf Rifi, the former head of one of Lebanon’s main security agencies. Almost two decades ago, Rifi’s investigators helped identify the Hezbollah operatives who had organized the murder of a string of Lebanese public figures, starting with former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. That bombing destroyed an entire block on Beirut’s seafront and killed 23 people. Rifi’s dogged police work publicly exposed Hezbollah’s willingness to kill anyone who got in its way. It also put him on the group’s target list.

Rifi is 70, with an austere, stiff-backed manner, and he lives in an elegantly furnished apartment in the center of Tripoli. When I went to see him there, he walked me out onto the terrace and pointed down through the evening gloom at a red traffic barrier on the far side of the street. That spot, he said, was where a car packed with 300 pounds of TNT was parked when it exploded in August 2013, one of two simultaneous bombings in central Tripoli that killed 55 people. Rifi told me the car bombing was a joint operation by Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence, and it was intended to kill him. He was inside at the time, and was shaken but not seriously injured.

Rifi knows both parties to this war well: Not only was he the target of that Hezbollah bombing, but as the head of the Internal Security Forces, he became familiar with Israeli spycraft by dismantling 33 Israeli cells inside Lebanon (three of them were in Hezbollah). Fighting Israeli espionage was one of the few objectives he and Hezbollah shared. Rifi told me that Israel’s successful infiltration of Hezbollah, which helped it kill many of the group’s senior leaders, became possible during the years the group spent fighting in Syria to protect the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Off their home turf, Hezbollah’s soldiers were exposed to Israeli surveillance. The Syrian war also created opportunities for self-enrichment and corruption within the organization—a problem that worsened with Lebanon’s subsequent economic collapse, as newly needy people could be tempted to spy in exchange for Israeli money.

Rifi told me he thought that about 20 percent of Hezbollah commanders in the middle and upper ranks had been killed in Israel’s operations this fall, including some of the group’s most effective leaders. He said he thought the bleeding would continue. As a critic of Israel, he would not have hoped to see Hezbollah disarmed this way. But the job is being done.

“The Iranian period is finished, I think,” Rifi told me. “In Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen.”

He may be right. The death of Nasrallah—the most powerful figure in Lebanon—felt like the end of an era to many people, and it ignited a frenzy of anxious speculation about what will happen next. Hezbollah’s defeat, if it comes, is by no means sure to bring peace or order. Day after day, I heard people ransack past chapters of Lebanon’s history for clues about the future.

One night in Tripoli, I listened to a group of friends argue for hours over an exquisite meal at a farm-to-table restaurant called Crop. (Lebanese restaurateurs have learned to take wars in stride.) One of the guests, a local city administrator who had spent years abroad, delivered an acerbic speech about Lebanon’s failure to cohere as a country. “I don’t see anyone who believes in a nation called Lebanon,” he said. “I see the Christians, the Sunnis, the Shia, the Druze—each is loyal to his own community or party. There is no public interest.”

A young historian named Charles al-Hayek interrupted and began to argue passionately that Lebanon was not past hope. The country had special traits that set it apart from other Arab countries: traditions of religious diversity, democracy, higher education, individual and public liberty. These could help Lebanon forge a more enlightened social compact.

A third guest began to argue that Lebanon needed a powerful leader with Western support to beat back the Iranian project and find a new way forward. Hayek shook his head impatiently. The Arab world, he said, was always clamoring for a rajul mukhalis—literally, a “man who finishes things.” This quest for a charismatic leader had always ended in tyranny, Hayek said. The same was true of Lebanon’s sectarian appeals to foreign patrons—France for the Christians, Saudi Arabia for the Sunnis, Iran for the Shia. The country must learn to stand on its own, Hayek said, and the end of Iranian hegemony could provide an opportunity.

At another dinner, this one in Beirut’s Sursock district, the hostess—a glamorously dressed woman in early middle age—asked everyone at the table to describe their best- and worst-case scenarios for Lebanon. One guest invoked the possibility of civil war, and another said: “Civil war? Come on, civil wars are expensive. We don’t have the money.” People laughed. But he wasn’t kidding. Lebanon’s economic collapse is so severe that the country’s political factions—which, apart from Hezbollah, have not fought for decades—lack the guns and ammunition to sustain a serious conflict.

[Read: How Israel could be changing Iran’s nuclear calculus]

At one point, the hostess glanced impishly around the room and said: “Please, I want to know who is the best urologue in Beirut.”

Why? someone asked.

“Because I will ask him who has the biggest balls in Lebanon, and that man will rescue us.”

People laughed. But again, it wasn’t just a joke. Many Lebanese I spoke with were desperate for a deus ex machina, and they seemed to want much more than a politician in the familiar mold. The country’s financial straits, together with the explosion that devastated the port of Beirut in 2020, have exposed the depravity of Lebanon’s political class. As one Lebanese friend told me, you go into politics in Lebanon to make money, not to serve the public interest. Corruption isn’t a by-product; it is the essence of the system. As a result, the talk about a new leadership has tended to revolve around the Lebanese army, often described as the country’s last intact national institution. The wish of many is for someone who will assert the army’s power against Hezbollah, smash the whole corrupt political system, and build a better one: Al rajul al mukhalis.

Lebanon’s power brokers have been deadlocked since the previous president’s term expired in 2022—no one has yet succeeded him—and the Biden administration has been pressing for a new election that might empower a government willing to challenge Hezbollah. The Lebanese presidency is reserved for a Maronite Christian (each of the top leadership jobs in Lebanon’s government is assigned by law to a particular religious community). The current head of the army, Joseph Aoun, qualifies. But even if an election could be held—which is hard to imagine in the chaos of this war—Aoun’s powers would be constrained by the Lebanese power-sharing system.

I relayed some of the conversations I had heard about the yearning for a military intervention to a retired senior officer in the Lebanese army who is close to Aoun and familiar with his thinking. We met in an officers’ club in the mountain town of Baabda, near the army’s headquarters, on a green hillside property that once belonged to a Kuwaiti princess. Through the boughs of cedar trees, we had a glorious view of Beirut far below, and the Mediterranean beyond.

The officer, clean-shaven and in civilian dress, told me that the army would never stray from its constitutionally defined role. Even if Hezbollah were substantially weakened, taking it on would spark a civil war. I asked about the possibility of disarming Hezbollah—the fervent aspiration of its domestic rivals and foreign adversaries. He said, “The only one who can disarm Hezbollah is Iran.” And that, he said, could happen only in the context of a political settlement between Iran and the United States, its most powerful enemy. Those were sobering words. In essence, he was telling me that Lebanon has no say in its own future.

As of now, no one knows for sure how much strength Hezbollah has left. Despite the battering of its top ranks and decision makers, it has a powerful corps of fighters in southern Lebanon who can operate independently. But with time, the officer told me, “Hezbollah will feel the lack of money. This will be the biggest problem. And when the Shia go back to the south, who will rebuild?”

A tent housing displaced Lebanese in Beirut, photographed on October 2 (Myriam Boulos / Magnum)

As I flew out of Beirut, I could see smoke rising from ruins not far from the airport. Middle East Airlines—Lebanon’s national carrier—is still operating, but other companies are no longer willing to take the risk. It has become so difficult to buy an outbound ticket that some people are sleeping outside the airport, hoping for cancellations. Others talk of fleeing by boat to Cyprus if things get worse. More than 300,000 Syrian refugees who fled to Lebanon during their country’s civil war have escaped back across the border over the past month, a testament to the depth of their fear.

As the plane banked and rose from the Beirut airport, passengers could see the Mediterranean on one side, glittering in the sun. But visible in the other direction, just beyond the runway, was something that offered a hint about the war now raging in Lebanon: a cluttered patch of warehouses and shacks that had arisen gradually during the 1980s, built by Shiite migrants from the south, with little or no oversight by the state. Now they store commodities of all kinds that are flown in and out of the country free of any taxes or tariffs. A shadow economy, made possible by Hezbollah’s enforcers, has gradually enriched and sustained the broader Shiite population.

That arrangement has been essential to Hezbollah’s power, and it has tied the lives and livelihoods of most of Lebanon’s Shia to the revolutionary creed of the Iranian regime. Many fear that if they lose Hezbollah, they will be left defenseless. Some of the elders still remember the days when most Shia were mired in rural poverty, mistreated not just by Lebanon’s other sects but by their own semifeudal overlords.

But their faith in Hezbollah is being tested. One Shiite woman who fled the south and is now living in a rented home in the mountains confided her disappointment to me. “A Hezbollah guy called us to say ‘What do you need?,’ but he didn’t have much to offer,” she said. “Just pillows. I asked for medicines for the kids, but they didn’t bring anything to us. Before the war, Hezbollah said they had an emergency plan. Where is the plan?”

Some people made bitter comparisons with Hezbollah’s reaction to the 2006 war it fought with Israel. Back then, the group’s leaders had quickly rolled out an energetic construction campaign, promising to rebuild every home that was destroyed. Young volunteers with clipboards surged into Shiite districts within hours of the cease-fire, delivering cash and food and supplies. Hardly anyone expects that to happen again. If the refugees’ needs continue to go unmet, Hezbollah could lose support. Might that make possible a new era in Lebanon, free of Tehran’s dictates?

Hezbollah loyalists rarely share their feelings with outsiders. But I got a glimpse of the atmosphere inside the group from a young woman whose brother, a Hezbollah fighter, had been killed in an Israeli air strike in late September. I met her through a friend in the mountain town of Aley, where she had taken refuge.

Her brother’s name was Hamoudi, and he was an unlikely militant. “He didn’t pray,” his sister told me. (She asked that I not reveal her name or the family’s surname.) “My mother said, ‘You will not become a martyr; you don’t pray.’” Some in the family—which is very loyal to Hezbollah—said Hamoudi seemed almost an atheist. “He didn’t read the Quran,” his sister said. “He listened to music. It’s haram”—forbidden—“to touch girls,” but Hamoudi, a burly 25-year-old with rosy cheeks and an infectious smile, loved women and didn’t try to hide it.

He was a film producer and editor and had taught himself the trade, working his way up from production assistant to camera operator and lighting designer. He started his own firm, doing social-media reels for restaurants and clothing companies and coffee shops. When he moved from the family’s southern village to Beirut, he found an apartment, not in the Dahieh, but in the more cosmopolitan Hamra district, where he often stayed out late partying with friends.

His sister showed me pictures and videos on her phone: Hamoudi swaying to music in the car, getting a haircut, voguing on the beach. “He was my friend, my brother, my secrets box,” she said, her eyes brimming with tears. “The one I go to first in my sadness and my happiness.”

Hamoudi had always been torn between the family tradition of muqawama—resistance—and the lure of Beirut and its glamor. Only at the end of the summer did he return to the family home in the south. By then, Israeli air strikes had become more frequent, the news ever grimmer. A 17-year-old friend in the family’s village was badly injured when a pager exploded in his hand in mid-September, she said. The boy’s father was killed soon afterward. On the day Nasrallah was killed, she called Hamoudi and asked him to come to Beirut to comfort her. He said he couldn’t. It was on that same day that he formally joined Hezbollah as a fighter, his sister said.

[Read: Full-on war between Israel and Iran isn’t inevitable]

Hamoudi seemed resigned to his death as soon as he joined. He even washed himself as martyrs are meant to, and made a martyrdom video, she told me—whether because everyone around him seemed to be dying, or because he had been assigned a mission, she didn’t know. But the very next day, an Israeli bomb struck the house where Hamoudi and two other Hezbollah fighters were sheltering, killing them all. The sister told me she suspected it even before she got the news. “I felt something,” she said. “Years before, he had a motorcycle accident, and I felt something the second it happened. This time, the same.”

Hezbollah issued a poster bearing Hamoudi’s picture and his name, with looping Arabic script declaring his martyrdom. You see these posters all over the Dahieh and in southern Lebanon these days, always with new faces. Hamoudi’s family has not yet been able to hold a funeral, because their village is still so dangerous. “When we see his grave, that day he will die again,” his sister said. “It will feel like the first day.”

Hamoudi’s sister is a devout Muslim and a supporter of Hezbollah. I have met many women like her in Lebanon, and I vaguely expected her to deliver a speech about the coming victory of the resistance, or to assure me that she would never give in. But as she wiped her tears away, she said nothing of the kind.

“I’m thinking to leave the country,” she said.

The Rise of the Post-Marxist Electorate

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2024 › 10 › democratic-voters-educated-populist › 680462

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A simple and intuitive view of democratic politics holds that political parties exist to advance the material self-interest of the coalitions that support them. If this were true, then as the Democrats became the party of high-earning college graduates, they would have abandoned economic policies that would threaten those voters’ pocketbooks. A version of this essentially Marxist analysis has become standard fare on the right, where the phrase woke capital has become a slur to describe the Democrats’ supposed fealty to corporate America; the Republican vice-presidential candidate, J. D. Vance, has argued that the Democratic Party is now the party of Wall Street.

But as wealthier and better-educated voters have shifted toward the Democrats, the party and its constituents have become more economically progressive, not less. They have largely united around an economic agenda that emphasizes aiding the poor and middle class, and around messaging that places that agenda front and center. The very richest Democrats have become just as left-wing on economics as their less affluent party members, and far more economically progressive than low- and middle-income Republicans. U.S. politics seems to have decisively entered what you might call a post-Marxist or post-materialist phase.

From the New Deal through the George W. Bush era, the Marxist view of politics largely held up. The rich and educated overwhelmingly voted for Republicans, who pursued tax cuts and deregulation, while the working class mostly voted for Democrats, who expanded the social safety net.

[Rogé Karma: Why America abandoned the greatest economy in history]

Over the past decade and a half, however, the dynamic has dramatically shifted. In 2008, the top fifth of earners favored Democrats by just a few percentage points; by 2020, they were the group most likely to vote for Democrats and did so by a nearly 15-point margin. (Democrats won the poorest fifth of voters by a similarly large margin.) Democrats now represent 24 of the 25 highest-income congressional districts and 43 of the top 50 counties by economic output. A similarly stark shift has occurred if you look at college education rather than income. Perhaps most dramatic of all has been the change among wealthy white people. Among white voters, in every presidential election from 1948 until 2012, the richest 5 percent were the group most likely to vote Republican, according to analysis by the political scientist Thomas Wood. In 2016 and 2020, this dynamic reversed itself: The top 5 percent became the group most likely to vote Democratic.

This newly educated and affluent Democratic Party did not swing to the right on economics. Quite the contrary. Following the 2020 election, the Biden administration pursued an expansive economic agenda that included a generous pandemic stimulus package, a massive expansion of the social safety net for the middle class and poor (including cash transfers to families and universal pre-K), and large investments to create well-paying jobs in left-behind places. These policies, if fully enacted, would have represented a significant redistribution of wealth. Most of the $4.5 trillion in proposed new spending would have been funded by a spate of new taxes on corporations and the ultra-rich. “The Biden agenda was more ambitious and redistributive than anything else pursued by Democrats since the 1960s or ’70s,” Jacob Hacker, a political scientist at Yale and co-author of a recent paper on the Democrats’ changing coalition, told me. “This is not a party pursuing a ‘Brahmin left’ agenda. It’s pursuing an incredibly progressive economic agenda.”

Despite its ambition, this agenda did not provoke anything resembling a rebellion from the party’s rich, educated base or the politicians who represent them. (Indeed, one of the biggest obstacles to its enactment was West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin, who represents a much more working-class state than most of his Democratic colleagues and who switched his affiliation to independent this year.) Kamala Harris is now running on many of those same policies and, according to the polls, her support among college-educated voters is even higher than Joe Biden’s was in 2020.

A common complaint from the center and the right is that the influx of affluent, highly educated voters into the Democratic Party has caused it to focus primarily on culture-war issues instead of pocketbook economics. But when Hacker and his co-authors analyzed party platforms since 1980, they found that since the early 2000s the share dedicated to economic issues has steadily increased and that economic issues take up twice as much space as cultural issues. They reached a similar conclusion when looking at Twitter, where you’d most expect to see party elites pandering to the cultural tastes of their base. They looked at the tweets of high-ranking Democrats from 2015 to 2022 and found that nine of the 10 most frequently tweeted phrases were focused on economic issues, such as Build Back Better, Affordable Care Act, and American Rescue Plan; the only noneconomic issue in the top 10 was Roe v. Wade. (By contrast, just three of the top 10 Republican-used phrases referred to economic issues.) The authors also found that members representing wealthy districts were actually slightly more likely to discuss pocketbook issues such as economics and health care than members from poor districts.

The policies and rhetoric coming from party leaders reflect the fact that affluent liberal voters have moved well to the left on economic issues. A major survey conducted after the 2020 election found that overwhelming majorities of Democrats in the top fifth of income distribution favored raising the federal minimum wage, hiking taxes on individuals earning more than $600,000 a year, making college debt-free, and enacting Medicare for All. That’s similar or slightly higher than the support for those policies among poor and middle-income Democrats and anywhere from 20 to 40 points higher than support among low- and middle-income Republicans.

None of this means material self-interest doesn’t matter at all to affluent liberals. Some evidence suggests that although wealthy Democrats tend to support higher taxes in the abstract, they are less likely to support specific tax increases that affect them directly; they are also known to oppose new housing construction in their own neighborhoods that would make housing more affordable. But even those exceptions are less exceptional than they may appear. According to the survey cited above, a bare majority of the richest Democrats support raising taxes on individuals making more than $250,000. And during this campaign season, the leaders of the Democratic Party—including both Harris and former President Barack Obama—have trumpeted their support for building more housing.

The leftward drift of high-status voters is partly a story about a genuine ideological conversion. Since the 2008 financial crisis, politicians, academics, and the media have paid far more attention to how the existing economic system has produced inequality and hardship. Highly educated, affluent voters, who also tend to be the most plugged-in to national politics, seem to have responded to this shift by embracing more progressive economic views.

[David Deming: ]Break up big econ

The story is also about political strategy. After Donald Trump’s 2016 victory, many Democrats became convinced that the best way to win back disaffected working-class voters was to enact policies that would help them. Surveys consistently find that middle- and low-income Republicans strongly disagree with their own party leaders on most economic issues, creating a potential opening for Democrats.

The Biden agenda that was shaped by those views has largely produced its intended economic effects. Unemployment has fallen, wage inequality has shrunk, and hundreds of billions of investment dollars have poured into red states. Many of the country’s forgotten communities are making a strong comeback. Politically, however, the effort to win back working-class voters appears to have flopped: If polls are to be believed, the Democratic Party is bleeding working-class support more badly than it did in 2016 or 2020.

Part of that failure seems to be because, when it comes to the economy, many voters are concerned about high prices above all else and view Democrats as responsible for them. But there’s also compelling evidence that Republican voters aren’t particularly motivated by economic policy in the first place. That is, although they disagree with GOP politicians about health care, taxing the rich, and the minimum wage, they don’t much care about that disagreement. A recent paper by the political scientist William Marble analyzed nearly 200 survey questions going back decades and found that in the 1980s and ’90s, non-college-educated white voters were more likely to vote in accordance with their economic views, causing them to support Democrats. Since the early 2000s, however, that dynamic has inverted: Non-college-educated white voters now place a far greater emphasis on culture-war issues over economic ones, pushing them toward supporting Republicans.

That realignment leaves both parties in a strange place heading into November. Voters consistently say that the economy is the most important issue of the 2024 election. And yet the affluent overwhelmingly support Kamala Harris, whose administration favored bold redistribution and big government spending, while a critical mass of working-class voters favor Donald Trump, whose economic agenda consisted largely of cutting taxes for the rich and trying to kill the Affordable Care Act.

The irony is that the Biden administration’s economic-populist push implicitly assumed that the Marxist view of politics was correct all along. Democrats embraced an agenda that largely went against its voters’ immediate material interests in the hopes that they could win over less-wealthy voters by appealing to their material interests. But working-class Trump supporters, just like liberal elites, turn out to have other things on their mind.