Illustrations by Ben Denzer

The splendor of the American big-box store lay before me, with its endless variety of shaving products in every imaginable size and color—a retail extravaganza, all of it locked behind Plexiglas. I needed a razor, and in order to obtain one at my neighborhood Target, I had to press a red button to summon a store clerk. Depending on where you live, you may know the drill. I waited in Aisle B45 with two women, one in front of the Dove deodorants, the other in the Old Spice section.

“I keep pushing, but no one comes,” said the Old Spice lady.

Six minutes passed. I pressed my button; my fellow shoppers pressed theirs. The Dove woman let out a dramatic sigh and left. Was a clean shave really worth all this? I looked at Old Spice; we shook our heads and departed. Result: three paying customers sacrificed to the War on Shoplifting.

By definition, most shoplifting is petty plunder—candy bars, baby formula, lipstick. But the small stuff adds up, as demonstrated by viral videos showing shelves of deodorant or cold medicine swiped into Hefty bags by thieves who can’t even be bothered to run away. Some people contend that all of the noise about shoplifting reflects mainly a race-tinged social panic, but the retail industry is not locking up its goods, annoying its customers, and closing stores because of a few viral videos. Companies are doing it because they’re seeing their goods walk out the door, costing them billions.

[From the March 2018 issue: The dark art of stealing from self-checkouts]

Big corporate retailers, mom-and-pop shops, cops, prosecutors, and lawmakers have tried everything to stop the thefts: get tough, be gentle, invest in new surveillance technology, turn pharmacies into fortresses. Nothing seems to work. At my Target in Washington, D.C., I counted 21 aisles of goods locked behind plastic, including toothpaste, body wash, underwear, earbuds, and air fresheners—all items that impulse thieves and organized criminals alike find desirable and easiest to resell, on the street or, more often these days, online.

Who is taking all of this stuff? And why has this age-old nuisance crime become so prevalent?

People steal because it’s easy and—with rare exceptions—free of consequences. David Kimmel, who resides at Northpoint Training Center, a former state mental hospital repurposed as a medium-security prison, in Boyle County, Kentucky, is one of those exceptions.

Kimmel is on his fourth tour in prison for shoplifting, for stealing a $12.88 doll from Walmart and $142.68 worth of ammunition from a Rural King store. This time, Kimmel faced a Kentucky prosecutor and jury who seemed determined to send a message. Each of Kimmel’s two charges was bumped up from a misdemeanor with a 90-day maximum sentence to a felony carrying up to a five-year penalty, mainly because he had already been banned from those stores for shoplifting (several previous instances of stealing from that Walmart, Kimmel told me, and one prior instance—stealing a lawnmower—from the Rural King). The jury didn’t think even that was enough, so they increased each sentence to 10 years. Finally, the jury recommended that Kimmel serve the two sentences not concurrently but consecutively, for a grand total of four decades.

Kimmel steals, he told me, because he’s a drug addict—pain pills, usually, or heroin and fentanyl. He is 39 now and has been shoplifting since he was 15. “I’ve done it hundreds of times,” he said. During all of those years, he was mostly employed—painting houses, doing construction. “I could make a living, pay rent and electric,” he said. “I couldn’t afford drugs.” He sold the stolen items at half their retail price to fences in a nearby parking lot, or on Facebook. He knows it’s not right, but “you ain’t hurtin’ nobody,” he told me. “It’s just from a big company.” If he were back on the street now, as an addict, he figures he’d still be shoplifting.

Kimmel appealed his conviction, and last year, the Supreme Court of Kentucky agreed that he should not have to serve his sentences consecutively. He told me his prison time was eventually cut back to 20 years. But the original sentence reflects how fed up many Americans are with shoplifting. At a rally last fall, Donald Trump announced that if he’s reelected, “we will immediately stop all of the pillaging and theft. Very simply: If you rob a store, you can fully expect to be shot as you are leaving that store. Shot!” At another rally last month, he said he could end shoplifting “immediately” with “one really violent day”— a “real rough, nasty day,” maybe even just “one rough hour”—during which police could take on criminals. Both times, the crowd cheered.

Whereas many on the right see the rise in shoplifting as proof of a nationwide moral collapse, many on the left deny that it’s even happening or that it is a meaningful problem. Shoplifting is one of the hardest crimes to measure, because only a tiny proportion of cases are ever reported to police. Thefts aren’t increasing in every city—in some, reported thefts have gone down—and viral videos of shoplifters-gone-wild don’t necessarily add up to a crime wave. But merchandise is disappearing off shelves at such high rates that stores have resorted to extreme measures to defend themselves—even at the risk of alienating paying customers. The surge, retailers and industry experts say, is real.

[From the November 2024 issue: How carjacking became a teenage pastime]

Shoplifting has soared over the past three years, according to a survey by Jack L. Hayes International, a loss-prevention consulting firm, of 26 big retail companies with, collectively, more than 22,000 stores. The study calculated the total retail losses due to theft to be $7.1 billion in 2022, up from $4.9 billion in 2019. Retailers say stores are closing because they can’t make up their losses, and because some employees are scared and don’t want to work there anymore.

When Mike Mershimer worked as a store detective in the 1980s and ’90s, the primary tools deployed against shoplifters were handcuffs, shame, and mockery. He’d see shoplifters swipe a belt or Air Jordans, and “I’d grab him, throw him on the ground, and cuff him,” he told me. Customers would ridicule the thief as Mershimer marched him out the door. “I never saw those shoplifters again,” he said. Today, Mershimer advises retailers and major brands on store security. Clients are looking for fixes, but though Mershimer can offer constructive advice, he’s well aware that there’s no simple solution. “I get a helpless pit in my stomach,” he told me. “I don’t know what to tell them.”

Guards aren’t the answer, he said. New engagement rules at many retail stores discourage police and security guards from using force to stop offenders—they can no longer grab and cuff shoplifters. Some chains, their lawyers eager to avoid injuries to employees, have made even chasing down shoplifters a fireable offense. In a recent video capturing a shoplifter rolling a cart of stolen items out of a D.C. supermarket, a customer berates the guard for not chasing the thief. The guard replies, “I’m just a visual deterrent,” a phrase now common in the retail-security industry. The criminals, Mershimer told me, “see them for what they are: nothing.”

Some businesses try to look tough by dressing the guards in black tactical gear or equipping them with a German shepherd or a handgun, but “you’re mainly intimidating your customers,” he said. “If I pull up in the parking lot and see that, I’m pulling out.”

Hardening the target—creating what the industry calls the “fortress store”—doesn’t work either. Adding physical barriers and locking away products “not only deters shoplifters; it deters legitimate customers,” Mershimer said. Ditto for limiting the amount of stock placed on display: A mostly empty shelf is more of a turnoff to real customers than to thieves.

Some stores have started locking their front doors, buzzing in only people who look like paying customers. But what does a paying customer look like? Door buzzers are invitations for a discrimination lawsuit.

Yet something has to be done, Mershimer told me. Twenty years ago, if someone swiped a pair of Levi’s, “you could stand the loss. You budgeted 2 percent for shrink. Now you can’t sustain these enormous losses. Now it’s a whole shelf of Levi’s.”

A senior executive at a national chain store was equally frustrated. He spoke with me on the condition of anonymity, because his bosses didn’t want the debate over shoplifting to tarnish the company’s brand. His stores lock up products even though they know it chases away paying customers and is an ineffective barrier against professionals. “They pop the locks; they melt the glass; they take the keys out of employees’ hands,” he said.

In the early 2000s, many cities and states began easing the consequences for shoplifting. Dallas police stopped responding to calls about thefts under $50 in value. In 2014, California voters approved a referendum reclassifying thefts of items worth $950 or less as misdemeanors.

Now the clamor for safer stores is pushing the pendulum back toward enforcement. In the past few years, states such as Florida, North Carolina, and Louisiana have ratcheted up penalties, especially for people caught stealing in a group. Next month, Californians will vote on a referendum that would toughen penalties for shoplifting, essentially undoing the reforms voters approved just a decade ago.

[Read: Why California is swinging right on crime]

Whether this will have an effect on thieves’ behavior is unclear. Shawn Hunter is 29 years old and has racked up more than 40 criminal charges in D.C., plus additional charges in Maryland and Virginia. Earlier this year, in a Target store in a wealthy section of D.C., two cops conducting a retail-theft surveillance operation watched Hunter stuff $54 worth of items into his bag and leave without paying. The officers stopped him just outside the door.

Hunter did not respond to requests for an interview, but I sat behind him in May in D.C. Superior Court as he waited his turn for a hearing. The judge called him to task for having missed a previous court date, but his lawyer explained that he had a good excuse: He’d failed to appear because he was in another courtroom on that same day, answering to yet another theft charge.

Hunter fidgeted throughout the hearing. The second he was dismissed, he jumped up, took the escalator two steps at a time, and burst out of the courthouse with a yelp of regained freedom.

Shoplifting is not a modern development; the term lifting dates back to a 1591 British pamphlet. In the years since, people have come up with plenty of theories about what drives shoplifters to steal. In Victorian Britain, shoplifting was seen predominantly as a female malady. The opening of department stores caused a moral panic—women with money and time to spare, London newspapers warned, were in danger of sullying their virtue and filling their days with petty crime.

When Rachel Shteir set out two decades ago to write a book on shoplifting, her idea was to plumb the roots of the early aughts’ apparent surge in retail thefts. She sold her book, The Steal, to her publisher on the back of a wave of attention devoted to the actor Winona Ryder, who’d been caught taking $5,500 of designer clothes and accessories from a Saks Fifth Avenue in Beverly Hills. According to a witness, Ryder claimed to have been conducting research for a role as a kleptomaniac. Ryder’s attorney denied this and suggested that the actor had assumed that the Saks clerk knew what she had taken and would charge her later for the goods. There was a sense then that women “were stealing not because they needed to eat but because they were shopping addicts,” Shteir, now a professor at DePaul University, told me. Talking about shoplifting in those years often meant discussing mental-health issues such as borderline personality disorder.

Beginning in the late 1960s, and especially after the publication of Abbie Hoffman’s Steal This Book, a different conception of shoplifters emerged, one that continues to dominate on the intellectual and political left. In this view, oppressed people steal to assert their power in the face of a society determined to keep them down. In the 2012 article “Stealing a Bag of Potato Chips and Other Crimes of Resistance,” the sociologist Victor Rios argued that shoplifting was a reasonable act of defiance against a system that preemptively labeled young men of color as criminals. Stealing, he wrote, was a way of “fighting for dignity.”

The idea that theft was both a reflection of social need and a form of political resistance became more entrenched on the left after protests—and, in some places, looting—erupted around the country over the murder of George Floyd, in 2020. Some commentators explicitly lumped shoplifting in with looting as a justified expression of frustration and rage. As Vicky Osterweil, the author of In Defense of Looting, told NPR, looting “freaks people out. But in terms of potential crimes that people can commit against the state, it’s basically nonviolent. You’re mass shoplifting. Most stores are insured; it’s just hurting insurance companies on some level. It’s just money. It’s just property. It’s not actually hurting any people.”

This is not a popular perspective in the retail industry. Those who have studied shoplifting point out that retail theft has always been more common than people think, and not primarily among the poor or those who view themselves as politically oppressed.

[Read: Why people loot]

An estimated one in 11 Americans have shoplifted at least once. In one study, criminologists spent the spring of 2000 to the spring of 2001 monitoring surveillance video in a major national chain drugstore in Atlanta. They determined that about 20,000 incidents of shoplifting took place in that one store, compared with only about 25,000 larceny-theft cases reported to police in the entire city in 2001. The study used shoppers’ clothing, jewelry, and other markers to draw conclusions about their economic class, providing a rough profile of who steals. The result: The shoplifters were not disproportionately minority, male, and lower-class, as many experts had assumed. In fact, about a third were middle-class and nearly 40 percent were women, and white people were just as likely to steal as were Black or Hispanic people.

These days, industry analysts say they are seeing more middle-class shoplifters than they did pre-COVID, mainly because shoplifters think they won’t face significant consequences (which is likely correct). Men might treat themselves to home-improvement tools and video-game accessories. Women, many of whom are the primary shopper for their family, will pay for milk and eggs but then swipe luxury items that a tight budget can’t accommodate: high-end cosmetics, skin-care products, jewelry.

Retailers are also becoming more concerned about what is known as organized retail crime, which often involves ringleaders ordering up shopping lists of goods they’ve often already sold to customers online. The thefts are contracted out to professional boosters, who rip off home goods, hardware, clothing, and drugstore items from any point along the supply chain, including freight trains, delivery trucks, warehouses, and stores. No reliable statistics show what portion of overall thefts are initiated by organized rings, but estimates range from as little as 5 percent to half of all theft. Coordination online has made organized theft more efficient, but it’s a different kind of puzzle for law enforcement than the far more common, and more psychologically complicated, individual shoplifting.

Why is shoplifting surging now? The coronavirus pandemic and social media are the two factors most often cited by researchers and industry executives.

At the very beginning of COVID’s spread, many categories of crime decreased, because people mostly stayed home and access to stores was limited. Shoplifting apprehensions reported by 22 major retail chains declined by 44 percent from 2019 to 2020, according to the Jack L. Hayes consultants. But since then, the numbers have soared far beyond their pre-COVID levels, reflecting persistent inflation, “less staff on sales floors,” and “thieves viewing shoplifting as a high-reward, low-risk endeavor,” their survey concluded.

Read Hayes is a former store detective with the scars to prove it. Back in the ’90s, his hands were repeatedly cut by shoplifters’ fingernails and pocketknives. These days, he runs the University of Florida’s SaferPlaces Lab, which develops and tests innovations in shoplifting prevention. He’s busier than ever. He told me he’d “seen surges before, but this is different—more significant, more widespread.”

He said that “everything changed” with COVID, “including how you think about other people. Everybody around you is a threat to your health and safety.” Store employees grew less willing to confront thieves, and lifters felt free to ignore shopkeepers’ efforts to halt them. People seemed “quicker to go violent” against clerks who did intervene.

“People just seem bolder,” Hayes told me. “We used to use shame as a deterrent, an informal sanction.” At some point, it stopped working.

Hayes told me that shoplifting has become more common among both casual thieves and hardened professionals. On one end of the spectrum, videos on social media showing young people how easy it is to steal items they’re not allowed to buy—cigarettes, beer—have gone viral, encouraging the curious to try their hand at it. On the other end, some people who formerly sold drugs are now drawn to big-ticket theft—power tools, TVs, laptops—because of the lower risk of punishment.

Thieves advertise their loot on Facebook and eBay, and trade tactical tips on Reddit as well as on more obscure sites. Online communities of pros and amateurs are occasionally shut down, but new ones pop up all the time. Many shoplifters are now trained by helpful online advisers to know precisely what to target. “They come into the store with a list,” the senior retail executive told me. “They want Prevagen or Maybelline. They know when our delivery trucks arrive; they know when we stock the shelves. They know when we’re lightly staffed.”

The internet isn’t just a place to garner tips. It has also, Hayes said, become a place “to showcase what you’ve stolen.” Videos of shoplifters committing their crimes and showing off their loot have become internet mainstays, both a reflection of evolving attitudes toward retail theft and an encouragement for new practitioners. Videos tagged #haul—some set to the tune of Ayesha Erotica’s “Real Messy Bitch” (“Yeah, I sca-a-am and I ro-o-ob, I’mma take everything that you go-o-ot … I love robbery and fraud, I’m a shoplifting god”)—feature slo-mo pans: energy drinks, candies, cleaning products.

The subreddit r/ShopliftersGoneWild, which has been around for two years and has 5,200 members, is run by a 53-year-old man in Florida who works from home for a medical company.  He asked not to be named, “because the internet is a crazy place.” He’s not a shoplifter himself; in fact, he’s quite derisive of lifters. His wife works in retail and has long provided him with a steady supply of shoplifting stories at the dinner table. He told me that he launched the forum “to be funny”; he enjoys watching thieves and their critics go at each other in the comments.

GoneWild Man, as I’ll call him, started off posting videos of encounters between clerks and thieves. But the subreddit morphed into a place where compulsive lifters talk about why they do it, and right-thinking Americans confront them with the damage they’re doing to their own community.

“Some people love the risk,” GoneWild Man told me. “It’s the same adrenaline rush as skydiving, but a lot cheaper and safer.” The lifters “try to claim ‘we only do it from the big boxes, not the mom-and-pops,’” he said. “They make themselves out to be the good person.” Or not: Some advise newbies to avoid problems by threatening store security guards that if they “touch me, I’ll sue” or—an enduring legacy of COVID—“I’ll cough on you.”

GoneWild Man often struggles with a “moral dilemma”: Should he shut down the subreddit, especially when he sees people encouraging crime by, say, offering instructions on how to remove security tags from expensive garments?

He says he likes that law-abiding people jump in, trying to talk lifters out of stealing more stuff. But he’s under no illusions that his subreddit is converting thieves into upstanding citizens. It’s hard to detect much shame among brazen lifters. He does, however, see some fear. Perhaps the most frequently asked question on the forum is: “Am I going to get busted?”

If there’s one thing retailers agree on, it’s that the courts will never make shoplifting a high-enough priority. The industry, therefore, devotes enormous energy to figuring out its own defense.

Kay Patel, an engineer for a tech company in Philadelphia, thought that owning a convenience store would be a rewarding side gig. What he didn’t count on when he bought the store last October was about $200 to $300 in goods walking out the door every day. “This place is definitely harder than I thought it would be,” he told me. “People came in and took whatever they wanted.”

Temple University’s campus police have a station down the block, and officers are in and out of Patel’s shop all day. (Patel draws them in with free coffee.) Shoplifters paid the officers no mind. Kids would run in, grab snacks, and bolt. “You can’t do anything,” one of them taunted Patel. He had a point. Patel can’t file an insurance claim without his rates shooting up. He doesn’t want his seven employees chasing or grabbing lifters, because it’s not worth the risk of violence. Patel had 16 cameras inside and outside the store, but his cashiers couldn’t monitor the screens while they rang up purchases.

On a drizzly, gloomy day in May, I watched as a 15-year-old boy strolled toward the exit of Patel’s store, sipping from a Big Gulp cup. From behind the counter, the cashier called to him: “Hey, kid!”

The kid wheeled around and held out his cup: “It’s just water.”

The cashier waved him on. Confrontation diffused. False alarm. What the kid didn’t know was that seconds before the cashier had called out to him, the cashier’s phone had buzzed with an alert. A few months earlier, Patel had installed a security-software product called Veesion—one of a slew of new programs that promise to catch thieves before they steal anything. The software, constantly scanning every aisle of the store, had captured the boy’s image and used AI to analyze his movements. “Gesture close to body,” said the alert, displaying an image of the boy holding his cup up against his chest.

Minutes later, another alert flashed on the cashier’s phone: “Very suspicious,” it said, showing a woman in the back of the store rummaging through her purse. The cashier looked up and saw the woman at the ATM machine. She’d been digging out her bank card.

The software picks up on the kinds of “suspicious cues” that the Atlanta-drugstore study found were the most accurate predictors of shoplifting behavior: people turning their head as they scan the aisles, nervously playing with products, looking for cameras or security tags. Alerts fly when people reach into their pockets, open their handbag, stick a hand inside their jacket. Patel says that Veesion alerts him and his employees 50 to 60 times a day, and about half are false alarms. In the week before my visit to the store, one alert was triggered by a man nonchalantly loading some 30 cans of Red Bull into his backpack. When the cashier confronted the man, he dropped the bag and left, Patel told me. This, he added, happens in many cases when a shoplifter is called out. He told me that his losses have fallen to maybe $75 a day.

Video and AI solutions are all the rage at loss-prevention trade shows. FaceFirst, for example, promises to “instantly detect habitual shoplifters” by running customers’ faces through a database of proven thieves. There’s talk of creating a surveillance network across the retail industry that would allow stores to share images of alleged or convicted shoplifters.

AI doesn’t get bored monitoring video, so it can watch the parking lot and alert store clerks if someone walks toward the shop carrying a crowbar. “Hey, manager, do you want to lock the front door?” the bot might ask. But such technologies also raise the creepiness factor and its more serious corollary: the potential that someone will perceive racial discrimination and take action against your business.

[Read: Defund facial recognition before it’s too late]

Still, the products keep coming. An Irish program, Everseen, recognizes when customers at self-checkout stations mis-scan products (for example, waving a barcode filched from some cheap product over the scanner instead of the one on the steak they’re putting in their bag).

Big home-improvement chains have developed power tools that remain deactivated until they’re purchased. Grocery chains in the U.K. are storing expensive meats in a case that opens only after checkout. Some supermarkets have shopping carts that jam if they approach the store exit without clearing the checkout lane—an extra security layer that may slow down shoplifters but can also make consumers “feel corralled,” says Emmeline Taylor, a criminologist at City, University of London who studies retail theft. Last year, Walgreens opened a store in Chicago in which most products have been removed from the open shelves and customers must order at a kiosk up front, whereupon a clerk retrieves their items from storage.

Barbara Staib, an executive at the National Association for Shoplifting Prevention, has been at this for a quarter of a century. She’s seen fancy fixes come and go. “You can keep going with your technology and your solutions and all the innovation in the world, but if you don’t address motivations, you’re not going to get anywhere,” she told me. That could mean getting shoplifters into counseling, rehab programs, food-assistance services, and job-training classes. Sometimes, especially with casual thieves, a few hours of education about the impact that shoplifting can have on their own friends and family—raising prices, closing stores—can make a difference. Staib’s organization offers a four-hour course focused on sending shoplifters the message that their behavior isn’t harmless. It seems to help: A four-year study in King County, Washington, found that fewer than 6 percent of young people who finished the course were nabbed again for shoplifting.

Such efforts won’t stop organized retail crime, Staib conceded, but they might help the many occasional shoplifters who think thievery is no big deal. “These people you can educate,” she told me. “We can’t stop them; we have to get them to stop themselves.”

But the surge in shoplifting is one piece of a larger collapse of the social forces that once restrained wayward behavior at least as much as the law did: trust, guilt, and shame. It took a lot to get us to this point—huge technological and psychological disruption; the atomization of American life by the anonymity of the internet; the isolation imposed by COVID lockdowns, which eroded many people’s sense of empathy; a lack of consequences for stealing, attributable to reductions in policing and store staffing. It’s hard to see how better surveillance cameras and longer prison terms, let alone programs like Staib’s, could roll back such powerful changes in how we live.

Maybe GoneWild Man was right when he said, “It’s just okay to be a bad person now.”

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If you follow politics, you can hardly escape Allan Lichtman, the American University history professor known for correctly forecasting the victor of all but one presidential election since 1984. In a whimsical New York Times video published over the summer, the 77-year-old competes in a Senior Olympics qualifying race—and confidently declares that Kamala Harris will win the race (get it?) for the White House. You might also have recently seen Lichtman on cable news, heard him on the radio, or read an interview with him.

In an era of statistically complex, probabilistic election models, Lichtman is a throwback. He bases his predictions not on polls, but rather on the answers to a set of 13 true-or-false questions, which he calls “keys,” and which in 2016 signaled a Trump victory when the polls said otherwise. He has little patience for data crunchers who lack his academic credentials. “The issue with @NateSilver538 is he’s a compiler of polls, a clerk,” Lichtman posted on X in July, as part of a long-running spat with the prominent election modeler. “He has no fundamental basis in history and elections.”

Lichtman’s complaint isn’t just with polls and the nerds who love them. In his view, almost everything that the media and political establishment pay attention to—such as campaigns, candidate quality, debates, and ideological positions—is irrelevant to the outcome. An election is a referendum on the incumbent party’s track record. “The study of history,” he writes in his book Predicting the Next President, “shows that a pragmatic American electorate chooses a president according to the performance of the party holding the White House, as measured by the consequential events and episodes of a term.”

[Anne Applebaum: The danger of believing that you are powerless]

According to Lichtman, the standard account of how presidential campaigns work is a harmful fiction. “The media, the candidates, the pollsters, and the consultants,” Lichtman writes, “are complicit in the idea that elections are exercises in manipulating voters,” which stymies political reform and meaningful policy debate. That argument contains a touch of the conspiratorial, but there’s a big difference between Lichtman’s worldview and a conspiracy theory: His predictions actually come true. If Lichtman is wrong about how elections work, how can he be so good at foretelling their outcomes?

One possible answer is that, in fact, he isn’t.

Lichtman developed his method in 1981 in collaboration with Vladimir Keilis-Borok, a Russian mathematical geophysicist. Lichtman had a hunch, he told me, that “it was the performance and strength of the White House Party that turned elections.” He and Keilis-Borok analyzed every election from 1860 to 1980; the hunch bore out.

Each of the 13 keys can be defined as a true-or-false statement. If eight or more of them are true, the incumbent-party candidate will win; seven or fewer, and they will lose. Here they are, as spelled out in Predicting the Next President:

1. Incumbent-party mandate: After the midterm elections, the incumbent party holds more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives than it did after the previous midterm elections.

2. Nomination contest: There is no serious contest for the incumbent-party nomination.

3. Incumbency: The incumbent-party candidate is the sitting president.

4. Third party: There is no significant third-party or independent campaign.

5. Short-term economy: The economy is not in recession during the election campaign.

6. Long-term economy: Real annual per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds mean growth during the two previous terms.

7. Policy change: The incumbent administration effects major changes in national policy.

8. Social unrest: There is no sustained social unrest during the term.

9. Scandal: The incumbent administration is untainted by major scandal.

10. Foreign or military failure: The incumbent administration suffers no major failure in foreign or military affairs.

11. Foreign or military success: The incumbent administration achieves a major success in foreign or military affairs.

12. Incumbent charisma: The incumbent-party candidate is charismatic or a national hero.

13. Challenger charisma: The challenging-party candidate is not charismatic or a national hero.

Lichtman says that keys 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 13 are true this year: just enough to assure a Harris victory.

Although some of the keys sound extremely subjective, Lichtman insists that they are not subjective at all—assessing them simply requires the kind of judgments that historians are trained to make. The charisma key, for example, doesn’t depend on your gut feeling about a candidate. “We are talking about the once-in-a-generation, across-the-board, inspirational, truly transformational candidates, like Franklin Roosevelt or Ronald Reagan,” he told me.

I can attest that applying the keys is challenging for those of us without a history Ph.D. The keys must be “turned” consistently from election to election without regard to polls, but in practice seem to be influenced by fluctuating public-opinion data. The Democratic nominee in 2008, Barack Obama, qualified as charismatic, but the 2012 nominee, who was also Barack Obama, did not, because of his diminished approval ratings. The “third-party challenger” key cuts against the incumbent if a third-party candidate is likely to get 5 percent of the vote—but this is only knowable through horse-race polling, which we’re supposed to ignore, or after the fact, in which case it’s not a prediction.

Lichtman insists that voters don’t change their minds in response to what the candidates say or do during the course of a campaign. This leads him to make some deeply counterintuitive claims. He has written that George H. W. Bush’s attacks on Michael Dukakis in 1988—which included the infamous Willie Horton ad—accomplished nothing, and actually hurt Bush’s subsequent ability to govern, because he already had enough keys to win and should have been focused on his policy agenda. He implies that JFK, who edged out Richard Nixon by less than two-tenths of a percentage point in 1960, would have won even if he had had the personality of, say, his nephew Robert, because he had eight keys in his favor in addition to charisma. And this past summer, Lichtman told anyone who would listen that Joe Biden should stay in the race, despite his difficulty completing a sentence, because replacing him on the ticket would mean the loss of the incumbency key. If Democrats persuaded Biden to drop out, he wrote in a July 3 op-ed, “they would almost surely doom their party to defeat and reelect Donald Trump.” (He changed his mind once it became clear that no one would challenge Harris for the nomination, thus handing her key 2.)

Arguments such as these are hard to accept, because they require believing that Lichtman’s “pragmatic electorate” places no stock in ideological positions or revelations about character and temperament. Lichtman is unperturbed by such objections, however. All arguments against the keys fail because they suggest that the keys are in some way wrong, which they plainly are not. Lichtman has written, for example, that the infamous “Comey letter” did not tip the 2016 election to Trump, as poll-focused analysts such as Nate Silver have “incorrectly claimed.” How does Lichtman know the claim is incorrect? Because the keys already predicted a Trump victory. The proof is in the fact that the system works. This raises the question of whether it actually does.

Going nine for 10 on presidential predictions is not as hard as it sounds. Only four of the past 10 elections were particularly close. Most campaign years, you can just look at the polls. Lichtman predicted a Biden victory in 2020, for example, but you probably did too.

To his credit, Lichtman has made many accurate calls, in some cases well before polls showed the eventual victor in the lead. Even in 2000, the election that he is generally considered to have gotten wrong, the system worked as advertised. As he explains in Predicting the Next President, the keys “predict only the national popular vote and not the vote within individual states.” (Lichtman has devoted considerable energy to proving that the election was stolen in Florida by the GOP, and that he has thus really gone 10 for 10.)

Lichtman’s most celebrated feat of foresight by far, the gutsy call that supposedly sets his keys apart from mere polls, was his 2016 prediction. Calling the race for Trump when the polls pointed the other way was reputationally risky. After Lichtman was vindicated, he was showered with praise and received a personal note of congratulations from Trump himself. “Authorities in the field recognized my nearly unique successful prediction of a Trump victory,” Lichtman told me in an email. He quoted the assessment of the political scientist Gerald M. Pomper: “In 2016, nine of eleven major studies predicted Clinton’s lead in the national popular vote. However, by neglecting the Electoral College and variations among the state votes, they generally failed to predict Trump’s victory. One scholar did continue his perfect record of election predictions, using simpler evaluations of the historical setting (Lichtman 2016).”

Oddly, no one seems to have noticed at the time what seems in hindsight like an obvious problem. By Lichtman’s own account, the keys predict the popular-vote winner, not the state-by-state results. But Trump lost the popular vote by two percentage points, eking out an Electoral College victory by fewer than 80,000 votes in three swing states.

Lichtman has subsequently addressed the apparent discrepancy. “In 2016, I made the first modification of the keys system since its inception in 1981,” he writes in the most recent edition of Predicting the Next President. In “my final forecast for 2016, I predicted the winner of the presidency, e.g., the Electoral College, rather than the popular vote winner.” He did this, he writes, because of the divergence of the Electoral College results from the popular vote: “In any close election, Democrats will win the popular vote but not necessarily the Electoral College.”

[Peter Wehner: This election is different]

But the gap that Lichtman describes did not become apparent until the results of the 2016 election were known. In 2008 and 2012, the Electoral College actually gave a slight advantage to Obama, and until 2016, the difference between the margin in the popular vote and in the Electoral College tipping state was typically small. Why would Lichtman have changed his methodology to account for a change that hadn’t happened yet?

Odder still is the fact that Lichtman waited to announce his new methodology until well after the election in which he says he deployed it. According to an investigation published this summer by the journalists Lars Emerson and Michael Lovito for their website, The Postrider, no record exists of Lichtman mentioning the modification before the fact. In their estimation, “he appears to have retroactively changed” the predictive model “as a means of preserving his dubious 10 for 10 streak.”

This is a sore subject for Lichtman. Whether he got 2016 totally right or merely sort of right might seem like a quibble; surely he was closer to the mark than most experts. But a forecaster who changes his methodology after the fact has no credibility. When I brought the matter up with Lichtman in a Zoom interview, he became angry. “Let me tell you: It steams me,” he said, his voice rising. “I dispute this, you know, When did you stop beating your wife? kind of question.”

Lichtman directed me to an interview he gave The Washington Post in September 2016. (When I tried to interject that I had read the article, he cut me off and threatened to end the interview.) There and elsewhere, Lichtman said, he clearly stated that Trump would win the election. Trump did win the election, ergo, the prediction was accurate. Nowhere did he say anything about the popular vote.

Later that evening, Lichtman sent me a follow-up email with the subject line “2016.” In it, he described Emerson and Lovito as “two unknown journalists with no qualifications in history or political science.” As for their claims, he pointed once again to the Washington Post interview, and also to an article in the October 2016 issue of the academic journal Social Education, in which he published his final prediction.

Here is what Lichtman wrote in the Social Education article: “As a national system, the Keys predict the popular vote, not the state-by-state tally of Electoral College votes. However, only once in the last 125 years has the Electoral College vote diverged from the popular vote.”

This seemed pretty cut-and-dried. I replied to Lichtman’s email asking him to explain. “Yes, I was not as clear as I could have been in that article,” he responded. “However, I could not have been clearer in my Washington Post prediction and subsequent Fox News and CBS interviews, all of which came after I wrote the article.” In those interviews, he said nothing about the popular vote or the Electoral College.

I got another email from Lichtman, with the subject line “Postriders,” later that night. “Here is more information on the two failed journalists who have tried to make a name for themselves on my back,” Lichtman wrote. Attached to the email was a Word document, a kind of opposition-research memo, laying out the case against Lovito and Emerson: “They post a blog—The Postrider—that has failed to gain any traction as documented below. They are not qualified to comment on the Keys, the polls, or any aspect of election prediction.” The document then went through some social-media numbers. Lichtman has 12,000 followers on Facebook; The Postrider has only 215, and the articles get no engagement. One hundred thousand followers for Lichtman on X; a few hundred for Emerson and Lovito.

[Gilad Edelman: The asterisk on Kamala Harris’s poll numbers]

I ran these criticisms by Emerson and Lovito, who were already familiar with Lichtman’s theory of the case. After they published their article, he emailed them, cc’ing his lawyer and American University’s general counsel, accusing them of defamation.

To the charge of being less famous than Lichtman, they pled guilty. “It’s true that a public intellectual who has been publishing books since the late 1970s and is interviewed every four years by major media outlets has a larger following than us, yes,” they wrote in an email. “But we fail to see what relevance that has to our work.” Regarding their qualifications, they pointed out that they each have a bachelor’s degree in political science from American University, where Lichtman teaches. (Emerson is a current student at American’s law school.) “As for this story on the Keys, we spent months reading and reviewing Professor Lichtman’s books, academic papers, and interviews regarding the Keys. If we are not qualified to comment at that point, he should reconsider how he publicly communicates about his work.”

In a December 2016 year-in-review article, the journalist Chris Cillizza looked back on the stories that had generated the most interest for his Washington Post politics blog, The Fix. “The answer this year? Allan Lichtman. Allan Lichtman. Allan Lichtman … Of the 10 most trafficked posts on The Fix in 2016, four involved Lichtman and his unorthodox predictions,” Cillizza wrote. “Those four posts totaled more than 10 million unique visitors alone and were four of the 37 most trafficked posts on the entire WaPo website this year.”

Americans love a prediction. We crave certainty. This makes the life of a successful predictor an attractive one, as Lichtman, who has achieved some measure of fame, can attest. But a professional forecaster is always one bad call away from irrelevance.

Give Lichtman credit for making concrete predictions to which he can be held accountable. As he always says, the probabilistic forecasts currently in vogue can’t be proved or disproved. The Nate Silvers of the world, who have unanimously labeled the upcoming election a toss-up, will be correct no matter who wins. Not so for Lichtman. A Trump restoration would not just end his winning streak. It would call into question his entire theory of politics. We are all waiting to find out how pragmatic the electorate really is.