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What Trump Is Really After in the Middle East

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › international › archive › 2025 › 02 › trump-gaza-iran-west-bank › 681852

Donald Trump has relentlessly insisted that the United States—or even he personally—should “take over” Gaza, remove its population of more than 2 million Palestinians, and turn the region into a “Riviera” on the Mediterranean for the “world’s people.” Just this week he posted an AI-generated video showing him and Elon Musk partying in “Trump Gaza,” a paradise dominated by a golden statue of the president.

As a practical and political matter, the idea is a nonstarter. But simply by proposing it, Trump may have paved the way for two more attainable goals that could reshape the Middle East—and lead to chaos for Palestinians, particularly those in the West Bank.

The first seems to be a nuclear agreement with Iran. Trump has been fairly open about his desire for a deal. After he announced new sanctions against the country early this month, Trump held a press conference in which he addressed Iran directly: “I would love to be able to make a great deal, a deal where you can get on with your lives and you’ll do wonderfully.” Trump must recognize, though, that the Israeli right—and its conservative allies in America—would be furious about such an agreement and demand some form of compensation.

[Yair Rosenberg: Nobody wants Gaz-a-Lago]

Which leads to his second goal. In the same press conference, Trump hinted that he might allay Israel’s concerns by offering to expand its formal control in the West Bank. When asked whether he supported Israel’s “sovereignty” in the region, he said that his administration would “be making an announcement probably on that very specific topic over the next four weeks.” Palestinians are still holding their breath.

Annexing additional portions of the West Bank sounds tame compared with Gaz-a-Lago. And that could be precisely the point. By repeating his plan to clear out Gaza, Trump has shifted the Overton window in the Middle East and reinforced the idea that Palestinians’ claims are somehow void. The move follows a standard Trump tactic: say the same shocking thing over and over until it isn’t shocking anymore. Gaz-a-Lago sounds like madness, but apply a Trumpian lens, and a certain method appears—one that just might get him a nuclear deal with Iran.

There are several reasons to think he can make such an agreement, and probably one with favorable terms for the U.S. First, Iran’s bargaining position is exceptionally weak. Israel has dealt extensive damage to Tehran’s regional proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi and Syrian militias, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas. Worse still for Iran was the downfall of the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December, the regime’s most powerful ally in the region. As a result, Iran is unable to project power in the Middle East or adequately defend itself from potential attacks from Israel or elsewhere. A deal would grant the regime not only an added measure of protection but also relief from sanctions, which would allow the country to begin to rebuild its economy and rethink its national-security strategy.

Iran’s little remaining leverage mostly comes from the progress it has made toward nuclear weaponization since 2018, when Trump withdrew from the deal that President Barack Obama had negotiated. That’s why another agreement is one of the few options Iran has to reclaim some power. One could imagine the country instead racing for a nuclear weapon. But the regime must know that Washington has a plan to destroy its nuclear capabilities within a matter of days through round-the-clock bombing.

Still, in response to Trump’s announcement this month that he was increasing sanctions, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, seemed to dismiss the notion of a deal. But Tehran has otherwise been signaling for at least the past 18 months that it’s open to renewing talks with Washington.

As for Trump, a deal is the simplest way to keep Iran from sprinting toward a bomb and drawing the U.S. into conflict, which is the last thing he wants. It might also represent the best opportunity for him to establish himself as an international dealmaker. He would surely claim that his unique genius produced a deal that Obama couldn’t get (even though almost everything that will have made it possible happened under Joe Biden). He will probably demand a Nobel Peace Prize, and he might even get one.

The outline of such a deal is easy to imagine. Iran will likely have to halt further uranium enrichment, relinquish its current stock to be held in escrow outside the country, and place its nuclear facilities under the control—or at least observation—of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Perhaps it will have to destroy some centrifuges, too.

[Read: How Israel could be changing Iran’s nuclear calculus]

By most estimates, Iran is about a year away from developing a usable warhead; any agreement would substantially extend that interval. Obama got Iran to agree to pause any nuclear advances for 15 years. Given the regime’s weakened stance today, Trump might well get 20 or more. Trump could also insist that Iran verifiably limit the arms and funding it grants to regional proxies. Israel has effectively proved that these groups can’t defend Iran anyway, so the regime may be more willing to curtail its support.

The main obstacle to a deal might be Iran’s missile arsenal, which the country could refuse to decommission. But unilateral missile disarmament is virtually unheard-of in international relations. This shouldn’t deter the United States. Israel’s air strikes in October significantly degraded Iran’s arsenal as well as its ground-to-air defenses and its ability to produce fuel for sophisticated rockets. Iranian missiles don’t pose nearly the threat they once did.

Billboards outside an Israeli settlement in the West Bank (Lucien Lung / Riva Press / Redux)

If a deal gets done, that leaves the resulting anger of the Israeli right and its allies in America. The administration already has a blueprint for how it might assuage them: the “Peace to Prosperity” framework that Jared Kushner championed during Trump’s first term. Much of the proposal is impractical, even farcical, but it contains a plan for Israel to annex an additional 30 percent or more of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley. This would leave the remaining Palestinian territory surrounded by a new and U.S.-approved expanded Israel.

Right-wing Israelis regard the entire West Bank as their exclusive patrimony, so they might not be thrilled to get only 30 percent more of it. But the plan would significantly extend their area of sovereign control. In all likelihood, it would be sufficient to appease them after a nuclear deal is signed.

Palestinians will protest; they want a state, not a shrunken territory circumscribed and dominated by an enlarged Israel that may soon want to pursue total control from the river to the sea, as its governing coalition envisions. But Israel and the U.S. will likely be able to impose the scheme by force. Israel has already effectively controlled the territory since 1967; little stands in the way of the country claiming it outright.

“Peace to Prosperity” was widely ridiculed when it was released in 2020. Now, next to Trump’s Gaza plan, it will look to some on the right like a model of rationality and restraint. That could be enough to make it happen.

Gaz-a-Lago is a fantasy. But by reciting the proposal again and again, Trump might be setting in motion very real—and extremely ominous—consequences for the West Bank and the entire region.

The Dangers of Holocaust Relativism

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › books › archive › 2025 › 02 › pankaj-mishras-nihilistic-book-world-after-gaza › 681840

It is the misfortune of Jews that they so often find themselves the subject of obsessive fixation. By his own description, Pankaj Mishra is a lifelong obsessive. As a boy in India in the 1970s, the writer grew up in a Hindu-nationalist family that revered Jews, despite not knowing any. In that spirit, Mishra placed a portrait of the Israeli general Moshe Dayan, the hero of the Suez Crisis, on his bedroom wall.

If I had known Mishra then, I would have warned him that philo-Semitism is not a healthy condition; that, in his future, he would realize that Jews, like every cluster of humans, have their flaws; and that he shouldn’t take his disappointment personally. This moment arrived for him during a trip to the West Bank in 2008, where he witnessed the ugliness of Israeli occupation, which left him feeling a “bit foolish” and “resentful.”

Obsessions, especially when they overtake an agile mind, are destabilizing; swooning and repulsion are the alternating registers of a mind consumed. And repulsion is the animating sentiment of Mishra’s new polemic, The World After Gaza.

The title suggests the grandiosity of his ambitions. To merely denounce the war, or to call for the end of American military support for Israel, would have been small beer. Instead, he wants to make the case that Israel today is a symptom of what ails the planet, “a case study of Western-style impunity,” and a “portent of the future of a bankrupt and exhausted world.”

The underlying problem with the West, Mishra argues, is its sanctification of the Holocaust. He blames Jewish leaders, along with their philo-Semitic supporters in the Western elite, for defining the Holocaust as the epitome of evil and insisting that the world incessantly remember the Nazi genocide, a practice he calls “atrocity hucksterism.” (Full disclosure: I think that the Holocaust was the epitome of evil.) By fetishizing the Holocaust, they diverted attention from the suffering of others and “obscured closer examination of the West’s original sin of white supremacy.” And then he asks: “When does organised remembrance become a handmaiden to brute power, and a legitimiser of violence and injustice?”

Mishra has a habit of couching incendiary accusations in rhetorical questions, but his answer to this one is unambiguous. From the first page, Mishra seems intent on demonstrating that Israelis are, in fact, the new Nazis. His book opens with a long description of the Warsaw Ghetto, quoting at length from the poet Czesław Miłosz’s description of the screams of Jews he heard drifting over its walls. Mishra then abruptly juxtaposes a scene from Gaza, flush with heavy-handed language that bludgeons home his comparison. He calls Israel’s war an “industrial-scale slaughter” and a “livestreamed liquidation.”

[Yair Rosenberg: Hamas’s theater of the macabre]

Although any decent human should mourn the deaths of Palestinian civilians, Mishra races past the specious underpinnings of his analogy. To cite the obvious: Unlike Hamas, the Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto never launched an armed invasion of Nazi Germany. They didn’t rape or murder or kidnap Germans, let alone German babies, or in any way engage in violent activity that might morally justify a military response. The Jews of Warsaw never used human shields. They never published a charter calling for German genocide. Mishra mentions Hamas’s attack in passing, but he never wastes his breath chastising the group.

Later in the book, Mishra concedes that anti-Israel protesters justifiably wield such comparisons in the service of trolling. He writes, “Since the Shoah was coded as the greatest evil, incomparable and unprecedented, those describing Zionism as a genocidal ideology aim to defuse the symbolism of the Shoah and represent the destruction of Gaza as the true evil of our times.” It shouldn’t require minimizing the senseless loss of life to acknowledge that the death of more than 46,000 Gazans, some number of whom were Hamas combatants, isn’t the same as the systematic extermination of 6,000,000 Jews. But by hyperbolically analogizing, Mishra seems to be intentionally salting Jewish wounds. This is hardly the stuff of the more ethical world that Mishra claims to desire.

Even on his own terms, this rhetorical turn is gratuitous, because imagining a more measured version of Mishra’s argument is so easy. It would go something like this: Benjamin Netanyahu has exploited memories of the Holocaust to justify brutal tactics in Gaza. Although Mishra agrees with that more restrained claim, it doesn’t suit his inflated goals.

His attempt to blame the plight of the wretched of the Earth on the Shoah’s central place in Western culture is unmoored from evidence. He writes about the “deepening links between Israeli governments, pro-Israel Jewish outfits and white supremacists in the United States and Europe.” But American white supremacists traffic in anti-Semitism and tend to blame Jews for the migration crisis. (In 2023, Elon Musk circulated a version of that claim.) And although American Jews have shifted slightly rightward in recent years, polling suggests that they remain a reliable constituency of the Democratic Party, far more liberal than other white voters. Mishra loves to mine the writings of postwar Jewish intellectuals for a damning quote—a racist protagonist in a Saul Bellow novel is one of his primary data points—but he can’t be bothered to cite the present-day leaders of Jewish organizations.

(Mishra does quote The Atlantic, as evidence of “a strenuously willed affiliation with the Shoah” that “diminishes” American journalism about Israel; and he also attacks The New Republic, which I once edited, for becoming a “purveyor of racism and Islamophobia” in the 1980s.)

[Read: The problem with moral purity]

As he depicts Jews parochially clinging to their victimhood, Mishra skirts some pretty important countervailing pieces of evidence. It was Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish lawyer, who in the 1940s coined the term genocide, which he helped to enshrine in international law, in a quest to prevent other ethnic minorties from suffering the fate of the Jews. Mishra flays Elie Wiesel, the Holocaust survivor who won a Nobel Peace Prize—quoting Alfred Kazin, who called him a “Jesus of the Holocaust”—while neglecting to mention Wiesel’s opposition to South African apartheid and his record of advocating for interventions to prevent genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur. (He also popularized the slogan “No human being is illegal.”’) And I wonder if Mishra has ever set foot in a synagogue aligned with Reform or conservative Judaism, the two largest denominations in the United States. After the police killing of George Floyd in 2020, they festooned their buildings with banners in support of Black Lives Matter, in the name of Tikkun Olam, healing the world.

Mishra inadvertently proves the thesis of Dara Horn’s book People Love Dead Jews. He writes with loving care about the Holocaust, referring to it by its Hebrew name, the Shoah, and he exudes nothing but sympathy for interwar writers such as Isaac Babel and Joseph Roth. But as he describes the Jewry that emerged from the ashes, he mostly finds unredeeming qualities. Mishra keeps reaching for his shelf to pull the books in which he’s underlined passages from intellectuals, many of them Jewish, denouncing Jews. Among the accusations he recycles: Jewish intellectuals in the U.S. became “too comfortably conforming to the American ruling class”: They “clung to the Holocaust and Zionism for a sense of identity and purpose”; “the Jew profits from his status in America.” Citing the unpleasant Holocaust survivors portrayed in an Isaac Bashevis Singer novel, he notes, “Oppression doesn’t improve moral character.” There are many more such accusations. Each might be justifiable in context. But sewn together, they resemble nothing better than a grotesque effigy.

Like so many other intellectuals who have taken up the banner of Palestine, Mishra is unclear about what he really wants. He describes the two-state solution as a “pretence,” without offering a viable alternative. After reading his book, I had no clue how downgrading the historical import of the Holocaust would enhance the struggle against racism. In the final paragraphs of the book, he applauds the campus protesters for their defiance, even though he admits “they risk permanently embittering their lives with failure.” To howl into the wind without any plausible vision of a better world isn’t heroic or ethical; it’s a gesture of nihilism, and so, too, is this book.