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Five Movies That Changed Viewers’ Minds

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › newsletters › archive › 2025 › 03 › five-movies-that-changed-viewers-minds › 682048

This is an edition of The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here.

Welcome back to The Daily’s Sunday culture edition.

Some films impart a message that lasts, especially if they offer another way to see the world. The Atlantic’s writers and editors answer the question: What is a movie that changed your mind?

The following contains spoilers for the films mentioned.

Priscilla (streaming on Max)

Priscilla, Sofia Coppola’s 2023 film about Priscilla Beaulieu’s relationship with Elvis Presley, is terrific to look at but hard to watch. Priscilla is 14 when she meets an already famous 24-year-old Elvis. While still a teenager, she moves with her future husband to Graceland, where she wears sophisticated clothes and sits in plush rooms. As the film critic Anthony Lane wrote in a New Yorker review, to call the movie superficial, “even more so than Coppola’s other films, is no derogation, because surfaces are her subject.”

Priscilla is a revisionist project: It aims to tell the other side of Elvis’s story, to convey another perspective on a beloved cultural figure whose life has been the subject of countless books and biopics. So I wasn’t surprised that I left the theater unsettled, with a darker view of this artist whose songs I’d sung in elementary-school revues and whose home I’d visited on a high-school-band trip. But beyond the straightforward record-correcting objective of the movie (which is inspired by Priscilla Presley’s 1985 memoir, Elvis and Me), Coppola’s choice to end the film on a stark, ambiguous note reminded me that an abrupt conclusion can be as satisfying as a tidy one. That, in a movie concerned with the way things seem, feels true to life.

— Lora Kelley, associate editor

***

The Death of Stalin (streaming on Pluto TV)

Totalitarianism, when it’s not terrifying, can be absurd—the constant bowing to a Dear Leader, the seemingly arbitrary list of enemies and outlawed ideas that change every hour, the silly pomp of statues and parading armies. It’s almost impossible to capture the humor without undermining the horror. But The Death of Stalin, Armando Iannucci’s 2017 satire, brilliantly reveals the ridiculous side of authoritarian rule, and it opened my eyes to the small, shuffling, utterly banal individuals who undergird even the scariest systems.

Iannucci makes little effort at historical accuracy—I mean, Steve Buscemi plays Nikita Khrushchev—but he gets at deeper truths. The story takes place following the sudden death of the titular dictator. The power vacuum that opens is filled with scheming and backstabbing politicians, including Khrushchev, Lavrentiy Beria, and Georgy Malenkov. But Iannucci mines it all for laughs, and they are plentiful. The pettiness, the servility, the insecurity of these men are all on display as they spin around Stalin’s corpse. And watching this transfer of power reduced to a bizarre human drama reminds you about what makes tyranny possible: very ordinary people.

— Gal Beckerman, staff writer

***

Rivers and Tides (streaming on Tubi)

When a friend first showed me Rivers and Tides, I had never heard of Andy Goldsworthy, and I had surely never seen anyone do what he did. The documentary follows the British artist through fields, forests, and tidelands as he creates sculptures and ephemeral works from materials he finds, often challenging our assumptions of what those materials, and their environments, even are. One frigid morning, we observe Goldsworthy snapping icicles apart, and whittling them with his teeth, to reconstruct them into a fluid form that seems to cut back and forth through a boulder; when the rising sun finally hits the sculpture, it’s spectacular. Another day, we see him collect fallen autumn leaves and arrange them over a pool of water into a surreal graphic gradient. Witnessing his way of seeing and collaborating with the world around him transformed me. I haven’t looked at a leaf—or twigs, or snow, or even stone—the same since.

— Kelsey J. Waite, senior copy editor

***

The Devil Wears Prada (streaming on FuboTV and Prime Video)

The Devil Wears Prada came out in June 2006, the same month I graduated from college. I saw it in a movie theater a few weeks into my first full-time job, and it was a revelation to watch its portrayal of the compromises, disappointments, and small victories that come with pursuing a career. The Devil Wears Prada is heightened and fantastical and unbelievable in all sorts of ways: The protagonist, Andy (the role that made me love Anne Hathaway forever), wears over-the-top clothes in an impossibly sleek office and kisses a suave older man on a lamp-lit Paris street. But the film is remarkably realistic and perceptive about work. Andy makes professional choices that alienate her from her parents, her friends, and her boyfriend. Even she doesn’t seem to fully understand why she is so determined to succeed at a job she never wanted in the first place. The film ends with her throwing her phone into a fountain and taking a job that more clearly aligns with her values and goals. But what’s stuck with me are the scenes where she is trying as hard as she can to prove to her boss, and to herself, that she can do anything that’s asked of her. Her ambition is remarkable—and it’s served as both an inspiration and a cautionary tale to me in the many years since.

— Eleanor Barkhorn, senior editor

***

Anora (available to rent on YouTube, streaming on Hulu March 17)

Of all the sex workers depicted in films, the titular protagonist of Anora—a movie that deserves at least three of its five Oscars—might be one of the few who actually feels like a worker.

At the strip club, Anora has shifts, a boss, and a mean colleague. Although sex work is technically illegal (albeit somewhat decriminalized) in New York City, she seems to have a somewhat normal job—until one night, when she gets close to Vanya, a new client. The story progresses like “Cinderella,” except the prince is the mediocre son of a Russian oligarch. Vanya marries Anora and gives her a taste of his opulent life. But when Vanya’s parents find out about the marriage, the love story is over.

Before watching Anora, I’d imagined that if work conditions improved for sex workers, they would be treated humanely. But Anora showed me—or perhaps reminded me—that society’s contempt for women in this industry is profound, and that better policies, important as they are, might never change that.

The beauty of Anora is that it never occurs to her that she is less-than. That a scion of the Russian oligarchy was never going to stay married to her seemed obvious to all of the characters—and perhaps also to the audience—but not to her. Anora screams and fights back, but even she has a limit to the amount of humiliation she can take. At the end of the movie, unable to continue holding her head high, she collapses into tears.

— Gisela Salim-Peyer, associate editor

Here are three Sunday reads from The Atlantic:

His daughter was America’s first measles death in a decade. Teens are forgoing a classic rite of passage. Meet the strictest headmistress in Britain.

The Week Ahead

Snow White, a live-action remake starring Rachel Zegler and Gal Gadot (in theaters Friday) The Residence, a murder-mystery show about an eccentric detective who must solve a murder at a White House dinner (premieres Thursday on Netflix) Red Scare, a book by Clay Risen about McCarthyism and the anti-Communist witch hunt (out Tuesday)

Essay

Pierre Crom / Getty

My Hometown Became a Different Country

By Tetiana Kotelnykova

Horlivka had always been a Russian-speaking city, but before 2014, our graduation ceremonies and school concerts were held in Ukrainian. We would sing the Ukrainian national anthem at the end of every event. Then, suddenly, the Ukrainian flags were taken down. The anthem was no longer sung. The Ukrainian language vanished from classrooms. The disappearance was so abrupt and absolute that it felt unreal, like a dream whose meaning was obscure to me. I remember asking my teacher why everything had altered so drastically. She didn’t have an answer—or maybe she was just too afraid to say.

Read the full article.

More in Culture

Bong Joon Ho will always root for the losers. The man who owned 181 Renoirs Megan Garber: “I can’t stop talking about The Traitors.” An unabashedly intellectual murder mystery There’s nothing else like Netflix’s Mo. “Dear James”: I hate playing with my children.

Catch Up on The Atlantic

Elon Musk looks desperate, Charlie Warzel writes. Mahmoud Khalil’s detention is a trial run. Don’t invite a recession in.

Photo Album

A cheerleader entertains the crowd during the annual Moomba Festival, in Melbourne, Australia. (William West / AFP / Getty)

Take a look at these photos of the week, which show a cheerleader in Australia, a train-pulling record attempt in Egypt, Holi celebrations in India, and more.

Explore all of our newsletters.

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Columbia University’s Anti-Semitism Problem

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2025 › 03 › columbia-antisemitism-israel-palestine-trump › 682054

This story seems to be about:

In January, when the historian Avi Shilon returned to Columbia University from winter break, a thought coursed through his mind: If calm can take hold in Gaza, then perhaps it could also happen in Morningside Heights. Just a few days earlier, in time for the start of the semester, Hamas and Israel had brokered a cease-fire in their war.

Over the many months of that war, Columbia was the site of some of America’s most vitriolic protests against Israel’s actions, and even its existence. For two weeks last spring, an encampment erected by anti-Israel demonstrators swallowed the fields in the center of the compact Manhattan campus. Nobody could enter Butler Library without hearing slogans such as “Globalize the intifada!” and “We don’t want no Zionists here!” and “Burn Tel Aviv to the ground!” At the end of April, students, joined by sympathizers from outside the university gates, stormed Hamilton Hall—which houses the undergraduate-college deans’ offices—and then battled police when they sought to clear the building. Because of the threat of spiraling chaos, the university canceled its main commencement ceremony in May.

Shilon felt that the tamping of hostilities in Gaza made the moment ripe for the course he was scheduled to teach, “History of Modern Israel,” which would examine the competing Jewish and Palestinian narratives about his native country’s founding.

But Columbia soon disabused him of his hopes. About 30 minutes into the first session of his seminar, four people, their faces shrouded in keffiyehs, burst into his classroom. A protester circled the seminar table, flinging flyers in front of Shilon’s students. One flyer bore an image of a boot stomping on a Star of David; another stated, The Enemy Will Not See Tomorrow.

In the Israeli universities where Shilon had studied and taught, he was accustomed to strident critiques of the country. Sometimes he even found himself sympathizing with them. Taking up difficult arguments struck him as the way to navigate tense disagreements, so he rose from his chair and gingerly approached the protesters. “You’re invited to learn,” he told them.

But the protesters ignored him. As one held up a camera to film, another stared at it and delivered a monologue in which she described Shilon’s class—which had barely progressed beyond a discussion of expectations for the semester—as an example of “Columbia University’s normalization of genocide.”

After she finished her speech, the demonstrators left the room, but a sense of intrusion lingered. Columbia University Apartheid Divest, the umbrella group that organized protests on campus, posted a video of the action, with the caption: “We disrupted a zionist class, and you should too.” The university later offered to provide security for Shilon’s class because it couldn’t be sure if CUAD was bluffing.

Over the past two years, Columbia’s institutional life has become more and more absurd. Confronted with a war on the other side of the world, the course of which the university has zero capacity to affect, a broad swath of the community acted as if the school’s trustees and administrators could determine the fate of innocent families in Gaza. To force the university into acceding to demands—ending study abroad in Israel, severing a partnership with Tel Aviv University, divesting from companies with holdings in Israel––protesters attempted to shut down campus activity. For the sake of entirely symbolic victories, they were willing to risk their academic careers and even arrest.

Because the protesters treated the war as a local issue, they trained their anger on Jewish and Israeli students and faculty, including Shilon, some of whom have been accused of complicity with genocide on the basis of their religious affiliation or national origin. More than any other American university, Columbia experienced a breakdown in the fabric of its community that demanded a firm response from administrators—but these administrators tended to choke on their own fears.

Many of the protesters followed university rules governing demonstrations and free expression. Many others did not. Liberal administrators couldn’t or wouldn’t curb the illiberalism in their midst. By failing to discipline protesters who transgressed university rules, they signaled that disrupting classrooms carried no price. By tolerating professors who bullied students who disagreed with them, they signaled that incivility and even harassment were acceptable forms of discourse.

It was as if Columbia was reliving the bedlam of 1968, which included a student takeover of the university and scarred the institution for decades. And just like in the Vietnam era, the university became a ripe target for demagogues on the right, who are eager to demolish the prestige of elite higher education. And now that Donald Trump and his allies control the federal government, they have used anti-Semitism as a pretext for damaging an institution that they abhor. In the name of rescuing the Jews of Columbia, the Trump administration cut off $400 million in federal contracts and grants to the university. Trump officials then sent a letter demanding—as preconditions for restoring the funds—a series of immediate, far-reaching steps, including suspending and expelling Hamilton Hall protesters, producing a plan to overhaul admissions, and putting the school’s Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies under “academic receivership.”

Mark Rudd, president of Students for a Democratic Society, addresses students at Columbia University in May 1968. (Hulton Archive / Getty)

And in an attempt to suppress political views it dislikes, the administration authorized the unlawful detention of Mahmoud Khalil, an alumnus who helped organize campus protests, and sent federal agents to search two dorm rooms. Another graduate student, targeted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement, fled to Canada rather than risk apprehension. The Trump administration’s war on Columbia stands to wreck research, further inflame tensions on campus, and destroy careers—including, in a supreme irony, those of many Jewish academics, scientists, physicians, and graduate students whom the administration ostensibly wants to protect.

Trump’s autocratic presence unbalances every debate. But just because his administration is exploiting the issue of anti-Semitism does not mean that anti-Jewish activism is not an issue at Columbia. Somewhere along the way, one of the nation’s greatest universities lost its capacity to conduct intellectual arguments over contentious issues without resorting to hyperbole and accusations of moral deficiency.

On Israel, the issue that most sharply divides Columbia, such accusations took a sinister cast. Jewish students faced ostracism and bullying that, if experienced by any other group of students  on campus, would be universally regarded as unacceptable. It was a crisis that became painfully evident in the course of the war over Gaza, but it didn’t begin with the war, and it won’t end with it.

The story of American Jewry can be told, in part, by the history of Columbia’s admissions policy. At the turn of the 20th century, when entry required merely passing an exam, the sons of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe began rushing into the institution. By 1920, Columbia was likely 40 percent Jewish. This posed a marketing problem for the school, as the children of New York’s old knickerbocker elite began searching out corners of the Ivy League with fewer Brooklyn accents.

To restore Anglo-Saxon Protestant demographic dominance, university president Nicholas Murray Butler invented the modern college-application process, in which concepts such as geographic diversity and a well-rounded student body became pretexts to weed out studious Jews from New York City. In 1921, Columbia became the first private college to impose a quota limiting the number of Jews. (In the ’30s, Columbia rejected Richard Feynman, who later won a Nobel Prize in physics, and Isaac Asimov, the great science fiction writer.) Columbia, however, was intent on making money off the Jews it turned away, so to educate them, it created Seth Low Junior College in Brooklyn, a second-rate version of the Manhattan institution.

Only after World War II, when America fought a war against Nazism, did this exclusionary system wither away. When I attended Columbia for four blissful years, a generation or so ago, the school was a Jewish wonderland, where I first encountered the pluralism of American Jewish life. I became friends with red-diaper babies, kids raised in Jewish socialist families. I dated an Orthodox woman who had converted from evangelical Christianity. Several floors of my dorm had been nicknamed Anatevka, after the shtetl in Fiddler on the Roof; they had kosher kitchens, and on the Sabbath, the elevators would automatically stop on each of those floors. I studied Yiddish with a doyenne of the dying Yiddish theater and attended lectures with Yosef Yerushalmi, one of the great Jewish historians of his generation. At Columbia, for the first time in my life, I felt completely at home in my identity.

I also imbibed the university’s protest culture: I briefly helped take over Hamilton Hall in the name of preserving the Audubon Ballroom, the Upper Manhattan site of Malcolm X’s assassination. Columbia wanted to convert the building into a research center. The leader of our movement, Benjamin Jealous, who went on to head the NAACP, was suspended for his role; I was put on probation.

Nostalgia, however, is a distorting filter. Long before the October 7 attack by Hamas on southern Israel that sparked the subsequent invasion of Gaza, there were accusations of anti-Semitism on campus. I tended to wish them away, but after the Hamas attack, the evidence kept walloping me.

Although protests against Israel erupted on many campuses after October 7, the collision between Zionists and anti-Zionists was especially virulent at Columbia. Less than a week after the attack, a woman was arrested in front of the library for allegedly beating an Israeli student who was hanging posters of hostages held in Gaza. (The Manhattan district attorney found that the woman hadn’t intentionally hit the student and dismissed the case after she apologized and agreed to counseling.)

Soon after the war in Gaza began, the Columbia Daily Spectator interviewed more than 50 Jewish students about their experiences: 13 told the student newspaper that they had been attacked or harassed; 12 admitted that they had obscured markers of their Jewish identity, tucking away Star of David necklaces and hiding kippot under caps to avoid provoking the ire of fellow students.

To Columbia’s misfortune, the university had a new president, Minouche Shafik, who’d arrived by way of the London School of Economics. Any leader would have been overwhelmed by the explosion of passions, but she seemed especially shell-shocked by the rancor—and how it attracted media, activists, and politicians, all exploiting the controversy for their own purposes. Panicked leaders, without any clear sense of their own direction, have a rote response: They appoint a task force. And in November 2023, Shafik appointed some of Columbia’s most eminent academics to assess the school’s anti-Semitism problem. (Shafik had hoped to have a parallel task force on Islamophobia, but Rashid Khalidi, a Columbia historian and the most prominent Palestinian scholar in the country, called the idea a “fig leaf to pretend that they are ‘balanced,’” and the idea never hatched.)

In “listening sessions” with students, task-force members heard one recurring complaint: that administrators were strangely indifferent to Jewish students complaining about abuse. Rather than investigating incidents, some administrators steered Jewish students to mental-health counseling, as if they needed therapy to toughen them up. Students who had filed official reports of bias with the university claimed that they’d never heard back. (To protect the privacy of listening-session participants, the task force never confirmed specific instances, but it deemed the complaints credible.)

Perhaps, early on, one could imagine benign explanations for the weak response. But in June, as the task force went about its investigation, The Washington Free Beacon reported on a series of text messages fired off by four Columbia deans as they attended a panel on Jewish life at Columbia. (A panel attendee who had sat behind one of the administrators had surreptitiously photographed the text thread over her shoulder.) Instead of sympathetically listening to panelists discuss anti-Semitism, the deans unwittingly confirmed the depth of the problem. These officials, whose role gave them responsibility for student safety, snarkily circulated accusations about the pernicious influence of Jewish power. “Amazing what $$$ can do,” one of the deans wrote. Another accused the head of campus Hillel of playing up complaints for the sake of fundraising. “Comes from such a place of privilege,” one of them moaned. After the Free Beacon published the screenshots, Columbia suspended three of the administrators. Not long after, they resigned.

A month later, at the beginning of the academic year, the task force published a damning depiction of quotidian student life. An especially powerful section of the report described the influence of Columbia University Apartheid Divest, the organizer of the anti-Israel protests. CUAD was a coalition of 116 tuition-supported, faculty-advised student groups, including the university mariachi band and the Barnard Garden Club.

CUAD doesn’t simply oppose war and occupation; it endorses violence as the pathway to its definition of liberation. A year ago, a Columbia student activist told an audience watching him on Instagram, “Be grateful that I’m not just going out and murdering Zionists.” At first, CUAD dissociated itself from the student. But then the group reconsidered and apologized for its momentary lapse of stridency. “Violence is the only path forward,” CUAD said in an official statement. That wasn’t a surprising admission; its public statements regularly celebrate martyrdom.

When groups endorsed CUAD, they forced Jewish students to confront a painful choice. To participate in beloved activities, they needed to look past the club’s official membership in an organization that endorsed the killing of Jews and the destruction of the world’s only Jewish-majority country.

According to the task force, complaining about the alliance with CUAD or professing sympathy for Israel could lead to a student being purged from an extracurricular activity. When a member of the dance team questioned the wisdom of supporting CUAD, she was removed from the organization’s group chats and effectively kicked off the team. A co-president of Sewa, a Sikh student group, says that she was removed from her post because of her alleged Zionism. In an invitation to a film screening, the founder of an LGBTQ group, the LezLions, wrote, “Zionists aren’t invited.”

I’m not suggesting that Jews at Columbia feel constantly under siege. When I gave a speech at the campus Hillel group last spring, many members, even some who are passionate supporters of Israel, told me that they are happy at Columbia and have never personally experienced anything resembling anti-Semitism. The pro-Palestinian encampments included Jewish protesters, some of whom received abuse from their fellow Jews. To the task force’s credit, its report acknowledges many such complexities, but it brimmed with accounts of disturbing incidents worthy of a meaningful official response. Unfortunately, that’s not the Columbia way.

Had I been wiser as an undergrad, I could have squinted and seen the roots of the current crisis. In the 1990s, Israel was a nonissue on campus: The Oslo peace process was in high gear, and a two-state solution and coexistence were dreams within reach. But the most imposing academic celebrity on campus was the Jerusalem-born Edward Said, a brilliant professor of literature, who had served as a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s legislative arm.

During my years at Columbia, Said, who was battling cancer, was a remote figure. A dandy who loved his tweeds and was immersed in the European cosmopolitanism that he critiqued, he taught only a course on Giuseppe Verdi and imperialism.

Still, he bestrode the university. His masterwork, Orientalism, was one of the few books by an active Columbia professor regularly included in the college’s core curriculum. That book, by the university’s most acclaimed professor, was also a gauntlet thrown in the community’s face. Said had convincingly illustrated how racism infected the production of knowledge in Middle Eastern studies. Even if scholarship paraded as the disinterested study of foreign cultures, it was inherently political, too often infected by a colonialist mindset.

To correct for that bias, admirers of Said’s book concluded, universities needed to hire a different style of academic, including scholars with roots in the region they studied, not just a bunch of white guys fascinated by Arabs. The Middle Eastern–studies department filled with Said protégés, who lacked his charm but taught with ferocious passion. Because they were unabashed activists, these new scholars had no compunction about, say, canceling class so that students could attend pro-Palestinian rallies.

Joseph Massad, a Jordanian-born political scientist who wrote a history of nationalism in his native country, became the most notorious of the new coterie soon after arriving in 1999. His incendiary comments provoked his ideological foes to respond with fury and, sometimes, to unfairly twist his quotes in the course of their diatribes. But his actual record was clear enough. Writing in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram in 2003, he accused the Israelis of being the true anti-Semites, because they destroyed the culture of the Jewish diaspora; the Palestinians were the real Jews, he argued, because they were being massacred.

Violence, when directed at Jews, never seemed to bother him. This moral vacuity was on full display in the column he wrote in response to October 7, which he called a “resistance offensive,” for The Electronic Intifada, a Chicago-based publication aligned with the more radical wing of the Palestinian cause. His essay used a series of euphoric adjectives—“astonishing,” “astounding,” “awesome”—to describe Hamas’s invasion, without ever condemning, let alone mentioning, the gruesome human toll of the massacre, which included rape and the kidnapping of babies. In fact, he coldly described the towns destroyed by Hamas as “settler-colonies.”

Massad has long been accused of carrying that polemical style into the classroom. In the course description for a class called “Palestinian and Israeli Politics and Societies,” he wrote in 2002: “The purpose of the course is not to provide a ‘balanced’ coverage of the views of both sides.” On the one hand, that’s an admirable admission. On the other hand, Jewish students complained that he treated those with dissenting opinions as if they were moral reprobates, unworthy of civility.

In 2004, a pro-Israel group in Boston put together a low-budget documentary called Columbia Unbecoming, which strung together student testimony about the pedagogical style of Columbia’s Middle Eastern–studies program. To take two representative incidents: After an Israeli student asked Massad a question at an extracurricular event, the professor demanded to know how many Palestinians he had killed; a woman recounted how another professor, George Saliba, had told her not to opine on Israel-Palestine questions because her green eyes showed that she couldn’t be a “Semite.”

In response, Massad denied ever meeting the Israeli student; Saliba wrote that he didn’t recall the green-eyes comments and that the student might have misconstrued what he was saying. But Columbia’s then-president, Lee Bollinger, instantly recognized the problem and appointed his own task force to examine the complaints. But it would have taken more than a task force to address the underlying problem. The emerging style of the American academy, especially prevalent at Columbia, viewed activism flowing from moral absolutes as integral to the mission of the professoriat. But a style that prevailed in African American–studies and gender-studies departments was incendiary when applied to Israel. With race and gender, there was largely a consensus on campus, but Israel divided the university community. And as much as Bollinger professed to value dissenting opinions, his university was ill-equipped to accommodate two conflicting points of view. And the gap between those two points of view kept growing, as Said’s legacy began to seep into even the far reaches of Columbia.

If I were writing a satiric campus novel about Columbia, I would have abandoned the project on January 29. That’s the day the Spectator published lab notes for an introductory astronomy course, written by a teaching assistant, that instructed students: “As we watch genocide unfold in Gaza, it is also important to tell the story of Palestinians outside of being the subjects of a military occupation. Take 15 minutes or so to read through the articles ‘Wonder and the Life of Palestinian Astronomy’ and ‘In Gaza, Scanning the Sky for Stars, Not Drones.’ Remind yourself that our dreams, our wonders, our aspirations … are not any more worthy.” At Columbia, a student couldn’t contemplate the Big Dipper without being forced to consider the fate of Khan Yunis.

This was a minor scandal, but a representative one. Over the years, the subject of Israel became nearly inescapable at Columbia, even in disciplines seemingly far removed from Gaza. For a swath of graduate students and professors, Palestinian liberation—and a corollary belief that Israel is uniquely evil among nations—became something close to civic religion.

In 2023, at the School of Public Health, a professor who taught a section of its core curriculum to more than 400 students denounced Jewish donors to the university as “wealthy white capitalists” who laundered “blood money” through the school. He hosted a panel on the “settler-colonial determinants of health” that described “Israel-Palestine” as a primary example of a place where the “right to health” can never be realized. Several years ago, the Graduate School of Architecture, Preservation and Planning offered a class on “Architecture and Settler Colonialism” and hosted an event titled “Architecture Against Apartheid.”

By insisting that Israel is the great moral catastrophe of our age, professors and graduate students transmitted their passions to their classes. So it is not surprising that Jewish students with sympathy for Israel found themselves subject to social opprobrium not just from their teachers, but also from their peers. In its September report, the task force that Shafik had convened described the problem starkly: “We heard about students being avoided and avoiding others” and about “isolation and even intimidation in classrooms, bullying, threats, stereotypes, ethnic slurs, disqualification from opportunities, fear of retaliation and community erosion.” This was the assessment of Columbia professors, many of them unabashed liberals, who risked alienating colleagues by describing the situation bluntly.

Pro-Palestinian protesters march around Columbia in April 2024. (Michael M. Santiago / Getty)

In September, the task force presented its findings to Columbia’s University Senate, an elected deliberative body that brings faculty, administrators, and students into the governance of the institution. Its creation was a utopian response to the 1968 protests. But the senate session about anti-Semitism was a fiasco. Almost from the start, members began to attack the task-force report’s motives and methodology—even its focus on discrimination against Jews. “No such resources were put into covering anybody else’s subjective experience on this campus,” the English professor Joseph Slaughter said, “and I think that creates real problems for the community.” The hostility to the report wasn’t meaningless fulmination; it was evidence of how a large part of the faculty was determined to prevent the university from acknowledging the presence of anti-Jewish activity in the school.

No other university has a governance structure quite like Columbia’s, and for good reason. Most academics with busy lives want to avoid endless meetings with their colleagues, so most professors aren’t rushing to join the senate. In recent years, the senate has attracted those of an activist bent, who are willing to put up with tedium in service of a higher cause. Two members of the rules committee were allegedly part of a faculty contingent that stood guard around the encampments on the quad. They did so even though they had jurisdiction over potentially disciplining those protesters. As it happens, exceedingly few of the protesters who flagrantly disregarded university rules have suffered any consequences for their actions. Columbia didn’t impose discipline on students who stormed Hamilton Hall last spring—at least not until last week, amid Trump’s threat of drastic cuts to the university. But by then, a culture of impunity was firmly rooted.

Barnard College is integrated into Columbia, but it has its own set of rules, its own governance structure and disciplinary procedures. And it acted swiftly to expel two of the students who were in the group that burst into Avi Shilon’s class in January. (Columbia had suspended another participant, pending an investigation, and failed to identify the other.) For once, it felt as if the university was upholding its basic covenant with its students: to protect the sanctity of the classroom.

But instead of changing anyone’s incentives, Barnard’s hard-line punishment inspired protesters to rush Millbank Hall, banging drums and chanting, “There is only one solution, intifada revolution.” In the course of storming the building, they allegedly assaulted a Barnard employee, sending him to the hospital. For more than six hours, they shut down the building, which houses the offices of the administration, and left only after the college threatened to bring in the police and offered an official meeting with the protesters. But the possibility of police action wasn’t a sufficient deterrent, because a week later, two dozen protesters returned to occupy Barnard’s library.

In some deep sense, the university had lost the capacity to reassert control, let alone confront the root causes of the chaos. And looking back over the past few months, I see a pattern of events that, in some ways, is far more troubling than the encampments that received so many headlines. In November, protesters descended on the building that houses Hillel, the center of Jewish life on campus—its main purpose is to provide Jewish students with religious services and kosher food—and demanded that the university sever ties with the organization. The next month, a demonstrator marching up Broadway punched a kippah-wearing Jew in the face. In January, to memorialize the murder of a Palestinian girl, protesters filled the toilets of the School of International and Public Affairs with cement. Skewering two Jewish women affiliated with the school—its dean, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and an adjunct assistant professor at the school, Rebecca Weiner—they spray-painted the message “Keren eat Weiner,” with an image of feces.

All of this unfolded as the Trump administration launched an assault on higher education. But thus far, Columbia students haven’t bothered to protest that. Unlike Palestine, which for most students is a distant cause, the stripping of federal funding for the institution will ripple through the lives of students and faculty. But university activism has its sights obsessively locked on Israel.

That Trump assault on Columbia has now arrived, in the heaviest-handed form. Anti-Semitism on campus, a problem that merits a serious response, has been abused in the course of Trump’s quest to remake America in his image. Tellingly, the administration’s withholding of federal grants will fall hardest on the hard sciences, which are the part of the university most immune to anti-Semitism, and hardly touch the humanities, where overwrought criticisms of Israel flourish.

The indiscriminate, punitive nature of Trump’s meddling may unbalance Columbia even further. A dangerous new narrative has emerged there and on other campuses: that the new federal threats result from “fabricated charges of antisemitism,” as CUAD recently put it, casting victims of harassment as the cunning villains of the story. In this atmosphere, Columbia seems unlikely to reckon with the deeper causes of anti-Jewish abuse on its campus. But in its past—especially in its history of overcoming its discriminatory treatment of Jews—the institution has revealed itself capable of overcoming its biases, conscious and otherwise, against an excluded group. It has shown that it can stare hard at itself, channel its highest values, and find its way to a better course.

There’s Nothing Else Like Netflix’s Mo

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › culture › archive › 2025 › 03 › mo-palestinian-american-family-netflix-comedy-season-2 › 682007

On Mo, the Netflix dramedy about a family of Palestinian refugees living in Houston, national labels are of deep importance. Throughout the series, Mohammed Najjar (played by Mohammed “Mo” Amer) struggles to hold on to employment—and any sense of security—because he’s not yet a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. His situation is made even more complicated by the fact that the American government, and many people he encounters, doesn’t recognize his family’s homeland as a legitimate state.

Early in the show’s second and final season, which premiered at the end of January, this sense of placelessness manifests in a frustrating conversation with a powerful diplomat. Mo, who is undocumented, has inadvertently traveled to Mexico and can’t legally return to Texas; he gains an unlikely audience with an American ambassador who offers to help him. But when the politician tries toasting to “your safe return and a peaceful end to the conflict,” gesturing toward unrest in Palestine, Mo can’t stop himself from challenging the nebulous characterization. His indignation gets him thrown out of the ambassador’s house, all but guaranteeing that Mo won’t get home in time for the Najjars’ long-awaited asylum hearing. After two decades spent in legal limbo, Mo once again has to come to terms with his indefinite future as a stateless person. Despite how naturally he seems to inhabit and move between multiple identities—Palestinian, American, racially ambiguous Texan—he can’t lay claim to any of them under the law.

This toggling sense of identity is crucial to how the characters of Mo see themselves—and in a recent conversation, Amer (who co-created the semi-autobiographical series with Ramy Youssef) told me the tense exchange with the ambassador is one of his favorites. The disagreement confirms Mo’s character: He’s steadfast in his Palestinian identity, but he’s also brash and prideful in ways that routinely get him in trouble. As Amer put it to me, “He’s willing to ruin his own life to make sure that he’s staying true to it, trying to stay true to himself.” The moment is just one example of how Mo tells an honest, complicated, and, most important, funny story about a Palestinian American family—and the territorial limbo that shapes their lives, even as they live thousands of miles away.

[Read: On Mo, it’s either God or therapy]

Shows about undocumented people are still rare, and Mo was the first American series to fully focus on a family of Palestinian protagonists. But the newest episodes were made in a particularly fraught climate. Mo’s writers started working on the second season a month before the dual Hollywood strikes began in May 2023. They reconvened that October, just days before Hamas’s attack on Israel and Israel’s ensuing bombardment of Gaza. The mounting death toll in Palestine put the show’s writers in a difficult position. Some viewers may have felt that Mo had a responsibility to address the escalating violence; others could be reflexively uncomfortable with hearing the words settler or occupation, language that pops up periodically in the show’s dialogue, sometimes in heated debates that Mo then defuses with humor.  

Instead of taking on the news directly, the season follows a main arc that Mo’s writers began developing back in April 2023, Amer told me. It continues a storyline from Season 1, when Mo’s widowed mother, Yusra (Farah Bsieso), started a small olive-oil business called 1947—after the last year before the Nakba, an Arabic word meaning “catastrophe” that refers to the mass displacement of Palestinians after the state of Israel was created. Yusra was born in Palestine, but spent much of her life away from it. After settlers took over her parents’ land in Haifa, her family fled to the West Bank, where many of her relatives still live. Yusra later left for Kuwait with her husband; when the Gulf War broke out, the couple moved once more, to Texas. Whenever Yusra talks about the olive oil she bottles in Texas, her longing for home is obvious—but so is her commitment to creating something from the pain of the protracted separation from her relatives, whom she hasn’t seen in decades.  

When we spoke, Amer recalled an aunt in Palestine shipping him some homemade olive oil and apologizing for not sending more; settlement blockades had prevented the family from accessing some of their olive groves. Still, he said, it was important to her to send what she could. That same sentiment is palpable when the Najjars finally make it to their family’s groves in Burin in Season 2, where they sing, eat, and commune with their loved ones under the shade of the olive trees. Despite the ever-present threat of violence from settlers and military authorities surrounding the groves, they rejoice because they’re together on the land. It’s one of the show’s most affecting scenes, and an uncommon representation of life in this region. Warm snapshots of life in Palestine are a rare sight in American media and pop culture, where images of Palestinians most often circulate alongside chronicles of conflict and devastation.  

[Read: A Saturday Night Live monologue that felt more like a prayer]

To the extent that Mo’s depiction of violence in the West Bank or the pains of refugee life feels especially timely, it’s largely a reflection of how much American awareness has shifted since October 7. But Amer has also said the creative team’s personal griefs are sublimated in this season, in a way that enhances the show’s resonance. This season, Yusra and her daughter, Nadia, lovingly disagree over the former’s constant attention to harrowing news back home—a dynamic that is incredibly familiar to Cherien Dabis, the Palestinian American actor who plays Nadia. In October 2023, Dabis, who is also a filmmaker, was in Palestine working on a historical drama about a family displaced from Jaffa in 1948. She was forced to evacuate, and to put the feature on hold, all while overwhelmed with fear about what would happen—so the news was always on. As she explained at a recent Mo screening in New York City, “The show was like a container for so many of us to come together and talk about what we were feeling during that incredibly intense, horrific time that is not over and didn’t just begin.”

The show’s portrait of the Najjars conveys the existential stakes of their statelessness, but it also highlights the beauty of the relationships they’ve been able to forge. Because the people who love him take Mo—and the Najjars’ struggles—seriously, they aren’t afraid to point out that Mo doesn’t always wind up in hot water because he’s valiantly defending his heritage or standing up for justice in the world. Sometimes, Mo really does seem to be crumbling under the pressures of life in a country where neither his heritage nor his local bona fides are respected. But he’s often just being an impatient, inconsiderate jerk. One of the delights of watching Mo is how clearly the series engages with all of its characters’ complexities—Palestinians, the show’s blundering protagonist included, don’t have to be perfect to hold our attention.

Chimamanda Adichie: ‘America Is No Longer America’

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › books › archive › 2025 › 03 › chimamanda-adichie-america-is-no-longer-america › 681955

One could almost be forgiven for forgetting that Chimananda Ngozie Adichie is a novelist. Well over a decade has passed since she published the best seller Americanah, about a young Nigerian woman’s confrontation with race and identity, which quickly secured a spot in the contemporary canon. The novel elevated Adichie to rare literary stardom—onto the cover of British Vogue, into a Beyoncé song. She continued to write but stuck to nonfiction—long essays on feminism and, more recently, on grief. Yet with the exception of a few short stories, she wasn’t producing much fiction. When I asked her during an interview two years ago about the long wait for a new novel, she said the question made her “go into a panic.”

The drought—which is how she sees it—is now over. Dream Count, her new novel, is about four African women—including three who share Adichie’s Nigerian background—and their love lives. The book’s central occupation is a serious one: how men affect the existences of women, either as destructive forces, objects of longing, or distractions from women’s dreams.

Chiamaka is a travel writer holding out for someone who will make her feel “truly known”; Zikora, her best friend, is a lawyer who badly wants to settle down and start a family; Omelogor, Chiamaka’s cousin, is a successful banker in Nigeria who rejects all pressure to live a conventional life; and, finally, Kadiatou, the book’s most interesting and original character, is a Guinean housekeeper who works for Chiamaka, tries to build a new life in America and finds herself the victim of a powerful and predatory man.

[Read: Chimamanda Adichie’s fiction has shed its optimism]

Adichie spoke with me in the days before the novel’s publication. I was curious to hear about the characters but also about how Adichie sees the United States right now. In her usual outspoken way, she had much to say about masculinity, Donald Trump, and the way that politics is skewing art.

This interview has been condensed and edited for clarity.

Gal Beckerman: Almost all the writing you’ve published over the past decade has been nonfiction, like your essay We Should All Be Feminists. Fiction offers you, as you said in your author’s note to Dream Count, a chance to explore complexities. How does it feel to be back in that fiction mode?

Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie: I’ve always wanted to be in that mode, so not being in it was hard. That expression, “writer’s block,” is one I don’t like, but it speaks to what it was: an inability to write fiction. I had that for a few years, and I just remember being terrified. I don’t know how to be moderate in thinking about my own creativity. And so, really, what it felt like when I couldn’t write fiction was: I felt like I was shut out of myself. Because fiction is the thing that gives meaning to me. It just gives me joy.

Beckerman: I wanted to read you a quote from a 2016 interview you gave that I think is a kind of keystone for understanding the bigger themes of Dream Count: “Put a group of women together, and the conversation will eventually be about men. Put a group of men together, and they will not talk about women at all … We women should spend about 20 percent of our time on men, because it’s fun, but otherwise, we should also be talking about our own stuff.” The four women in this book are each contending with the men in their lives, and men who are mostly doing damage to them.

Adichie: I might have to revise that number: maybe more like 15 or 18 percent. I should say that that is more about what I wish the world would be than about what the world is. And I think that fiction, if nothing else, has to be honest. It has to be unforgivingly honest. And I don’t want to write about women’s lives as I wish they were. So, for example, I know many women who, looking at their relationships from the outside, it’s very clear to me, and I think to most people, that it’s an unhealthy relationship. But I’m always interested in how women justify to themselves remaining in those relationships. Someone actually just said to me that all the men in the book are jerks.

Beckerman: I was about to say that too!

Adichie: Really? I feel like I’ve been grossly misunderstood. Good Lord, come on. There’s one that we might argue is not the most appealing of men. But even [him], I think, we could view with some empathy. But I feel like the other men are not jerks. I suppose if I’m hearing it this often, it must mean there is some truth to it.

Beckerman: It does seem that what matters more in the book is the way their actions end up affecting each of the four women.

Adichie: I would argue that heterosexual women’s lives are, in fact, shaped quite often by men. Girls are often socialized from childhood to be nice in a way that boys are not socialized to be nice. You know, it’s women in relationships who almost unconsciously make compromises and sacrifices; we’re often taught that love is self-sacrifice, and that makes us feel ashamed to think about ourselves. Men do not have the same kind of fear of consequences if they’re selfish. I don’t even know if it occurs to men.

Beckerman: I know you don’t think all the men were jerks, but while I was reading, the idea of a certain aggressive, careless, destructive masculinity was inescapable, especially at a moment when American politics and culture have been overtaken by what one writer in our pages just called an “Adolescent Style.” Do you think this novel has something to say about the particular form of what might be called immature patriarchy that we’re living under right now?

Adichie: I think that many of the women in my book do, in fact, escape masculinity—if not escape, then they have figured out ways to sort of push it to the side. Honestly, just thinking about what is happening in this country, it feels as though America is no longer America. It feels to me a disservice to my novel to try to talk about the masculinity of my beloved characters alongside this confederacy of dunces.

[Read: The key mismatch between Zelensky and Trump]

Beckerman: But I do feel like, reading this right now, there was something that echoed with our times.

Adichie: I would actually say that the actions of the Trump administration feel more like those of toddlers, not men. How they are acting doesn’t feel manly. I think I want to make a distinction between manly and masculinity. So there is a kind of ugly, masculine energy, but it’s not a manly energy. I think to be manly is to show maturity, responsibility—and there’s none of that. But what I’ve been thinking about more in this novel, as in all my work, is love. I’m a hopeless romantic who hides it behind sarcasm. I remember a few weeks ago thinking that what we’re witnessing from Trump is actually from a lack of love. So you cannot love a country and treat it with such careless recklessness, you just cannot.

Beckerman: When you say that America doesn’t feel like America anymore, how does that affect how you think about your role as a writer?

Adichie: I’m still a little bit dizzy. It’s been a month, and just so much has happened. But in general, I like to make a distinction between myself the writer and myself the citizen. Yes, of course, political issues do inform my fiction, but I hope that I never let it either propel or become a hindrance to my writing. I think of my writing as something that’s quite separate from my political self, if that makes sense. Which is not to say they aren’t intertwined, because most of my fiction is political. As a citizen, things have changed for me. I mean, you have to remember that I come from Nigeria, where, growing up, America was the place where everything went the way it was supposed to go. And the reality is that Nigeria and the U.S. are the same now. Someone said to me, “Are you thinking about moving back to Nigeria?” Well, no, because it’s the same.

Beckerman: Nigeria moved to you.

Adichie: The only difference is that I don’t have to use my generator as much here in the U.S. In Nigeria today, we have a president who, in my opinion, was not elected. And Nigerian politics has always been a politics of patronage: the Big Man, and you give your friends jobs, that kind of thing. But I think that Nigerian leaders, even if they just pay lip service to ideas like competence, they are not likely to be so brazen about creating sort of long, lasting actions from personal vengeance. It’s the brazenness of it [in the U.S.] that just feels to me stranger, stranger than Nigeria.

Beckerman: I wanted to ask you to talk about the Kadiatou character in the book, whom you based on the story of Nafissatou Diallo, the Guinean immigrant who was allegedly assaulted in a New York City hotel suite in 2011 by Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former head of the International Monetary Fund. You write about her in your author’s note, and the idea that fiction can become a kind of justice, that your depiction of her was “a gesture of returned dignity.”  Did it worry you at all as a fiction writer, interested in complexity, about approaching the creation of a character with that motive in mind?

Adichie: Actually, I feel as though the motive came afterwards. And honestly, I did not want to write an author’s note. The legal department of my publishers felt I should. And it made me go back and read my own work. I also don’t think of my fiction in terms of themes. I only find out the themes afterward. And I realized I was fascinated by her, but also I loved her.

Beckerman: Did that make it hard to write about her in complex ways? The way you would if you were inventing someone?

Adichie: Well, she’s the character who I spent the most time on, but that’s also because I did a lot of research. Guinea is a country that’s not familiar to me. I talked to people. I watched endless videos of Guinean women cooking. She’s the character who took the most work. I hear you about the complexity, because I had unconscious “noble ideas” for her. To write honestly about people is to start off with the premise that people are flawed. I think what I worried about most was just having her be a believable human being. And to do that, I decided at some point just to completely put aside everything I knew about the real person.

[Chimamanda Adichie: How I became Black in America]

Beckerman: The book is full of women taking account of the men in their lives, but it is also very much about mothers and daughters. You write in the author’s note that this was a book about your own mother, who recently died.

Adichie: I started writing it after my mother died, but I did not set out to write about my mother in any way. And actually, again, it was when I went back to reread this book that I just thought, My goodness. At the risk of sounding a bit strange, I just felt my mother’s spirit, and it was actually very emotional for me. I remember just weeping and weeping after I had read it. I became a bit dramatic. I feel as though she opened the door for me to get back into my fiction and my creative self. But just seeing how much of it was about mothers and daughters, I thought, Is this all this novel is about? And I did not think this in a hopeful way. I was thinking, I hope it’s also about other things.

Beckerman: Well, it’s also about jerks. But we won’t relitigate that. More than a lot of other writers, I feel like you really have insisted in your public comments on that need for complexity. And you say some version of this, again, in the author’s note. You talk about contemporary ideology—I think you’re thinking about the left here, though it’s obviously also true of the right—that sort of stamps out that possibility of contradiction. You talk about “reaching answers before questions are asked, if the questions are asked at all.” I wonder if you worry at all about art being shaped by that ideology.

Adichie: I do worry, and I am seeing that. Even the idea of an author’s note, which you could read through an ungracious lens as being defensive, as explaining too much. I think we live in a time of this kind of ideological capture, and you’re right that it exists on both sides. It’s almost as though the intellectual right doesn’t exist anymore. But of course, I’m more interested in the left, because it’s my tribe. And if there was some magical way, I would want to protect fiction writers and artists from what is a kind of tyranny, this ideological conformity. And also, I think that there are young people who are really brilliant, who are original, but who see the climate that we live in and who then, in some ways, dim their lights. And we suffer for it.

Trump’s Own Declaration of Independence

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › politics › archive › 2025 › 03 › trumps-own-declaration-of-independence › 681944

Long live the king!

Down with the king!

President Donald Trump sees the appeal of both.

Trump jokingly declared himself a sovereign last month, while his advisers distributed AI-generated photos of him wearing a crown and an ermine robe to celebrate his order to end congestion pricing in New York City. “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law,” he’d decreed a few days earlier, using a phrase sometimes attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, the emperor of the French.

But the president has also asked advisers in recent days about moving the Declaration of Independence into the Oval Office, according to people familiar with the conversations who requested anonymity to describe the planning.

Trump’s request alarmed some of his aides, who immediately recognized both the implausibility and the expense of moving the original document. Displayed in the rotunda at the National Archives Building, in Washington, D.C., it is perhaps the most treasured historical document in the U.S. government’s possession. The original is behind heavy glass in an oxygen-free, argon-filled case that can retract into the wall at night for security. Because of light damage to the faded animal-skin parchment, the room is kept dimly lit; restrictions have been placed on how often the doors can even be opened.

But to the relief of aides, subsequent discussions appear to have focused on the possibility of moving one of the historical copies of the document, not the original. “President Trump strongly believes that significant and historic documents that celebrate American history should be shared and put on display,” the White House spokesperson Steven Cheung told us in an email.

Displaying a copy would still enshrine history’s most famous written rejection of monarchy in the seat of American power. The document is reprinted in textbooks nationwide and is recognized the world over as a defiant stand against the corrupting dangers of absolute power. It declares equality among men to be a self-evident truth, asserts that governments derive their authority from the consent of the governed, and offers a litany of grievances against a despotic ruler.

“A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people,” reads the 1776 repudiation of British King George III’s dominion over the American colonies. (Spokespeople for the National Archives declined to comment on Trump’s request and whether a Declaration display in the Oval Office is imminent. White House aides also declined to share the timing of when the document might arrive in its new West Wing home, if it is coming at all.)

Since returning to power, Trump has moved quickly to redesign his working space. He has announced plans to pave over the Rose Garden to make it more like the patio at his private Mar-a-Lago club, as well as easier to host events with women wearing heels. He has also revived planning for a new ballroom on the White House grounds. “It keeps my real-estate juices flowing,” Trump explained in a recent interview with The Spectator.

Golden trophies now line the Oval Office’s mantlepiece. Military flags adorned with campaign streamers have returned. And portraits of presidents past now climb the walls—George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Martin Van Buren, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan, among others. Gilded mirrors hang upon the recessed doors. A framed copy of his Georgia mug shot appears in the outside hallway. And the bright-red valet button, encased in a wooden box, is back on the desk.

In addition to the National Archives’ original Declaration, the government has in its possession other versions of the document. The collection includes drafts by Jefferson and copies of contemporaneous reprintings, known as broadsides, that were distributed among the colonies.

Alarmed by the deterioration of the original Declaration in the 1820s, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams commissioned William J. Stone to create an engraving of it with the signatures appended. That version forms the basis of the document since reproduced in school history books—the one with which most Americans are familiar. Adams tasked Stone with engraving 200 copies—but in what passes for a mini 19th-century scandal, Stone made an extra facsimile to keep for himself, the documents dealer and expert Seth Kaller told us.

Many of those Stone copies of the document have now been lost; roughly 50 are known to survive, Kaller said. The White House already has in its archives at least one of the Stone printings. Kaller told us that one of his clients who had recently purchased a Stone facsimile was visiting the White House when President Barack Obama asked him whether he could help procure a Stone printing for the White House.

“The client called me, and I said, ‘I can’t—because, one, there aren’t any others on the market right now, and two, the White House already has one,’” Kaller told us. In 2014, Kaller visited the White House to view the Stone Declaration, which the curator displayed for him in one of the West Wing’s rooms. (The White House curator’s office did not respond to multiple requests for comment, including on whether the Stone copy still resides under its purview.)

It is unclear where Trump first got the idea to add a Declaration to the Oval Office’s decor. Since returning, Trump has shown interest in the planning for celebrations next year of the 250th anniversary of the document’s signing. Days after taking office, he issued an executive order to create “Task Force 250,” a White House commission that will work with another congressionally formed commission to plan the festivities.

Trump and the billionaire philanthropist David Rubenstein, who owns four Stone engravings and is a historical-documents aficionado, also met privately at the White House last month, according to two people familiar with the meeting. Trump had decided weeks earlier to replace much of the board of the Kennedy Center for the Arts so that he could install himself as chair, replacing Rubenstein.

Previously, Rubenstein had worked with the Foundation for Art and Preservation in Embassies to have a modern copy of the Stone Declaration, placed in a replica of a historic frame, displayed at U.S. embassies around the globe.

“Because the Declaration of Independence has—like the Stars and Stripes—become a symbol of the United States, and because the Stone copy of the Declaration is the most recognizable version of that historic document, I thought it would be appropriate to have a new copy of a Stone Declaration placed in each of the American embassies around the World,” Rubenstein wrote at the time in a booklet describing the history and importance of the Stone facsimiles. “My hope was that everyone who visited an American embassy would see not just our flags, but also this unique symbol of our country.” (Rubenstein did not respond to requests for comment.)

Kaller told us that he thinks moving the original document in its special enclosure to the Oval Office would likely cost millions of dollars. But a Stone printing would be far simpler to exhibit, requiring only getting “the lighting right in a display case,” he said. The reason Quincy Adams commissioned the Stone version, Kaller added, was in part for this very purpose.

And if Trump decides he wants it, he will likely get it—even without the powers of a king.

When America Persecutes Its Teachers

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2025 › 03 › teachers-schools-dei-communism › 681906

This story seems to be about:

On March 13, 1953, a teacher named Julius Hlavaty appeared before the United States Senate’s Committee on Government Operations, chaired by Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. Hlavaty led the mathematics department at New York City’s prestigious Bronx High School of Science, and was widely considered one of the best math teachers in America. He wore a gray chalk-striped suit, a polka-dot tie, and a textured white handkerchief in his breast pocket. He kept his white hair slicked back, and looked more like a continental industrialist than a high-school instructor.

He was there, ostensibly, to speak about Voice of America, the federally sponsored news service that McCarthy was investigating for supposedly pro-Communist leanings. Hlavaty, a Slovakian-speaking immigrant, had recorded a statement about coming to America that had been broadcast across Central Europe. But McCarthy had an ulterior motive for the hearing.

Hlavaty was a member of the left-wing American Labor Party, and may have been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s. Almost immediately, McCarthy lit into him. Was he a member of the Communist Party? Not now, Hlavaty said, though he refused to talk about his past. Had he registered as a member of the ALP? Hlavaty confirmed that he had, though he didn’t see why his private political opinions were McCarthy’s business.

This article has been adapted from Clay Risen’s forthcoming book, Red Scare: Blacklists, McCarthyism, and the Making of Modern America.

Hlavaty had no illusion about what was going on. “It seems to me that my name tomorrow is going to be spread over all the newspapers in the country, and what I said here, which would be the strongest defense that I would have, will not be in there,” he told the committee. “What is happening here today means, if not actually, potentially, the end of a career.”

Three weeks later, Hlavaty was fired by the New York City Board of Education for insubordination. The board had recently ruled that anyone refusing to cooperate with Congress—which meant not only answering interrogators’ questions, but also providing them with the names of other suspected Communists—would be summarily ousted. A week after that, Hlavaty’s wife, Fancille, a teacher in the New York suburbs, was also fired. On her last day, she told her students that she had “nothing to hide” but that “inquisitions into a person’s private beliefs, particularly of their distant past, are a danger.”

Many hundreds of teachers were hounded out of the profession in the late 1940s and early ’50s by school boards, congressional committees, and ad hoc citizens’ groups. Countless more were scared away from teaching “controversial” material.

Schools have always been contested ideological terrain in America, whether over who got to attend them or what would be taught there. Today we can hear echoes of the Red Scare campaign against teachers in the Trump administration’s orders to end diversity programs in education, which some worry could lead to interference in teaching about race and history. Several states, most notably Florida, have ordered schools and colleges to restrict or eliminate courses on gender, while groups such as Moms for Liberty have rallied parents to police curricula and ban books from school libraries. Ideological battles over education may be proxies for larger conflicts—Communism in the ’40s and ’50s; diversity, equity, and inclusion today. But such fights are particularly fierce because of how important schools are in shaping American values. To control the country’s education system is, in no uncertain terms, to control the country’s future.

“Propaganda for New Deal doctrines, socialism, and the ‘welfare state’ is being poured into American high school children in massive doses,” the Chicago Tribune claimed in 1951. Conservative critics had long charged that the very idea of free, publicly supported education was socialistic. Now, suddenly, in the form of teachers such as Julius and Fancille Hlavaty, they seemed to have found their proof.

Especially in big cities, teachers were indeed a progressive bunch, better educated and often more worldly than the average American. A few had become Communists in the 1930s and early ’40s; a handful still were. And for a while, they had been able to bring their ideas to their classrooms—not Communism itself, but ideas that Communists shared with the broader left, about civil rights, women’s rights, labor, and foreign affairs. When the culture turned against those ideas, teachers were among the biggest targets.

New York City was the epicenter of the Red Scare in education. From 1940 to 1942, two Republican state legislators, Assemblyman Herbert Rapp and Senator Frederic Coudert Jr., held closed-door hearings that, in their secrecy and low standards of evidence, presaged the McCarthy inquiries: Hostile witnesses were forced to name names, and informers were allowed to speak with anonymity. The Board of Education fired anyone who did not cooperate, as well as anyone identified as a subversive by two or more witnesses.

In 1949, New York State passed the so-called Feinberg Law, which made membership in any group labeled subversive by the U.S. attorney general grounds for a teacher’s dismissal. A year later, the New York City Board of Education began “trials” against teachers suspected of Communist sympathies.

One such teacher, Irving Adler, led a group of union members in a suit against the Board of Education, which reached the United States Supreme Court in 1952. But the Court, in a 6–3 decision, ruled that teaching was a privilege, not a right, and that the public’s interest in keeping Communist influence out of impressionable young minds outweighed Adler’s First Amendment rights.

In their scathing dissent, the Court’s two stalwart civil libertarians, Hugo Black and William O. Douglas, wrote that teachers had no recourse under the law to explain why they had belonged to a subversive group, which might not be subversive to begin with. “Any organization committed to a liberal cause, any group organized to revolt against an hysterical trend, any committee launched to sponsor an unpopular program, becomes suspect,” the pair wrote. “In that manner, freedom of expression will be stifled.”

During the decade-long Red Scare, from roughly 1946 to 1957, not a single American teacher was found to have imparted Communist ideas on their students, let alone acted “subversively” against the government. But that did little to allay the truly paranoid, who insisted that Communist influence worked in more subtle and sinister ways. Anti-Communist watchdog groups emerged everywhere: some national in scope, others hyperlocal.

In September 1949, a Belgian-born, Yale-trained sculptor named Suzanne Stevenson founded the Minute Women of the U.S.A., a sort of 1950s precursor to today’s Moms for Liberty. Within three years, the group claimed to have 500,000 members. The Minute Women went after Communism in all its alleged forms, but their focus was education. Stevenson gave the mothers of young children a list of subversive books, then instructed them to hunt through their school libraries and haul any suspicious titles before their local school boards. What the Minute Women considered “Communist” broadened over time. Progressive education was a target. So was civil-rights talk—the Houston chapter protested a speech at the University of Houston by Rufus Clement, the president of Atlanta University, a historically Black institution, claiming that his ideas about racial equality made him politically suspect. They managed to bar a United Nations–sponsored writing contest from Houston’s public high schools, and in 1953 forced out the deputy superintendent, who had promoted the contest as too “controversial.”

Groups such as the Minute Women received significant support from national organizations with anodyne titles such as the National Council for American Education, founded by a far-right activist named Allen Zoll. During the 1930s, Zoll had founded an anti-Semitic, pro-fascist group called American Patriots, which was considered so extreme that the military refused Zoll’s application for civilian intelligence training during World War II. His new group positioned itself as a defender of patriotic education against subversives. He pumped out a steady stream of pamphlets: “How Red Are the Schools?,” “Progressive Education Increases Delinquency,” “They Want Your Child,” “Red-ucators at Harvard.” He created a blacklist of sorts, keeping track of ousted teachers and circulating the names to his subscribers around the country, to prevent educators from relocating to a new state. And he developed a running list of “subversive” books, insisting that school and public libraries get rid of them immediately. Hundreds followed his orders; one library, in Oklahoma, even burned its suspicious texts, out of expediency or stridency or both.

Parents and students were encouraged to act as informants, reporting their slightest suspicion about a teacher or principal. In California, the state education commissioner urged the American Legion to report “to me any evidence concerning subversive activity it may have respecting any person connected with the public schools.” School districts got help from Washington: Through its Responsibilities program, the FBI allowed administrators to request information on suspicious teachers or job applicants. According to the historian Beverly Gage, by 1955 the bureau had fulfilled 900 such requests.

All of this—the vigilantism, the censorship, the loyalty investigations—had an immense effect on teacher morale. Thousands left the profession in the early 1950s; many more surely thought better of joining in the first place. Most of those who remained kept their heads down and shied away from important if “controversial” subjects. A 1953 survey by the National Education Association found an overwhelming reluctance on the part of teachers to discuss civil rights, universal health care, capitalism, and sex. “Far more to be feared than any radicalism in our schools is the tyranny that would force education into a straightjacket of regimented conformity,” said Reverend Walter Tunks, the rector of St. Paul’s Church in Akron, Ohio, at the National Education Association’s 1953 convention in Miami Beach. “That is the real threat to our American way of life.”

Many of the same people who went after elementary and high-school teachers soon opened a second front against professors on college campuses. In 1948 in Washington State, the Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities—a mini-House Un-American Activities Committee—launched investigative hearings into University of Washington professors suspected of subversion. Using tactics borrowed directly from HUAC, the committee interrogated dozens of faculty members and administrators; three professors lost their jobs, and many others had their careers derailed.

By the 1950s, more than a dozen states had barred Communists from teaching at public colleges and universities, as had scores of private colleges. Almost every state instituted some form of loyalty oath. In 1950, under pressure from the California state legislature, the University of California adopted an additional oath, forswearing belief in subversive ideas and membership in any subversive organization; as usual, subversive was largely undefined.

In most cases, universities went along. In 1953, the Association of American Universities, a group representing 37 of the country’s top educational institutions, issued a statement declaring that no Communist should be allowed to teach in a college classroom, and demanding that any academic called to testify before a government committee should speak honestly and fully. Several university presidents, including James Conant of Harvard, issued blanket statements barring Communists from their faculties. “America’s colleges and universities,” the historian Ellen Schrecker wrote, “had given Joe McCarthy and the members of HUAC a say over selecting their faculties.”

It was perhaps inevitable that HUAC would single out Harvard: the best-known and most prestigious university in the country and the alma mater of so many of the liberals and progressives behind the New Deal. (Harvard was hardly a fortress of pro-Communist sentiment, however; in a 1949 poll of faculty taken by The Harvard Crimson, more than two-thirds agreed that “Communists should not be employed as teachers.”) In 1953, HUAC got several Harvard academics—including the literary scholar Granville Hicks and the historian Daniel Boorstin, both of whom had attended Harvard during the ’30s and dabbled in Communism—to name names. They testified to the existence of a Communist cell on Harvard’s campus in the ’30s, involving students and professors; though the cell was long gone, it had included one professor who remained on faculty, a physicist named Wendell Furry. Both HUAC and McCarthy called Furry to testify. At first he declined to speak, citing his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Then, during televised hearings in 1954, he agreed to discuss his own past as a Communist, but he adamantly refused to name names. Congress voted him in contempt. He only barely managed to avoid prison time.

After being attacked by McCarthy in Washington and losing his job at Bronx Science, Julius Hlavaty suffered a further indignity. His sole book, a student primer called Review Digest on Solid Geometry, was added to a list of titles to be removed from government-sponsored overseas libraries. In an acid letter published in The New York Times, Hlavaty wrote that his book “consists exclusively of questions, problems, and solutions in solid geometry, logarithmic and trigonometric tables, and reprints of past examinations in solid geometry. Yet it has been thought important to notify all United States libraries abroad to ban this apparently ‘dangerous’ and ‘controversial’ work.” Other books on the list included the novels of Howard Fast and the poems of Langston Hughes, two authors who had likewise refused to discuss their political beliefs before Congress.

Libraries around the world removed copies of more than 300 titles by dozens of writers. A worldwide survey by the Times found that the policy was inconsistently carried out. Books were burned in Tokyo, but merely set aside in a locked room in Sydney. A book by the Times reporter Walter Duranty that was removed from the more than 40 Amerika Haus libraries across West Germany was left on the shelf in Vienna. An overzealous librarian in Buenos Aires removed not just prohibited titles such as The Maltese Falcon, by the pro-Communist novelist Dashiell Hammett, but Whittaker Chambers’s aggressively anti-Communist Witness as well.

Though much of this happened under Dwight Eisenhower’s administration, even he was taken aback by the federal government’s foray into censorship. In June 1953, he traveled to Hanover, New Hampshire, to deliver the commencement address at Dartmouth College. “Don’t join the book burners,” he told the gathered students and families. “How will we defeat communism unless we know what it is, and what it teaches, and why does it have such an appeal for men, why are so many people swearing allegiance to it?” He continued: “They are part of America. And even if they think ideas that are contrary to ours, their right to say them, their right to record them, and their right to have them at places where they are accessible to others is unquestioned, or it isn’t America.”

It was a lesson that America is, apparently, still struggling to learn.

This article was adapted from the forthcoming Red Scare: Blacklists, McCarthyism, and the Making of Modern America.

The Great Forgetting

The Atlantic

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Somewhere, Richard Nixon is raging with envy. Nixon was twice left for politically dead, after the 1960 presidential election and then the 1962 California governor’s race, but Watergate proved too much for even him to overcome. (Not that he didn’t try, as Elizabeth Drew reported in The Atlantic in 2014.)

Andrew Cuomo, inheritor of Nixon’s resting scowl face, may have found a way to do what the 37th president couldn’t: come back from an apparently career-ending scandal. Over the weekend, the Democrat launched a campaign for mayor of New York, and polling right now shows him with a wide lead, thanks to the corruption allegations plaguing the incumbent and newly minted Donald Trump ally Eric Adams.

The idea that Cuomo is the man to clean things up, however, is ridiculous. He was forced to step down as governor of New York in 2021 after revelations that his administration covered up mishandling of COVID and multiple allegations of sexual harassment. (Cuomo has denied wrongdoing but did admit to instances that were “misinterpreted as unwanted flirtation.”) Cuomo’s candidacy is an indictment of New York City politics: A city so eager to tell the rest of us how great it is should be able to produce a better class of mayoral contender (a point made pithily by The Onion with this parody headline: “De Blasio: ‘Well, Well, Well, Not So Easy to Find a Mayor That Doesn’t Suck Shit, Huh?’”).

The nascent comeback is also a sign of the weird amnesia some Americans seem to have developed about the past few years. After his resignation, Cuomo followed his brother, Chris, into the media, launching a podcast where he assailed cancel culture. The implication was that he was a victim; his reemergence as a candidate suggests that the podcast successfully spread that idea, but Cuomo is a victim of nothing except his own bad behavior.

In the early weeks of the coronavirus pandemic, Cuomo’s clear, consistent briefings made him a media star, and they provided a counter to then-President Trump’s erratic statements. As it turned out, though, New York wasn’t especially effective at fighting the virus, and Cuomo’s administration went to great lengths to cover up the number of deaths in nursing homes.

Then, in August 2021, the state attorney general’s office released an investigation finding that “Governor Cuomo sexually harassed current and former state employees in violation of both federal and state laws.” The probe found 11 credible accusers who brought allegations against Cuomo.. He denied wrongdoing, though he admitted to making at least some of the alleged statements. “I acknowledge some of the things I have said have been misinterpreted as an unwanted flirtation. To the extent anyone felt that way, I am truly sorry about that,” he said.

It is true, and irrelevant, that Cuomo was not ultimately charged with any crimes. The facts in either of these scandals still ought to disqualify him from holding public office, and his resurrection represents a failure of the Democratic Party.

“Parties help to make political choices legible for voters, and, even more importantly, they organize politicians in pursuit of collective policy goals,” Jacob M. Grumbach, a political scientist at UC Berkeley who studies state-level politics, wrote to me in an email. The system is working if “the goals of the group come before the ambitions of individual politicians,” Grumbach said. The Democratic Party knows there are potential candidates who would be better than Cuomo for the party as a whole, but it’s “unable to coordinate to stop Cuomo from using his political capital to enter and likely win the NYC mayoral elections,” he said.

Instead, Democrats seem to be either acquiescing or openly backing him. Representative Ritchie Torres, a young moderate who has become prominent for criticizing the party’s progressive wing, endorsed Cuomo—in an exclusive given to the conservative New York Post, no less—as someone who would battle extremists on the left and right. Torres refused to “relitigate” Cuomo’s resignation, telling the Post: “America loves a comeback, New York loves a comeback.” Okay, but doesn’t it matter who’s doing the comeback, and what they’re coming back from? Cuomo is likely benefiting from a broader societal backlash to cancel culture and “wokeness.” But if, in order to curb the far left, Democrats like Torres are willing to embrace an alleged sex pest who tried to cover up seniors’ deaths, is it worth it?

This kind of selective amnesia about the recent past is not exclusive to New York or to politics—it’s afflicting many areas of American culture. The film director Brett Ratner, who faced multiple credible accusations of sexual harassment and misconduct in 2017 (which he denied, and for which he wasn’t charged), released a documentary about First Lady Melania Trump that received a reported $40 million licensing fee from Amazon. Jon Gruden, a football coach who was forced to resign for emails that used homophobic language, among other things, has been restored to the Tampa Bay Buccaneers’ Ring of Honor. The late Pete Rose, who in 2022 blithely dismissed the allegation of having had a sexual relationship with a 14- or 15-year-old girl by telling a reporter, “It was 55 years ago, babe,” is in line for a presidential pardon and possible reinstatement in Major League Baseball after he was barred for gambling.

But politics is where voters and institutions seem most ready to ignore the past. As my colleague Jonathan Chait wrote last week, the whimpering end of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Trump’s ties to Russia has led many on the center and left to pretend that no scandal existed. “But even the facts Mueller was able to produce, despite noncooperation from Trump’s top lieutenants, were astonishing,” Jonathan wrote.

In some Trump-related cases, his administration is trying to force the country to forget what happened. The most maddening of the Trump scandals was his alleged hoarding of classified documents at Mar-a-Lago. The president escaped a trial on the case by winning the election, but the basic facts were not really in dispute: He possessed boxes and boxes of documents, he had no credible claim to them, and he didn’t give them back when asked to by the government. Now the FBI has handed the materials back over to Trump. And as my colleague Quinta Jurecic recently wrote, Trump and his administration are trying (in vain) to pretend that the January 6 insurrection never happened, yanking down government webpages and issuing pardons.

At the peak of social-justice activism in America, critics complained that pulling down statues of Confederates or removing the names of tarnished figures from institutions was tantamount to erasing history. Now, as the movement wanes, a different message is emerging: Some parts of history are apparently fine to erase.

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Today’s News

Donald Trump said that 25 percent tariffs will be imposed on Canada and Mexico tomorrow, and that there is “no room left” for last-minute deals. In the first full month of Trump’s presidency, the number of migrants illegally crossing America’s southern border hit a new low not seen in at least 25 years, according to preliminary government data obtained by CBS News. Israel will stop all humanitarian aid from entering Gaza until Hamas accepts the new terms for an extension of the cease-fire agreement, Israeli officials said yesterday.

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Work in Progress: With the best intentions, the United Kingdom engineered a housing and energy shortage that broke its economy, Derek Thompson writes. The Wonder Reader: Shan Wang compiled Atlantic articles about why the egg is a miracle.

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Evening Read

lllustration by Katherine Lam

Migrants Prepare to Lose Their American Lives

By Stephanie McCrummen

At a Mexican restaurant, the owner stashed newly laminated private signs under the host stand, ready to slap on the walls of the kitchen and a back dining room where workers could hide if agents arrived without a proper warrant.

Inside a house nearby, a woman named Consuelo went to the living-room window and checked the street for unusual cars, then checked the time as her undocumented husband left for work, calculating when he was supposed to arrive at the suburban country club where he’d worked for 27 years, where he’d earned an “all-star” employee award, and which now felt like enemy territory. She lit the first prayer candle of the day.

Read the full article.

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Illustration by The Atlantic. Sources: NEON; Patrick T. Fallon / Getty; Trae Patton.

Watch. Anora (available to rent online) swept the Oscars, proving that Hollywood’s biggest night can still recognize indie movies, David Sims writes.

Examine. The trend known as “anti-fan art” hinges on irony: The creators’ best works are inspired by the pop culture they disdain, Shirley Li writes.

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P.S.

If I invoke the musical style called Americana, who comes to mind? Jeff Tweedy? Tyler Childers? Jason Isbell? As Giovanni Russonello wrote in 2013, the genre is heavily white and male, in contrast to its influences. I’ve been listening a lot over the past week to “Cry Baby,” a song by Sunny War that features Valerie June. It’s a summit of two young Black women from Tennessee who are making music—and a reminder that there’s no American music, or Americana, without Black music. Sunny War’s Anarchist Gospel was one of my favorite records of 2023, and Armageddon in a Summer Dress, which features “Cry Baby,” is one of my favorites of 2025 so far.

— David

Stephanie Bai contributed to this newsletter.

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