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Negroes

The Rise of the Brown v. Board of Education Skeptics

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › magazine › archive › 2025 › 04 › brown-v-board-of-education-integrated-noliwe-rooks-book › 681766

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On May 17, 1954, a nervous 45-year-old lawyer named Thurgood Marshall took a seat in the Supreme Court’s gallery. The founder and director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund hoped to learn that he had prevailed in his pivotal case. When Chief Justice Earl Warren announced the Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, Marshall could not have known that he had also won what is still widely considered the most significant legal decision in American history. Hearing Warren declare “that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place” delivered Marshall into a state of euphoria. “I was so happy, I was numb,” he said. After exiting the courtroom, he joyously swung a small boy atop his shoulders and galloped around the austere marble hall. Later, he told reporters, “It is the greatest victory we ever had.”

For Marshall, the “we” who triumphed in Brown surely referred not only, or even primarily, to himself and his Legal Defense Fund colleagues, but to the entire Black race, on whose behalf they’d toiled. And Black Americans did indeed find Brown exhilarating. Harlem’s Amsterdam News, echoing Marshall, called Brown “the greatest victory for the Negro people since the Emancipation Proclamation.” W. E. B. Du Bois stated, “I have seen the impossible happen. It did happen on May 17, 1954.” When Oliver Brown learned of the outcome in the lawsuit bearing his surname, he gathered his family near, and credited divine providence: “Thanks be to God for this.” Martin Luther King Jr. encouraged Montgomery’s activists in 1955 by invoking Brown: “If we are wrong, then the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong. If we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong.” Many Black people viewed the opinion with such awe and reverence that for years afterward, they threw parties on May 17 to celebrate Brown’s anniversary.

Over time, however, some began questioning what exactly made Brown worthy of celebration. In 1965, Malcolm X in his autobiography voiced an early criticism of Brown: It had yielded precious little school desegregation over the previous decade. Calling the decision “one of the greatest magical feats ever performed in America,” he contended that the Court’s “masters of legal phraseology” had used “trickery and magic that told Negroes they were desegregated—Hooray! Hooray!—and at the same time … told whites ‘Here are your loopholes.’ ”

[Read: The children who desegregated America’s schools]

But that criticism paled in comparison with the anti-Brown denunciation in Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton’s Black Power: The Politics of Liberation two years later. They condemned not Brown’s implementation, but its orientation. The fundamental aim of integration must be abandoned because it was driven by the “assumption that there is nothing of value in the black community,” they maintained.

To sprinkle black children among white pupils in outlying schools is at best a stop-gap measure. The goal is not to take black children out of the black community and expose them to white middle-class values; the goal is to build and strengthen the black community.

Although Black skeptics of the integration ideal originated on the far left, Black conservatives—including the economist Thomas Sowell—have more recently ventured related critiques. The most prominent example is Marshall’s successor on the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas. In 1995, four years after joining the Court, Thomas issued a blistering opinion that opened, “It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior.”

Desperate efforts to promote school integration, Thomas argued, stemmed from the misperception that identifiably Black schools were somehow doomed to fail because of their racial composition. “There is no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an integrated environment,” he wrote. Taking a page from Black Power’s communal emphasis, Thomas argued that “black schools can function as the center and symbol of black communities, and provide examples of independent black leadership, success, and achievement.” In a 2007 opinion, he extolled Washington, D.C.’s all-Black Dunbar High School—which sent dozens of graduates to the Ivy League and its ilk during the early 20th century—as a paragon of Black excellence.

In the 2000s, as Brown crept toward its 50th anniversary, Derrick Bell of the NYU School of Law went so far as to allege that the opinion had been wrongly decided. For Bell, who had sharpened his skills as an LDF lawyer, Brown’s “integration ethic centralizes whiteness. White bodies are represented as somehow exuding an intrinsic value that percolates into the ‘hearts and minds’ of black children.” Warren’s opinion in the case should have affirmed Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” regime, Bell wrote, but it should have insisted on genuine equality of expenditures, rather than permitting the sham equality of yore that consigned Black students to shoddy classrooms in dilapidated buildings. He acknowledged, though, that his jaundiced account put him at odds with dominant American legal and cultural attitudes: “The Brown decision,” he noted, “has become so sacrosanct in law and in the beliefs of most Americans that any critic is deemed wrongheaded, even a traitor to the cause.”

In her New Book, Integrated: How American Schools Failed Black Children, Noliwe Rooks adds to a growing literature that challenges the portrayal of the decision as “a significant civil rights–era win.” Rooks, the chair of the Africana-​studies department at Brown University, offers an unusual blend of historical examination and family memoir that generally amplifies the concerns articulated by prior desegregation discontents. The result merits careful attention not for its innovative arguments, but as an impassioned, arresting example of how Brown skepticism, which initially gained traction on the fringes of Black life, has come to hold considerable appeal within the Black intellectual mainstream.

As recently as midway through the first Trump administration, Rooks would have placed herself firmly in the traditional pro-Brown camp, convinced that addressing racial inequality in education could best be pursued through integration. But traveling a few years ago to promote a book that criticized how private schools often thwart meaningful racial integration, she repeatedly encountered audience members who disparaged her core embrace of integration. Again and again, she heard from Black parents that “the trauma their children experienced in predominantly white schools and from white teachers was sometimes more harmful than the undereducation occurring in segregated schools.”

[From the May 2018 issue: The report on race that shook America]

The onslaught dislodged Rooks’s faith in the value of contemporary integration, and even of Brown itself. She now exhibits the convert’s zeal. Brown, she writes, should be viewed as “an attack on Black schools, politics, and communities, which meant it was an attack on the pillars of Black life.” For some Black citizens, the decision acted as “a wrecking ball that crashed through their communities and, like a pendulum, continues to swing.”

Rooks emphasizes the plight of Black educators, who disproportionately lost their positions in Brown’s aftermath because of school consolidations. Before Brown, she argues, “Black teachers did not see themselves as just teaching music, reading, or science, but also as activists, organizers, and freedom fighters who dreamed of and fought for an equitable world for future generations”; they served as models who showed “Black children how to fight for respect and societal change.”

Endorsing one of Black Power’s analogies, she maintains that school integration meant that “as small a number as possible of Black children were, like pepper on popcorn, lightly sprinkled atop wealthy, white school environments, while most others were left behind.” Even for those ostensibly fortunate few flecks of pepper, Rooks insists, providing the white world’s seasoning turned out to be a highly uncertain, dangerous endeavor. She uses her father’s disastrous experiences with integration to examine what she regards as the perils of the entire enterprise. After excelling in all-Black educational environments, including as an undergraduate at Howard University, Milton Rooks became one of a very small number of Black students to enroll at the Golden Gate University School of Law in the early 1960s.

Sent by his hopeful parents “over that racial wall,” Milton encountered hostility from white professors, who doubted his intellectual capacity, Rooks recounts, and “spit him back up like a piece of meat poorly digested.” She asserts that the ordeal not only prompted him to drop out of law school but also spurred his descent into alcoholism. Rooks extrapolates further, writing:

Milton’s experience reflected the trauma Black students suffered as they desegregated public schools in states above the Mason-Dixon Line, where displays of racism were often mocking, disdainful, pitying, and sword sharp in their ability to cut the unsuspecting into tiny bits. It destroyed confidence, shook will, sowed doubt, murdered souls—quietly, sure, but still as completely as could a mob of white racists setting their cowardice, rage, and anger loose upon the defenseless.

The harms that contemporary integrated educational environments inflict upon Black students can be tantamount, in her view, to the harms imposed upon the many Black students who are forced to attend monoracial, woeful urban high schools. To make this point, Rooks recounts her own struggle to correct the misplacement of her son, Jelani, in a low-level math class in Princeton, New Jersey’s public-school system during the aughts (when she taught at Princeton University). She witnessed other Black parents meet with a similar lack of support in guiding their children to the academically demanding courses that could propel them to elite colleges. In Jelani’s case, she had evidence that teachers’ “feelings were hardening against him.” He led a life of relative safety and economic privilege, and felt at ease among his white classmates and friends, she allows, even as she also stresses that what he “experienced wasn’t the violence of poverty; it was something else equally devastating”:

We knew that poor, working-class, or urban communities were not the only places where Black boys are terrorized and traumatized. We knew that the unfamiliarity of his white friends with any other Black people would one day become an issue in our home. We knew that guns were not the only way to murder a soul.

Frustrated with Princeton’s public schools, Rooks eventually enrolled Jelani in an elite private high school where, she notes, he also endured racial harassment—and from which he graduated before making his way to Amherst College.

seven decades have now elapsed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown. Given the stubbornly persistent phenomenon of underperforming predominantly Black schools throughout the nation, arguing that Brown’s potential has been fully realized would be absurd. Regrettably, the Warren Court declined to advance the most powerful conception of Brown when it had the opportunity to do so: Its infamously vague “all deliberate speed” approach allowed state and local implementation to be delayed and opposed for far too long. In its turn, the Burger Court provided an emaciated conception of Brown’s meaning, one that permitted many non-southern jurisdictions to avoid pursuing desegregation programs. Rooks deftly sketches this lamentable, sobering history.

[From the May 2014 issue: Segregation now ...]

Disenchantment with Brown’s educational efficacy is thus entirely understandable. Yet to suggest that the Supreme Court did not go far enough, fast enough in galvanizing racially constructive change in American schools after Brown is one thing. To suggest that Brown somehow took a wrong turn is quite another.

Rooks does not deny that integration succeeded in narrowing the racial achievement gap. But like other Brown critics, she nevertheless idealizes the era of racial segregation. Near Integrated  ’s conclusion, Rooks contends that “too few of us have a memory of segregated Black schools as the beating heart of vibrant Black communities, enabling students to compose lives of harmony, melody, and rhythm and sustained Black life and dignity.” But this claim gets matters exactly backwards. The brave people who bore segregation’s brunt believed that Jim Crow represented an assault on Black life and dignity, and that Brown marked a sea change in Black self-conceptions.

Desegregation’s detractors routinely elevate the glory days of D.C.’s Dunbar High School, but they refuse to heed the lessons of its most distinguished graduates. Charles Hamilton Houston—Dunbar class of 1911, who went on to become valedictorian at Amherst and the Harvard Law Review’s first Black editor—nevertheless dedicated his life to eradicating Jim Crow as an NAACP litigator and Thurgood Marshall’s mentor in his work contesting educational segregation. Sterling A. Brown—Dunbar class of 1918, who graduated from Williams College before becoming a distinguished poet and professor—nevertheless wrote the following in 1944, one decade before Brown:

Negroes recognize that the phrase “equal but separate accommodations” is a myth. They have known Jim Crow a long time, and they know Jim Crow means scorn and not belonging.

Much as they valued having talented, caring teachers, these men understood racial segregation intimately, and they detested it.

In the 1990s, Nelson B. Rivers III, an unheralded NAACP official from South Carolina, memorably heaved buckets of cold water on those who were beginning to wonder, “ Was integration the right thing to do? Was it worth it? Was Brown a good decision?” Rivers dismissed such questions as “asinine,” and continued:

To this day, I can remember bus drivers pulling off and blowing smoke in my mother’s face. I can remember the back of the bus, colored water fountains … I can hear a cop telling me, “Take your black butt back to nigger town.” What I tell folk … is that there are a lot of romanticists now who want to take this trip down Memory Lane, and they want to go back, and I tell the young people that anybody who wants to take you back to segregation, make sure you get a round-trip ticket because you won’t stay.

Nostalgia for the pre-Brown era would not exercise nearly so powerful a grip on Black America today if its adherents focused on its detailed, pervasive inhumanities rather than relying on gauzy glimpses.

No one has pressed this point more vividly than Robert L. Carter, who worked alongside Marshall at the LDF before eventually becoming a distinguished federal judge. He understood that to search for Brown’s impact exclusively in the educational domain is mistaken. Instead, he emphasized that Brown fomented a broad-gauge racial revolution throughout American public life. Despite Chief Justice Warren formally writing the opinion to apply exclusively to education, its attack on segregation has—paradoxically—been most efficacious beyond that original context.

[From the October 1967 issue: Jonathan Kozol’s ‘Where Ghetto Schools Fail’]

“The psychological dimensions of America’s race relations problem were completely recast” by Brown, Carter wrote. “Blacks were no longer supplicants seeking, pleading, begging to be treated as full-fledged members of the human race; no longer were they appealing to morality, to conscience, to white America’s better instincts,” he noted. “They were entitled to equal treatment as a right under the law; when such treatment was denied, they were being deprived—in fact robbed—of what was legally theirs. As a result, the Negro was propelled into a stance of insistent militancy.”

Even within the educational sphere, though, it is profoundly misguided to claim that Black students who attend solid, meaningfully integrated schools encounter environments as corrosive as, or worse than, those facing students trapped in ghetto schools. This damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t analysis suggests an entire cohort stuck in the same boat, when its many members are not even in the same ocean. The Black student marooned in a poor and violent neighborhood, with reason to fear actual murder, envies the Black student attending a rigorous, integrated school who worries about metaphorical “soul murder.” All struggles are not created equal.

This article appears in the April 2025 print edition with the headline “Was Integration the Wrong Goal?”

Chimamanda Adichie’s Anti-Romance Novel

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › books › archive › 2025 › 03 › chimamanda-adichies-anti-romance-novel › 681922

On the same day that the Access Hollywood tape landed, a month before Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton at the ballot box, the Nigerian American writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie drew a surprising gender-related battle line of her own. In an October 2016 interview, she expressed mild displeasure that on Beyoncé’s track “Flawless,” the pop star had sampled (with permission) from Adichie’s by-then-famous 2013 TED Talk, “We Should All Be Feminists.” “Her type of feminism is not mine,” she observed, politely calling Beyoncé out for giving “quite a lot of space to the necessity of men.” Hastening to say that she thinks “men are lovely,” Adichie envisioned a recalibration: “We women should spend about 20 percent of our time on men … but otherwise we should also be talking about our own stuff.”

Dream Count, her fourth novel, is about how difficult this task actually is. Adichie is interested in women who, in certain ways, shrug off the patriarchal straitjacket of decades past, yet who also can’t quite manage to focus on their “own stuff,” letting men monopolize more than their allotted 20 percent. This is provocative cultural terrain—rife with historical and social and psychological (and biological) tensions—and the sort of ground that Adichie has nimbly traversed in her fiction before. In Dream Count’s predecessor, Americanah, she casts a satiric eye on race in America. Her well-heeled Nigerian protagonist Ifemelu navigates postcollege life—and sex and romance—in the United States, recording her reflections in a blog titled Raceteenth or Various Observations About American Blacks (Those Formerly Known as Negroes) by a Non-American Black. Like her creator, Ifemelu has an outsider’s knack for spotlighting the cruelties, vacuous niceties, and comic absurdities of race relations in a country caught between the past evils of slavery and Jim Crow, and the aspirational multiculturalism of a semi-enlightened 21st century.

But Adichie also provided Ifemelu a comparatively sanguine view of relations between the sexes. And it is precisely this optimism that has been scrubbed, more than a decade later, from Dream Count, an unusually dispiriting novel. Americanah’s incisive critique of race was set within a rom-com arc: Ifemelu ends up back home and in the arms of her high-school-and-college boyfriend, Obinze, whose own story of a brutal immigrant sojourn in Britain shares center stage in the novel. This time, Adichie’s protagonists are all women: three globally mobile Nigerians from the kind of upper-class backgrounds familiar from her earlier fiction, and one Guinean immigrant who has taken refuge in America, following her romantic partner.

Each is accorded her own section of Dream Count, yet their stories intersect and share a basic trajectory and bleak tone: Men enter their lives like meteors entering the atmosphere, leaving a trail of heat and light but always burning out. Whose fault this is—the women’s, the men’s—is for the most part unclear. Adichie’s protagonists are independent and deeply ambivalent, not so much aloof as detached, both from their love interests and from their own desires and aspirations. In a novel stuffed with reminiscences of past relationships, regret is startlingly absent. If Adichie the feminist-manifesto writer is comfortable dispensing advice in the form of shoulds and should nots, Adichie the novelist seems allergic to such judgments.

Dream Count unfolds during the peak of the COVID era, yet reaches back to a time before Zoom screens and hoarded toilet paper. Chiamaka, a struggling travel writer quarantined in a suburban Maryland house purchased for her by her father, is the hub of the group, and her first-person narration opens and closes the novel. At 44, she’s been based in the U.S. for years but has resisted putting down roots, and she spends much of the novel reflecting on her history with men. She calls her self-imposed audit her “dream count,” which she uses as a softer-edged synonym for “body count.” This effort to reckon with her flings and love affairs speaks to the novel’s broader project: a bricolage of confusion, set against a backdrop of 21st-century feminism, with its unsatisfying forms of liberation, and traditionalist African patriarchy, with its equally unsatisfying constraints and at-times-violent indignities.

[Chimamanda Adichie: How I became Black in America]

Adichie quite deliberately presents us with protagonists who have trouble sticking to that one-fifth time limit of thinking about men. Her quartet of characters is a lineup of familiar female archetypes. Chia is a romantic intent on true love, an adventurer forever seeking a soulmate. Her best friend, Zikora, is a striver eager to have it all—a lucrative legal career and a husband and children. Omelogor is Chia’s cousin, recently back home after a leave from her Nigerian finance job to study pornography in American graduate school; she’s an acerbic pragmatist who avoids serious relationships. And Kadiatou, Chia’s hired help, has been lured from Guinea by dreams and is shocked by permissive American mores. Motherhood, real and hypothetical, is front of mind for all, and expectations veer off course for each of them.

In Omelogor, Adichie seems to be reaching for another satirical guide on the model of Ifemelu, Americanah’s race-blogger protagonist: a participant observer of fraying gender dynamics, emotionally preoccupied with the opposite sex while also bemusedly untethered. For several years, Omelogor has been running a popular website, For Men Only, which takes off during the pandemic. There she dispenses anonymous but clearly female counsel about gender, sex, and romance, having decided that men need more than the pornographic tutelage they’re steeped in. She signs her missives with a lightly pandering flourish: “Remember, I’m on your side, dear men.”

But Omelogor is angry too (sometimes a symptom of depression, Chia notes). She’s well aware that despite the persona she creates for her blog, she is no expert on serious relationships, and she suspects that she may be too cynical and disillusioned to be on anyone’s side in the gender war, including her own. She cops to having returned from her American sojourn with “a jaundiced spirit and a mood like midnight.” Instead of enjoying the restorative break she’d hoped for (money laundering loomed large in her African banking work), she felt lonely and alienated, not least by “perfect righteous American liberals,” insistent that “you board their ideological train.”

Omelogor, who bridles at pigeonholing and being pigeonholed, is a study in contradictions. Online, she urges her readers to shower their partners with verbal affection—because “love needs tending”—while out in the world, she breaks off relationships at the first sign of a possible “emotion happening,” her term for falling in love. Dream Count is peppered with excerpts of For Men Only’s invariably banal advice (there are many ways to be a man, etc.), blog entries so anemic that you’re left wondering whether that’s the point: Nobody’s heart is really in communicating. Omelogor herself is skeptical that she can commit to truly opening up to others, in either her public or private life. When she was young, she chose aloofness because she “wanted to be free.” Now her general self-diagnosis is “disappointed disenchantment, or disenchanted disappointment.”

That spirit pervades the COVID-haunted novel, as Adichie undercuts conventional assumptions about gender roles and attitudes. Tucked into Chia’s romantic quest for a “merging of souls” is a self-reliant ruthlessness more often associated with the male script. “I did want a husband and child, but not under any circumstances,” she reflects early on. “I didn’t want to be single, but being single was not intolerable.” In the relationship that stands out most in her memory—with a kindhearted Nigerian named Chuka, eager to marry and have kids, and great in bed—he’s the one left protesting that “I told you my intentions from day one.” She cannot come up with a reason for torpedoing it that will satisfy either him or herself, and instead admits simply: “I did not want what I wanted to want.”

[Read: America’s blindness to the racism all around us]

Adichie counterposes a more recognizable script for Zikora, who for all her confidence at work lacks Chia and Omelogor’s bold assurance with men. She’s endured a few insufferable boyfriends—classic narcissists—when she finds Kwame, a fellow lawyer with a background very different from hers: Reared in northern Virginia, he’s been pushed hard by his Ghanaian father and African American mother, “his dreams already dreamed for him.” But she’s thrilled to discover what feels like true intimacy: “So this was happiness, to live in the first person plural.” When he abruptly disappears at the news that she’s pregnant, she is stunned and can’t stop wondering how she could have made herself any clearer.

In some sense, Dream Count is a novel about inscrutable intentions: our own and those of other people. Why does Chia leave Chuka? Why does Omelogor cut and run at the first tremor of an “emotion happening”? Why does Zikora’s seemingly forthright boyfriend abandon her? Even as Adichie scatters hints (was Kwame more of a cowed son than Zikora grasped?), she is also explicit, in a closing “author’s note,” that sometimes the goal of a successful novel is to leave its tangles tangled. “To attempt to fictionally humanize a person,” she writes, means confronting

how we let ourselves and others down, how we emerge or don’t from our failings, how we are petty, how we try to overcome and strive to improve, how we seethe in our self-pity, how we fail, how we hold on tenaciously to hope.

Adichie, with her focus squarely on women, doesn’t hold back in Dream Count from revealing how her protagonists, in their romantic relationships, can be as deluded about themselves and their desires as they are about men and theirs. “Each day with Chuka, I encountered his otherness,” Chia reflects in a patronizing tone as she cites examples of his shirt-tucked-in, methodical ways: “sturdy, reassuring, uncreative.” However, Adichie also resists turning these uncoupled couplings into cautionary tales: Years later, Chia feels a belated tug of uncertainty about her decision to leave Chuka, but the reader is given no clear sense that she made the wrong choice, only that she made a sad one.

[Chimamanda Adichie: Nigeria’s hollow democracy]

Nor do conflicting African and American values get resolved, melded into a best-of-both-worlds fusion of beliefs. Zikora, overwhelmed with shame at being a single mother, is jolted into a new perspective on her own mother, who comes to help with her baby: She learns that a long-ago family rupture when her father took a second wife—an Igbo tradition when the first hasn’t produced a male heir—is more complicated than she had guessed. Kadiatou is a victim of female genital mutilation, and yet she’s taken aback when her Guinean boyfriend describes the practice as “barbaric.” She initially balks at his suggestion that she seek asylum on the pretext of sparing her own daughter from the cutting.

Asylum is not what Kadiatou, who is the most burdened of the four yet who also unexpectedly emerges feeling the most liberated, finds in America. She gets caught up in a justice system clearly not designed to serve people like her after she is assaulted by a rich and powerful man in the hotel where she has found work as a maid. The scene is harrowing but short, the procedural aftermath briefly hope-instilling. The police are called, the evidence gathered, the perpetrator identified. And then Kadiatou’s ordeal goes on and on: grueling interrogations that make her feel guilty and trip her up, while the monstrous VIP uses his fame and fortune to delay and delay.

The author’s note reveals that Kadiatou’s story is based on the real-life case of Nafissatou Diallo, a Guinean immigrant and hotel maid who accused the head of the International Monetary Fund of assault in 2011. The case, Adichie reminds readers, was dismissed—not because prosecutors had proved the accused was innocent, but because the defendant’s lawyers felt that she had lied too much about her past for a jury to trust her. In the novel, Adichie vividly imagines the lawyerly grilling, the media hounding, the experience of being ambushed and isolated. And then, taking artistic license, she dispenses a fate that departs from Diallo’s; Kadiatou is granted a resolution that brings her huge relief, even if it undercuts the convictions of her far wealthier Nigerian friends.

In We Should All Be Feminists, the book that grew out of the TED Talk, Adichie observed that women are habituated to give up “a job, a career goal, a dream”; ultimately, as she put it, “compromise is what a woman is more likely to do.” In the end, none of Dream Count’s protagonists compromises, yet Adichie seems uninterested in turning this refusal into a feminist triumph. Their dreams don’t pan out. Her characters experience no cathartic epiphany that they are better off without men after all. Nor do they truly second-guess their life choices: We get no sense that they would be better off with men either.

We aren’t treated to a valorization of the nuclear family, or an African spin on resurgent tradwifery, or a paeon to the miracles of motherhood. “What am I supposed to do with him?” Zikora wonders about her baby. “There would be more days and weeks of this, not knowing what to do with a squalling person whose needs she feared she could never know.” Omelogor doesn’t hesitate to take a closing swipe at the special proclivity to pontificate that she encountered everywhere in the U.S.: “They want your life to match their soft half-baked theories,” she once ranted in a For Men Only entry that she deleted before posting but shares with us. She claims to detest the “provincial certainty” of Americans who are overconfident in their quick cultural judgments, yet Dream Count makes clear that the cosmopolitan uncertainty of the wealthy African abroad is not much better.

The Attack on Birthright Citizenship Is a Big Test for the Constitution

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2025 › 01 › trump-executive-order-citizenship › 681404

The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to settle once and for all the question of racial citizenship, forever preventing the subjugation of one class of people by another. Donald Trump’s executive order purporting to end birthright citizenship is an attempt to reverse one outcome of the Civil War, by creating a permanent underclass of stateless people who have no rights they can invoke in their defense.

In 1856, in the infamous Dred Scott decision that declared that Black people could not be American citizens, Chief Justice Roger Taney wrote that as “a subordinate and inferior class of beings,” Black people had “no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” Yes, the Declaration of Independence had stated that “all men are created equal,” but “the enslaved African race were not intended to be included.”

Frederick Douglass, who argued that the Constitution did not sanction slavery, responded to the Taney decision by saying that one could find a defense of slavery in the Constitution only “by discrediting and casting away as worthless the most beneficent rules of legal interpretation; by disregarding the plain and common sense reading of the instrument itself; by showing that the Constitution does not mean what it says, and says what it does not mean, by assuming that the written Constitution is to be interpreted in the light of a secret and unwritten understanding of its framers, which understanding is declared to be in favor of slavery.” Sounds familiar.

[David A. Graham: It’s already different]

Trump’s executive order similarly rewrites the Constitution by fiat, something the president simply does not have the authority to do. The order, which purports to exclude the U.S.-born children of unauthorized immigrants from citizenship, states that such children are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the U.S. and therefore not included in the amendment’s language extending citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States.” This makes no sense on its own terms—as the legal scholar Amanda Frost wrote earlier this month, “Undocumented immigrants must follow all federal and state laws. When they violate criminal laws, they are jailed. If they park illegally, they are ticketed.” The ultraconservative Federal Judge James C. Ho observed in 2006 that “Text, history, judicial precedent, and Executive Branch interpretation confirm that the Citizenship Clause reaches most U.S.-born children of aliens, including illegal aliens.”

As such, Trump’s executive order on birthright citizenship is an early test of the federal judiciary, and of the extent to which Republican-appointed judges and justices are willing to amend the Constitution from the bench just to give Trump what he wants. They have done so at least twice before, the first time by writing the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on insurrectionists running for office out of the Constitution, and the second time by seeking to protect Trump from prosecution by inventing an imperial presidential immunity out of whole cloth. But accepting Trump’s attempt to abolish birthright citizenship would have more direct consequences for millions of people, by nullifying the principle that almost anyone born here is American.

In the aftermath of the Civil War, white southerners tried to restore, at gunpoint, the slave society that had existed prior to the war, notwithstanding the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery. Republicans in Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment to secure equal citizenship and the Fifteenth Amendment to protect the right to vote regardless of race, amendments that guaranteed political and civil equality. The Civil War amendments, the work of the Republican Party, are the cornerstone of multiracial democracy in the United States. Despite this historic accomplishment, for the past 80 years or so, the party of Lincoln has aimed its efforts at repealing or nullifying them.

“Adopted as part of the effort to purge the United States of the legacy of slavery, birthright citizenship, with which the Fourteenth Amendment begins, remains an eloquent statement about the nature of American society, a powerful force for assimilation of the children of immigrants, and a repudiation of a long history of racism,” the historian Eric Foner writes in The Second Founding, a history of the Civil War amendments, though he is cautious to note that these principles were not always respected by the government—Jim Crow and Japanese internment being obvious examples. Birthright citizenship was “a dramatic repudiation of the powerful tradition of equating citizenship with whiteness, a doctrine built into the naturalization process from the outset and constitutionalized by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott.”

This detachment of American citizenship from whiteness was one of the parts of the Fourteenth Amendment that Democrats, at the time the party of white supremacy, hated the most. “Democratic members of Congress repeatedly identified American nationality with ‘the Caucasian race,’ insisted that the government ‘was made for white men,’ and objected to extending the ‘advantages’ of American citizenship to ‘the Negroes, the coolies, and the Indians,’” Foner writes.

Trump’s immigration braintrust sees things similarly. In emails with conservative reporters, Trump’s point man on immigration, Stephen Miller, praised articles attacking the 1965 repeal of racist restrictions on immigration that had been passed in 1921 and were intended to keep out nonwhite people, Southern and Eastern Europeans, and Jews. These laws again redefined American citizenship in racist terms, and helped inspire the Nazis. The end of those restrictions meant that more nonwhite immigrants were able to gain citizenship in the United States, a phenomenon conservatives have dubbed a “Great Replacement,” borrowing a concept from white-supremacist sources. That the Trump coalition now includes people who would have been shut out by Miller’s preferred immigration policies does not change the fact that Trump’s immigration advisers view the decline of the white share of the population as an apocalyptic occurrence that must be reversed. It is no accident that this project begins with the nullification of constitutional language guaranteeing citizenship regardless of race or country of origin.

[Martha S. Jones: The real origins of birthright citizenship]

Republicans have made significant inroads among nonwhite voters in the past few years. Their reasons for supporting Trump change neither the intent of his entourage nor the effects of his policies. A successful repeal of birthright citizenship would mean the so-called pro-life party creates a class of stateless infants, a shadow caste mostly unprotected by law. It would require Americans to prove their citizenship time and time again, and leave them vulnerable to administrative errors that could endanger proof of their status. These burdens would likely fall disproportionately on those nonwhite people Trumpists see as their “replacers,” no matter how enthusiastic about Trump they might be.

Since the rise of Trump, the once-fringe idea that the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer citizenship on the children of undocumented immigrants has gained traction among ambitious conservatives whose malleable principles allow them to shape themselves to Trump’s whims. By November of 2024 the aforementioned Ho, who had previously written a detailed law-review article rejecting such theories, had become a bombastic, partisan Trumpist judge; he carefully retraced his steps and insisted that the birthright-citizenship clause doesn’t apply in the case of immigrant “invasion,” substituting Fox News talking points for legal reasoning.

This is the level of respect for the Constitution one can expect from conservative jurists in the Trump era. Whatever Trump says is correct. What the original framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood was that the necessities of multiracial democracy demand more than bowing and scraping before this sort of lawlessness. For now, neither party’s political leadership seems up to the task.