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Diamond League: Dina Asher-Smith third on return since injury at Tokyo Olympics

BBC News

www.bbc.co.uk › sport › av › athletics › 61443890

Watch as Great Britain's Dina Asher-Smith finishes third in the 200m at the opening meeting of the Diamond League in Doha, Qatar as America's Gabrielle Thomas is first with Jamaica's Shericka Jackson second.

Open Now: A Forest for the Trees

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › press-releases › archive › 2022 › 05 › forest-trees-glenn-kaino-open-now-los-angeles › 629854

A forest grows in downtown Los Angeles. Opening today with a limited run through summer 2022, A Forest for the Trees is an immersive art show created and directed by visionary artist Glenn Kaino, together with The Atlantic and Superblue, that is designed to inspire audiences to reimagine their relationship with the natural world.

A Forest for the Trees is open to all ages, and tickets are on sale now. Press should inquire about opportunities to tour the show. Installation photographs and show notes are also now available upon request. The show is joined by a culinary experience from celebrated local chef Minh Phan of porridge + puffs and PHENAKITE, and a shop conceived and curated in collaboration with ThunderVoice Eagle’s Thunder Voice Hat Co., whose work explores conditions of memory and the sacred, carrying on the lineage of sustainable, hand-crafted Native fashion through unique collaborations between Native cultures.

A Forest for the Trees is unlike anything that has come before it, taking visitors on a journey through a surreal forest of magic, music, and wonder—with animatronic performing trees, captivating illusions of fire that visitors can control with their hands, and multi-sensory storytelling, all hidden within a 28,000-square-foot space in downtown Los Angeles. The experience is steeped in histories inspired by the people closest to the forests and nearby neighborhoods: from an immersive interactive fire illusion referencing the controlled burns that are central to Native forest stewardship, to the symbolic resurrection of an iconic 144-year-old tree.

A Forest for the Trees is created and directed by internationally renowned, Los Angeles–based artist Glenn Kaino, working alongside Grammy-winning producer/musician David Sitek as part of the duo’s new band project, HIGH SEAS. The show is inspired by The Atlantic’s editorial series “Who Owns America’s Wilderness?,” which launched in 2021 with the cover story “Return the National Parks to the Tribes” written by David Treuer and edited by Ross Andersen, and by The Atlantic’s 165 years of writing by some of the most influential voices on America’s natural spaces. That tradition began with the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson, a co-founder of the magazine, and continued through the end of the 19th century, when John Muir made his case for the national parks in The Atlantic.

Over the past year, Kaino has been working alongside an interdisciplinary collective of artists, musicians, tribal leaders, and environmentalists to bring A Forest for the Trees to life. Kaino and his team also draw from more than a decade of deep research into the field of magic, including the production of the hit off-broadway show and film In & Of Itself. Vance Garrett (Sleep No More, Museum of Ice Cream) serves as executive producer, bringing his deep background in immersive theater to the show, which is organized in collaboration with Superblue’s senior curator Kathleen Forde.

“I have worked my entire career to build the tools and relationships that have allowed me to embark upon a project of this unprecedented scale and ambition, both conceptually and formally,” Kaino said. “Intergenerational problems of this magnitude require new thinking and new models about how we bring together traditional ecological knowledge and advanced technology. It is my hope that this show can provide inspiration into how to connect and contribute to some of the most pressing issues of our time, in a dynamic and exciting way that our audience can take home with them.”

The presenting sponsor is Mastercard, whose cardholders also receive exclusive benefits, including 10% off tickets and a one-month digital trial subscription to The Atlantic. Additionally, in support of Mastercard’s commitment to restore 100 million trees by 2025 through the Priceless Planet Coalition, Conservation International will plant a tree for every ticket sold to the show.

Among the collaborators and creators involved with A Forest for the Trees:

Original music throughout the project is produced by Grammy Award–winning producer and musician David Sitek.

The show is narrated by actor Jesse Williams.

The singer-songwriters Priscilla Ahn, Kittie Harloe, and Alice Smith perform original songs by HIGH SEAS created for the show.

Laundi Keepseagle, a Lakota creative producer and community architect from the Standing Rock reservation, has been a key collaborator.

Bill Tripp, Director of the Department of Natural Resources, from the Karuk Tribe, important stewards of the California forests and the inspiration for many of the artworks, has been the primary consultant for the project.

Ukrainian art director Kirill Yeretsky created illustrations that help bring the stories to life.

Dakota and Lakota teacher and community organizer Breanne Luger is contributing writing and performances.

The project is developed and executive produced by Atlantic Ventures, a business development group at The Atlantic that creates large-scale initiatives grounded in The Atlantic’s most consequential journalism.

A Forest for the Trees
Website: AForestLA.com
Location: Ace Mission Studios at 516 South Mission Road, Los Angeles
Tickets: $10–$50 (children and adults, peak and non-peak)
Dates: Opening Friday, May 13, for a limited run through summer 2022
General Hours: Wednesday–Sunday, 12–6pm (check for daily hours)
Social Media Handles: @aforestLA on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok
Press Contacts: Paul Jackson and Anna Bross, The Atlantic, press@theatlantic.com

Will Fall’s Omicron Vaccines Come Too Late?

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › health › archive › 2022 › 05 › covid-vaccine-recipe-omicron-protection › 629846

Up here in the Northern Hemisphere, the spring weather’s just barely warming, but regulators in the United States are already wringing their hands over a tricksy fall brew: the contents of the COVID shot that vaccine makers are prepping for autumn, when all eligible Americans may be asked to dose up yet again (if, that is, Congress coughs up the money to actually buy the vaccines). In a recent advisory meeting convened by the FDA, Peter Marks, the director of the agency’s Center of Biologics Evaluation and Research, acknowledged the “very compressed time frame” in which experts will need to finalize the inoculation’s ingredients—probably, he said, by the end of June.

Which is, for the record, right around the corner. A big choice is looming. And whatever version of the virus that scientists select for America’s next jab is “probably going to be the wrong one,” says Allie Greaney, who studies the push and pull between viruses and the immune system at the University of Washington and the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center.

Unavoidably, several months will separate the selection of this autumn’s vaccine and the deployment of said shot. That’s eons in coronavirus time. Half a year ago, we were all still living in Delta’s world; now a whole gaggle of Omicrons are running the show. Any decision that scientists make in June will have to involve assumptions about how SARS-CoV-2 will shape-shift in the future, which exactly no one is eager to make. “We keep getting burned,” says Adam Lauring, a virologist at the University of Michigan. Perhaps the virus will stay on its Omicron bender, making an Omicron vaccine—a favorite for the fall’s jab jubilee—sound like a no-brainer. Or perhaps by the time summer’s through, it will have moved on to a Rho, Sigma, or Chi that sproings out from somewhere totally unexpected and undermines that Omicron shot. With so many people around the world harboring some degree of immunity, the virus is being forced to continually reinvent itself, and no one knows what new costumes it might try on next.

[Read: We might not need annual COVID shots]

Our choice of fall shot, then, is inevitably going to be a gamble and a guess. But with the clock ticking down, most of the experts I’ve been talking with think an ingredient swap is wise, and probably inevitable. “We should be updating the vaccines now or yesterday,” said Jonathan Abraham, a physician and immunologist at Harvard Medical School. Modeled on the version of the virus that kick-started the crisis more than two years ago, our current crop of immunizations is still guarding against severe illness and death. But that OG variant has long since fizzled out—leaving our shots, in this one sense, frozen in the past, while the real SARS-CoV-2 continues to race ahead. A 2022 revamp might finally give our vaccines a chance to close some of that gap.

The decision that regulators make in early summer won’t just be about a boost. In the recent advisory meeting, Marks emphasized that any vaccine updates would be expected to be comprehensive, replacing old formulations as both boosters and primary-series doses; after the changeover, people who haven’t gotten their first doses—who number in the tens of millions in the U.S. alone, and would include future generations of kids—might not be able to nab an original-recipe shot. “We would not be going backwards,” Marks told the committee. “It would be too confusing and potentially dangerous to have different regimens.”

The same system shuffles the populace through a new flu-shot formulation year after year, and it usually works just fine. Those viruses have been twining themselves into the human population for centuries; host and pathogen have settled into an uneasy rhythm, with a more or less set flu season playing out in most parts of the world each year. Last year’s successful flu strains tend to give rise to this year’s, which then sire next year’s—a phenomenon scientists call “ladder-like evolution,” because of its soothing stepwise shape. To concoct the forthcoming season’s flu shot, “we do surveillance; we figure out what to be prepared for,” Lauring told me. With SARS-CoV-2, however, “the dynamics are still so wacky.” Waves of infection crest and crash in different countries every few months; the virus is still sloshing out new variants and subvariants at breakneck speed. The emergence of coronavirus iterations has also been less ladder-ish and more radial, like spokes erupting out of the center of a bicycle wheel: Alpha did not beget Delta, which did not birth Omicron.

In recent months, though, the virus appears to have taken a different tack. Since the end of 2021, nearly everything’s been coming up Omicron. From BA.1 (a.k.a. Omicron classic) to BA.2, and now the rising BA.2.12.1, BA.4, and BA.5, the last few viral successions have all occurred within the Omicron clan. So our next move might seem obvious: counter with an Omicron-centric vaccine, a switch some experts have been favoring for months. On that front, Moderna and Pfizer might soon deliver. The two vaccine makers have each been testing, among other options, bespoke BA.1 versions of their shots that they say could be ready within the next few months, just in time for a pre-winter inoculation push. “We plan to have a data readout soon,” Jerica Pitts, a spokesperson for Pfizer, wrote in an email.

[Read: Why can’t we just call BA.2 Omicron?]

By numbers alone, there is a pretty strong likelihood that more BA-whatever subvariants will come down the pike. And as a booster, especially, an Omicron shot could have clear perks, shoring up the defenses laid down by previous doses while also, ideally, pushing a new batch of immune cells to wise up to the variant’s unique and never-before-seen quirks, says Marion Pepper, an immunologist at the University of Washington. The hope is that Pfizer’s and Moderna’s data will back that notion up and show that people boosted with Omicron’s spike are better at duking it out with most of the BA fam than those who are injected with the original recipe again. But there’s also a chance that the evidence won’t bear this out. A smattering of recent studies, some in animals, hint that chasing an original-recipe shot with something Omicron-y might not push the body to develop a ton of Omicron-specific defenses, at least not at first; studied head-to-head, a BA.1 booster and an OG booster performed about the same. Pepper still has faith that a lesson on Omicron’s spike will pay dividends—the effects just might take more time to unspool. Taia Wang, an immunologist at Stanford, agrees. “Boosting with Omicron will almost certainly provide more immunity against currently circulating strains,” she told me. Currently could quickly become previously, though, if another variant elbows in. Although the virus’s evolution might look sort of, kind of, more stepwise right now, “we’ve seen the different lineages pass the baton back and forth,” Siobain Duffy, a virologist at Rutgers University, told me. “There’s absolutely nothing stopping a similar large jump in SARS-CoV-2 evolution from happening again.”

Perhaps the bigger worry is whether BA.1 will end up being a terrible teacher when deployed as an unvaccinated person’s starter shot. The variant’s bizarro-looking spike, so unlike any that came before it, is such an outlier that it may fail to show an unsavvy immune system how to recognize other morphs of SARS-CoV-2. That’s not a problem if the future of the virus stays hooked on Omicron. But should it be booted by another variant more resembling Alpha, Delta, or something else, bodies schooled on BA.1 alone might be ill-prepared. Pfizer, which is testing a triple-Omicron series in a group of previously unjabbed people, could produce data to the contrary. Absent those, a premature pivot to Omicron might bias immune systems toward the wrong track.

[Read: Should we go all in on Omicron vaccines?]

If an Omicron-only vaccine is starting to sound like a possible lose-lose situation, maybe it’s no surprise that the experts I spoke with ran the entire gamut of opinions about it. “If I could get an Omicron booster now, I definitely would,” Wang told me. Harvard’s Abraham said that he’s in the same boat. Meanwhile, John Wherry, an immunologist at the University of Pennsylvania, was one of several scientists who said that option’s a “nope”—safer, they said, to keep something with OG. The most common refrain, though, was, I’m not sure, and I’m glad I’m not the one deciding.

There could still be a quasi-compromise: a dose that includes two spike variations, maybe more, in the same shot. So-called bi- and multivalent vaccines are already in the works; both Moderna and Pfizer are slurrying together spikes from BA.1 and the OG coronavirus variant, a recipe that Moderna executives have repeatedly described as their “lead candidate for fall 2022.” That tactic could simultaneously enhance and focus the body’s defenses, says Lexi Walls, a biochemist and vaccine developer at the University of Washington. Such combo shots are the wary vaccinologist’s hedge: They might offer both a reminder of a version of the virus that most immune systems have already seen, as well as a preview of what might still be to come.

Cramming several spikes together isn’t a perfect solution. A recipe that’s half BA.1 and half OG won’t necessarily yield an immune response that splits the difference. Such a concoction also doesn’t fully solve the problems of an Omicron-only vaccine. The pesky delay between design and deployment always puts the humans behind: BA.1 may no longer be the most relevant form of Omicron to use, because it’s rapidly being ousted by speedier siblings. And a body trained on BA.1 might have some trouble tussling with some of its more irksome kin, which appear to circumvent some of the antibodies their predecessor lays down. The BA subvariants, for now, share the name Omicron, but in reality, some of them are “just as divergent as some of the variants of concern that have their own Greek letter,” says Jemma Geoghegan, a virologist at the University of Otago, in New Zealand.

Several experts, including UW’s Greaney and Michigan’s Lauring, told me that, in an ideal world, they would have liked to see BA.2’s spike slotted into the next shot instead. That’s not necessarily a reason to forgo an upgrade to BA.1, though, because that could still better familiarize bodies with other Omicron offshoots than if they were left none the wiser. Strain-vaccine mismatches happen all the time with flu shots, Geogeghan points out, and even so, those vaccines “are still really good at protecting against severe disease and death.”

Experts won’t know for sure how bivalent vaccines will fare until Moderna and Pfizer publish data from their ongoing trials. Omicron-only shots might outperform them; original-recipe boosters might still trounce them all; none of those data will have clear bearing on the next theoretical variant to rise. Abraham, for one, isn’t quite sold on the idea of a bivalent vaccine. “We don’t know what the second-best antigen would be” after Omicron’s spike, he told me; pick the wrong one, and it may just end up wasting space in shots. He’d prefer to lean into Omicron’s ongoing monopoly, he said, and model the next shot on only that. (Moderna is also trialing a Beta-OG bivalent shot—remember Beta?—that the company says is performing well, even against BA.1.)

Vaccines may not always need to lag variants this much. Geogeghan expects that the pace at which new, antibody-dodging variants sprout off the coronavirus family tree will eventually slow down. And researchers such as Walls, at UW, are working on universal vaccines that may be able to guard against a whole menagerie of coronavirus iterations—perhaps even ones that haven’t yet been detected—so that the game of variant whack-a-mole can end.

Until then, experts are working with limited options, based on limited data—and there is yet another option that may feel like the easiest of all: Do nothing, and stick with the vaccines we have. They are, after all, still performing extraordinarily well, especially when delivered in full rounds of at least three doses; it’s what’s known, and maybe, what feels safe. Among the dozen-plus experts I spoke with for this piece, there wasn’t consensus on what our next vaccine’s main ingredients should be. Still, most agreed on this: The worst thing to do would be to stay stagnant with our shots—to miss an opportunity to move our understanding forward when the virus has already gained so much ground. “We’re always playing catch-up,” says Karthik Gangavarapu, a computational biologist at UCLA. “But if we don’t do anything, we’re for sure not going to be able to win the race.”

What Americans Really Think About Abortion

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2022 › 05 › public-opinion-abortion-rights-overturn-roe › 629840

The relationship between public opinion and the codification of rights is not linear. Public opinion lagged decades behind the courts on the question of interracial marriage, but led the way on same-sex marriage. In theory, rights supersede public opinion—you should have the right to free speech even if what you’re saying is very unpopular. In practice, rights are safer when they are popular.

Now that the Supreme Court seems poised to reverse itself on Roe v. Wade, abortion-rights advocates and anti-abortion advocates are both claiming the mantle of popularity. Who’s right? I dug into the numbers, and found that views were more straightforward than I’d thought—and the exercise was more disquieting than I’d anticipated.

Most people want abortion to be legal, and they want restrictions on its availability. Beyond that basic position, however, voters’ views can appear contradictory. That’s in part because, although Americans tell pollsters that the details of an abortion policy are important in determining whether or not they will support it, survey respondents display very little knowledge of the relevant details.

[Kimberly Wehle: What we keep getting wrong about abortion]

One study indicates that myths about abortion are pervasive enough to skew voters’ understanding of the issue. Women correctly answered 18 percent of questions about abortion regulations in their state, and correctly identified only 23 percent of true statements about abortion. For instance, many incorrectly believe that “childbirth is safer than abortion” and that “abortion causes depression and anxiety.”

Similarly, in 2016 poll by Vox and Perry/Undem of 1,060 registered voters, only 19 percent of respondents correctly answered that giving birth was less safe than having an abortion; 31 percent of respondents said they weren’t sure whether doctors who provide abortions are “licensed medical professionals like other doctors.” (The answer is yes, they are).

Americans may not have a firm grasp of the details. But pollsters have still been able to learn a few clear lessons about attitudes on abortion policy.

Views about abortion are unusually stable

In 1958, when Gallup first asked Americans whether they approved of marriage between Black and white people, only 4 percent said yes. That number rose steadily over the next 50 years: In 1967, when the Supreme Court ruled in Loving v. Virginia that bans on interracial marriage were unconstitutional, approval stood at a little less than 20 percent; in 1997, 64 percent; and in 2021, 94 percent.

In 1937, when Gallup polled Americans about whether they were willing to vote for a woman presidential candidate, 33 percent said yes; in 1959, 57 percent said yes; and at the end of the century, 92 percent answered affirmatively.

In 1996, just 27 percent of Americans told Gallup that they believed same-sex marriages should be recognized as equal to “traditional marriages.” By 2015, when the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that states had to recognize same-sex marriage, that number had shot up to 60 percent.  

Abortion is different. In the 1970s, a large majority of Americans wanted abortion to be legal in at least certain circumstances. That remains true today.

[From the May 2022 issue: The future of abortion in a post-Roe America]

“You look at anything like support for interracial marriage or voting for a woman for president or gay marriage or legalizing marijuana … all of the cultural shifts that have happened since the dawn of polling, and this is the thing that hasn’t shifted. Abortion is a real exception in the cultural landscape,” Lydia Saad, Gallup’s director of U.S. social research, told me.

In a comprehensive review of abortion polling, the American Enterprise Institute’s Karlyn Bowman found that—across decades, pollsters, and different types of questions—attitudes have remained stable since the 1970s. For example, a 1990 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found that 57 percent of Americans believed “the choice [to have an abortion] should be left up to the woman and her doctor.” In October 2009, this number was 51 percent. A Yankelovich/Time/CNN poll from August 1987 found that 34 percent of Americans believed abortion was the “woman’s decision no matter what the reason”; 39 percent said the same in January 2003. In August 1997, 40 percent of people identified themselves as pro-life to a Fox News pollster; in June 2019, that number was 45 percent.

Saad told me that opinions about abortion have also remained stable within generational cohorts across time. Women ages 18 to 29 in 1975 had roughly the same views as women ages 63 to 75 today: “The same age group will flash forward 50 years, and the balance of views hasn’t changed on the legality question. So these are hardwired,” she explained.

People want abortion to be legal, but favor a variety of restrictions

Gallup has found that the number of people favoring legal abortion under any circumstance has consistently outstripped the number of those wanting it to be illegal under any circumstance since 1975. But the broad center of public opinion says that abortion should be legal only “under certain circumstances.” This number has bounced from 54 percent in 1975 to a high of 61 percent in 1997 to 48 percent in 2021.

What are those circumstances? Americans are sympathetic to women seeking abortions if they are victims of rape or incest, if they have a serious health concern, or if the baby will be born with a disability. They are significantly less willing to approve of abortion in cases of economic hardship or personal preference.

To put some numbers on it: In 1972, 83 percent of Americans agreed that abortions should be allowed when “a woman’s health [is] seriously endangered by the pregnancy” and 72 percent said the same when the pregnancy is the product of rape. In 2021, those numbers were 87 percent and 84 percent, respectively.

At least 70 percent of Americans since 1972 have also favored legal abortion if “there is a strong chance of a serious defect in [the] baby.”

A poll conducted by NORC at the University of Chicago semiregularly from 1972 to 2018 found that Americans are evenly split on the acceptability of abortion if the “family has [a] very low income and cannot afford any more children” or if a woman is married and doesn’t want any more children. (The precise figures in 2018 were 47 percent and 49 percent in support, respectively.)

On the question of timing, polls by Gallup/CNN/USA Today and Associated Press/NORC from 1996 to 2021 reveal that more than 60 percent of Americans say abortion “should be generally legal” in the first three months of a pregnancy. That number drops precipitously, to the low 30s, when Americans are asked about the second trimester, and to below 20 percent when they’re asked about the third.

Various restrictions have broad support as well. In 2011, 69 percent of respondents told Gallup that they support a law forcing women seeking abortions to wait 24 hours before having one. In that same year, 71 percent said minors should have to get parental consent for an abortion. And in 2005, a Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll found 64 percent support for requiring that the “husband of a married woman be notified if she decides to have an abortion.”

Respondents may not understand how cumbersome these requirements are. “Most voters are trying to express really vague concepts through these incredibly specific questions that we ask them,” Charlotte Swasey, a Democratic strategist and pollster, told me.

Relatedly, laws that ban abortions in the second trimester don’t represent a middle-ground consensus position, because states that pass them also tend to put up barriers to getting abortions early on.

[Helen Lewis: How to win the abortion argument]

One 2006 study indicated that 91 percent of women who had an abortion in the second trimester would have preferred to terminate their pregnancy earlier. Some 67 percent of second-trimester patients, for instance, said they’d had to delay having their abortion because it took them so long to make arrangements; 36 percent said “it took some time before I knew I was pregnant or how far along I was.”

The political salience of abortion

On the national level, voters have generally trusted Democrats over Republicans on abortion policy. In 2012, when the Pew Research Center asked voters whether President Barack Obama or his rival in the election, Mitt Romney, was better suited to handle abortion policy, Obama edged out Romney 55 percent to 36 percent. (The same poll showed that 54 percent of voters believed correctly that Romney was pro-life, whereas 21 percent believed that incorrectly of Obama.)

Perhaps surprisingly, given how contentious abortion is in the national conversation, voters tend not to rank it as high as other issues. In an October 2021 YouGov/Economist poll, 44 percent of respondents said that abortion was “very important” to them but only 4 percent named it as a “top issue.”

But of the people who do rank abortion highly, anti-abortion advocates are more likely to subject their candidates to litmus tests on the issue. In a 2015 Gallup poll, 23 percent of those opposed to abortion and 19 percent of abortion-rights supporters said they would vote only for candidates who shared their views on the issue.

This dynamic could be shifting. As FiveThirtyEight reported, “After the Supreme Court allowed a highly restrictive abortion law to go into effect in Texas last fall, the share of Biden voters who said abortion is a ‘very important’ issue for them jumped, while the share of Trump voters who said the same thing fell.”

All of the aforementioned polling has been conducted nationally, but with the imminent demise of Roe likely, the politics of abortion will happen at the state level, where public opinion varies significantly and where Republican legislatures are ready to severely restrict or eliminate abortion rights.

I found writing this essay difficult. While scrolling through poll after poll, I resented that I had to care about public opinion on something as private as a medical decision. The doctor’s office is crowded enough without inviting in the opinions of 300 million Americans. I can’t imagine weighing in on someone’s decision to donate an organ, or to stop treatment for a difficult disease. My irritation only compounded as the survey data revealed a public that feels a sense of ownership over my choices. I imagine the median voter staring disapprovingly at me with a clipboard, trying to determine if I deserve full decision-making authority over my body. Nobody should get to volunteer my body, my time, and my life to the state, no matter how unpopular my choices.

For now, few believe that they should have the ability to impose their opinions about abortion via state violence. Pew has found that 47 percent of American adults say women should face penalties for getting an abortion “in a situation where it is illegal.” When pressed, however, only 14 percent of respondents think that jail time is an appropriate punishment, another 16 percent support community service, and 17 percent remain unsure.

But we can expect the disconnect to grow between what Americans want and what they get. Republicans in states across the country have passed or are pondering legislation well outside the mainstream of public opinion. So-called heartbeat bills, which have been proposed in several states, would limit abortion to the first six weeks, before many women even know they are pregnant. In Louisiana, Republicans are considering a bill that would treat abortion as murder, meaning patients could be charged as criminals. In Oklahoma, the second Roe falls, abortion will be banned, with no exception for rape or incest. To put a fine point on it, these are extremely radical policies, intended to almost entirely eradicate abortions.

The effect will be significant. One study that looked at 1,178 counties in 18 states from 2000 to 2014 found that “highly restrictive” abortion policies led to a 17 percent decrease from the median abortion rate. Another study estimated that total abortion bans would lead to a 21 percent increase in deaths due to pregnancy-related mortality. This is the new reality, one that has not felt possible while most women of childbearing age have been alive.

Americans’ views have remained stable under a relatively stable legal framework. But when stories of women seeking unsafe and illegal abortions hit the front pages, when victims of rape or incest find themselves forced to bear children, when underfunded social services struggle to provide adequate care for newly born but uncared-for infants, all of that could change.

The Most Essential Work, the Lowest Pay

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › family › archive › 2022 › 05 › unpaid-domestic-labor-essential-work › 629839

About a year into the pandemic, at an emotional low, I entered the hours I spent caring for my family and our home into the online Invisible Labor Calculator to see how much my work might be worth. It was created by the journalist Amy Westervelt, who used Bureau of Labor Statistics data to assign an hourly wage to different tasks—cleaning, considering the emotional needs of family members, doing yard work, cooking, etc. I was floored when the calculator told me that my annual wage should be more than $300,000, which would make being a domestic worker the highest-paying job I’ve ever had. By far.  

According to Oxfam, if women around the world made minimum wage for all the unpaid hours of care work they performed in 2019, they would have earned $10.8 trillion. In America alone, they would have earned $1.5 trillion, according to an analysis by The New York Times.

[Read: Becoming a parent during the pandemic was the hardest thing I’ve ever done]

Even care work that is paid is hardly ever paid enough. For many domestic workers, providing quality care means forging intimate, familial relationships and acquiring professional knowledge that is sensual and personal.

This article was adapted from Angela Garbes’s new book Essential Labor

This expertise lives in the bodies of women of color throughout America. Ninety-two percent of domestic workers are women, and 57 percent of them are Black, Hispanic, Asian American, or Pacific Islander. We entrust the safety and cleanliness of our homes to Latin American workers, who make up 62 percent of house cleaners. Whether they maintain our house, care for our elders, or watch our children, there is a wide and long-standing gap between the wages of domestic workers and all other workers in America. Whereas the median wage for workers in this country is nearly $20 an hour, it is barely $12 for domestic workers. The gap is widest for nannies—97 percent of whom are women—who earn a median of just $11.60 an hour. And although the cost of living has steadily risen, domestic workers’ wages have remained mostly stagnant for decades.                                                                   

“White class-privileged women in the United States have historically freed themselves of reproductive labor by purchasing the low-wage services of women of color,” Rhacel Salazar Parreñas writes in her study of Filipina immigration and international reproductive labor.

[Read: How domestic workers enable well-off women to prosper]

How did we get to this place where essential work is so devalued? We are entrusting what we say is most precious—our children, our future—to other people, yet we are not willing to pay them a living wage? This is by design. American capitalism relies on free and cheap domestic labor. Our economic systems cannot be truly equitable and just unless we compensate care work fairly.

Associations of caregiving with women and the domestic sphere and of “real work” with the money and activities outside the home run deep. But they are actually fairly recent concepts, historically speaking. “The division between ‘home’ and ‘workplace’ didn’t exist in feudal Europe [where] women worked as doctors, butchers, teachers, retailers, and smiths,” the labor journalist Sarah Jaffe writes. But the home was excluded from the idea of the “market” under capitalism.

Placing reproductive labor outside of market relations is what upholds the professional world that relies on domestic laborers. If those who do “professional” work had to commensurately pay the care workers who made their jobs possible, less profit would be made. Without care workers, the system falls apart.                

The work of mothering remains out of sight and out of mind to many because it occurs in the home. The scholars Raj Patel and Jason W. Moore call this confinement of women, which began in the 17th century, the “Great Domestication.”

Domestication moved people away from a more communal way of living. Men ventured out and worked for employers, in fields and factories, and earned an individual wage. Women stayed in and oversaw the home, where they kept men fed and comfortable, and gave birth to the next generation of workers. This paved the way for the promotion of the nuclear family as the primary framework for organizing our lives: a single household unit with private property (a wife was property), where the children she raised became the means to protect and pass down wealth. This arrangement cemented the notion that domestic work is women’s work, natural and good, done with no expectation of compensation: a labor of love. That ethos—of each household going it alone—prevails today.

[Read: My husband paid me to do housework]

After the Great Depression, which left so many Americans destitute, the federal government stepped in to help families. The concept of a “family wage,” a guaranteed minimum wage that would be enough to support a working husband, a housewife, and a couple of children, became popular. While New Deal programs came closer to providing a family wage, that grand idea was doomed in predictably American ways: Lawmakers from the South didn’t believe that Black men and women should be entitled to the same wages and opportunities as white people. So the protections excluded two types of laborers: agricultural workers and domestic workers. These jobs were commonly held by Black people.   

Little progress has been made toward fair pay for domestic work. The division between home and work remains paramount. Since the 1960s, women’s participation in the waged workforce has steadily risen. But as Jaffe notes, in the current age, when many women work both outside and inside the home, “we hear a lot about ‘work-life’ balance, but not enough about how, for everyone ‘life’ (code for ‘family’) means ‘unpaid work.’”                                                            

In the 20th century, one of the most notable efforts to improve the lives of care workers and mothers was the welfare-rights movement. Established in 1966, the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), led by Black women such as Johnnie Tillmon, organized for expanded access and entitlements for women eligible for welfare, which at the time was called Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). The NWRO used direct action—holding sit-ins and disrupting welfare offices—as well as marches and rallies to lobby for greater benefits and the elimination of punitive policies. Eventually, the NWRO started a campaign to benefit all people in America, not just AFDC mothers and families.

In a 1972 article for Ms. magazine titled “Welfare Is a Women’s Issue,” Tillmon laid out the organization’s vision for a guaranteed adequate income:

There would be no “categories”—men, women, children, single, married, kids, no kids— just poor people who need aid. You’d get paid according to need and family size only and that would be upped as the cost of living goes up …

In other words, I’d start paying women a living wage for doing the work we are already doing—child-raising and house-keeping. And the welfare crisis would be over, just like that.

The NWRO came very close to winning a guaranteed income. President Richard Nixon put forth a Family Assistance Plan that, as Jaffe writes, “would have given a basic income to more than ten million people.” Ultimately, Nixon’s plan did not pass, and instead America got Ronald Reagan and the racist narrative of the “welfare queen.” But that the NWRO came as close as it did to enacting a guaranteed income for caregivers suggests that this is possible. Though they did not succeed in everything they fought for, the NWRO and its allies did improve conditions for thousands of families, helping them access all the benefits they were legally entitled to. As Tillmon wrote, “Maybe we poor welfare women will really liberate women in this country.”

When most of us imagine economies, domestic or international, we picture workers toiling in factories or offices, money being wire transferred, stocks and bonds traded: all activities that play out in public, highly visible. But the global economy is also driven by domestic labor—happening in laundry rooms and nurseries, performed on hands and knees, sponge or toilet brush in hand.                    

I’m Pinay, my husband is white, and we have relied on my mother’s unpaid labor, as well as the paid labor of immigrants and Latina, Black, and Chinese women, to care for our children. I continue to navigate my place as an American woman of color who is financially privileged. I’ve been mistaken by strangers for my light-skinned daughters’ caretaker, which has angered me and also forced me to question why it makes me angry. This tension has made me bold, willing to speak out in solidarity with caregivers in some instances. At other times, it’s made me quiet and embarrassed. I can claim otherness, I know it intimately, but I have always understood that, if things fell apart, I could ask for help, that I would never be left destitute or totally alone.

Women who can easily work outside the home are still not free or unburdened from other people. We are dependent on our nannies, cleaners, personal Instacart shoppers, DoorDash delivery drivers, parents, co-parents, and in-laws. The domestic load is as heavy as ever, but those who have means often spread it out among multiple people. This is not real progress.

Care is expected to be cheap the world over, in part because the global economy doesn’t have the ability to properly value care work; conventional economic measures—concepts such as supply, demand, and markets—fall woefully short. But the failures of imagination that have led to this moment don’t have to dictate that care work not be assigned monetary value going forward, or that we shouldn’t try.

We have gotten glimpses of what is possible when women insist on being fully visible and valued.  On October 24, 1975, when women in Iceland staged the Women’s Strike. An estimated 90 percent of women did not show up for work that day—in and outside the home—and it brought Iceland’s economy to its knees. Factories, schools, and nurseries were closed, and men either called in to stay home from work or took their children with them. In the decades that have followed, some of the strike’s agenda has taken hold. In 2018, Iceland became the first country in the world to require employers with more than 25 employees to give women and men equal pay for equal work. Part of the strike’s legacy is showing that organizing on a mass scale is possible, and that such a demonstration of solidarity made lasting impressions.

If we reframe domestic work as essential labor and insist upon its centrality in a global labor movement, we create opportunities for solidarity among caregivers, mothers, and all workers. Unity can exist across gender identities, international borders, and disparate industries, rooted in any work that exploits an invisible labor force. Because caregivers are no different from ride-share drivers, sanitation workers, welders, teachers, physicians, and nurses. Those of us who outsource care work are no different from our nannies and child-care workers and the people cleaning our homes. Our issues are the same as those of the women we have paid to take care of our children—for me, that means I stand with Maria, Josephine, Huang Ping, Belen, Ceci, Mari, Marta, Sandra, and Titi.            

We have been trained to view our houses and apartments as private refuges, but they must also be seen for what they are: sites of work and monetary exchange that are part of the global economy. Redefining the workplace, as so many of us have during the COVID-19 pandemic, is a step toward this vision. Work, we now all know, has never been confined to the office or the field or the factory. It was always happening in the kitchen, garage, and backyard.

The pandemic has been an unprecedented opportunity to see the reality of modern American life: We are all workers, and all of our work is valuable. But it’s not enough to see that; the next step is to actually value it, with fair pay.

This article was adapted from Angela Garbes’s new book Essential Labor.

I Thought I Was Writing Fiction

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2022 › 05 › supreme-court-roe-handmaids-tale-abortion-margaret-atwood › 629833

In the early years of the 1980s, I was fooling around with a novel that explored a future in which the United States had become disunited. Part of it had turned into a theocratic dictatorship based on 17th-century New England Puritan religious tenets and jurisprudence. I set this novel in and around Harvard University—an institution that in the 1980s was renowned for its liberalism, but that had begun three centuries earlier chiefly as a training college for Puritan clergy.

In the fictional theocracy of Gilead, women had very few rights, as in 17th-century New England. The Bible was cherry-picked, with the cherries being interpreted literally. Based on the reproductive arrangements in Genesis—specifically, those of the family of Jacob—the wives of high-ranking patriarchs could have female slaves, or “handmaids,” and those wives could tell their husbands to have children by the handmaids and then claim the children as theirs.

Although I eventually completed this novel and called it The Handmaid’s Tale, I stopped writing it several times, because I considered it too far-fetched. Silly me. Theocratic dictatorships do not lie only in the distant past: There are a number of them on the planet today. What is to prevent the United States from becoming one of them?

[Read: Margaret Atwood on envy and friendship in old age]

For instance: It is now the middle of 2022, and we have just been shown a leaked opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States that would overthrow settled law of 50 years on the grounds that abortion is not mentioned in the Constitution, and is not “deeply rooted” in our “history and tradition.” True enough. The Constitution has nothing to say about women’s reproductive health. But the original document does not mention women at all.

Women were deliberately excluded from the franchise. Although one of the slogans of the Revolutionary War of 1776 was “No taxation without representation,” and government by consent of the governed was also held to be a good thing, women were not to be represented or governed by their own consent—only by proxy, through their fathers or husbands. Women could neither consent nor withhold consent, because they could not vote. That remained the case until 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, an amendment that many strongly opposed as being against the original Constitution. As it was.

Women were nonpersons in U.S. law for a lot longer than they have been persons. If we start overthrowing settled law using Justice Samuel Alito’s justifications, why not repeal votes for women?

Reproductive rights have been the focus of the recent fracas, but only one side of the coin has been visible: the right to abstain from giving birth. The other side of that coin is the power of the state to prevent you from reproducing. The Supreme Court’s 1927 Buck v. Bell decision held that the state may sterilize people without their consent. Although the decision was nullified by subsequent cases, and state laws that permitted large-scale sterilization have been repealed, Buck v. Bell is still on the books. This kind of eugenicist thinking was once regarded as “progressive,” and some 70,000 sterilizations—of both males and females, but mostly of females—took place in the United States. Thus a “deeply rooted” tradition is that women’s reproductive organs do not belong to the women who possess them. They belong only to the state.

Wait, you say: It’s not about the organs; it’s about the babies. Which raises some questions. Is an acorn an oak tree? Is a hen’s egg a chicken? When does a fertilized human egg become a full human being or person? “Our” traditions—let’s say those of the ancient Greeks, the Romans, the early Christians—have vacillated on this subject. At “conception”? At “heartbeat”? At “quickening?” The hard line of today’s anti-abortion activists is at “conception,” which is now supposed to be the moment at which a cluster of cells becomes “ensouled.” But any such judgment depends on a religious belief—namely, the belief in souls. Not everyone shares such a belief. But all, it appears, now risk being subjected to laws formulated by those who do. That which is a sin within a certain set of religious beliefs is to be made a crime for all.

Let’s look at the First Amendment. It reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The writers of the Constitution, being well aware of the murderous religious wars that had torn Europe apart ever since the rise of Protestantism, wished to avoid that particular death trap. There was to be no state religion. Nor was anyone to be prevented by the state from practicing his or her chosen religion.

[Read: The challenge of Margaret Atwood]

It ought to be simple: If you believe in “ensoulment” at conception, you should not get an abortion, because to do so is a sin within your religion. If you do not so believe, you should not—under the Constitution—be bound by the religious beliefs of others. But should the Alito opinion become the newly settled law, the United States looks to be well on the way to establishing a state religion. Massachusetts had an official religion in the 17th century. In adherence to it, the Puritans hanged Quakers.

The Alito opinion purports to be based on America’s Constitution. But it relies on English jurisprudence from the 17th century, a time when a belief in witchcraft caused the death of many innocent people. The Salem witchcraft trials were trials—they had judges and juries—but they accepted “spectral evidence,” in the belief that a witch could send her double, or specter, out into the world to do mischief. Thus, if you were sound asleep in bed, with many witnesses, but someone reported you supposedly doing sinister things to a cow several miles away, you were guilty of witchcraft. You had no way of proving otherwise.

Similarly, it will be very difficult to disprove a false accusation of abortion. The mere fact of a miscarriage, or a claim by a disgruntled former partner, will easily brand you a murderer. Revenge and spite charges will proliferate, as did arraignments for witchcraft 500 years ago.

If Justice Alito wants you to be governed by the laws of the 17th century, you should take a close look at that century. Is that when you want to live?

What Americans Really Think About Abortion

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2022 › 05 › public-opinion-abortion-rights-overtun-roe › 629840

The relationship between public opinion and the codification of rights is not linear. Public opinion lagged decades behind the courts on the question of interracial marriage, but led the way on same-sex marriage. In theory, rights supersede public opinion—you should have the right to free speech even if what you’re saying is very unpopular. In practice, rights are safer when they are popular.

Now that the Supreme Court seems poised to reverse itself on Roe v. Wade, abortion-rights advocates and anti-abortion advocates are both claiming the mantle of popularity. Who’s right? I dug into the numbers, and found that views were more straightforward than I’d thought—and the exercise was more disquieting than I’d anticipated.

Most people want abortion to be legal, and they want restrictions on its availability. Beyond that basic position, however, voters’ views can appear contradictory. That’s in part because, although Americans tell pollsters that the details of an abortion policy are important in determining whether or not they will support it, survey respondents display very little knowledge of the relevant details.

[Kimberly Wehle: What we keep getting wrong about abortion]

One study indicates that myths about abortion are pervasive enough to skew voters’ understanding of the issue. Women correctly answered 18 percent of questions about abortion regulations in their state, and correctly identified only 23 percent of true statements about abortion. For instance, many incorrectly believe that “childbirth is safer than abortion” and that “abortion causes depression and anxiety.”

Similarly, in 2016 poll by Vox and Perry/Undem of 1,060 registered voters, only 19 percent of respondents correctly answered that giving birth was less safe than having an abortion; 31 percent of respondents said they weren’t sure whether doctors who provide abortions are “licensed medical professionals like other doctors.” (The answer is yes, they are).

Americans may not have a firm grasp of the details. But pollsters have still been able to learn a few clear lessons about attitudes on abortion policy.

Views about abortion are unusually stable

In 1958, when Gallup first asked Americans whether they approved of marriage between Black and white people, only 4 percent said yes. That number rose steadily over the next 50 years: In 1967, when the Supreme Court ruled in Loving v. Virginia that bans on interracial marriage were unconstitutional, approval stood at a little less than 20 percent; in 1997, 64 percent; and in 2021, 94 percent.

In 1937, when Gallup polled Americans about whether they were willing to vote for a woman presidential candidate, 33 percent said yes; in 1959, 57 percent said yes; and at the end of the century, 92 percent answered affirmatively.

In 1996, just 27 percent of Americans told Gallup that they believed same-sex marriages should be recognized as equal to “traditional marriages.” By 2015, when the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that states had to recognize same-sex marriage, that number had shot up to 60 percent.  

Abortion is different. In the 1970s, a large majority of Americans wanted abortion to be legal in at least certain circumstances. That remains true today.

[From the May 2022 issue: The future of abortion in a post-Roe America]

“You look at anything like support for interracial marriage or voting for a woman for president or gay marriage or legalizing marijuana … all of the cultural shifts that have happened since the dawn of polling, and this is the thing that hasn’t shifted. Abortion is a real exception in the cultural landscape,” Lydia Saad, Gallup’s director of U.S. social research, told me.

In a comprehensive review of abortion polling, the American Enterprise Institute’s Karlyn Bowman found that—across decades, pollsters, and different types of questions—attitudes have remained stable since the 1970s. For example, a 1990 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found that 57 percent of Americans believed “the choice [to have an abortion] should be left up to the woman and her doctor.” In October 2009, this number was 51 percent. A Yankelovich/Time/CNN poll from August 1987 found that 34 percent of Americans believed abortion was the “woman’s decision no matter what the reason”; 39 percent said the same in January 2003. In August 1997, 40 percent of people identified themselves as pro-life to a Fox News pollster; in June 2019, that number was 45 percent.

Saad told me that opinions about abortion have also remained stable within generational cohorts across time. Women ages 18 to 29 in 1975 had roughly the same views as women ages 63 to 75 today: “The same age group will flash forward 50 years, and the balance of views hasn’t changed on the legality question. So these are hardwired,” she explained.

People want abortion to be legal, but favor a variety of restrictions

Gallup has found that the number of people favoring legal abortion under any circumstance has consistently outstripped the number of those wanting it to be illegal under any circumstance since 1975. But the broad center of public opinion says that abortion should be legal only “under certain circumstances.” This number has bounced from 54 percent in 1975 to a high of 61 percent in 1997 to 48 percent in 2021.

What are those circumstances? Americans are sympathetic to women seeking abortions if they are victims of rape or incest, if they have a serious health concern, or if the baby will be born with a disability. They are significantly less willing to approve of abortion in cases of economic hardship or personal preference.

To put some numbers on it: In 1972, 83 percent of Americans agreed that abortions should be allowed when “a woman’s health [is] seriously endangered by the pregnancy” and 72 percent said the same when the pregnancy is the product of rape. In 2021, those numbers were 87 percent and 84 percent, respectively.

At least 70 percent of Americans since 1972 have also favored legal abortion if “there is a strong chance of a serious defect in [the] baby.”

A poll conducted by NORC at the University of Chicago semiregularly from 1972 to 2018 found that Americans are evenly split on the acceptability of abortion if the “family has [a] very low income and cannot afford any more children” or if a woman is married and doesn’t want any more children. (The precise figures in 2018 were 47 percent and 49 percent in support, respectively.)

On the question of timing, polls by Gallup/CNN/USA Today and Associated Press/NORC from 1996 to 2021 reveal that more than 60 percent of Americans say abortion “should be generally legal” in the first three months of a pregnancy. That number drops precipitously, to the low 30s, when Americans are asked about the second trimester, and to below 20 percent when they’re asked about the third.

Various restrictions have broad support as well. In 2011, 69 percent of respondents told Gallup that they support a law forcing women seeking abortions to wait 24 hours before having one. In that same year, 71 percent said minors should have to get parental consent for an abortion. And in 2005, a Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll found 64 percent support for requiring that the “husband of a married woman be notified if she decides to have an abortion.”

Respondents may not understand how cumbersome these requirements are. “Most voters are trying to express really vague concepts through these incredibly specific questions that we ask them,” Charlotte Swasey, a Democratic strategist and pollster, told me.

Relatedly, laws that ban abortions in the second trimester don’t represent a middle-ground consensus position, because states that pass them also tend to put up barriers to getting abortions early on.

[Helen Lewis: How to win the abortion argument]

One 2006 study indicated that 91 percent of women who had an abortion in the second trimester would have preferred to terminate their pregnancy earlier. Some 67 percent of second-trimester patients, for instance, said they’d had to delay having their abortion because it took them so long to make arrangements; 36 percent said “it took some time before I knew I was pregnant or how far along I was.”

The political salience of abortion

On the national level, voters have generally trusted Democrats over Republicans on abortion policy. In 2012, when the Pew Research Center asked voters whether President Barack Obama or his rival in the election, Mitt Romney, was better suited to handle abortion policy, Obama edged out Romney 55 percent to 36 percent. (The same poll showed that 54 percent of voters believed correctly that Romney was pro-life, whereas 21 percent believed that incorrectly of Obama.)

Perhaps surprisingly, given how contentious abortion is in the national conversation, voters tend not to rank it as high as other issues. In an October 2021 YouGov/Economist poll, 44 percent of respondents said that abortion was “very important” to them but only 4 percent named it as a “top issue.”

But of the people who do rank abortion highly, anti-abortion advocates are more likely to subject their candidates to litmus tests on the issue. In a 2015 Gallup poll, 23 percent of those opposed to abortion and 19 percent of abortion-rights supporters said they would vote only for candidates who shared their views on the issue.

This dynamic could be shifting. As FiveThirtyEight reported, “After the Supreme Court allowed a highly restrictive abortion law to go into effect in Texas last fall, the share of Biden voters who said abortion is a ‘very important’ issue for them jumped, while the share of Trump voters who said the same thing fell.”

All of the aforementioned polling has been conducted nationally, but with the imminent demise of Roe likely, the politics of abortion will happen at the state level, where public opinion varies significantly and where Republican legislatures are ready to severely restrict or eliminate abortion rights.

I found writing this essay difficult. While scrolling through poll after poll, I resented that I had to care about public opinion on something as private as a medical decision. The doctor’s office is crowded enough without inviting in the opinions of 300 million Americans. I can’t imagine weighing in on someone’s decision to donate an organ, or to stop treatment for a difficult disease. My irritation only compounded as the survey data revealed a public that feels a sense of ownership over my choices. I imagine the median voter staring disapprovingly at me with a clipboard, trying to determine if I deserve full decision-making authority over my body. Nobody should get to volunteer my body, my time, and my life to the state, no matter how unpopular my choices.

For now, few believe that they should have the ability to impose their opinions about abortion via state violence. Pew has found that 47 percent of American adults say women should face penalties for getting an abortion “in a situation where it is illegal.” When pressed, however, only 14 percent of respondents think that jail time is an appropriate punishment, another 16 percent support community service, and 17 percent remain unsure.

But we can expect the disconnect to grow between what Americans want and what they get. Republicans in states across the country have passed or are pondering legislation well outside the mainstream of public opinion. So-called heartbeat bills, which have been proposed in several states, would limit abortion to the first six weeks, before many women even know they are pregnant. In Louisiana, Republicans are considering a bill that would treat abortion as murder, meaning patients could be charged as criminals. In Oklahoma, the second Roe falls, abortion will be banned, with no exception for rape or incest. To put a fine point on it, these are extremely radical policies, intended to almost entirely eradicate abortions.

The effect will be significant. One study that looked at 1,178 counties in 18 states from 2000 to 2014 found that “highly restrictive” abortion policies led to a 17 percent decrease from the median abortion rate. Another study estimated that total abortion bans would lead to a 21 percent increase in deaths due to pregnancy-related mortality. This is the new reality, one that has not felt possible while most women of childbearing age have been alive.

Americans’ views have remained stable under a relatively stable legal framework. But when stories of women seeking unsafe and illegal abortions hit the front pages, when victims of rape or incest find themselves forced to bear children, when underfunded social services struggle to provide adequate care for newly born but uncared-for infants, all of that could change.

The Silence of the Right on Ukrainian Refugees

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › politics › archive › 2022 › 05 › silence-right-ukrainian-refugees › 629841

Last summer, anti-immigration advocates mobilized in opposition to the resettlement of tens of thousands of Afghan refugees in the United States. “It threatens the national security of the United States,” wrote Stephen Miller, the former top Donald Trump adviser. Miller charged in another tweet that President Joe Biden had “cruelly betrayed his oath of office” by expediting the entry of Afghans fleeing the Taliban without, Miller said, proper vetting. A prominent immigration-restrictionist group issued a report warning of fraud and abuse in the nation’s refugee programs, and immigration hard-liners flooded conservative airwaves throughout the fall to denounce the administration’s plans.

Then came another refugee crisis, this time in Ukraine. In March, Biden said the U.S. would admit up to 100,000 of the millions of Ukrainians who had left their country after the Russian invasion. The announcement was sure to provoke the outrage of the nation’s most ardent immigration foes, whose cries about an influx of refugees from a war-stricken region had barely faded from the news.

Except it didn’t.

Anti-immigration advocates have been far quieter about the Biden administration’s policy toward Ukrainian refugees than they were about its stance toward Afghan refugees. What’s more, the criticism they have leveled has had almost nothing to do with concerns about vetting or national security. Miller, for example, tweeted dozens of dire warnings about Afghan refugees during the summer and fall of 2021. He has also tweeted frequently about Ukraine since the crisis escalated at the beginning of this year, but not a single time about Biden’s plan to accept 100,000 refugees. (Through a spokesperson, he declined an interview request.)

[From the June 2022 issue: ‘You cannot host guests forever’]

To the groups who resettle refugees in the U.S., the divergent responses from the political right are a stark but familiar example of the long-standing bias against immigrants from poor or predominantly Muslim countries in favor of those from Europe, who are predominantly white. Those attitudes are also reflected in—and might contribute to—public opinion about America’s refugee policy. In a poll conducted last month for The Atlantic by Leger, 58 percent of respondents supported the U.S. accepting refugees from Ukraine, while just 46 percent backed admitting those from Afghanistan. Asked whether the U.S. should admit more refugees from one country than the other, 23 percent of respondents said the U.S. should take more people from Ukraine, while just 4 percent said the U.S. should accept more from Afghanistan, despite America’s two-decade involvement in the war there. Gallup found even broader support for admitting Ukrainian refugees, the highest for any refugee group it has polled about since 1939.

“Americans get a certain amount of compassion fatigue for certain parts of the world that are chronically in turmoil, and no American alive today can ever remember a time of peace in the Middle East,” Dan Stein, the president of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, a group that seeks a reduction in overall immigration to the U.S., told me. “It’s also true that Ukraine has not been viewed routinely as a source of refugees, of political conflict, at least not in the modern world.”

Senior officials with refugee-resettlement groups told me that they haven’t put much stock into the reaction of immigration hard-liners, because Republican governors and leaders in Congress have remained broadly supportive of accepting Afghan refugees. But they have sharply criticized the Biden administration for what they say is unequal treatment of refugees from Afghanistan and Ukraine. “It certainly appears that Ukrainians are receiving special treatment,” Adam Bates, a policy counsel for the International Refugee Assistance Project, told me.

Under its Uniting With Ukraine program, the Biden administration is waiving all fees associated with applying for humanitarian parole. By contrast, IRAP says, the U.S. government charged more than 40,000 applicants from Afghanistan as much as $575 to seek similar protection last summer. The government is also scrapping requirements that Ukrainians submit evidence that they were specifically targeted by the Russian military or President Vladimir Putin, whereas Afghan applicants must provide proof of individualized, targeted violence against them by the Taliban.

The White House declined to comment. The administration has touted its evacuation of more than 82,000 Afghans to the U.S., including many allies who helped the U.S. military during its 20-year war. In both crises, the government has sought to route many applicants around the official refugee and special-immigrant visa programs because they are so backlogged. Officials have said that the humanitarian parole that the U.S. is offering to Ukrainians lasts for only two years, which Bates took as a suggestion that the government assumes many refugees will want to stay in the country only temporarily. I asked him what he thought was the real reason the Biden administration was expediting the process for Ukrainians in ways it did not for Afghans. “This is just speculating,” he cautioned in his reply. “But to me, I do not think that the influence of systemic racism and xenophobia in this country has been limited to just one party in the context of immigration.”

The politics of immigration have bedeviled Biden from his first days in office. Republicans have accused him of countenancing a veritable invasion of the southern border by migrants and asylum seekers, while progressives criticized his decision to keep in place some Trump-administration policies reviled by immigrant advocates. Biden’s critics on the right say his lax handling of the southern border has left the country stretched too thin to respond effectively to the humanitarian crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine. “The problem is that resettling refugees takes work and money and infrastructure, which has been overwhelmed by all the illegal aliens who were using asylum as a gambit to get past the Border Patrol,” Mark Krikorian, the executive director of the restrictionist Center for Immigration Studies, told me.

[Read: The world’s refugee system is broken]

Many others, however, say the U.S. has both the moral obligation and the capacity to open its doors to those fleeing war and persecution.

Conservatives who have raised alarms about resettling Afghan refugees say the need to vet them is stronger because the American invasion created enemies who could try to sneak into the U.S. to exact revenge. They’ve also warned about the cultural differences between Afghanistan and the U.S., highlighting reports of child trafficking by male evacuees who claim young girls as their brides.

Krikorian has assailed the nation’s refugee policy across the board and told me the U.S. could do more good simply by sending money overseas to help resettle evacuees in countries closer to their homeland. But he had harsher words for the Biden administration’s pledge to admit refugees from Ukraine. “We clearly have more obligation to Afghans than we do to Ukrainians,” Krikorian said. At the same time, he said, individual Afghan refugees presented bigger security and cultural concerns than did Ukrainians. As an example, Krikorian referenced reports of widespread sexual abuse of young boys by members of the Afghan security forces made by members of the U.S. military during the war. “I wouldn’t say because of that, we don’t take Afghans, but we do take Ukrainians,” he said. “But in individual cases, in doing vetting and assessing whether it’s a good idea to bring somebody into the United States, we definitely should take that into consideration.”

Those reports and the stereotypes they feed may help explain why the public voices stronger support for refugees from Ukraine than from Afghanistan, and, on some level, why the government has treated them differently. But to those who work on behalf of refugees, they are beside the point. “Of course, we need to vet immigrants who are coming into the U.S. to make sure that they are not a threat to the American public. But we need to do that consistently,” Krish O’Mara Vignarajah, the president of the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, told me. “Both populations have strong rationales for seeking refuge here in the U.S. We shouldn’t pit one population against the other.”

Escape From Hong Kong

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › international › archive › 2022 › 05 › hong-kong-prodemocracy-activists-exile-beijing › 629741

To avoid drawing unwanted attention, Tommy and the four others dressed as if they were heading out for a leisurely day. It was July 2020, and the weather was perfect for some time on the water. The young men acted as though they knew one another well, and were excited to reconnect. But inside, Tommy felt panicked and desperate. He was about to attempt an escape from Hong Kong, where he faced a near-certain jail sentence for his role in the prodemocracy protests there. He feared that he, or one of these strangers, might have been tailed by police to the docks.

In the scenario that kept replaying in his head, officers closed in on the men as they stood next to their boat, a roughly 20-foot rigid speedboat laden with jugs of extra fuel and fishing equipment. Tommy—who asked to be identified by a nickname—didn’t allow himself to relax until the boat sped away from land, the coastline shrinking behind them and the blue sky stretching out in front.

As the boat’s hull slapped against the rolling swells, the life vests the men carried flew overboard, but they didn’t bother to turn back. One leaned over the edge and peeled identifying numbers off the boat’s bow, hoping for an extra layer of anonymity. They took turns driving—the young men had learned their elementary boating skills from watching videos on YouTube and had practiced a handful of times. No matter who was behind the wheel, they kept the engine throttle wide open and scanned the horizon for trouble. The whipping wind and the din of the motors made communication nearly impossible. The sun set. The lights of fishing boats and enormous shipping vessels bobbed up and down.

Tommy lost track of how long they’d been driving the boat—at least 10 hours. When the GPS unit showed the vessel leaving Hong Kong waters, they finally eased off on the throttle. “We knew we were safe,” Tommy later told me. They passed around snacks and water, then introduced themselves to one another, sharing their real names for the first time and explaining their reasons for undertaking such a perilous journey: All were prodemocracy activists looking for safety on the island of Taiwan. Their bid for freedom, however, would soon draw in the United States.

Hours earlier, one of Tommy’s green Vans sneakers had sailed over the side of the boat and into the water. No one had considered stopping to retrieve it. Now, in spontaneous, rowdy celebration of their nearly completed escape, the group peed on the remaining shoe, then kicked it overboard—a memory that Tommy would laugh about later.

Their plan had been fairly simple: If they made it this far, they would turn off their engines, and call a contact in Taiwan who would alert the coast guard to their presence. When the authorities arrived, they would claim they had run out of fuel on a fishing trip and needed to be towed to shore. Only once on land would they divulge their true stories. Tommy gazed upward as they waited for the coast guard to arrive. The light pollution radiating from Hong Kong normally obscured his view of the stars. But here, in the open water, he could see the whole sky.

When the Taiwanese coast guard appeared, the five men waved flashlights to attract attention. Their plan fell apart almost as soon as the authorities reached their boat. The coast guard had extra fuel on hand, and initially offered to simply transfer it over, then send the wayward boat on its way. As the coast guard crew spoke to the young men, however, they grew suspicious. What were the five doing in the area? Why were they carrying so few supplies and traveling in an unmarked boat? “They knew that we weren’t just out fishing,” Tommy told me.

The young men fessed up, telling the sailors their real intentions. They had been among huge crowds of people who since the spring of 2019 had taken to the streets to call for democracy in Hong Kong. Now they feared for their safety as Beijing not only stamped out the protests, but moved to decimate all dissent in the city. The Taiwanese coast guard brought the group ashore where they were questioned by military officials. The next day, they were moved again by ship. Tommy slept on and off. He wasn’t sure where they were heading.

Eventually, he and the others were deposited in rooms that reminded him of the dorms at his university back in Hong Kong. They had no computers and no internet access. Government officials—Tommy isn’t sure who they were—came and went, asking more questions. Eventually, the five men were allowed to watch TV and read articles from Apple Daily, the now-defunct prodemocracy newspaper. As their confinement stretched into months, Tommy, who had been an arts student before he abandoned his studies, sketched to pass the time.

Some of the young men wanted to stay in Taiwan, but others hoped to resettle elsewhere. They were given English lessons by a tutor. The materials, for reasons none of them understood, covered the history and geography of Boston, and how to navigate the city on public transportation. To mark New Year’s Eve, Tommy shaved off his long hair. He wanted a symbolic new start. Two weeks later—about six months after he’d fled Hong Kong—the journey to freedom that started on a small boat would end on a commercial flight that touched down in the United States.

Hong Kong was long a magnet for people seeking opportunity and running from persecution. Residents of mainland China fleeing the violence and political purges of the Cultural Revolution swam toward the city’s lights—Tommy’s grandmother among them. In the late 1970s, thousands packed into ships, many of which were cramped wooden fishing boats, to escape to Hong Kong from Vietnam as that country’s war ended. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, student activists from China snuck into Hong Kong.

Now the fleeing has reversed, as Beijing’s crusade to strip Hong Kong of its defining freedoms has created a wave of exiles. “It is still beautiful,” Kwok Ka-ki, a former prodemocracy lawmaker, told me of the city, “but underneath, everything has changed.” Soon after we spoke, he was arrested, and now faces charges under a draconian national-security law imposed in 2020, an effort to extinguish any form of political opposition wholesale.

At Hong Kong’s airport—even as it is crippled by stringent COVID regulations—crowds gather nightly to board flights abroad, aiming to join the tens of thousands who have already left. Among them are parents worried about the city’s more nationalistic curriculum, activists escaping the ever-shrinking space for dissent, and former prodemocracy legislators who have seen their colleagues locked up.

Over the course of several years living in and covering Hong Kong, I have met countless such exiles. Some want nothing more than anonymity in their new countries, hoping to put the movement behind them. Others remain deeply involved in activism from abroad, setting up organizations and creating online initiatives. They share an acute feeling of isolation and sadness, unmoored from a place they once believed they could help save.

Three in particular are fleeing almost certain jail time after joining in prodemocracy demonstrations and agitation, their stories highlighting the gulf between Hong Kong’s promise and its reality today. They either escaped aboard a tiny boat, ultimately crossing a vast distance, or tested U.S. border policy by illegally slipping into America on land. One later spent months walking from New York to Florida on foot to raise awareness of Hong Kong’s plight. “You think this is crazy?” Tommy said to me when I marveled at the riskiness of his trip. “Imagine how I feel.”

The exiles—all of whom, like Tommy, asked to be identified by nicknames to avoid retribution from Beijing and pro-China groups—are each grappling with their newfound freedom in different ways, at times clashing with other members of the Hong Kong diaspora over how best to help their home city, and wrestling with guilt for those left behind. They have put their fate in the hands of the U.S., a country they still see as a beacon in their fight against China.

Almost as soon as Tommy and his fellow travelers were escorted ashore in Taiwan, officials there began working to resolve the geopolitical dilemma the group had inadvertently set off. Beijing had baselessly accused the U.S. and Taiwan of fomenting the Hong Kong protests, so a public announcement about the five could further inflame tensions. Taiwan—which lives under Beijing’s constant threat of forceful reunification with mainland China—sought American help. The State Department worked with a Hong Kong lobbyist in Washington, D.C., to begin planning the group’s transfer to U.S. soil.

In January 2021, the men boarded a flight from Taipei to New York City. Through all those months in limbo in Taiwan, Tommy had been unable to directly contact his family. He had rehearsed cracking a joke to tell them he was fine, but when he landed in the U.S. and finally spoke to them on the phone, he broke down crying.

Adams Carvalho

On the surface, Tommy and Ray have a lot in common. Both have family members who fled mainland China for the relative safety of Hong Kong (albeit decades apart), and both grew up on tales of Chinese Communist Party abuse. And though the men’s paths did not cross in Hong Kong, they were both active participants in the city’s protest movement. Tommy had been among those who broke into the Legislative Council building; Ray was one of the students who occupied a university campus in a days-long siege.

But the two are also very different. Tommy is a wiry, bespectacled 24-year-old, whereas Ray, 20, is stocky and gregarious, a bit of a smartass. Tommy was riven with fear and uncertainty during the months it took him to plan his escape from Hong Kong; Ray seemed to me to be totally unbothered by the risks he had taken.

Ray fled Hong Kong aboard a plane bound for London in August 2020. After arriving and looking up Britain’s asylum-acceptance rates, he turned his sights to the United States. But the Trump administration had banned flights from Europe as part of efforts to curtail the coronavirus pandemic, so after a few months in Britain, and some scheming with an eccentric Chinese activist and immigration lawyer he connected with on Twitter, he boarded another flight, this one bound for Mexico. He would cross into the U.S. on foot.

Ray first attempted the crossing soon after arriving, in January 2021. He walked for hours after being dropped near a crossing point by a smuggler. It was frigid and windy. To avoid detection, he trekked in complete darkness. But no one stopped him, and eventually he arrived at a gas station in Southern California, where a contact met him. He fell asleep during the car ride north and awoke only when the driver announced, “Welcome to L.A.”

From there, he initiated an asylum claim, which likely would have inched through the bureaucracy were it not for Ray’s own impatience. Holed up in an Airbnb east of Los Angeles, he killed time watching cable news. He was particularly infatuated with debates over immigration. On one show, liberal-leaning politicians claimed the American system was so dysfunctional that migrants detained after attempting to enter the U.S. would likely be granted asylum faster than those who arrived without incident. Hearing this, Ray devised a new plan.

In early February, he headed back to the border, walked into Mexico, and then, after a few days, tried crossing into the U.S. again. This time, he hiked across a stretch of hills outside Mexicali and used a flashlight to catch the attention of a group of border guards. When they got ahold of him, he explained his situation in English, hoping to find a compassionate audience. Instead, the oldest-looking of the three turned him around, menacingly warned him not to try crossing again, and watched as Ray trudged into Mexico. Again.

Undeterred, Ray waited a few days and revised his tactics. He took a new route and this time, after flagging down some border guards, pretended not to understand English, speaking to them in Cantonese, the dominant language of Hong Kong. Carrying only his mobile phone and a few other possessions, he feigned ignorance—and had to stifle a laugh—when one of the agents said, “I caught a ninja!” The border guards finally resorted to using a translation app to pepper him with questions.

Authorities took him to a detention center where he was held for eight days with about 20 other men. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement facility in San Diego where he was soon transferred was far better. After interviews with U.S. officials, he walked out of Otay Mesa Detention Center in mid-April 2021. The asylum process typically takes from six months up to several years, according to the National Immigration Forum, an advocacy group. It took Ray just 63 days.

Since the start of the 2019 protests, the U.S. has consistently called for China to preserve Hong Kong’s independent press, judiciary, and rule of law. Time and again, American officials and politicians have criticized Beijing for its crackdown. Congress passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2019, which put the city’s special trading privileges with the U.S. under greater scrutiny, and compelled the U.S. to level sanctions against Hong Kong officials responsible for human-rights abuses. If these measures were designed to curtail China’s actions, however, they failed. Beijing has brushed them off as little more than a nuisance.

Stories such as Tommy’s and Ray’s suggest the U.S. is fulfilling its obligation to Hong Kong’s prodemocracy movement. The means they took to get to the U.S., though, were drastic and almost impossible to replicate. A truer test of American mettle is the countless others like them who remain in limbo, victims of a broken and deeply politicized American immigration system. These people stood up to Beijing’s authoritarian might and, knowing they would likely lose, fought for their freedoms anyway. Yet U.S. lawmakers from both parties who once cheered them seem to have largely moved on.

The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act passed the House of Representatives by a 417–1 vote in November 2019, but the bipartisanship was fleeting. At the time, few were more eager to bash China than Senator Ted Cruz, who flew to Hong Kong at the height of the protests and dressed in all black out of “solidarity” with the demonstrators. The marches were “inspiring,” Cruz said then. About a year after he proclaimed Hong Kong to be the “new Berlin,” however, he showed the limits of his support. In December 2020, he killed a bill that included provisions for temporary protected status for Hong Kongers and expedited certain refugee and asylum applications. It had previously passed in the House.

A few months before Cruz shot down the bill, saying it was a ploy by Democrats who support “open borders” to make “all immigration legal,” a group of Hong Kongers, among them an American citizen, sought protection in the city’s U.S. Consulate but were turned away. One was arrested by the Hong Kong authorities and sentenced to three years and seven months in jail.

Last August, the Biden administration made a small concession, blocking the enforced removal of many Hong Kong residents from the U.S. for a period of 18 months. The White House said in a memo that “offering safe haven for Hong Kong residents who have been deprived of their guaranteed freedoms in Hong Kong furthers United States interests in the region.” Getting in, however, remains a challenge.

Adams Carvalho

Kenny, a 27-year-old former civil engineer, took the same route as Tommy to flee Hong Kong; he was on the same boat. But while Tommy soon decided that he liked New York, Kenny felt restless.

Kenny had stayed fervently involved in the Hong Kong prodemocracy movement when he was resettled, initially in Arlington, Virginia. He joined protests and tried to spread his message on social media. But he wanted to do more, and staying planted in Arlington while trying to sound the alarm seemed ineffective. So he settled on the most American of pastimes, a road trip—but without that most American of possessions, a car. His first walk was a 10-day trek from the White House to New York City. He hoped that by speaking to ordinary Americans, he could raise awareness of the crackdown under way in his home city. A few months later, Kenny set off on an even more ambitious route, from the Pentagon all the way to Miami. In all, he estimated, he would walk more than 1,000 miles.

Kenny documented his movements on Instagram, posting videos and photos of the people he encountered and the places he passed through. He snapped pictures fit for a tourism ad for rural America: rolling cornfields, Amish families standing near their horse-drawn buggies, red-painted barns. He embarked on his walk with his face completely covered by a reflective sunglass shield that looked like it was borrowed from the prop closet on a cyberpunk film set, and a thin flag pole jutting from his backpack adorned with two black banners that read Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times, one in Chinese and another in English.

His unusual appearance attracted attention, not all of it welcoming. In Maryland, someone called the police on him as he knocked on doors looking for bandages. On the eighth day of his walk to Miami, a stranger pulled a gun on him as he tried to hide near the man’s garage during a rainstorm.

As he moved farther south, Kenny found people to be more accommodating, which he’d expected, and more informed about the prodemocracy movement, which he hadn’t. Often, though, he was downbeat, discovering that many Americans had the luxury of not knowing or caring what was happening on the other side of the world.

He felt more optimistic when a worker at a sports bar in Moncure, North Carolina, told him he had followed the news about Hong Kong, and gave Kenny slices of pizza and an orange soda. In Glynn County, in southeastern Georgia, Kenny spent the night with firefighters who let him sleep in the firehouse. In Florida in mid-October, a woman invited him to sleep at her house. He stayed for three days, met her family, and joined them on a trip to a park where he spotted a manatee in the water. He documented the sighting with an Instagram post punctuated by a string of exclamation points. In all, the walk lasted 66 days.

As he navigated America’s roadways, a court case about him in Hong Kong carried on. Kenny had been among a group of demonstrators who, rallying against a government decision to ban face masks at marches, had assaulted a police officer after the officer grabbed a protester. Video of the skirmish, filmed by a passenger on a nearby bus, was picked up by international news outlets. Kenny was arrested but released on bail, which is when he began trying to escape Hong Kong by boat, eventually succeeding on his fifth or sixth try. (Earlier failed efforts cost him a small fortune.)

Days after his outing to the park in Florida, sentences were handed down against two of Kenny’s co-defendants. One was given seven years in jail, the other sent to a rehabilitation center. Kenny told me he had no regrets about fleeing, that he wanted to look forward. “This is why I decided to walk—because I don’t want to think back or live in a constant state of regret,” he said. He later admitted that he did at times feel guilt about leaving, but he tried to bury it, preferring to focus on forward action. “I’m thinking: What can I do on their behalf?” he said. “This is my purpose.”

In some—extremely limited—respects, he has succeeded, telling individual Americans about a fight for freedom half a world away that many of them are unaware of. I spoke with one of the people who met Kenny on his walking tour, Nicholas Kiernan, who said he had initially driven past Kenny in Northern Virginia in late August while on his way to work. Kenny’s peculiar appearance caught Kiernan’s attention. He resembled “a Google mapping device,” Kiernan told me. “He looked wild.” About a half hour later, Kiernan, a land surveyor, was still thinking about the odd character from his morning commute when Kenny stumbled onto Kiernan’s worksite. Intrigued, Kiernan hopped out of his truck to ask Kenny what he was up to.

Kenny showed him photos of the Hong Kong protests, explaining to Kiernan, who knew nothing about what was happening there, about how police had cracked down on demonstrators. “It was thought-provoking stuff,” Kiernan recounted. But perhaps more than anything, Kiernan said he was impressed by Kenny’s courage—sleeping in a tent and carrying a heavy backpack for miles at a time, speaking to total strangers in a foreign language in a new country. “It takes heart to be able to do something like that.”

Additional reporting by Karina Tsui.