The Wagner Group, a mercenary force that is effectively an arm of the Putinist state, has been very good at meddling in the politics of countries other than Russia—and ensuring that its preferred regime either takes or stays in power. Before Wagner’s fighters became infamous over the past few months for their extremely brutal attacks on the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, the group honed its expertise in political control mainly in Africa, supporting governments that served its interests in the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Libya, among other states.

In that light, what we’ve witnessed over the past 24 hours has every appearance not of a spontaneous mutiny but of an extremely well-planned attempt to manipulate President Vladimir Putin and even threaten his rule. Within a day, what looked like a pretty far-fetched stab in the dark evolved into a military incursion approaching the gates of Moscow. This has resulted, the latest developments suggest, in a deal with Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin. If that agreement meets one of his central demands—the removal of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov—that would potentially give Prigozhin greater say over the Russian war effort.

What has become clear is how well plotted this operation was. Putin’s onetime caterer of choice, Prigozhin has emerged as one of the most ruthless operators in the Russian oligarchy—and this political move is perhaps his pièce de résistance.

What can we tell so far? Prigozhin’s preparations for this operation—at least as a contingency plan—must have been in the works for months. Military supplies, including armored vehicles and air-defense systems, had to be stockpiled and moved into place inside Russia itself. All of Prigozhin’s very public complaining about being deprived of supplies by the Russian military now appear to have involved an element of crocodile tears. Prigozhin and his supporters were not only able to send a significant military force into action last night, but they also had a logistical network to back it that was capable of moving hundreds of miles in a day. The Russian army now trying to resist Ukraine’s counteroffensive probing must be looking on in envy.

[Phillips Payson O’Brien and Mykola Bielieskov: What the battle in Bakhmut has done for Ukraine]

The timing of the plot seems shrewdly chosen. The Ukrainian counteroffensive began in earnest almost three weeks ago, and the bulk of the Russian army—an estimated 80 to 90 percent of its strength—has been deployed to Ukraine. Much of that force has already seen combat, and a significant portion of its reserves are also now in the field. At the same time, the Ukrainians have gone to great lengths to degrade the Russian army’s logistical capacity in Ukraine.

The consequence of all this was that Putin could not easily draw upon those forces to hold Wagner off. He would have had to order Russian troops facing Ukrainian attacks to retreat—potentially weakening points in Russia’s defensive line. And even if he had ordered them back into Russia, that movement would have taken many days, and more likely weeks, to have a significant effect.

Even an efficient army faces real challenges taking troops out of action, shipping them to a new location, and redeploying them into action. And one thing we can say about the Russian army today is that it is not particularly efficient.

So Prigozhin’s timing seems optimal. Putin would have had to either try to get by with the relatively small number of troops left in Russia—whose loyalty and willingness to fight for him appear in question—or accept the risk and delay of ordering frontline troops to leave Ukraine. (The troop shortage Putin faces seems evident from the fact that the quickest force sent into action has consisted of troops under the orders of the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.)

If Prigozhin was careful in both his preparations and his timing, he also selected ideal locations for his operation. The first two large cities his forces appeared in, Rostov and Voronezh, are among the most important transportation hubs for the Russian army in Ukraine. These cities, with their large railway systems, have been used to stockpile military equipment. By seizing control of them, Prigozhin planted his boot on the windpipe of the Russian army.

[Anne Applebaum: Russia slides into civil war]

Whether the Wagner fighters felt that they could count on wider support remains a mystery, but striking, almost shocking, was the lack of organized military resistance to Wagner’s maneuvers—even as the group’s motorized military column advanced on Moscow itself. The operation seems to have faced just a handful of mostly ineffective attacks, but very little evidence of organized resistance on Putin’s behalf. According to some reports, Wagner shot down much of the aerial-attack force sent against it, including six Russian helicopters and one fixed-wing aircraft. This would equal Russia’s losses on some of the heaviest days fighting against Ukraine.

For now the question of whether Prigozhin will benefit from all of this planning remains. Reports have emerged that Putin has been forced to cut a deal with Prigozhin, brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, to call off the Wagner Group. The details are still emerging, but the plain fact that Putin was willing to settle after calling Prigozhin a criminal earlier in the day is telling. If he agrees to sacrifice Shoigu and Gerasimov, that will be even more significant—and a triumph for Prigozhin. But if, after the Wagner Group’s withdrawal, Shoigu and Gerasimov are still in place, all of Prigozhin’s planning might have been in vain. In that case, he will soon have to start making new plans—if he wants to stay alive.