On Saturday, a brief revolt by Wagner Group soldiers under Yevgeny Prigozhin's command moved unimpeded into the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don and advanced hundreds of kilometres toward Moscow.

In announcing the deal purportedly brokered by the Belarusian leader, Aleksandr Lukashenko, that Evgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the short-lived rebellion against Russia’s military leadership, would be permitted to “retire” to Belarus, in exchange for stopping his “March of Justice” to Moscow, the Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov explained that the deal, “was for the sake of a higher goal—to avoid bloodshed, to avoid internal confrontation, to avoid clashes with unpredictable results.”

That sounds very noble, except that only a few hours earlier, Peskov’s boss, Russian President Vladimir Putin, gave a televised address describing Prigozhin’s mutiny as treason and “a betrayal,” that struck at the very heart of Russian statehood. He seemed to be preparing the Russian people for a civil war. So, for Prigozhin to literally fly off into the evening sunset (at least for now), is odd, to put it mildly. It is especially bizarre given that in Putin’s Russia, even teenagers can be jailed for posting anything faintly critical of the “special military operation” (it is illegal to call it a war) that the Russian defense forces have been pursuing in Ukraine since February 23, 2022. The liberal opposition figures Ilya Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza received prison sentences of 8.5 and 25 years respectively for their social-media criticisms of the war last year. While their weapons were words, Prigozhin’s were tanks and guns. One would think leading an armed rebellion is significantly more problematic for the regime than some tweets and interviews. So what is the true “higher goal” for which Prigozhin was let off the hook?

Evidently, there was genuine fear in the Kremlin of Prigozhin’s mutiny leading to a wider military rebellion. Indeed, it is striking that after announcing his intentions on Telegram, Prigozhin met no resistance in marching his forces into the city of Rostov on Don, the seat of Russia’s Southern Military District, and staging ground for the military effort in Eastern Ukraine. He was able to take over the command center in a matter of hours, and was even recorded chastising the Deputy Minister of Defense Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Lieutenant General Vladimir Alexeyev for “guys dying because you are sending them into the meatgrinder in Ukraine.” Heading north from Rostov, the Wagner column reportedly made it within 200 kilometers of Moscow before Prigozhin announced on Telegram that his troops would be returning to their camps “as planned” in order to avoid spilling “big blood.” But his quick conquest of Rostov and rapid journey north toward Moscow indicates that some units of the Russian defense forces stationed along the way may have been at least passively, and perhaps even actively, supporting his mission.

Given how poorly the war in Ukraine has gone for the rank and file of the Russian military, it would be understandable if some junior officers empathized with Prigozhin’s complaints against the Russian high command. Casualty estimates run as high as 250,000, with perhaps a quarter of those being deaths. Commanders have reportedly abandoned their troops in battle, corruption is rampant, and undersupplied and underprepared soldiers have been used as cannon fodder.

Putin’s speech offered an explicit warning against joining the rebellion, providing implicit confirmation that Prigozhin was gaining followers as he moved toward Moscow. Further, the fact that Moscow was clearly preparing for a long and bloody battle, indicates that there was genuine concern that a broader conflict was imminent. Prigozhin’s column of mercenaries stopped less than 200 kilometers outside of the city, but rumors put some Wagnerites prepositioned in the capital. So Putin had ample reason to allow Lukashenko to negotiate a quick end to the rebellion, with a promise to let the mutineers, and especially Prigozhin, go free (at least for now).

What does all of this tell us about what might now be going on in Russia and how Putin might pursue the war in Ukraine going forward? While to us, Putin may look weak and ineffective, he will undoubtedly use his control over the Russian media to pin the rebellion on Ukraine, NATO, and Russia’s other enemies. He may even take credit for avoiding mass casualties in a civil war by making a deal with Prigozhin. Spinning the story as best he can, Putin himself will survive, although his carefully crafted myth of competence will be damaged. Over time, this might erode elite confidence, although it is unlikely to result in an open coup attempt any time soon.

Beyond this, the clear disorganization of the leadership’s response to Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion can only be good for Ukraine. Wagner mercenaries delivered one of Russia’s few military victories in finally capturing the town of Bakhmut a few months ago. Now, they are off the battlefield. Further, there may well be more military mutinies to come.

Although this is not the end of the war or of Putin, the Wagner rebellion might yet prove the beginning of the end of both.