The Ukrainian counteroffensive now under way is an operation that no advanced military would ever want to have to launch. Last year, Ukraine surprised many Western experts with its ability to defend against Russian invaders and even win back territory from them, exposing flaws in Russia’s strategy, logistics, and military leadership. But Russia has still managed to occupy a slice of Ukraine, and Ukraine is now trying to go on the offensive against a military that has spent months building entrenchments while maintaining considerable stocks of modern weaponry. Starting a counteroffensive under these conditions would be risky for the United States or another NATO power, and the Ukrainians lack the technological and training advantages that a NATO member’s military typically enjoys.

In some ways, what Ukraine is trying to do is unprecedented. When Anglo-American or Red Army forces advanced against the Nazis in World War II, and when Israel pushed its opponents back in the 1967 Six-Day War, the successful offensive side had command of the air. That is, it was able to use air power both to protect its own ground troops as they moved forward and to batter the enemy armies that they would soon encounter.

Ukraine does not have this luxury. The airspace over the battlefield throughout Ukraine is contested fiercely. The Russians have a larger air force, and their fixed-wing aircraft are technologically superior to Ukraine’s (even if the Russians do not always operate theirs as intelligently as the Ukrainians do). Russia can also use large numbers of drones, for both intelligence-gathering and direct action against Ukrainian forces. Russian helicopters, such as the Ka52s, have shown themselves capable of destroying Ukrainian armored vehicles.

A further challenge is that the Russians can also use ground-based systems against the Ukrainians. The Russians still deploy a large number of artillery and rocket-launching systems, have their own handheld anti-vehicle weapons, and have laid extensive minefields across terrain that Ukraine must cross. Indeed, if the two armies were evenly matched in terms of intelligence, motivation, training, and the ability to operate complex systems, the Ukrainians would have only a small chance of success.

[From the June 2023 issue: The counteroffensive]

Yet although the counteroffensive is in its early days, the story so far suggests that Ukraine has the abilities to achieve more than current conditions might indicate—but also that success could take more time than people realize. No one should expect to see an immediate armored break through Russian lines. Pictures are circulating of disabled Ukrainian vehicles, including at least one German-designed Leopard 2 tank and a number of U.S.-built Bradley fighting vehicles.

These are some of the most modern armored vehicles in the Ukrainian arsenal. Yet they were disabled by a range of the different systems that Ukraine will face as it advances. In many areas, Russian minefields have constricted where the Ukrainians can operate, forcing them to bunch their forces together more than they would prefer and contributing to their losses at the start of the counteroffensive. In other areas, Russian artillery fire or attack helicopters have been responsible for blunting the Ukrainian assault.

Because the counteroffensive forces must contend with varied Russian defensive firepower from so many different areas, Ukrainian advances have been modest so far. The Ukrainians have been moving forward a few miles here and a few miles there. Since the withdrawal of Russian forces from around Kyiv in late March 2022 and the hardening of defensive lines, the only major breakthrough occurred in September 2022, when the Ukrainians liberated a large chunk of land near Kharkiv. In this counteroffensive, a force of Ukrainian vehicles rushed forward for many miles a day—but that was possible only because Russian forces in the area were very thin on the ground. Once the Ukrainians pushed their way through the Russian front, there was precious little to stop them.

Ukraine is unlikely to repeat that feat. Over the past six months, Russia has been on the offensive, albeit able to advance only at a glacial pace. From January to May, Russian forces around the city of Bakhmut managed to advance maybe five miles in total (while suffering major casualties that the U.S. estimates at about 100,000 over approximately the same timeframe). By this standard, the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which is slowly pushing the Russians back in a number of locations, already appears more successful.

[Phillips Payson O’Brien: Ukraine pulled off a masterstroke]

However, Ukraine will want to achieve much more than it has so far, and to do that it will probably have to be content with modest advances as it undertakes the brutal work of weakening Russian forces enough to allow for greater forward movement later. Because they lack control of the air, and the Russians have strong defensive firepower, the Ukrainians have no choice but to wear down the enemy’s ground troops enough to compensate for Russia’s air advantage. President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged as much when, in an address this week, he stated that Ukrainians were “destroying” Russian forces in the south and east, a process that would go on for a while.

Instead of trying to rush forward, the Ukrainians have continued and in some ways amplified their efforts to hit Russian forces behind the lines. Recent Ukrainian probing attacks have been useful in prompting the Russians to move their own forces—which creates additional opportunities. Ukraine has been able to strike a number of large targets. Most important, perhaps, it has been able to start hitting Russian ammunition and supply depots that were out of range of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System equipment obtained from the West. Using British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles, the Ukrainians seem to have destroyed a large Russian supply hub at Rykove, just north of Crimea. They also reportedly wiped out a gathering of more than 100 Russian soldiers in Luhansk Oblast who were waiting to hear a rousing speech before being sent into combat.  

Fortunately for Ukraine, it retains the advantage in motivation, intelligence, and strategic high command. It is also receiving better and better weapons from the West. In time, these factors will become evident. But no one should expect immediate results. If the Ukrainians are going to achieve major gains from the counteroffensive, it will be by first destroying so many Russian forces that they can eventually advance. They are doing something audacious, risky, and time-consuming, and they won’t simply steamroller through.

The Chonhar road bridge is damaged but there are no casualties, Russian-appointed officials in Kherson and Crimea say.

The bridge linking the peninsula to Kherson in the south was hit by British missiles, say officials.

Moscow alleges Kyiv plans to strike the annexed Crimean Peninsula with long-range NATO missiles.

Russia's TASS state agency reported no 'critical danger' to the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia facility — Europe's largest nuclear plant.