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Why So Many Americans Have Stopped Going to Church

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › newsletters › archive › 2023 › 08 › why-church-religion-attendance-decline › 674916

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Church attendance in America has been on the decline in recent decades. Are Americans losing their ability to incorporate religion—or any kind of intentional community—into their lives?

First, here are three new stories from The Atlantic:

How Bronze Age Pervert charmed the far right To get happier, choose to read this column. Bird flu has never done this before.

How American Life Works

“Take a drive down Main Street of just about any major city in the country, and—with the housing market ground to a halt—you might pass more churches for sale than homes,” two sociologists wrote in The Atlantic in January. And the facts bear out that visual: As Jake Meador, the editor in chief of the quarterly magazine Mere Orthodoxy, notes in a recent essay, about 40 million Americans have stopped going to church in the past 25 years. “That’s something like 12 percent of the population, and it represents the largest concentrated change in church attendance in American history,” he writes.

The Great Dechurching, a forthcoming book analyzing surveys of more than 7,000 Americans conducted by two political scientists, attempts to figure out why so many Americans have left churches in recent years. The authors find that religious abuse and corruption do play roles in pushing attendees away, but that a much larger share of the people surveyed indicated that they left the church “for more banal reasons,” as Meador puts it:

The book suggests that the defining problem driving out most people who leave is … just how American life works in the 21st century. Contemporary America simply isn’t set up to promote mutuality, care, or common life. Rather, it is designed to maximize individual accomplishment as defined by professional and financial success. Such a system leaves precious little time or energy for forms of community that don’t contribute to one’s own professional life or, as one ages, the professional prospects of one’s children.

As Meador notes, part of the problem is the unusual role that religion has come to play in some Americans’ lives. The Atlantic writer Derek Thompson coined the term workism in 2019—and diagnosed himself as a worker under its thrall. “The economists of the early 20th century did not foresee that work might evolve from a means of material production to a means of identity production,” Thompson wrote then. “They failed to anticipate that, for the poor and middle class, work would remain a necessity; but for the college-educated elite, it would morph into a kind of religion, promising identity, transcendence, and community.”

Workism doesn’t deliver on these promises, Thompson noted: “Our jobs were never meant to shoulder the burdens of a faith, and they are buckling under the weight. A staggering 87 percent of employees are not engaged at their job, according to Gallup. That number is rising by the year.” Even so, for those who have come to view work as the guiding principle of life, other priorities can quickly fall by the wayside. “The underlying challenge for many is that their lives are stretched like a rubber band about to snap—and church attendance ends up feeling like an item on a checklist that’s already too long,” Meador writes.

At its core, the issue is not just church attendance, Meador argues, but rather what American society has become:

The problem in front of us is not that we have a healthy, sustainable society that doesn’t have room for church. The problem is that many Americans have adopted a way of life that has left us lonely, anxious, and uncertain of how to live in community with other people.

Meador’s point here reminded me of one of my favorite episodes of our podcast How to Talk to People, in which the hosts discuss the role of public spaces in building community. Places such as coffee shops, churches, and libraries can serve as truly shared spaces, where people mingle and make new friends. But even in those places, host Julie Beck notes, “I’ve observed … a hustle and bustle.” People are “on a mission.” What she and producer Rebecca Rashid call “American efficiency culture” makes it so that we’re just not incentivized to take it slow, sit down, and meet someone new. Beck is getting at the same point as Meador: Many Americans seem to have forgotten how to create truly deliberate communities with one another.

I’ve painted a pretty negative picture thus far about the future of community and spirituality in America, whatever religion or practice a person might abide by. But a competing trend is humming along too: Some Americans are rewriting the rules for what an intentional or spiritual life can look like. As Wendy Cadge and Elan Babchuck noted in The Atlantic in January, metrics such as church attendance might no longer be the most accurate proxy for America’s religious affiliation. “Although participation in traditional religious settings (churches, synagogues, mosques, schools, etc.) is in decline, signs of life are popping up elsewhere: in conversations with chaplains, in communities started online that end up forming in-person bonds as well, in social-justice groups rooted in shared faith,” they wrote.

Meador, for his part, arrived at an ambitious way for churches to bring Americans back into the fold after reading The Great Dechurching. Maybe churches could better serve their members by asking more of them, he argues:

A vibrant, life-giving church requires more, not less, time and energy from its members. It asks people to prioritize one another over our career, to prioritize prayer and time reading scripture over accomplishment … Churches could model better, truer sorts of communities, ones in which the hungry are fed, the weak are lifted up, and the proud are cast down.

Creating an environment where people can ask more of one another, and give more in turn, seems like a wise rule of thumb for any community. If only American life didn’t make such a prospect feel so daunting.

Related:

The misunderstood reason millions of Americans stopped going to church American religion is not dead yet.

Today’s News

Donald Trump pleaded not guilty in federal court today to criminal charges related to conspiring to remain in office despite losing the 2020 presidential election. A dead body was found along river buoys in the Rio Grande, which were recently installed by Texas authorities to deter border crossings. Firefighters are battling California’s largest wildfire this year as it continues to threaten the Mojave National Preserve.

Dispatches

Work in Progress: Experts were certain that America was headed for a recession. But the 2023 economy is historically strong, Derek Thompson writes. What happened?

Explore all of our newsletters here.

Evening Read

Illustration by Ben Kothe / The Atlantic. Source: Getty

The UCLA Students Who Live in Their Cars

By M. Nolan Gray

The month I moved to Los Angeles felt apocalyptic, even by the standards of a city forever being destroyed in film. It was the end of the summer of 2020; stores were closed, streets empty, and wildfires had enveloped the region in smoke, turning the sky orange. Yet after I parked the U-Haul, things got even bleaker.

Walking to my new apartment, I passed a car where a 20-something had passed out with the engine running. Folks, I noticed, were sleeping in nearly every car on the street—a mix, I would later learn, of UCLA students and construction workers.

Read the full article.

More From The Atlantic

Jimi Barber died a forgiven man. They are still with him. Would you drive an extra five minutes to save the planet?

Culture Break

Martin Parr / Magnum

Read. The Atlantic’s summer reading guide gathers 24 titles chosen by our writers and editors that are perfect for your warm-weather mood.

Listen. If the U.S. women’s team loses the World Cup, does global soccer win? Hanna Rosin poses the theory in a new episode of Radio Atlantic.

Play our daily crossword.

Katherine Hu contributed to this newsletter.

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The Enigma of ‘Heat-Related’ Deaths

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › health › archive › 2023 › 08 › the-enigma-of-heat-related-deaths › 674911

The autopsy should have been a piece of cake. My patient had a history of widely metastatic cancer, which was pretty straightforward as far as causes of death go. Entering the various body cavities, my colleague and I found what we anticipated: Nearly every organ was riddled with tumors. But after we had completed the work, I realized that I knew why the patient had died, but not why he’d died that day. We found no evidence of a heart attack or blood clot or ruptured bowel. Nothing to explain his sudden demise. Yes, he had advanced cancer—but he’d been living with that cancer the day before he died, and over many weeks and months preceding. I asked my colleague what he thought. Perhaps there had been some subtle change in the patient’s blood chemistry, or in his heart’s electrical signaling, that we simply couldn’t see? “I guess the patient just up and died,” he said.

I’m a hospital pathologist; my profession is one of many trying to explain the end of life. In that role, I have learned time and again that even the most thorough medical exams leave behind uncertainty. Take the current spate of heat-related fatalities brought on by a summer of record-breaking temperatures. Residents of Phoenix endured a month of consecutive 110-degree days. People have been literally sizzling on sidewalks. And news organizations are taking note of what is said to be a growing body count: 39 heat deaths in Maricopa County, Arizona; 10 in Laredo, Texas. But the precision of these figures is illusory. Cause of death cannot be measured as exactly as the temperature, and what qualifies as “heat-related” will always be a judgment call: Some people die from heat; others just up and die when it happens to be hot.

Mortality is contested ground, a place where different types of knowledge are in conflict. In Clark County, Nevada, for example, coroners spend weeks investigating possible heat-related deaths. Families are interviewed, death scenes are inspected, and medical tests are performed. The coroner must factor in all of these sources of information because no single autopsy finding can definitively diagnose a heat fatality. A victim may be found to have suffered from hyperthermia—an abnormally high body temperature—or they may be tossed into the more subjective bucket of those who died from ”environmental heat stress.”

Very few deaths undergo such an extensive forensic examination in the first place. Most of the time, the circumstances appear straightforward—a 75-year-old has a stroke; a smoker succumbs to an exacerbation of his chronic lung disease—and the patient’s primary-care doctor or hospital physician completes the death certificate on their own. But heat silently worsens many preexisting conditions; oppressive temperatures can cause an already dysfunctional organ to fail. A recent study out of China estimated that mortality from heart attacks can rise as much as 74 percent during a severe, several-day heat wave. Another study from the U.S. found that even routine temperature fluctuations can subtly alter kidney function, cholesterol levels, and blood counts. Physicians can’t easily tease out these influences. If an elderly man on a park bench suddenly slouches over from a heart attack in 90-degree weather, it’s hard to say for sure whether the heat was what did him in. Epidemiologists must come to the rescue, using statistics to uncover those hidden causes at the population level. This bird’s-eye view shows a simple fact: Bad weather means more death. But it still doesn’t tell us what to think about the man on the bench.

[Read: America is failing to protect workers from extreme heat]

Research (and common sense) tells us that some individuals are going to be especially vulnerable to climate risks. Poverty, physical labor, substandard housing, advanced age, and medical comorbidities all put one in greater danger of experiencing heat-related illness. The weather has a way of kicking you while you’re down, and the wealthy and able-bodied are better able to dodge the blows. A financial struggle as small as an unpaid $51 portion of an electricity bill can prove deadly in the summer. In the autopsies I’ve performed, a patient’s family, medical record, and living situation often told a story of long-term social neglect. But there was no place on the death certificate for me to describe these tragic circumstances. There was certainly no checkbox to indicate that climate change contributed to a fatality. Such matters were out of my jurisdiction.

The public-health approach to assessing deaths has its own problems. Mostly it’s confusing. Reams of scientific studies have reported on hundreds of different risk factors for mortality. Sultry weather appears to be dangerous, but so do skipping breakfast, taking naps, and receiving care from a male doctor. Researchers have declared just about everything a major killer. A few months ago, the surgeon general announced that feeling disconnected is as deadly as smoking up to 15 cigarettes a day. The FDA commissioner has said that misinformation is the nation’s leading cause of premature death. And is poverty or medical error the fourth-leading cause? I can’t keep track.

With so many mortality statistics at our disposal, which ones get emphasized can be more a matter of politics than science. Liberals see the current heat wave—and its wave of heat-related deaths—as an urgent call to action to combat climate change, while conservatives dismiss this concern as a mental disorder. A recent Wall Street Journal op-ed concluded that worrying about climate change is irrational, because “if heat waves were as deadly as the press proclaims, Homo sapiens couldn’t have survived thousands of years without air conditioning.” (Humans survived thousands of years without penicillin, but syphilis was still a net negative.) Similarly, when COVID became the third-leading cause of death in the U.S., pandemic skeptics said it was a fiction: Victims were dying “with COVID,” not “from COVID.” Because many people who died of SARS-CoV-2 had underlying risk factors, some politicians and doctors brushed off the official numbers as hopelessly confounded. Who could say whether the virus had killed anyone at all?

[Read: Summer in the South is becoming unbearable]

The dismissal of COVID’s carnage was mostly cynical and unscientific. But it’s true that death certificates paint one picture of the pandemic, and excess-death calculations paint another. Scientists will be debating COVID’s exact body count for decades. Fatalities from heat are subject to similar ambiguities, even as their determination comes with real-world consequences. In June, for example, officials from Multnomah County, Oregon—where Portland is located—sued oil and gas producers over the effects of a 2021 heat wave that resulted in 69 heat-related deaths, as officially recorded. This statistic will likely be subjected to intense cross-examination. The pandemic showed us that casting doubt on the deceased is a convenient strategy.

No matter how we count the bodies, extreme weather leads to suffering—especially among the most vulnerable members of society. A lot of people have already perished during this summer’s heat wave. Their passing is more than a coincidence—not all of them just up and died.

A Progressive City Debates Crime

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › newsletters › archive › 2023 › 08 › a-progressive-city-debates-crime › 674909

Welcome to Up for Debate. Each week, Conor Friedersdorf rounds up timely conversations and solicits reader responses to one thought-provoking question. Later, he publishes some thoughtful replies. Sign up for the newsletter here.

Question of the Week

Donald Trump is guilty of deplorable actions, under indictment for multiple crimes, and yet remains the most popular candidate with voters in the Republican Party’s presidential primary.

Why do you think he is still their first choice?

Send your responses to conor@theatlantic.com.

Conversations of Note

The prevailing public conversation about crime has been upended in one of the most progressive enclaves in America, where a storied civil-rights organization has had enough. In Oakland, California, the local branch of the NAACP released a scathing open letter on crime last week that purports to capture the frustrations of a community where many now live in fear.

Cynthia Adams, president of the Oakland NAACP, and Bishop Bob Jackson, a local pastor, are listed as the letter’s authors. It begins:

Oakland residents are sick and tired of our intolerable public safety crisis that overwhelmingly impacts minority communities. Murders, shootings, violent armed robberies, home invasions, car break-ins, sideshows, and highway shootouts have become a pervasive fixture of life in Oakland. We call on all elected leaders to unite and declare a state of emergency and bring together massive resources to address our public safety crisis.

African Americans are disproportionately hit the hardest by crime in East Oakland and other parts of the city. But residents from all parts of the city report that they do not feel safe. Women are targeted by young mobs and viciously beaten and robbed in downtown and uptown neighborhoods. Asians are assaulted in Chinatown. Street vendors are robbed in Fruitvale. News crews have their cameras stolen while they report on crime. PG&E workers are robbed and now require private security when they are out working.

Everyone is in danger.

The letter proceeds to lay blame for the crisis on local leadership and their progressive policies, stating:

Failed leadership, including the movement to defund the police, our District Attorney’s unwillingness to charge and prosecute people who murder and commit life threatening serious crimes, and the proliferation of anti-police rhetoric have created a heyday for Oakland criminals. If there are no consequences for committing crime in Oakland, crime will continue to soar.

People are moving out of Oakland in droves. They are afraid to venture out of their homes to go to work, shop, or dine in Oakland and this is destroying economic activity. Businesses, small and large, struggle and close, tax revenues vanish, and we are creating the notorious doom-loop where life in our city continues to spiral downward. As economic pain increases, the conditions that help create crime and criminals are exacerbated by desperate people with no employment opportunities.

We are in crisis and elected leaders must declare a state of emergency and bring resources together from the city, the county, and the state to end the crisis. We are 500 police officers short of the number that experts say Oakland needs. Our 911 system does not work. Residents now know that help will not come when danger confronts them. Worse, criminals know that too.

The authors call for a multiracial anti-crime coalition, and imply that would-be members of such a coalition have been too intimidated to form one:

We urge African Americans to speak out and demand improved public safety. We also encourage Oakland’s White, Asian, and Latino communities to speak out against crime and stop allowing themselves to be shamed into silence. There is nothing compassionate or progressive about allowing criminal behavior to fester and rob Oakland residents of their basic rights to public safety. It is not racist or unkind to want to be safe from crime.

And it advocates for social programs and economic development to address root causes of crime:

Our youth must be given alternatives to the crippling desperation that leads to crime, drugs, and prison. They need quality education, mentorship, and, most importantly, real economic opportunities. Oakland should focus on creating skilled industrial and logistics jobs that pay family sustaining wages, and vocational training so Oakland residents can perform those jobs. With this focus we can produce hundreds, if not thousands, of the types of jobs desperately needed to stem economic despair. Unfortunately, progressive policies and failed leadership have chased away or delayed significant blue collar job development in the city, the Port of Oakland, and the former Army Base. That must change! We also must continue with mentoring programs like the Oakland branch of the national OK Program that steers youth away from criminal activity. We believe that young people currently in the criminal life will choose another path if they are shown a way.

In response to the letter, the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office released the following statement to local media outlets: “We are disappointed that a great African-American pastor and a great African-American organization would take a false narrative on such an important matter. We would expect more from Bishop Bob Jackson and the Oakland Chapter of the NAACP.”

Commenting on the NAACP’s letter, the civil libertarian criminal-defense attorney Scott H. Greenfield argued at his blog, Simple Justice, “There is nothing inconsistent about wanting better cops, who treat citizens respectfully, don’t violate their constitutional rights and don’t resort to needless violence, and wanting police to do the job of protecting citizens.” He continued:

Nobody wants to be wrongfully beaten by a cop. Nobody wants to be beaten by a vicious criminal either. Nobody wants people who are inclined to commit crimes, whether because economic circumstances aren’t as wonderful as Bidenomics tells them or just because committing crimes is a quicker path to getting what they want than working for it, to believe they can do so with impunity … When people on the street live in fear of crime, their lives are miserable and their participation in society limited. They don’t want to live that way, and the Oakland NAACP has stood up to speak for its constituency. This doesn’t make them cop lovers or reform haters, but human beings trying to survive together. Cops are part of that survival, and to accept this does not mean that cops can’t, and shouldn’t, do a whole lot better than they have in the past.

The Boston Globe columnist Jeff Jacoby writes:

Each year, tens of thousands of Oakland residents are victimized in criminal attacks. Preventing shoplifting, car jackings, armed robberies, and homicides is not a conservative or a liberal goal. It is why governments exist in the first place.

The Road Not Taken

At Notes From the Middleground, Damon Linker is considering the newest indictment of Donald Trump with trepidation for the future and frustration about a key moment in the recent past:

Short of an intervening (possibly stress-induced) medical event, Trump is going to be the Republican nominee for president. He will be running for the nation’s highest office while on trial for multiple crimes in multiple jurisdictions. His campaign will take direct aim at the rule of law, declaring it a sham fit only for saps, suckers, and chumps, and most Republican voters will fall in line with this sordid civic lesson, just as most Republican voters have come to believe the 2020 election was stolen by the Democrats simply because Trump has said it was.

Trump could well be convicted in one or more of these trials before Election Day 2024. And he could well win the election, sending him to the White House instead of federal prison. Far from vindicating the rule of law, such an outcome would make a mockery of it.

And what if he loses, claiming once again to have been robbed of a victory by a vast conspiracy involving the Democratic Party, prosecutors and the courts, ostensibly neutral government functionaries, and the “fake news” media that will stop at nothing to deny power to the nearly half of the country that dares to resist left-wing totalitarian control? I won’t try to answer that question. Your imaginations can do the work all on their own.

I’ll leave you with something else instead—my growing conviction is that the last opportunity we had to contain and partially neutralize the civically pestilential influence of Donald Trump on our polity was February 13, 2021. That’s the day Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell voted to acquit Donald Trump for his actions on and leading up to the events of January 6. While describing Trump’s words and deeds in the run-up to the insurrectionary violence on Capitol Hill as “disgraceful,” McConnell nonetheless preferred to let the judicial branch of government solve his Trump problem for him, declaring, “We have a criminal justice system in this country. We have civil litigation. And former presidents are not immune from being held accountable by either one.”

In the annals of shirked political responsibility, that has to deserve a special prize. It would have taken ten more votes in the Senate to convict Trump in his second impeachment. Had McConnell taken a public stand against the former president and whipped others in his party to do the same, Trump might have been barred from ever holding public office again. That would have been a political solution to what was and remains a fundamentally political problem. Instead, we’re left with the legal solution McConnell preferred—and the considerable risk that politics may well overwhelm and devour it.  

In Hot Water

In The Atlantic, Marina Koren argues that rising sea temperatures are especially troubling:

Earth is an ocean planet, a water world. We have not observed anything like it yet in the universe, not even with our best telescopes, and so we cannot know exactly how rare—and thus, how difficult—it may be for the forces of cosmic nature to produce such a thing. And yet, here we are, simmering its oceans at our peril and changing the fundamental makeup of the ecosystem that defines Earth. Our oceans have absorbed most of the excess heat produced by greenhouse-gas emissions in recent decades, serving as a buffer that protects us from the worst effects of climate change. Humans may be sweltering on land this summer, but our planet’s future—and therefore ours—is intimately tied with the sea.

Provocation of the Week

Writing at Law & Liberty, Yuval Levin explores the relationship between America’s constitutional design and our efforts to live together across differences.

Acting together when we don’t think alike requires creating some space for competing approaches to governance; compelling opposing factions to bargain, negotiate, and seek accommodations that not only avert conflict but bring us closer together; administering the government in steady, predictable ways in accordance with those accommodations; and enforcing clear boundaries on the power of majorities and public officials. This is the work of federalism, Congress, the president, and the courts, respectively. But it all requires a citizenry well formed in core republican virtues by the very experience of working together even when we don’t think alike.

This is a fact we often miss about our Constitution. It works by setting competing interests and powers against each other, which critics sometimes caricature as substituting an almost mechanical proceduralism for morally substantive civic formation. But that is precisely wrong. This approach actually begins from the insight that, in order to be properly formative, our politics must always be in motion—that moral formation is a matter of establishing habits, and that civic habits are built up by civic action more than by a proper arrangement of rules. The different interests, priorities, and power centers set against each other in our system do not rest against each other, like interlocking beams holding up a roof. Rather, they push, pull, and tug at each other and unceasingly compete for position. They are living political actors, not inanimate structural supports. And none can achieve anything without dealing with the others, who are always in their way. The result is a peculiar style of politics, which feels frustrating and acrimonious at almost any given instant, but can be remarkably dynamic in the long run.

Thanks for your contributions. I read every one that you send. By submitting an email, you’ve agreed to let us use it—in part or in full—in the newsletter and on our website. Published feedback may include a writer’s full name, city, and state, unless otherwise requested in your initial note, and may be edited for length and clarity.

Would You Drive an Extra Five Minutes to Save the Planet?

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2023 › 08 › google-maps-eco-mode-driving-efficiency › 674904

All my life, I thought there was just one way to get to my hometown’s ShopRite: right on Fair Street, right on Gleneida Avenue, right into the parking lot. That was until I plugged ShopRite into Google Maps. Now I had two options. I could turn right into the parking lot in front of the grocery store or, if I felt compelled, enter closer to Gold’s Gym and cut across the asphalt sea. Either route would take four minutes, the app said, but the latter earned the Google Maps eco-mode seal of approval: a little green leaf. A blurb informed me that I would save 6 percent gas by turning into the lot before, rather than after, the spot where my mom takes Bodypump classes. I could do my part to save the world.

It’s been two years since Google announced its Maps eco-routing feature. For all trips by car in the U.S., Canada, and much of Europe, the app defaults to recommending the most environmentally friendly route, as long as it’s not that much slower than the alternative. If the time difference between routes is negligible, the app defaults to the one that saves gas. The feature’s launch was met with significant internal buzz. Google’s CEO, Sundar Pichai, said that it could save “over one million tons of carbon emissions per year—the equivalent of removing over 200,000 cars from the road.”

That sounds great. But those numbers are less impressive when you consider that the EPA estimated on-road-vehicle emissions of about 1.5 billion tons of CO2 last year, and that nearly 103 million cars were registered in the United States in 2021. The tiny green leaf may help the planet a little, but it might also make things worse by giving drivers like me a false sense of accomplishment as we continue destroying the planet with gas-guzzling personal vehicles. Eco-mode is a little nudge in a time when little nudges just don’t feel like enough—a sign of how much inconvenience any of us is actually willing to suffer in order to mitigate climate change.

The question of how much eco-mode is actually changing drivers’ behavior is difficult to answer. For one thing, the “green” routes that Google recommends are, in many cases, exactly the same routes it would’ve offered anyway. “The fastest route and the most fuel-efficient one are the same the vast majority of the time,” Rosa Wu, a product manager at Google Maps, told me, though the company was unable to provide any precise numbers. In cases where there are multiple options, Wu said, eco-mode does make it easier for drivers to choose a more sustainable route when planning a trip.

[Read: EVs are sending toxic tire particles into the water, soil, and air]

When I talked with David Reichmuth, a senior engineer in the Clean Transportation program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, he asked the app for directions from his Oakland, California, home to his parent’s house in Petaluma, about 45 miles northwest. The result was fantastic: “It says right now that I will save 62 percent gas,” he told me about the 40-minute trip. But the alternative was a roundabout two-hour journey that took him south to San Jose, north through San Francisco, and over the Golden Gate Bridge (and avoided a $7 toll). “So I guess, yes,” he said, “you do save 60 percent over driving the wrong way.”

When eco-mode’s recommendations do differ from the fastest route available, estimating how much gas is saved is not trivial. To calculate its eco routes, Google Maps relies on a vehicle-energy-consumption model co-created by Jacob Holden, a research scientist at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Predicting how much gas a certain vehicle will consume at a certain speed on a certain path is a fairly simple engineering problem, Holden told me, but it’s harder to transfer this information when road conditions, and people’s individual driving styles, are unpredictable. “You and I and 1,000 of our friends could drive the same stretch of road, and we’ll all drive it a little bit differently,” he told me. Still, he thinks eco-mode’s predictions are roughly accurate; one paper he co-authored in 2018 found that the NREL’s current methodology “should accurately select the route that consumes the least fuel 90% of the time.”

We also have no way of knowing the net climate impact of eco-mode other than to take Google’s word for it. Konstantinos Katsikopoulos, a behavioral-science professor at the University of Southampton, wanted to see more data on the 200,000-car figure especially. Though a 200-word endnote in Google’s 2023 environmental report outlines how the company reached that figure, it doesn’t include the raw data. “Maybe they’re assuming that nobody’s interested to know more or they couldn’t understand it,” he told me. But to him, it mostly seemed opaque.

[Read: Google Maps’ failed attempt to get people to lose weight]

Eco-mode’s impact may be small, at least so far, but wide-scale eco-nudges could cumulatively play a role in reducing overall emissions. A 2022 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, according to a summary by one of its co-chairs, concluded that “having the right policies, infrastructure and technology in place to enable changes to our lifestyles and behaviour can result in a 40–70% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.” Google Maps isn’t helping people buy electric vehicles, retrofit their houses with energy-efficient technologies, or install heat pumps—changes that would undoubtedly carry a much larger benefit—but it’s still a behavior change. If small reminders incorporated into tools people already use in their daily lives could make a real dent in emissions, the world might indeed warm more slowly. And in that sense, eco-mode’s successes are as instructive as its shortcomings.

But that doesn’t mean people will use it when the more sustainable choice is actually slower. Holden told me that, on his own trips, he’ll more often than not take the eco-route, but it’s not always great. “There are certainly times where I’ll be given a route that’s recommended as efficient and we'll just kind of chuckle at the impracticality,” he told me. If the app instructs him to  avoid the highway in favor of a slightly longer drive through a series of stoplights, he’ll believe the recommendation—it’s based on his own model, after all—but still drive the highway route. “And I think that’s really interesting,” he said. “Me of all people, I’m reaching that conclusion.”

To impress the benefits of the eco-routes upon drivers like Holden, Google is considering retooling how its eco-routes are presented, Wu told me. Maps doesn’t display emissions estimates—such as carbon-dioxide equivalent—because they’re confusing for regular drivers, she said. “When we were doing research, we found that users had no conception of emissions.” But the percentages might not be persuasive enough to change people’s behavior. Instead of “saves 2% gas,” the company is thinking of presenting potential financial savings at some point—take this route, spend four more minutes driving, and save $1.45.

Kate Brandt, Google’s chief sustainability officer, told me repeatedly that the goal of programs like eco-mode and Google Flights’ carbon-footprint calculation (which estimates how many kilograms of CO2 I’ll contribute to the atmosphere depending on which flight I pick) is to provide “helpful information that people are seeking.” But as I scrolled through Maps over the past few weeks, I wondered who was seeking some of the information Google offered: the route to upstate New York that would take 40 more minutes and, depending on the time of day, possibly save me 2 percent on emissions; the ShopRite parking-lot maneuver that would save a couple of teaspoons of gas.

[Read: America is missing out on the biggest EV boom of all]

If Google Maps is so intent on showing me the greenest way to get to the grocery store, its eco-friendly nod would perhaps more helpfully be directed toward a non-driving option. Though Google Maps provides helpful walking, biking, public-transit, and mixed-mode directions, no amount of industrious trekking will earn you a green leaf. Reichmuth thinks this is a mistake. When he pulled up routes from his home to San Francisco’s Oracle Park, he wondered why Google bestowed the eco seal of approval on any driving route when he could take public transit, get there in about the same amount of time, and not waste minutes and fuel parking.

Holden, despite his gas-use models, felt similarly. “The actual solution here is to get on your bike and go to Trader Joe’s,” he said. “That will be the most efficient path.”

How Bronze Age Pervert Charmed the Far Right

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › magazine › archive › 2023 › 09 › bronze-age-pervert-costin-alamariu › 674762

This story seems to be about:

Illustrations by Nicolás Ortega

In 2014, the actor B. J. Novak, best known as Ryan, the weaselly temp from The Office, went on the Late Show With David Letterman and confessed to a small role he’d played 17 years earlier in the history of the American far right. The significance of this role could not have been obvious at the time, either to Novak (who was in high school) or to its victims, the bewildered patrons of Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts. Novak had recruited a Romanian classmate with a deep voice, and together they’d recorded an audio tour for the exhibition “Tales From the Land of Dragons: 1,000 Years of Chinese Painting.” With the help of friends, they then slipped cassettes containing their tour into the museum’s official audio guides.

Art lovers must have wondered about the thick Eastern European accent that greeted them, over the twang of a Chinese string instrument. The Romanian soon became opinionated (“Personally,” he said, “I think this painting is a piece of crap”), then deranged. He alluded to his “disgusting anatomical abnormalities.” He called his listeners “decadent imperialist maggots” and confessed a desire to smash a glass case with a sledgehammer and “rip [a] scroll to shreds with my teeth, which, by the way, are extremely long and sharp … more like fangs than human teeth.” At last he offered an interlude of “idiot music” while he fumbled with his script. “This should keep you occupied, you drooling imbecile!” he bellowed at the listeners, by now either amused or complaining to management. The last several minutes were a cha-cha by Tito Puente.

Exit Novak from the stage of American fascism. (His last known political donation was $1,000 to Hillary Clinton in 2016.) But the Romanian has kept in character, complete with the peevish attitude and hammed-up accent. About the time Novak went on Letterman, the Romanian began posting on social media as “Bronze Age Pervert,” a mad-in-both-senses weirdo who had escaped the Museum of Fine Arts and now aimed to take over the world. His message, delivered in tweets, podcasts, and a self-published book, mixes ultra-far-right politics, unabashed racism, and a deep knowledge of ancient Greece. He has never shown his face or admitted his real name. But I know Bronze Age Pervert, and have known him almost as long as B. J. Novak has. He’s an MIT graduate who grew up in Newton, Massachusetts. His name is Costin Alamariu.

It is hard to convey precisely what BAP believes, in part because his views are so outlandish that even when stated simply, they sound like incoherent ranting. America’s civic religion holds that all humans have inherent and equal worth, that they should not be graded according to beauty or nobility, and that they should not aim to destroy one another. BAP says this orthodoxy is exactly wrong. He argues that the natural and desirable condition of life is the domination of the weak and ugly by the strong and noble. He considers American cities a “wasteland” run by Jews and Black people, though the words he uses to denote these groups are considerably less genteel than these.

The modern state, he says, has been designed to empower the feebleminded and the misshapen at the expense of their betters. The strong and noble must humiliate and conquer their tormentors and destroy their institutions. On Twitter, where he has more than 100,000 followers, BAP posts images of seminude Aryan beefcakes, usually in tropical settings, to celebrate the physical perfection of the warrior element of the race that he hopes will someday be restored to dominance.

The world, or at least parts of it, has been more receptive to BAP than one might think. By now he is a leading cultural figure on the fascist right—among both elites, who have cottoned to his political philosophy, and non-elites, who love his brio and aspire to his erudition.

I consider myself a connoisseur of brilliant lunatics, and I have a high tolerance for their lunacy if it has compensating virtues of, say, humor or ingenuity. But even I find BAP worrisome. What starts as comedy can become something more sinister—and BAP’s shtick, while sometimes hilarious, shows every sign of transforming into a new mode of far-right radicalism, with fans in positions of responsibility and power.

Typically philosophy books go unread even by the philosophers’ closest friends and family. But BAP’s book, Bronze Age Mindset (2018), tumbled screeching into the world, unignorable, at one point ranking among the top 150 books in the entire Amazon catalog. “It’s still a cult book,” a former Trump White House official told Politico in 2019. “If you’re a young person, intelligent, adjacent in some way to the right, it’s very likely you would have heard of it.” His podcast, Caribbean Rhythms, has likewise won an avid following.

Only the most incautious admit their devotion. BAP tells his young disciples to burrow into government, to deny him publicly, to wait. Matthew Kriner, with the Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, monitors the social-media activity of groups that are trying to ignite race wars and revive fascist movements. Their accounts have unsubtle Teutonic names such as Atomwaffen. “Bronze Age Pervert is across the vast majority of them,” Kriner told me. Moreover, he has an odd crossover appeal—among both extremely online misfits and figures with real-world influence. BAP, Kriner said, “represents that bridge to get you from really not-acceptable content to maybe ending up in someone’s legislative activities, within a very reasonable amount of time.”

BAP’s relationship to Donald Trump has been curious. He refers to the former president repeatedly, almost in the manner of a Homeric epithet, as a Borscht Belt comedian, a master of yuks. To BAP, Trump’s chief virtue is destruction. He views the former president fondly, as a kindred insult comic, brazenly impious and generally right about race and immigration. The affection has been repaid in print by Michael Anton, a former Trump-administration national-security official who wrote a 2019 essay in the Claremont Review of Books sympathetic to BAP, while noting his tendency to be “racist,” “anti-Semitic,” “anti-democratic,” “misogynistic,” and “homophobic.” Anton suggested (correctly, I think) that BAP’s vile utterances, whether sincere or not, serve a purpose: to keep whiny leftists so busy cataloging his petty thoughtcrimes that they overlook his more serious heresies. Meanwhile, those capable of reading him without being rage-blinded quietly learn from him and heed his advice to bond, network, and plot.

[From the April 2023 issue: America’s terrifying cycle of extremist violence]

Anton wrote that BAP “speaks directly to a youthful dissatisfaction (especially among white males) with equality as propagandized and imposed in our day: a hectoring, vindictive, resentful, leveling, hypocritical equality that punishes excellence and publicly denies all difference while at the same time elevating and enriching a decadent, incompetent, and corrupt elite.” Anton, who was once a graduate student in political philosophy, ended his essay by prognosticating a BAPist future: “In the spiritual war for the hearts and minds of the disaffected youth on the right, conservatism is losing. BAPism is winning.”

Nicolás Ortega. Sources: Alamy; Auguste Vinchon.

BAPism, for all its emphasis on bodily perfection, began as an intellectual phenomenon, and its first victories came in intellectual circles. They were so subtle that even the guardians of those circles recognized their enemy only after he was already within the gates.

Last year, at a conference of political philosophers at Michigan State University, a Yale professor named Bryan Garsten told his colleagues that they were in trouble. The topic of the conference was liberalism—not Ted Kennedy liberalism, but the classical version that predates the modern Democratic Party and indeed America itself. Liberalism is the view that individuals have rights and beliefs, and that politics involves safeguarding rights and making compromises when beliefs conflict. It has existed for only a few centuries and is by some measures the most successful idea in history. Just look where people want to live: the United States, the European Union, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, all liberal places that people will risk their life to reach.

But Garsten said liberalism had some of his best students hopping into rafts and paddling in other intellectual directions. He said they had been “captured” by the belief “that to be morally serious, one faces a choice.” The choice, he said, is not between liberalism and illiberalism. Liberalism had already lost. Its greatest champion, the United States, had run aground after pointless wars, terminal decadence, and bureaucratic takeover by activists and special interests. Garsten said his best students were choosing between the protofascism of Nietzsche and a neomedieval, quasi-theocratic version of Catholicism opposed to Enlightenment liberalism. These students considered liberal democracy an exhausted joke, and they hinted—and sometimes did more than hint—that the past few centuries had been a mistake, and that the mistake should now be corrected.

Some at the conference countered that these illiberals might have just not done their homework. “Your students need to become better readers,” said Diana J. Schaub, a political-science professor at Loyola University Maryland. But Garsten’s illiberal students were good readers. Their deficiencies lay elsewhere, possibly everywhere but there.

Many of the participants knew that Garsten was talking about the threat posed by Bronze Age Pervert, though his name was uttered with great reluctance. Partly this reluctance came from political philosophers’ unwillingness to admit that they browse the Twitter feed of a genocidal nudist. Partly it was their worry that they had unwittingly been complicit in BAPism’s spread by sending their students to intern in Washington, and to staff offices on Capitol Hill and in conservative institutions such as the Heritage Foundation.

[Graeme Wood: Harlan Crow wants to stop talking about Clarence Thomas]

From there, BAPism reached members of the right who lack philosophical training—young men whose main interest is not in the rise or fall of the American civic religion but in something more primal, an urge they themselves hardly understand, let alone control. “There is a level of self-loathing, chronic-masturbating anger out there among adolescent and early-20s fucked-up males,” one Republican operative told me. To them the world is dry, purposeless, and designed for the flourishing of anyone but them. Conservatism in the old way—not Bronze Age old, but Reagan old—does not satisfy them. “BAPism essentially involves re-enchanting the world and giving purpose to these young guys,” the operative told me. “And for some reason we can’t.”

“Do you watch X-Men ?” Vish Burra, a 32-year-old legislative aide to Representative George Santos of New York, asked me recently. He said BAP’s followers hid out in government like mutants in the Marvel Comics universe. (The leader of the mutants, Professor Charles Xavier, can put on a special helmet and scan the world for fellow mutants.) “The movement’s coagulating, connecting,” Burra said, and only at private gatherings and parties will the BAPists on Capitol Hill confess their devotion. Someday, he said, they’ll go public, with a “big reveal.” But that moment will not come until the BAPists “get in position first,” Burra said. “Why would I [reveal myself] before I’m in front of the control panel?”

After the museum prank, almost 20 years passed before BAP’s politics emerged into the light. And just as it did, the Romanian himself shrank vampirically into the shadows. No one seems sure where he is, or how he spends his days. But a sufficiently colorful and idiosyncratic personality is its own guarantee of detection. When I heard his podcast, it took me about 10 seconds to identify him.

Costin Alamariu is in his mid-40s, and he has never publicly admitted that he is BAP. (He did not reply to requests for comment for this article.) I met him only once, two decades ago, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, after a mutual friend intuited that we might enjoy each other’s company. Costin appeared one night wearing a dramatic overcoat—the kind whose wearer is begging for those around him to make a comment. I resisted. He had emigrated from Romania, he said, when he was about 10. That explained the Dracula note in his voice.

We spent that evening striding around Cambridge, having what I vaguely recall as a conversation that started with philosophy and then roamed widely over history, ethnography, and literature. Notably absent from our discussion was mathematics, then Costin’s undergraduate major at MIT. He had a gift for finely titrated offense—just enough to appall me but keep the conversation going. He learned that I was studying Persian, and I said the grammar was startlingly simple, because its use as a lingua franca over several centuries had shorn it of many of its complexities. “Is it like Spanish,” he asked, in a mischievous deadpan, “where every time you say a word, you feel your brain shrinking?”

For many years, we corresponded. Costin’s messages arrived irregularly, and the tone ranged from friendly and inquisitive to boorish and insulting. I went to South America on assignment. He sent long messages extolling the virtues of Joseph Conrad’s novel Nostromo, which is set there. A friend who reads books like Nostromo, and can talk about them, is a friend worth putting up with. When I traveled to northwestern Pakistan, he suggested that we go in on a cabin in the mountains around Chitral and “plan the freedom of the Kalash,” an Indigenous Indo-Aryan people in the surrounding valleys.

About 10 years ago, he took to calling my friends “fags” and exhorting me not to “be a faggot.” At some point he had begun bodybuilding, and he sent me a picture of himself shirtless, with the message “Do you like this pic of me.” (He had asked me to keep our messages between us, and I continue to honor that request, with the exception of offhand remarks, comments he has repeated elsewhere, and publicly available facts. He must have sent the seminude thirst pic to others, because I have not shared it, but it has surfaced on social media.)

Eventually I decided that the book recommendations and ethnographic whimsies no longer made the slurs worth enduring. I let our correspondence trail off. I wrote to him when I discovered his BAP persona, and then it was he who stopped replying to me.

BAP’s origin story begins at Newton South High School, outside Boston. Newton has an outstanding public-school system, and both he and the friend who introduced us were in a clique of edgy nerds and teenage intellectuals. In philosophy, the group favored Nietzsche; in music, Rachmaninoff; in politics, none of the above. They indulged in adolescent intoxication with ideas, especially the forbidden and obscure. This kind of extremism is a privilege of youth, because if you’re still just a kid, you can idolize Che Guevara or Nietzsche all you like, and (usually) no one gets hurt.

Newton also has a large Jewish population. BAP has said on Twitter that he is Jewish, and this appears to be true. Costin has relatives who were interned in Nazi concentration camps. His older brother works as a geopolitical strategist at an investment research firm and has no detectable accent. Costin has kept his Romanian accent in private life. While in character, he speaks in what I believe is an intentionally bad Russian accent.

After high school, Costin went to MIT, where his father worked in the technology-licensing office. The New York Times once ran a photo of Costin, wearing his overcoat with Teva sandals, to illustrate the impaired fashion sense of MIT undergraduates. Upon graduation, he briefly worked in investment banking in New York, then began a doctoral program in political science at Yale—where he was a student of Bryan Garsten’s. (I teach part-time in Costin’s old department, where Garsten is a friend and colleague. Costin had left New Haven by the time I arrived.)

Faculty and graduate students from that era describe him as clever and manipulative. He wrote caustic letters to the student newspaper and contributed to The New Criterion, a venerable right-leaning cultural journal. He disappeared for long periods. He claimed he had been living out of a van in Argentina. No one was sure what to believe. His aversion to normal human company echoed Nietzsche’s: “When I am among the many I live as the many do, and I do not think as I really think; after a time it always seems as though they want to banish me from myself and rob me of my soul.” When among fellow grad students, he mocked them and played tricks. One grad student took Costin seriously, only to realize, she told me, “Oh no—I’m an idiot—this guy is just fucking with me.”

Costin was always ready to talk about political philosophy, but he objected to attempts to enlist him in mundane campus politics. Others gathered signatures to denounce dictators during the Arab Spring. He humbly suggested that if petitions did not topple Hosni Mubarak, a well-attended candlelight vigil might. Yale’s grad students attempted to unionize and to pressure the university to increase stipends and benefits. One wrote to a grad-student listserv with questions about the school’s dental-insurance coverage. “My cousin Benko run Benko-Magnitogorsk Dental Emporium, he make good dental work in white van at Grand Av. and East St. in parking lot outside plumbing supplies store,” Costin replied. “You forward me small price of $100 he do work … steel teeth, gold teeth anything you want.” The email was an early exercise in refitting his character to needle and ridicule liberals.

His dissertation is a peculiar document. His adviser, Steven B. Smith, is often identified with the German-born Jewish philosopher Leo Strauss, about whom Smith wrote an elegant book. Strauss argued that great thinkers have embedded hidden messages in their writing, and the apparent meaning of their books and essays often contradicts the recondite meaning that only discerning readers can decode. The upshot: Read carefully, because things are not what they seem.

Costin’s dissertation follows Smith’s and Strauss’s lead. It is eccentric even within this eccentric tradition, as Costin himself allows. He reads Plato in a Straussian style: Plato’s teacher, Socrates, was executed for doing philosophy in a manner vexing to the Athenian state, so naturally Plato would have learned from that experience and written so that only the most perceptive reader could discern his true, subversive beliefs. At least one of those beliefs, in Costin’s reading, is a doozy. Plato, taken by most readers to scorn tyrants, is read by Costin as their covert defender. “Philosophy and tyranny are fundamentally connected,” Costin writes, and their shared aim is eugenic. They seek “the breeding,” the “biological” production of genius, nobility, and virtue: a master race.

Nicolás Ortega. Source: Alamy.

“There is much in this view that is frightening and even abhorrent to us,” Costin writes. Yet he states that Plato’s claims are validated by the history of human cultures. For evidence, he offers a bizarre mix of folklore, history, and ethnography. The development of an aristocratic class, he says, demands conquest, the vanquishing of lesser races by the organized violence of the greater. As an example, he quotes Pierre van den Berghe, an anthropologist who described Rwandan Tutsis, an archetypal aristocratic elite, as “intelligent, astute in political intrigue, born to command, refined, courageous, and cruel.” His dissertation is dripping with admiration for these martial, masculine virtues, and for their feminine counterpart of beauty. He despises, in turn, farming and manual labor, the characteristics of a slave class.

One of the best ways to conceal your genocidal fascism is to write about it openly in that most unread of documents, the unpublished doctoral dissertation. The few who noticed considered it an intellectual exercise rather than an act of incipient fascism.

Costin’s advisers were not alone in failing to take his Nietzscheanism as seriously as they might have. Dustin Sebell, a former acquaintance of Costin’s from that period and now a professor at Michigan State, told me that political philosophy as a whole has been one big victory parade for liberalism for several decades now. “You have a tradition of reflection that has gone on for decades largely oblivious to these radical Nietzschean critiques,” Sebell said. “When those critiques resurfaced, many professional philosophers had little to say for themselves.”

When Costin began submitting his doctoral work, Smith, his adviser, became enraged. “I was shocked that his family would escape Ceaușescu’s Romania only for Costin to undermine the principles of [American] democracy,” Smith told me. “I view that as a shameful act of betrayal.” He said he made his disgust known but ultimately signed off, and Costin received his degree. “I was his dissertation adviser, not his censor.”

In 2015, Emory University hired Costin for a postdoctoral fellowship, on the basis of less incendiary writing samples. His time there was a disaster. He acted erratically. At one point, he refused to give Emory’s human-resources department his home address. During the spring semester, the university discovered that Costin had secretly stopped teaching his classes in person and was instead attempting to teach them over email. Further investigation revealed that Costin was medically unable to teach in person, with a vague but apparently real physical infirmity. His fellowship was not renewed. Later he lived for some time in Brazil, although he has been sighted recently in Japan, Spain, Hong Kong, and Iceland.

Within two years of his departure from Emory, Bronze Age Mindset was published—a noxious, digressive summa that incorporated the conclusions in his dissertation, and added many others too outré for any but a self-published document. It is a narcissistic, 198-page love letter to himself, or to the philosopher-as-muscleman that his BAP persona purports to be. The tone approaches at times the onanistic genius of a young Norman Mailer, but much more resentful toward the modern world. “Perversions—lame ones—are born by the thousands and haunt, like myriad cripplette midgets in halls of mirrors, they haunt the world, books, the internet. Minds are lost. If you wait any longer everything will be pounded to garbage, there will be nothing left—it will all turn, the whole world will turn to a Bulgarian rest stop lavatory,” he writes. “I declare to you, with great boldness, that I am here to save you from a great ugliness.”

The “great ugliness” is the liberal bureaucratic state. Democracy, he writes, destroys “personal freedom and initiative” by elevating an unworthy caste of subhuman creatures he calls “bugmen,” who flourish only under these debased conditions, like roaches in a pit latrine. On his podcast, BAP praises the philosopher James Burnham, who wrote that the heroic age of capitalism had passed, and that a “managerial revolution” had elevated to power bean counters and bureaucrats (think of his supposed persecutors from Emory’s HR department) over noble intellects and creators. Any person of talent or intelligence is ground down by this system, by “life under the thumb of the empowered old matriarchs and the conceptual dildoes they use to clobber the heads of young men.”

The ugliness extends to art and culture. Low dominates high. Screeching popular music drowns out Rachmaninoff. “From the point of view of real culture and refinement we’re as barbaric as the most obscure herd of the Khwarezm [an ancient Central Asian people] where the women scratch their pubes in public.”

The “Bronze Age” element of his perversion refers to the earliest days of ancient Greece—an era of virile pagan militarism, before the moderns, and even some of the ancients, were beguiled into weakness. Men performed feats of intellect and strength unknown today: memorization of names and poetry, running flat-out for miles under heavy armor to impale enemies. These men prospered under “life at its peak,” which happens “not in the grass hut village ruled by nutso mammies, but in the military state.”

Then things get weird. BAP fantasizes about a near-apocalyptic cleansing:

Here is my vision of the true justice, the justice of nature: the zoos opened, predators unleashed by the dozens, hundreds … four thousand hungry wolves rampaging on streets of these hive cities, elephants and bison stampeding, the buildings smashed to pieces, the cries of the human bug shearing through the streets as the lord of beasts returns. Manhattan, Moscow, Peking reduced to ruins overgrown by vines and forest, the haunt of the lynx and coyote again. The great cesspool slums, Calcutta, Nairobi, all the fetid latrines of the world covered over by mudslides, overgrown with thick jungle, this is justice.

The beings fit to rule this rewilded landscape are the neo-warriors, men of greatness and violence. “The only right government is military government, and every other form is both hypocritical and destructive of true freedom,” BAP writes. He considers Japan during the late imperial period, when the emperor was a martial god, an ideal political arrangement, and has written elsewhere that it is “the perfect model of national political life and national identity.”

BAP styles his book an “exhortation,” and ultimately he exhorts white people to form military units with deep masculine bonds, and together annihilate lesser races or throw them under the yoke. One could more easily dismiss BAP as a political shock jock, and his racism as cheap and tasteless subversion, if this section were not so obviously heartfelt. He mentions by name the white mercenaries who toppled governments for profit and pleasure in the 20th century. “The coming age of barbarism will not be owned, as so many of you urban cucks fear, by the gangbangers and the unwashed hordes of the teeming cesspools of the world, but by clean-cut middle-class and working-class vets, men of military experience, who know something about how to shoot and how to organize. The fools who think oligarchs will be able to control these men for very long should look to the fortunes of the Sforzas”—the Renaissance clan that controlled, then lost, the duchy of Milan—“and many others, and remember that money is no match for force of arms combined with charm.”

I asked Vish Burra, the young Hill staffer, how BAP had charmed him. “The power, the vitality, the energy,” he said. “The left has stuck itself in a position of promoting a politics of sterility.” He said he didn’t agree with everything BAP said, but he loved the vision, the verve, the relentless mockery of the bugmen.

The bugmen, as Burra suggests, are terrible at countering BAP’s message. Liberals and leftists are used to sitting in a blind, watching for telltale signs of their enemies’ racism. There is no point in yelling “racist” at someone who is already yelling racial epithets at full volume. And there is, among BAP’s fans, perverse pleasure in watching their critics passionately denounce their hero, to no discernible effect.

BAPists are not supposed to talk about being BAPists, and they even have a term of abuse for those who do: facefag. “He wouldn’t appreciate a face—” Rather than utter the word, Burra sort of gestured at it, pawing the air. “He wouldn’t appreciate a guy like me, but I’m a big fan.”

BAP enjoys suggesting how close his followers are to the control panels. He posts pictures of their copies of Bronze Age Mindset next to tokens of their power, such as U.S.-government-official passports and patches, IDs, and other items from the livery of the Secret Service, Army Rangers, Department of Homeland Security, and Air Force. He allows one to wonder whether for every Vish Burra, who proudly keeps his copy of the book on the office shelf, there are others who adopt bugman camouflage. To be part of a clandestine movement, so extreme that it feels almost invisible to one’s elders, is part of the thrill. “I mentioned him in class the other day; my students were shocked that I knew who Bronze Age Pervert was,” the Notre Dame political theorist Patrick Deneen said at a conference in April.

A BAPist can take pleasure in having entered an exclusive cognitive club. One of his supporters wrote to me that BAP’s character was layered with irony, and that the ability to see the truth in BAP, and separate it from the hilarious megalomania, is a kind of Straussian test, to determine who can read and think, and who is so offended by the racism, misogyny, and anti-Semitism that he is incapacitated and unable to focus on anything else, even to criticize it. “Nobody who has the IQ to listen to one hour of BAP without tuning out actually believes he recommends becoming an autistic nudist bodybuilder.”

I am not sure I pass that test. Listening to BAP, one gets the impression of florid insanity. He digresses as if not in control of his own thoughts. He barks insults and orders at subordinates in his recording studio, and one can reasonably wonder whether these figures are comic creations or psychotic delusions. He cannot possibly believe everything he says he believes.

BAP glorifies bodybuilding and devotes much of his Twitter feed to images of half-naked white hunks in the flower of youth. Allegedly this is to worship their vitality, their fitness for the aristocratic warrior class that the modern world has dishonored. He stresses that in ancient Athens, the cultivation of physical perfection was a privilege of the elite. Only citizens could train in the gymnasium. The process of creating an ideal male form was deemed beyond the station of lesser entities, such as women and slaves.

The parade of Adonises has led many to question BAP’s sexuality. Bizarrely, Costin is not the only fascist I know who has been dogged by such rumors. Richard Spencer, my chemistry-lab partner in middle school, faced persistent questions about his sexuality when he was a leader of the alt‑right. (If anyone out there can explain why homoerotic fascists keep seeking my company, please let me know.) Spencer told me, more than a little exasperated, that he thought the case for BAP’s homosexuality had been proved. “If I had posted even one photo of some guy’s ass on Twitter, do you think there would be any question in anyone’s mind?” In Bronze Age Mindset, BAP writes that the confusion of masculine bonding for homosexuality “is misunderstanding and exaggeration promoted by the homonerds of our time,” a poverty of our imagination and lack of friendship, “because we can’t conceive of such intense love between friends without some carnal or material benefit in play.”

[From the June 2017 issue: How Richard Spencer became an icon for white supremacists]

The sheer length of time BAP has held his pose makes one wonder whether more of it is sincere than his followers think. As a character sings in a Sam Shepard play, “I believe in my mask: The man I made up is me.” The breeding of a caste of supermen is not just a pseudo-comic reverie. It is the subject of his dissertation. The fantasies of killing “lower forms of life” are not funny at all, not even as a lampoon of liberal excess. And while some people know BAP personally, and vouch for his intelligence and wit, few have emerged to state with confidence that he’s not a fascist and racist. That is because he probably is one.

What might it feel like to experience the modern world as a “great ugliness”—an inverted kingdom of sniveling ass-kissers? “Society became something approaching mass concentration camp,” BAP has said on his podcast. “I’m exaggerating only a little.” His rejection of this world is matched by his rejection by it. His classmates are successful; they hold good jobs. One by one, the adolescent Nietzscheans grew up into productive citizens, and put aside childish fascinations. The person who introduced us, now decades ago, was once so close to Costin that their friends described them as sharing something almost as deep as marriage. (They did not suggest the bond was erotic.) That friend has excelled in a normal life: a job at a tech company, a family, leadership in his synagogue. At some point he chose to be normal, which means rejecting BAP.

To take a job, to toil in the modern fields among the bugs and bugmen, is the greatest betrayal. No one respectable wants anything to do with someone who tweets out messages calling for “high violence” against the “kike and nigger” scourge.

BAP has responded to this rejection with bitterness, with what Milton called “a sense of injured merit.” I find his message melancholic. Recently he posted a video of himself in Rio de Janeiro’s Botanical Garden, following around a wild bird. “Yes, hello,” he says. “Do not run from me. Come back. I love you.” I do not see much space for true love in the world he has built for himself, whose components are war, purification, and mutual masculine admiration ever fearful of its eros.

Fixation on BAP’s monstrous qualities has, I think, led even his fervent admirers to overlook the most unexpected aspect of his philosophy, which is a literal belief in the transmigration of souls, as described in Eastern religions and the work of Arthur Schopenhauer. If this life fails, another will come. When the ironic pose drops, when the outrageous Boratism subsides, this conviction is what remains. “I believe reincarnation is fundamentally true,” he writes, in a section of his book that does not appear to be for laughs.

“I think that is the deepest layer of his outlook,” Dustin Sebell, at Michigan State, told me. “He believes in an esoteric version of metempsychosis, that our truest selves live on after death and take on different forms. He is profoundly unwilling to accept his own mortality.”

No humans receive praise higher than what BAP lavishes on noble animals like jaguars and birds of prey. He is taken, however, with the diminutive Japanese writer Yukio Mishima. In midlife, Mishima took up bodybuilding and raised a squad of erotically intertwined neo-samurai warriors. When it became clear that Japan’s managerial revolution had extinguished its imperial spirit, he attempted to overthrow the Japanese government and restore the power of the emperor. After that failed, he ritually disemboweled himself.

In Michigan, when Bryan Garsten made his comment about the seductions of illiberalism, BAP was like the ghost at the banquet, cackling from the rafters at his professor’s consternation. But the remarks went on longer, and they were also searching, and self-critical. Garsten told his listeners that they—he—may have failed to cultivate students’ imagination. His illiberal students, Garsten said, had learned why the Greeks admired Achilles, the fiery warrior. But they neglected the Greeks’ admiration for Ulysses, a subtler and greater model of manhood. Ulysses’s greatness emerged not from his rejection of this world, but from his mastery of its constraints. He owed myriad debts to those around him: to his men, to his son, to his wife.

The students romanticized the tyrant, while assuming that liberalism bred sloth and laziness. “Life in a liberal democracy is full of demanding moments,” Garsten said at the conference. I had the impression that he was addressing BAP apostrophically, delivering a warning he wished he had delivered in person. “As far as I have read, life under tyrants is full of lassitude, selfishness, duplicity, betrayal.”

One could feel, over the course of these discussions, the stirrings of dormant liberal passions—as if the mere invocation of BAPism, after many years ignored, had inspired a counteroffensive. Another political theorist, a former Marine and a Brookings Institution scholar named William A. Galston, piped up to remind everyone that when liberalism had come under mortal threat in the Pacific theater, “Americans as a whole found it in themselves to do something.” Specifically, his fellow Marines charged, shot, and bayoneted their way from island to island until illiberalism, in the form of Japanese fascism, begged them for mercy. “Is there really an opposition between the open society and the virtue of courage?” Galston asked.

The defeat of imperial Japan illustrated the point nicely, I thought. But it also raised a much stranger question, about how liberals acquired such a reputation for sissydom in the first place. The Battle of Iwo Jima wasn’t that long ago. But in certain spaces—academia, elite journalism—liberalism’s victory had been so overwhelming that for generations it grew soft, flabby, and unaccustomed to the hard work of defending itself from a vigorous challenger. As such challengers left universities and newspapers, those institutions became self-congratulatory monocultures, inhospitable even to conservatives far less nutty than BAP. By now, a ranting nudist poses a real danger—of poisoning politics, splitting apart societies, and persuading otherwise talented people to spurn the modern world’s greatest achievements, which are peace, tolerance, and prosperity.

The great Straussian Allan Bloom predicted doom for liberalism when these challenges disappeared. “The most essential of our freedoms, as men and as liberal democrats, the freedom of our minds, consists in the consciousness of the fundamental alternatives,” he wrote. An unchallenged liberal democrat, he argued, ceases to want to improve, unless he confronts his enemies in their most potent forms. Those forms will shock and humble us, he wrote, and have “the added salutary effect of destroying our sense of our own worth and giving us higher aspirations.”

To Costin personally, I have never been more grateful. His last message came during the pandemic. I asked how things were looking in Brazil. “Not bad,” he reported, with laconic caginess. He had not yet veered, as he later did in his public statements about COVID-19, into outright conspiracy theory and extended roasts of Anthony Fauci. Since then, I have come to think of BAP’s performances in immunological terms: a gnarly virus that had lain dormant for decades in circles of philosophers and their unread books. Now that it’s loose in the human population, it is a vicious kick to the liberal immune system. And that is not entirely bad. Unchallenged, liberalism’s defenses waned, and liberals forgot, temporarily, why their cause was worth defending. The antibodies are stirring.

This article appears in the September 2023 print edition with the headline “The Rise of Bronze Age Pervert.”

How the Recession Doomers Got the U.S. Economy So Wrong

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 08 › recession-doomers-economy › 674900

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In 2022, it was a matter of conventional and nearly universal wisdom that the 2023 economy would be a nightmare.

Last October, a Bloomberg economic model said that the odds of a U.S. recession this year were 100 percent. No, not 99.99 percent, as in the odds that you’ll avoid being struck by lighting this evening. One hundred percent, as in the odds that you’ll avoid falling into a time-bending wormhole that spits you out in 17th-century Versailles at a dinner table with Louis XIV.

Bloomberg’s bot wasn’t unique in its gloom, either. The Federal Reserve itself projected hundreds of thousands of job losses by this December. In a survey by the Philadelphia Fed that has been conducted since the late 1960s, the number of economists anticipating an imminent recession hit an all-time high last year, meaning the level of expert pessimism was greater than before the stagflation crisis of the 1970s, the brutal recession of the early 1980s, and the Great Recession of 2008. Economic glumness spread to the C-suite. Last year, a KPMG poll found that nine in 10 chief executives anticipated a recession in 2023. Republicans eagerly piled on, proactively blaming the White House for a “Cruel Biden Recession” that all the experts seemingly claimed was inevitable.

And how’d those experts do? So far, terribly. We’re now in the back half of a year that was supposedly doomed, and the U.S. economy isn’t just narrowly avoiding a downturn. As the writer Noah Smith points out, nearly everything you should want to go well in an economy is going quite well right now.

[Annie Lowrey: The reason the recession hasn’t happened yet]

Employment is high, inflation is falling, real incomes are rising, and inequality is narrowing. Superlatives abound. The official unemployment rate is near a 60-year low, and the jobless rate for Black Americans recently hit an all-time low. The U.S. has the fastest growth rate and the lowest annual inflation of any G7 country. Yes, problems exist. Essentials such as housing, education, and health care are still too expensive; wages could be growing faster; and last year’s inflation is still baked into today’s prices. But mostly, things are good—for now.

In fairness, economists had some fine reasons to expect a rough 2023. When inflation surged to multi-decade highs, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates. As economists, including Larry Summers, pointed out, deploying high rates to combat high inflation has historically been a simple recipe for a recession. The logic is straightforward. Higher interest rates increase the cost of capital, which reduces investment, which blunts hiring, which reduces wage growth, which depresses spending, and ta-da, you’ve produced an economic downturn that cools prices.

But that’s not how 2023 has gone at all. Instead, we seem very close to something like “immaculate disinflation”—an unusual case of falling inflation without rising unemployment. So what, exactly, might experts have gotten so wrong? How did we beat a serious case of inflation without, to date, triggering a downturn?

The first explanation is that economic prediction has always been more sorcery than science. Since the Philly Fed survey started in 1968, the majority of economists have failed to anticipate every single recession. Less than a third of economists foresaw the 1990 and 2001 downturns, and they whiffed on the 2008 crash. Economic models of the future are perhaps best understood as astrology faintly decorated with calculus equations.

The second explanation is that the U.S. economy bravely withstood a number of shocks—and then the shocks went away. J.P. Morgan’s Michael Cembalest wrote that the economy’s resilience reminds him of Rasputin, the Russian mystic who survived poisoning, several beatings, and a few shootings. Similarly, the U.S. economy has endured a gauntlet of pain: a wild surge in post-pandemic spending on stuff like cars and electronics, and then broken supply chains that couldn’t handle all this new demand, a historic increase in resignations as the service sector came back online, a spike in energy prices after the initial invasion of Ukraine, a run on real estate that depleted inventory, and don’t forget the slowdown in China and, of course, rocketing interest rates. That’s a lot! The shocks came from all over: high demand, low supply, geopolitics, international shipping, Vladimir Putin’s imperial mania. But eventually, the pain subsided, and the Rasputin-esque U.S. economy is alive today because the tortuous inflation surprises have mostly dissipated.

This explanation leaves out the Federal Reserve entirely. And perhaps that’s telling. One cheeky lesson of the past 15 years might be that monetary policy is weaker than most experts thought at both stimulating and depressing growth. During the 2010s, the Obama administration (constrained by Republican intransigence) leaned on the Fed and low interest rates to lift the moribund economy, but economic growth was rather putrid anyway. If the Fed wasn’t strong enough then to stimulate an economy suffering from depressed demand, and isn’t strong enough now to depress an economy overstimulated by high inflation, maybe we need a new theory of just how important interest rates are to overall economic health.

But as the writer Matt Yglesias points out, another interpretation of the past two years gives the Fed a bit more credit. The central bank is not just a mute wizard with a joystick that raises and lowers interest rates. Central bankers talk. Their talking shapes expectations, moods, vibes. The chair of the Federal Reserve is the chief vibemeister of the U.S. economy, and conceivably the combination of his statements and his actions has maneuvered the U.S. economy into the Goldilocks zone by making Americans just anxious enough to throttle consumer spending and wage growth while other economic disruptions went away.

[Adam Ozimek: The simple mistake that almost triggered a recession]

I like this idea. For the past few months, I’ve been puzzling over a related mystery, which is why ordinary Americans are so convinced that the economy is terrible. In April, just as unemployment hit a 60-year low, a record-high share of the public expressed negative views of the economy. Now, Jeff Bezos famously said that “when the anecdotes and the data disagree, the anecdotes are usually right.” But Americans’ feelings have been factually disconnected from reality. This summer, nearly half of Americans said we were in a recession, which is just incorrect. In April, Americans said it was the worst time to buy stocks in almost 20 years. But the S&P 500 had surged 14 percent in six months leading up to April, and stocks are up another 11 percent since then.

Discounting the pessimism of tens of millions of Americans would be crass. But something important and weird is going on here. The writer Kyla Scanlon has memorably diagnosed what we’re experiencing as a “vibecession,” in which people are happily contributing to a growing economy even as they externalize the vague anxiety that everything is about to fall apart. In a similar vein, I wrote an article titled “‘Everything Is Terrible, but I’m Fine,’” noting that people in surveys keep saying they are depressed about the state of the national economy but hopeful (and even happy) about the state of their household economy.

At this point, you might be thinking, Wait, what does all of this have to do with our central question? Well, here’s a complex and unprovable theory: Maybe the recession doomers got the economy very wrong precisely because they were so convincing. A sense of economic dusk took the edge off spending, hiring, and wage growth, and that, in turn, reduced inflation without as yet causing a full-blown recession.

So, this is my favorite theory: The vibecession prevented the real recession. In medicine, weaker versions of a virus, like the flu, inoculate people against the real thing. By analogy, Fed Chair Jerome Powell and his melancholy minions essentially administered an injection of mostly safe gloom into the economic bloodstream, which seems to have triggered just the right level of macroeconomic immune response to reduce inflation without causing a downturn.

Or maybe all of these theories are true at once. Economic forecasts are genre fiction. America Rasputined its way out of the crisis years. The Fed’s titrated pessimism successfully reduced inflation at the margins. And maybe the very act of writing this article guarantees that we’ll have a recession at the end of this year.