Itemoids

Elon Musk

The Most Important Technology of 2023 Wasn’t AI

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2023 › 12 › tesla-chatgpt-most-important-technology › 676980

One day in late November, I cradled a red Samsung flip phone in my hands as if it was a ruby gemstone. To me, it was just as precious. Deep inside an overstuffed dresser in my childhood bedroom, I had spotted the glint of my first-ever cellphone, a Samsung SGH-A707 purchased in the waning days of the George W. Bush presidency. The device, no bigger than a credit card, had long ago succumbed to the spider web of cracks on its screen. For a moment, I was brought back to life before the smartphone, clicking the phone’s plastic keys for the first time in more than a decade.

This device, and every other phone like it, of course, was made obsolete by the touchscreen slabs now in all of our pockets. Perhaps you have heard that we are now on the cusp of another iPhone moment—the rise of a new technology that changes the world. No, not that one. Despite the post-ChatGPT frenzy, artificial intelligence has so far been defined more by speculative hype than actual substance. Does anyone really want “AI-powered” smoothies, sports commentary, or roller skates? Assuming the bots don’t wipe out humanity, maybe AI will take the jobs of high-school teachers, coders, lawyers, fast-food workers, customer-service agents, writers, and graphic designers—but right now, ChatGPT is telling me that Cybertruck has 11 letters. There’s a long way to go.

Meanwhile, electric cars are already upending America. In 2023, our battery-powered future became so much more real—a boom in sales and new models is finally starting to push us into the post-gas age. Americans are on track to buy a record 1.44 million of them in 2023, according to a forecast by BloombergNEF, about the same number sold from 2016 to 2021 total. “This was the year that EVs went from experiments, or technological demonstrations, and became mature vehicles,” Gil Tal, the director of the Electric Vehicle Research Center at UC Davis, told me. They are beginning to transform not just the automotive industry, but also the very meaning of a car itself.

If the story of American EVs has long hinged on one company—Tesla—then this was the year that these cars became untethered from Elon Musk’s brand. “We’re at a point where EVs aren’t necessarily exclusively for the upper, upper, upper class,” Robby DeGraff, an analyst at the market-research firm AutoPacific, told me. If you wanted an electric car five years ago, you could choose from among various Tesla models, the Chevy Bolt, the Nissan Leaf—and that was really it. Now EVs come in more makes and models than Baskin-Robbins ice-cream flavors. We have more luxury sedans to vie with Tesla, but also cheaper five-seaters, SUVs, Hummers, pickup trucks, and … however you might categorize the Cybertruck. Nearly 40 new EVs have debuted since the start of 2022, and they are far more advanced than their ancestors. For $40,000, the Hyundai Ioniq 6, released this year, can get you 360 miles on a single charge; in 2018, for only a slightly lower cost, a Nissan Leaf couldn’t go half that distance.

[Read: Admit it, the Cybertruck is awesome]

All of these EVs are genuinely great for the planet, spewing zero carbon from their tailpipes, but that’s only a small part of what makes them different. In the EV age, cars are no longer just cars. They are computers. Stripping out a gas engine, transmission, and 100-plus moving parts turns a vehicle into something more digital than analog—sort of like how typing on an iPhone keyboard is different than on my clackety old Samsung flip phone. “It’s the software that is really the heart of an EV,” DeGraff said—it runs the motors, calculates how many miles are left on a charge, optimizes the brakes, and much more.

Just like with other gadgets that bug you about software updates, all of this firmware can be updated over Wi-Fi while a car charges overnight. Rivian has updated its software to add a “Sand Mode” that can enhance its cars’ driving ability on dusty terrain. Many new cars are getting stuffed with technology—a new gas-powered Mercedes-Benz E-Class comes with TikTok integration and a selfie stick—but EVs are capable of more significant updates. A gas car is never going to meaningfully get more miles per gallon, but one such update from Tesla in 2020 increased the range on its Model X car from 328 to 351 miles after the company found ways to wring more efficiency out of its internal parts. And because EVs all drive basically the same, tech is a bigger part of the sell. Instead of idly passing the time while an EV recharges, you can now use a car’s infotainment system to Zoom into a meeting, play Grand Theft Auto, and stream Amazon Prime.

The million-plus new EVs on the road are ushering in a fundamental, maybe existential, change in how to even think about cars—no longer as machines, but as gadgets that plug in and charge like all the others in our life. The wonderful things about computers are coming to cars, and so are the terrible ones: apps that crash. Subscription hell. Cyberattacks. There are new problems to contend with too: In Tesla’s case, its “Autopilot” software has been implicated in fatal crashes. (It was the subject of a massive recall earlier this month that required an over-the-air update.) You now might scroll on your phone in bed, commute in your EV, and log into your work laptop, all of which are powered by processors that are constantly bugging you to update them.

[Read: The end of manual transmission]

If cars are gadgets now, then carmakers are also now tech companies. An industry that has spent a century perfecting the internal combustion engine must now manufacture lithium-ion batteries and write the code to govern them. Imagine if a dentist had to pivot from filling cavities to performing open-heart surgery, and that’s roughly what’s going on here. “The transition to EVs is completely changing everything,” Loren McDonald, an EV consultant, told me. “It’s changing the people that automotive companies have to hire and their skills. It’s changing their suppliers, their factories, how they assemble and build them. And lots of automakers are struggling with that.”

Take the batteries. To manufacture battery cells powerful enough for a car is so phenomenally expensive and arduous that Toyota is pumping nearly $14 billion into a single battery plant in North Carolina. To create software-enabled cars, you need software engineers, and car companies cannot get enough of them. (Perhaps no other industry has benefited the most from Silicon Valley’s year of layoffs.) At the very low end, estimates Sam Abuelsamid, a transportation analyst at Guidehouse Insights, upwards of 10,000 “software engineers, interface designers, networking engineers, data center experts and silicon engineers have been hired by automakers and suppliers in recent years.” The tech wars can sometimes verge on farce: One former Apple executive runs Ford’s customer-software team, while another runs GM’s.

At every level, the auto industry is facing the type of headache-inducing questions about job losses and employment that still feels many years away with AI. “There’s a new skill set we’re going to need, and I don’t think I can teach everyone—it will take too much time,” Ford’s CEO, Jim Farley, said in May. “So there is going to be disruption in this transition.” Job cuts are already happening, and more may come—even after the massive autoworker strike this year that largely hinged on electrification. Such a big financial investment is needed to electrify the car industry that from July to September, Ford lost $60,000 for every EV it sold. Or peel back one more onion layer to car dealerships: Tesla, Rivian, and other EV companies are selling directly to consumers, cutting them out. EVs also require little service compared with gas vehicles, a reality that has upset many dealers, who could lose their biggest source of profit. None of this is the future. It is happening right now.

But if EVs are having an “iPhone moment,” we are still in the days when a few early adopters had the clunky, OG version. Most cars you see are a decade old; for all these EV sales, just 1 percent of cars on the road are all-electric. Even if we hit President Joe Biden’s EV target of 50 percent of sales by 2030, the sheer life span of cars will mean that gas vehicles will still greatly outnumber electric ones by then. Gas stations are not closing. Parking garages are not buckling under the weight of EVs and their hefty batteries. Electric cars remain too expensive, and they are limited by janky public chargers that are too slow, assuming they work at all. If you don’t have a house where you can install your own plug, EVs are still mostly just unrealistic. Most alarming might be the politics that surround them: Donald Trump and lots of other Republicans are vowing to stymie their growth. Carmakers are not even hiding that next year’s election might lead them to reconsider their EV plans.

Even so, the transition is not slowing down. Next year, America should hit 1.9 million EV sales, Corey Cantor, an EV analyst at BloombergNEF, told me. Another burst of models is coming: A retro-futuristic Volkswagen van! A Cadillac Escalade with a 55-inch touchscreen! A tiny Fiat 500e for just $30,000! And yes, they are succumbing a bit to hype themselves. In June, Mercedes’s infotainment screen got an optional update. Now you can talk to it through a chatbot.

This story is part of the Atlantic Planet series supported by HHMI’s Science and Educational Media Group.

Two US senators told Elon Musk they want Tesla to end the year with even more recalls

Quartz

qz.com › two-us-senators-told-elon-musk-they-want-tesla-to-end-t-1851126413

In the court of public opinion, more charges are coming against America’s favorite electric vehicle manufacturer. Reuters is reporting that two US senators, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Ed Markey of Massachusetts, are directly telling Elon Musk that they want Tesla to recall components with frequent failures…

Read more...

The Return of the Pagans

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 12 › paganism-right-and-left › 676945

Take a close look at Donald Trump—the lavishness of his homes, the buildings emblazoned with his name and adorned with gold accoutrements, his insistent ego, even the degree of obeisance he evokes among his followers—and, despite the fervent support he receives from many evangelical Christians, it’s hard to avoid concluding that there’s something a little pagan about the man. Or consider Elon Musk. With his drive to conquer space to expand the human empire, his flirtation with anti-Semitic tropes, his 10 children with three different women, Musk embodies the wealth worship and ideological imperialism of ego that are more than a little pagan too.

Most ancient pagan belief systems were built around ritual and magic, coercive practices intended to achieve a beneficial result. They centered the self. The revolutionary contribution of monotheism was its insistence that the principal concern of God is, instead, how people treat one another.

Although paganism is one of those catchall words applied to widely disparate views, the worship of natural forces generally takes two forms: the deification of nature, and the deification of force. In the modern world, each ideological wing has claimed a piece of paganism as its own. On the left, there are the world-worshippers, who elevate nature to the summit of sanctity. On the right, you see the worship of force in the forms of wealth, political power, and tribal solidarity. In other words, the paganism of the left is a kind of pantheism, and the paganism of the right is a kind of idolatry. Hug a tree or a dollar bill, and the pagan in you shines through.  

[Tim Alberta: My father, is faith, and Donald Trump]

The two may be tied together. We used to believe that human beings stood at the summit of creation. A lot has since conspired to make us feel less important: an appreciation of the vastness of the cosmos, the reality that we are motivated by evolutionary pressures we barely understand, psychology’s proof of the murkiness inside our own psyche, even the failures of Promethean technology. (Yes, we have smartphones, but we also have a climate crisis; it’s slender comfort that the bad news is now instantaneously available.) As we slide down the slope of significance, we may undertake to prove how potent we are.

Shortly before the Second World War, the historian Arnold J. Toynbee described communism and fascism each as a form of idolatry that “worships the creature instead of worshipping the creator.” If we don’t have a God to simultaneously assure us of our centrality and our smallness, we will exaggerate both. Rabbi Simcha Bunim, a Hasidic master of the 18th and 19th centuries, used to advise his disciples to carry two pieces of paper, one in each pocket. In one pocket was the phrase “For me the world was created.” In the other, “I am but dust and ashes.” In the balance between the two lies the genuine status of the human being.

* * *

The current worship of wealth is a pagan excrescence. I am spending this year at Harvard, and it is not easy to find an undergraduate who isn’t interested in “finance.” The poets want to go into finance. The history students are studying investment. For a long time in the United States, the accumulation of capital was teleological: Wealth was a means of improving society, of creating something greater than oneself. The current ideology of wealth is solipsistic: I should become wealthy because I should become wealthy. Gone is the New Testament admonition that it is harder for a rich man to enter heaven than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. On campus, a lot of students are now threading that needle.

Wealth is a cover for, or a means to, the ultimate object of worship in a pagan society, which is power. “Life simply is the will to power,” the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche wrote, in the manner of a billionaire tech bro. That’s probably truer to Google’s corporate ethos than “Don’t be evil.” The reshaping of politics as a pure contest unconstrained by truth or mutuality, a feature of our political landscape, is both Nietzschean and pagan. The use and abuse of Nietzsche’s work by the Nazis was only to be expected.

Nietzsche criticized Judaism and Christianity for what he saw as their valorization of weakness, which he despised. The Greeks taught that the rich and powerful and beautiful were favored by the gods. Then along came Judaism, and after it, Christianity, arguing that widows and orphans and the poor were beloved of God. This was Judaism’s “spiritual revenge,” Nietzsche argued, which spread through the world on Christian wings. The Nazis, in championing blond, blue-eyed Aryan Übermenschen—a term they took from Nietzsche—were reinvigorating a pagan ideal.

[Arthur Brooks: Three paths toward the meaning of life]

This worship of the body—of beauty, which is another form of power—is a pagan inheritance. The monotheistic faiths did not disdain beauty, but it was not an ideal they extolled. Not only do biblical heroes rarely merit a physical description, but even traditionally heroic attributes are portrayed as worthless if they lack a spiritual foundation. In the Bible, if someone is physically imposing, that usually signals trouble. Samson is a boor who redeems himself at the last minute. Saul stands a head above the crowd, but is an utter failure as king. The English critic Matthew Arnold famously said that the Greeks believed in the holiness of beauty, and the Hebrews believed in the beauty of holiness.

The veneration of physical beauty, the Instagramization of culture, is pagan to its roots. The overwhelming cascade of drugs, surgeries, and procedures intended to enhance one’s physical appearance—all precursors to “designer babies”—is a tribute to the externalization of our values. Movements of hypermasculinity, championed figures such as the now-indicted Andrew Tate, flow from the elevation of the human body to idolatrous status.

It is not enough to look good for a while; we have to look good forever. Attempts by some billionaires to become immortal, and the conceit that we should never die, are born of a conviction that we can transcend our finitude, that we can become as gods. Other billionaires make forays into space, or dream of conquering other worlds. Although this is sold as utilitarian—we are using up the resources of the planet on which we are planted—this is not a public-works project, but a Promethean one.

The virtue that falls furthest in the pagan pantheon of traits is humility. In the ancient Greek epics, humility is not even reckoned a virtue. Edward Gibbon, in his monumental history of the Roman empire, assigned Christianity a large role in its fall: “The clergy successfully preached the doctrines of patience and pusillanimity; the active virtues of society were discouraged; and the last remains of military spirit were buried in the cloister: a large portion of public and private wealth was consecrated to the specious demands of charity and devotion; and the soldiers’ pay was lavished on the useless multitudes of both sexes who could only plead the merits of abstinence and chastity.”

Wealth, power, beauty, and lust for domination made Rome into Rome, in Gibbon’s account. Humility, sexual restraint, patience, and tolerance sapped the brio of a once-great empire, and it fell to the barbarians, unbridled by the strictures of monotheistic faith. What we might call the religious virtues, according to Gibbon and his ideological successors, made defending society impossible.

You can see the same worship of power over heroic endurance and restraint today on the political right. “I like people who aren’t captured,” Trump infamously said about John McCain. Consider how Trump reframes heroism, making it not about bravery, but about success. And the idolatrous slant is also visible in the symbology of the far right. January 6 made Jacob Chansley, the “QAnon Shaman,” with his bare chest and Norse headdress, instantly notorious. Norse and Viking mythology have played a large role in the far right, just as they did for the Nazis. The Norse were people of conquest, rape, and pillage, at least in the popular imagination. That the right, which has long marched under the banner of Christian values, is beginning to embrace pagan symbols ought to be deeply troubling.

[James Surowiecki: Why Americans can’t accept the good economic news]

But modern paganism is hardly confined to the political right. The left-wing movement to demote the status of human beings displays a complementary form of paganism. In The Case Against Human Superiority, the Harvard philosopher Christine M. Korsgaard argues that because no standard is common to humans and animals, we cannot sustain a moral hierarchy. In other words, because wildebeests don’t read Kant, we cannot hold them to the categorical imperative. Korsgaard doubts whether one can say that the death of a human being is really worse than the death of, say, an aardvark. Such arguments go back to Peter Singer, whose Animal Liberation was a landmark in the field. Interviewed almost 50 years after the book was published, Singer told The Guardian, “Just as we accept that race or sex isn’t a reason for a person counting more, I don’t think the species of a being is a reason for counting more than another being.”

For those who believe that the pagan outlook has no consequences, Singer illustrated the radical difference between believing that human beings are created in the image of God and believing that they are animals like other animals. In the same interview, after saying that a child on a respirator should perhaps be allowed to die, Singer said, “And I think, even in cases where the child doesn’t need a respirator, parents should be able to consult doctors to reach a considered judgment, including that the child’s life is not one that is going to be a benefit for the child or for their family, and that therefore it is better to end the child’s life.” After all, we shoot horses to put them out of their suffering. If we are all animals, why morally elevate an infant over a horse?

* * *

The monotheistic faiths are not without their own failings. Their critics note the manifold cruelties that have been perpetrated in their name. No one who looks at the history of any faith can have illusions about the ability of believers to prosecute the most horrendous atrocities. As a Jew, I am not likely to overlook the cruelties of religious people to one another throughout the centuries.

The question, however, is not whether beliefs can lead us astray, as they all can, but what sorts of beliefs are most likely to lend themselves to respect for human life and flourishing. Should we see human beings as virtual supermen, free to flout any convention, to pursue power at any cost, to accumulate wealth without regard for consequence or its use? Are gold toilets and private rocket ships our final statement of significance? Or is it a system of belief that considers human beings all synapse and no soul, an outgrowth of the animal world and in no way able to rise above the evolutionary mosaic of which everything from the salmon to sage is a piece?

Monotheism, at its best, acknowledges genuine humility about our inability to know what God is and what God wishes, but asserts that although human beings are elevated above the shackles of nature, we are still subordinate to something greater than ourselves.

If we are nothing but animals, the laws of the jungle inevitably apply. If we are all pugilists attacking one another in a scramble to climb to the top of the pole, the laws of the jungle still apply. But if we are all children of the same God, all kin, all convinced that there is a spark of eternity in each person but that none of us is superhuman, then maybe we can return to being human.

The Co-opting of Twitter

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2023 › 12 › twitter-substack-elon-musk-alt-tech › 676966

After Donald Trump was banned from Twitter in 2021, Donald Trump Jr. made a public appeal to Elon Musk for help. “Wanted to come up with something to deal with some of this nonsense and the censorship that’s going on right now, obviously only targeted one way,” he said in a video that was posted to Instagram. “Why doesn’t Elon Musk create a social-media platform?” (The video was titled “Here’s How Elon Musk Could Save Free Speech.”)

This was—I think we can say it—prescient.

A little more than a year later, Musk was promising not an entirely new site, but a hostile takeover of a familiar one. And he explicitly presented this action as a corrective to right-wing grievances about “shadowbanning” and censorship. He promised to use his new platform to combat the “woke mind virus” sweeping the nation and said he wanted to save free speech. (His supposed devotion to unfettered expression, it’s worth noting, sometimes comes second to his personal feuds.)

So here we are. Liberal activists used to be the ones suggesting that the social network could be used to organize in defiance of the state; now technology accelerationists are the ones saying this. “Elon acquired Twitter, fired the wokes, and removed DC’s central point of control over social media,” the tech-world iconoclast Balaji Srinivasan wrote in November. At a conference he led in Amsterdam the month before, he talked about how the tech world could build a “parallel establishment” with its own schools, financial systems, and media. Co-opting existing organizations could work, too.

[Read: Twitter is a far-right social network]

Previously, the “alt-tech” ecosystem was a bit of a sideshow. It encompassed moderation-averse social-media sites that popped up in the Trump era and resembled popular services such as Twitter and Facebook; their creators typically resented that their views had been deplatformed elsewhere. Parler and especially Gab (which is run by a spiky Christian nationalist) were never going to be used by very many normal people—apart from their political content, they were junky-looking and covered in spam.

But now, alt-tech is emerging from within, Alien-style. Twitter’s decade of tinkering with content moderation in response to public pressure—adding line items to its policies, expanding its partnerships with civil-society organizations—is over. Now we have X, a rickety, reactionary platform with a skeleton crew behind it. Substack, which got its start by offering mainstream journalists lucrative profit-sharing arrangements, has embraced a Muskian set of free-speech principles: As Jonathan Katz reported for The Atlantic last month, the company’s leadership is unwilling to remove avowed Nazis from its platform. (In a statement published last week, Hamish McKenzie, one of Substack’s co-founders, said, “We don’t like Nazis either,” but he and his fellow executives are “committed to upholding and protecting freedom of expression, even when it hurts.”) The trajectory of both resembles that of Rumble, which started out as a YouTube alternative offering different monetization options for creators, then pulled itself far to the political fringes and has been very successful.

These transformations are more about culture than actual product changes. Musk has tinkered plenty with the features of Twitter/X in the past year, though he’s also talked about changing far more than he actually has. More notable, he’s brought back the accounts of conspiracy theorists, racists, and anti-Semites, and he got rid of Twitter’s policy against the use of a trans person’s deadname as a form of harassment. In a recent Rumble video, the white supremacists Richard Spencer and Nick Fuentes praised Musk’s management of the platform, saying that the “window has shifted noticeably on issues like white identity” during his tenure. And in support of anecdotal claims that hate speech rose after Musk’s acquisition of Twitter, a team of researchers has shown that this was actually the case. They observed a large spike right after the acquisition, and even after that spike had somewhat abated, hate speech still remained higher than pre-acquisition levels, “hinting at a new baseline level of hate speech post-Musk.”  

Social-media platforms are kind of like parties: People’s perception of them matters almost as much as the reality. You can see changing attitudes about whom Twitter or X is for in recent polling from the Pew Research Center. Two years ago, 60 percent of Republican or Republican-leaning Twitter users thought the site was having a negative impact on American democracy. In 2023, the number was just 21 percent. And the percentage of those users who thought Twitter was having a positive impact jumped from 17 to 43 percent. Conversely, Democrats and Democratic-leaning users were more likely this year than they were two years ago to say that Twitter was having a negative impact on American democracy, and less likely to say it was having a positive one. Pew also found a partisan divide regarding abuse and harassment on the platform, with 65 percent of Democratic users saying these are major problems and just 29 percent of Republican users agreeing. The gap between the two positions has quadrupled in the past two years.

[Read: To be honest with you, no influencer has been treated more unfairly than Donald Trump Jr.]

When I spoke with Keith Burghardt, a computer scientist at the University of Southern California who worked on the hate-speech study, he emphasized that the research doesn’t address the specific cause of the increase. It could be that reductions in staff or the disbanding of Twitter’s Trust and Safety Council had a significant effect. Or that may have stemmed from other changes in moderation policy or enforcement that aren’t visible to the public. It could be that Elon Musk’s public statements made people rush to the site to see what they could get away with saying. “In fact, it’s important to mention that we found hate speech increased a little bit even before Elon Musk bought Twitter,” Burghardt told me. “Perhaps because of users anticipating a perceived drop in moderation.”

This is not an end point but a funky state of limbo. Instagram’s Threads signed up 100 million people in its first week, but activity dropped after the big debut and growth appears to have slowed. Platform migration is complicated, and early research has found that many people who are unhappy on X have not left the site entirely. Instead, they tend to make secondary accounts on alternative sites. They show “wavering commitment” to staying on X, while still being more active there than they are on alternatives like Bluesky or Threads. Pew data published in May showed that the majority of “highly active tweeters” were still Democrats and Democratic leaners. However, these people were posting less frequently than they had been before, and this data was collected before Musk’s recent public display of anti-Semitism.

“Does the Musk Twitter Takeover Matter?” Deana Rohlinger, a sociology professor at Florida State University, asked in a February analysis of the site’s supposed mutation. The question was rhetorical; when I spoke with her recently, she said the answer was definitely yes. “Despite its flaws,” Twitter was something of a common space in its prime, she said. New microblogging sites may want to serve that same purpose, but she isn’t sure that it will be possible. The hostility between these two entrenched, polarized online factions may be so much that they just don’t want to share a space anymore. “Perhaps it’s a reflection of our broader political environment and media environment,” she said. “I don’t know that you can re-create what Twitter did, because things have changed entirely too much. It’s not 2006 anymore.” The Twitter diaspora, she thought, was cursed to just drift.


As alt-tech has taken over the mainstream, the old mainstream has found itself in a funny position. Five years after the #DeleteFacebook campaign, many are cheering Mark Zuckerberg—a literal Elon Musk sparring partner—as a hero in the platform wars. Our only response to the current state of the web seems to be a sigh of resignation: Sure, let’s just do everything on Instagram.

X Is Elon Musk’s Lonely Party Now

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › newsletters › archive › 2023 › 12 › x-is-elon-musks-lonely-party-now › 676977

This is an edition of The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here.

As we close out the year, it’s official: The Twitter we once knew is long gone. Elon Musk’s reinvention of the platform, from its name down to its core features, has rendered it nearly unrecognizable to users. The lead writers of this newsletter, Tom Nichols and Lora Kelley, have each spent time thinking and writing about X, as well as posting and lurking on the platform. I chatted with them recently about Musk’s murky logic and the new internet era he’s accidentally ushered in.

First, here are three new stories from The Atlantic:

The 25 best podcasts of 2023 ​​America lost its one perfect tree. The only thing more dangerous than authoritarianism

‘It Still Has a Kitchen’

Isabel Fattal: Do either of you call it X? Does anybody call it X?

Tom Nichols: Nobody I know calls it X. What stupid branding, to go on the internet with something called X. It’s like Musk just doesn’t understand the site that he bought—I think that’s been a problem from day one. Musk wanted the new Twitter to be just like the old Twitter, except it would be a place where he and all of his friends are cool.

A lot of people use the metaphor of a playground, but it’s like walking into a party in an apartment building, and people aren’t laughing at your jokes, so you buy the whole building and say, This is my apartment now, and I own the building, and you have to like me and laugh at my jokes.

Lora Kelley: Musk made changes to the algorithm to help his own posts get more engagement, according to reporting earlier this year. He wants it to be the place where he’s the funniest guy.

Something I’ve heard comedian friends say in the past is: If you’re doing a stand-up set and the audience isn’t laughing, it’s not that there’s something wrong with the audience. There’s something wrong with the jokes that you’re telling. I think Elon Musk is trying to use his billions of dollars to reorient that logic, and it’s not really working.

Isabel: Tell me how you each use Twitter (uh, X) right now.

Tom: I don’t use Twitter professionally as much as I do to post cat pictures and talk about vintage television and swap nerdy tips about gaming. I do post stories from The Atlantic, and I do push my books every chance I get. But I first came to Twitter years ago, when I was a professor, and, as an academic, I had many other resources for substantive conversations—so Twitter was mostly about political arguments while posting little life bits here and there.

These days, my political engagement with the platform has dropped significantly, because it’s too tiring to have to wade through all the crap.

Isabel: Have you had a productive political debate on Twitter in the past six months?

Tom: No. If you had asked about the past six years, I would have said yes.

Lora: I’m largely a lurker at this point. I was never the biggest Twitter user; I have always used it to share article links and do some reporting. I do have this thread of anthropomorphic teeth, my finest expression of Twitter use.

Tom: I have not seen this. Is this something I need?

Lora: Yes!

Isabel: At this point, Twitter isn’t much use for reliable news, but there was a time when users were relying on the platform for news updates—maybe too much. Do you think that an overreliance on Twitter for news was a mistake even in the pre-Musk era?

Tom: It was always a mistake to rely solely on Twitter for news. But it was really useful. I’ll actually say a good thing about Twitter being less useful for news, which is that it doesn’t allow people to live in the moment of a national crisis all day. They actually have to unplug.

Lora: I agree with Tom that relying solely on Twitter for news, to the extent that people were doing that, was a mistake. But I did find it useful to hear directly from people who were living through news events—the day-to-day experiences of living in this country during times of change. I used to find sources for articles on Twitter, but it’s gotten less useful since Musk made changes to features such as search and DM.

It’s a shame that that’s gone. But the site has gotten so bad lately that it’s easy to idealize what it was like before Musk took over. People were being harassed and sharing all kinds of weird, funky information back then, even if the owner of the site wasn’t personally pointing users to this information.

Isabel: We know that the platform has lost some of its users under Musk. Do you think we could see a mass exodus in the coming months?

Tom: All good parties end up in the kitchen, with a small group of people that are having a lot of fun because they’ve moved away from everything. Twitter still has a kitchen; you’re still connected to the people you were connected to five years ago or three years ago. Every now and then, some uninvited doofuses drunkenly stumble through. But by and large, we’re still having fun, just with a smaller group.

We haven’t hit the point where everybody leaves, but there are now multiple places to go in the same building: Bluesky, Threads. It used to be that Twitter was pretty much the only place in the building where there was a good party. Now the party’s dispersed. That’s all Musk really achieved: reminding people that there are other options, and making it conceivable for other platforms to pick up the slack.

Lora: I do think that this has been a gift to Meta and Mark Zuckerberg. It’s ironic: A lot of people are flocking to Threads, but a few years ago, a lot of people in the media and in general wouldn’t have flooded to a Zuckerberg-operated product.

Tom: Elon Musk has achieved the impossible: He’s made people think well of Mark Zuckerberg.

Isabel: How do you each approach the idea of leaving X? Is there one line the platform could cross that would make it impossible to stay?

Tom: The people who leave annoy me, because they’re like the people who say, “If Trump’s reelected, I’m moving to Canada.” You don’t solve anything by going anywhere. You stay and you voice your objections, and you communicate with the people that you want to communicate with.

The one thing that could kill off Twitter is if Musk removes the block function. Then I think everyone would have to leave, because it would become unmanageable.

Lora: For me, it might be less of a dramatic “I’m quitting and never coming back” and more of a decline in my usage, which has already been happening. As someone who writes about these topics, it’s interesting for me to keep an eye on things, but I’m already finding the site less useful.

Tom: We’re never going to get to the end of Twitter, but we’re at the end of Twitter as the most influential social-media site. I also think that could change. If Musk were to leave and grown-ups were back in charge of Twitter, Twitter could actually come back.

Lora: I also wonder if the era of these big, dominant social-media companies is winding down, especially for younger users who are coming of age on the internet. For a few years now, a lot of younger people have been moving toward direct messages, group messages, and smaller-format social-media experiences rather than posting to the world on a feed.

Tom: In that sense, Musk broke the spell. He taught people that they can live without deep engagement on social media.

Related:

Twitter’s demise is about so much more than Elon Musk. The co-opting of Twitter

Evening Read

Illustration by Matteo Giuseppe Pani. Source: Getty.

Why Black Jesus Made My Grandmother Uncomfortable

By A.J. Verdelle

When I was a tween, and just beginning to be conscious about the giving of gifts, my sisters and I were Christmas shopping at one of the festive pop-up markets in our corner of the city. We found a stellar gift for one of our grandmothers, which we knew for sure she would love …

By her own careful design, Ma Jones was the personification of Black matriarchy: loving, hovering, caring, devoted almost to the point of martyrdom. She worked three jobs not for herself, but for the family; not for herself, but for our future. Not one of us doubted that she modeled herself after Jesus—his behaviors, his ideals …

We found a painting of Jesus who was as chocolate brown as Ma Jones. I can still see her—dark skin ringed with wisdom lines, showing age in the same way as trees …

When gift-giving time came, my sisters and I worked as a team to ceremonially reveal our studiously selected present. Our grandmother looked on, smiling. We carefully unsheeted our Jesus, and we watched our grandmother as recognition slowly dawned … Our grandmother turned and left the room, holding her hand over her mouth. Sacrilege!

Read the full article.

More From The Atlantic

Pediatricians see an alarming number of noodle-soup burns. The case for Kwanzaa The return of the pagans

Culture Break

Warner Bros. Pictures

Watch. The Color Purple (in theaters) finds its own rhythm in a tear-jerking and exultant epic.

Read. Condolence, a new poem by L. A. Johnson:

“After the store-bought Christmas / dinner was ordered     purchased / picked up by me     and presented on / ceramic dinner plates because / it is Christmas     after all.

Play our daily crossword.

Katherine Hu contributed to this newsletter.

When you buy a book using a link in this newsletter, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

Twitter’s Demise Is About So Much More Than Elon Musk

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2023 › 12 › twitter-tiktok-short-form-video › 676923

It’s really, really hard to kill a large, beloved social network. But Elon Musk has seemingly been giving it his absolute best shot: Over the past year, Twitter has gotten a new name (X), laid off much of its staff, struggled with outages, brought back banned accounts belonging to Alex Jones and Donald Trump, and lost billions in advertising revenue.

Opportunistic competitors have launched their own Twitter clones, such as Bluesky, Mastodon, and Threads. The hope is to capture fleeing users who want “microblogging”—places where people can shoot off little text posts about what they ate for lunch, their random thoughts about politics or pop culture, or perhaps a few words or sentences of harassment Threads, Meta’s entry which launched in July, seems the most promising, at least in terms of pure scale. Over the summer, it broke the record for fastest app to reach 100 million monthly active users—beating a milestone set by ChatGPT just months earlier—in part because Instagram users were pushed toward it. (Turns out, it’s pretty helpful to launch a new social network on the back of the defining social-media empire of our time.)

But the decline of Twitter, and the race to replace it, is in a sense a sideshow. Analytics experts shared data with me suggesting that the practice of microblogging, while never quite dominant, is only becoming more niche. In the era of TikTok, the act of posting your two cents in two sentences for strangers to consume is starting to feel more and more unnatural. The lasting social-media imprint of 2023 may not be the self-immolation of Twitter but rather that short-form videos—on TikTok, Instagram, and other platforms—have tightened their choke hold on the internet. Text posts as we’ve always known them just can’t keep up.

Social-media companies only tend to sporadically share data about their platforms, and of all the main microblogging sites —X, Threads, Bluesky, and Mastodon—just Bluesky provided a comment for this story. “We’ve grown to 2.6 million users on an invite-only basis in 2023,” BlueSky’s CEO, Jay Gruber, wrote in an email, “and are excited about growth while we open up the network more broadly next year.” So I reached out to outside companies that track social analytics. They told me that these new X competitors haven’t meaningfully chipped away at the site’s dominance. For all of the drama of the past year, X is by far still the predominant network for doing brief text posts. It is still home to more than four times as many monthly active users as Threads, Bluesky, and Mastodon combined, according to numbers shared with me by data.ai, a company that tracks app-store activity. (Data.ai looks only at mobile analytics, so it can’t account for desktop users.)

Mastodon and Bluesky amounted to just “rounding errors, in terms of the number of people engaging,” says Paul Quigley, the CEO of NewsWhip, a social-media-monitoring platform. Threads has not fared much better. Sensor Tower, another analytics firm, estimates that fewer than 1 percent of Threads users opened the app daily last month, compared with 18 percent of Twitter users. And even those who open the app are spending an average of just three minutes a day on it.

That doesn’t mean X is thriving. According to data.ai’s 2024-predictions report, the platform’s daily active users peaked in July 2022, at 316 million, and then dropped under Musk. Based on its data-science algorithms, data.ai predicts that X usership will decline to 250 million in 2024. And data.ai expects microblogging overall to decline alongside X next year, even though these new platforms seem positioned for growth: Threads, after all, just recently launched in Europe and became available as a desktop app, and to join Bluesky, you still need an invite code.

Of course, these are just predictions. Plenty of people do still want platforms for sending off quick thoughts, and perhaps X or any other alternative will gain more users. But the decline of microblogging is part of a larger change in how we consume media. On TikTok and other platforms, short clips are served up by an at-times-magical-seeming algorithm that makes note of our every interest. Text posts don’t have the same appeal. “While platforms like X are likely to maintain a core niche of users, the overall trends show consumers are swapping out text-based social networking apps for photo and video-first platforms,” data.ai noted in their predictions report.

Short-form videos have become an attention vortex. Users are spending an average of 95 minutes a day on TikTok and 61 minutes on Instagram as of this quarter, according to estimates from Sensor Tower. By comparison, they’re estimated to average just 30 minutes on Twitter and three minutes on Threads. People also want companies to shift to video along with them in what is perhaps this the real pivot to video: In a recent survey by Sprout Social, a social-media-analytics tool, 41 percent of consumers said that they want brands to publish more 15- to 30-second videos more than they want any other style of social-media post. Just 10 percent wanted more text-only content.

Maybe this really is the end for the short text post, at least en masse. Or maybe our conception of “microblogging” is due for an update. TikTok videos are perhaps “just a video version of what the original microblogs were doing when they first started coming out in the mid-2000s,” André Brock, a media professor at Georgia Tech who has studied Twitter, told me; they can feel as intimate and authentic as a tweet about having tacos for lunch. Trends such as “men are constantly thinking about the Roman empire” (and the ensuing pushback) could have easily been a viral Twitter or Facebook conversation in a different year. For a while, all of the good Twitter jokes were screenshotted and re-uploaded to Instagram. Now it can feel like all of the good TikToks are downloaded and reposted on Instagram. If the Dress (white-and-gold or black-and-blue?) were to go viral today, it would probably happen in a 30-second video with a narrator and a soundtrack.

But something is left behind when microblogging becomes video. Twitter became an invaluable resource during news moments—part of why journalists flocked to the platform, for better or for worse—allowing people to refresh and instantaneously get real-time updates on election results, or a sports game, or a natural disaster. Movements such as Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter turned to Twitter to organize protests and spread their respective messages.

Some of the news and political content may just as easily move to TikTok: Russia’s war with Ukraine has been widely labeled the “first TikTok War,” as many experienced it for the first time through that lens. Roughly a third of adults under 30 now regularly get their news from TikTok, according to Pew Research. But we don’t yet totally know what it means to have short-form videos, delivered via an algorithmic feed, be the centerpiece of social media. You might log onto TikTok and be shown a video that was posted two weeks ago.

Perhaps the biggest stress test for our short-form-video world has yet to come: the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Elections are where Twitter, and microblogging, have thrived. Meanwhile, in 2020, TikTok was much smaller than what it is now. Starting next year, its true reign might finally begin.