Let us now praise Donald Trump. It’s hard for me not to choke on that phrase. But it was his bluster—his demand that Hamas release its remaining hostages before his inauguration, or else “all hell will break out”—that effectively ushered in a cease-fire, the beginning of the end of the Gaza war.  

Although honesty requires crediting Trump, his success was not the product of magical powers or an indictment of Biden-administration diplomacy. Trump’s splenetic threats injected urgency into floundering talks. And by allowing his envoy Steven Witkoff to coordinate with the Biden administration, the incoming president left Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with an acute sense of isolation.

Over the course of Netanyahu’s long reign, he has transformed his nation’s foreign policy. For much of its history, the Jewish state cultivated bipartisan support in the United States. Netanyahu trashed that tradition; for his own domestic purposes, he has provoked spats with Democratic presidents, bolstering his reputation among his right-wing base. At the same time, he tethered himself to the Republican Party.

As the Gaza war began to meander—and as it became clear that Israel would never achieve the “total victory” that he promised—Netanyahu dipped into this old playbook. In a video he released last June, he accused Biden of denying Israel the munitions that it needed to win the war. That charge was arguably slanderous, given the large sums of money that the United States had spent on arming Israel.

Although that strategy advanced his career, it had an obvious flaw. Because of Netanyahu’s lockstep partnership with the Republicans, he is beholden to the whims of the leader of that party. Once Trump emphatically expressed his desire to end the war, Netanyahu was stuck. To cross the incoming president would risk losing the most important pillar of Israel’s foreign support.

[Read: Trump made the Gaza cease-fire happen]

Some American observers assumed that Netanyahu wanted to extend the war into Trump’s term, during which he would have the Republican president’s permission to behave however he liked. These were, after all, like-minded politicians. But that assessment misread the Netanyahu-Trump dynamic.

Over the past four years, Netanyahu clearly has had reason to feel insecure about his relationship with Trump. Trump reportedly abhorred the fact that Netanyahu called Joe Biden to congratulate him on winning the 2020 presidential election. By acknowledging Biden’s victory, Netanyahu flunked the fundamental Trumpist loyalty test. (As Trump fumed about the episode to Axios’s Barak Ravid, he declared, “Fuck him.”) After October 7, Trump cast blame on the Israeli prime minister for failing to foresee the attack. Given this history, and all the anxieties it must surely provoke, Netanyahu was desperate to deliver for Trump, days before his inauguration, at the height of his prestige.

After months of diplomatic futility, Biden was shrewd to allow Trump and Witkoff to serve as the front men for the talks. Rather than clinging territorially to the office during his last days in power, or invoking clichés about how there’s one president at a time, he invited his successor into an ad hoc coalition in which they operated in sync, sharing the same strategy and applying combined pressure. This moment will be remembered as an atavistic flourish of bipartisan foreign policy, but it also makes me think about Antony Blinken’s eyes.

When I traveled with the secretary of state to the Middle East, and the lights of television cameras pointed at his face, I saw the toils of shuttle diplomacy in the bulging bags beneath his eyes. For months, protesters camped outside his suburban-Virginia house. They hurled red paint at his wife’s car while he kept returning to the region in the hopes of brokering a deal. Indeed, it was those months of excruciating, energetic negotiation that yielded the substance of an agreement, the gritty details of peace. That hard work should be at the center of the narrative, and maybe someday it will be, but right now it feels like a footnote.

On the left, plenty of Biden’s critics are now crowing. Many of those who hate “Genocide Joe” have always claimed that Trump would be better for the Palestinian cause, or perhaps just as bad, which justified a desire to punish Biden’s Zionism electorally. Now that strange faith in Trump will be tested, because the coming diplomacy will be even harder than ending the war. Hamas remains a fact of life in Gaza. For the time being, it’s the government there, and it has every incentive to remain an armed force. Reconstructing the Strip, rescuing it from dangerous anarchy, will require somehow navigating around that fact. I doubt that Trump cares deeply about the future of Gaza, or that he has the patience to maneuver through the tangle of complexities. But if he does, I will be the first to praise him.

Today, after 15 months of brutal war, Israel and Hamas agreed to a deal to secure the release of Israeli hostages and the cessation of hostilities in Gaza. The agreement’s first six weeks will see Israel withdraw from much of the enclave and release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, including convicted mass murderers, in exchange for Hamas releasing 33 captive Israelis—some living, some dead. Should everything proceed according to plan, subsequent negotiations would assure the release of the remaining Israeli hostages and the reconstruction of Gaza in the deal’s second and third stages.

Given the precarious nature of the deal’s phased structure, the matter is far from settled, despite the headlines and handshakes. The accord must also still be ratified by the Israeli cabinet. If that happens, the ensuing weeks will be traumatic, as returning Gazan refugees discover whether their homes are still standing, and the families of Israel’s hostages discover whether their loved ones are still alive.

The tentative agreement is nonetheless a victory for the foreign-policy teams of Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump, who worked in tandem with regional partners Qatar and Egypt to bring it about. The terms largely echo a proposal laid out by Biden himself in May 2024, but the incoming president dragged the parties over the finish line. What changed was not Washington’s general orientation toward the conflict. Far from turning up the heat on Israel, Trump telegraphed a further embrace of its positions during his 2024 campaign, repeatedly attacking Biden for restricting arms sales to Israel. But this posture may have helped deliver both sides: Hamas could reasonably surmise that it would not get a better deal during Trump’s presidency, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hard-right government likely acceded to the arrangement in order to stay in the new leader’s good graces as he assumed office.

[Eliot A. Cohen: Cancel the foreign-policy apocalypse]

The Israeli far right, whose lawmakers hold the margin of power in Netanyahu’s coalition, had previously threatened to collapse the government should a deal be reached without Hamas fully vanquished from Gaza. But amid Trump’s return, the radicals have their eyes on bigger prizes, such as the annexation of the West Bank—which the Palestinians claim for their future state—and are loath to forgo such opportunities. For this reason, they will likely vote against the cease-fire but leave Netanyahu in power, allowing him to enact it.

Put another way, it’s not that Trump had a stick with which to beat Israel that Biden didn’t have; it’s that his presidency holds out the prospect of carrots that Biden would never offer. It was less the president-elect’s pressure than his potential promise that brought the Israeli far right onside. With Trump, everything is a transaction, and for his would-be suitors—not just Israel, but also Hamas’s sponsors in Qatar—the Gaza cease-fire is a down payment.

[Samer Sinijlawi: My hope for Palestine]

On the Palestinian side, the deal marks a momentary if Pyrrhic triumph for an eviscerated Hamas, which will get to claim that it outlasted the Israeli army and parade some of the released prisoners through the streets of Gaza. But with its leaders killed and its territory devastated, the group will have little to celebrate or to show for its atrocities on October 7. The terrorist organization may continue to impose its will by force, but it is deeply unpopular in its own backyard, according to recent polls.

Meanwhile, with Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar dead, Lebanon’s Hezbollah decimated, Syria’s pro-Iran regime overthrown, and Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance shattered, Netanyahu has a plausible claim to victory, should the deal hold. And if it doesn’t, or should Hamas prove insufficiently forthcoming in negotiations over the remaining hostages, he has a new American president in office who may happily underwrite a return to hostilities.

The guns might mercifully fall silent for now, but if history is any indication, the long war between Israel and Hamas will continue, in one form or another.