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Joe Biden

What a Collapse Could Look Like

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › national › archive › 2023 › 12 › trump-2024-second-term-washington-week › 676957

Editor’s Note: Washington Week With The Atlantic is a partnership between NewsHour Productions, WETA, and The Atlantic airing every Friday on PBS stations nationwide. Check your local listings or watch full episodes here.

In this year-end episode, some of the contributors to the The Atlantic’s January/February issue forecast what a second Trump term might look like. For the magazine, 24 Atlantic writers––experts in foreign and domestic policy, economics, and national security––examined Trump’s record and his recent statements, and wrote about what they believe his agenda would be in a theoretical second term.

Joining editor in chief of The Atlantic and moderator, Jeffrey Goldberg, this week to discuss this and more are McKay Coppins, staff writer at The Atlantic and author of Romney: A Reckoning; Franklin Foer, staff writer at The Atlantic and author of The Last Politician: Inside Joe Biden’s White House and the Struggle for America’s Future; Adrienne LaFrance, executive editor of The Atlantic; and Clint Smith, staff writer at The Atlantic and author of How the Word Is Passed: A Reckoning With the History of Slavery Across America.

Read the full transcript here.

Suddenly, Trump Is Interested in Democracy

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 12 › trump-maine-ballot › 676987

Donald Trump won the presidency with fewer votes than his opponent?

We’re a republic, not a democracy.

State Republican parties in Wisconsin, North Carolina, and other states gerrymandered themselves into supermajorities?

We’re a republic, not a democracy.

Forty-one senators block laws favored by 59? A single senator blocks promotions across the Defense Department?

We’re a republic, not a democracy.

Florida voters restored voting rights to felons, only to see the reform disregarded by the state legislature?

We’re a republic, not a democracy.

States rule that Trump is an insurrectionist under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, barring him from their ballots?

Let the people decide!

There’s not much use in pointing out hypocrisy in the Trump era. Trump and his core supporters are governed only by the Cartman principle—“I do what I want!”—and to that principle, they are always faithful.

Yet even if it changes nothing to understand the game that’s being played, the understanding is still worth having in its own right.

Trump lost the 2020 presidential election. He plotted to overturn that election, first by fraud, then by violence. His scheme to cheat Joe Biden out of the presidency amounted to the single most spectacular effort to defy the will of the voters since the slave states started a civil war rather than accept Abraham Lincoln’s election. Trump’s actions appear both criminal and anti-constitutional. For the alleged crimes, he’s been indicted by both state and federal prosecutors. For the constitutional offense, he now faces disqualification from the ballot in a growing number of states.

Trump was disqualified in Maine yesterday. Colorado also disqualified him, but has for the moment stayed the enforcement of the disqualification. Minnesota ruled that Trump is not disqualified yet but may be in the future.

Will these state disqualifications survive Supreme Court review? Even if they are legal, are they prudentially wise ways to protect American democracy against Donald Trump? We all have our own opinions. (Mine was originally negative, but I am becoming disqualification-curious.)

Trump himself launched his presidential career by arguing that President Barack Obama should not have been able to run for president because Obama was not a natural-born citizen of the United States. In 2016, Trump argued that his rival Ted Cruz should be disqualified as a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination because Cruz was born in Canada. (Unlike Trump’s fantasies about Obama, Trump was right on the facts about Cruz—just wrong on the law.)

In 2020, Trump tried to disqualify voters who’d exercised their right to vote by mail or whose ballots had for any reason not yet been counted by midnight on Election Day.

Trump and his supporters have conjured a series of self-serving rules. Where antique anti-majoritarian devices work for them, the antique anti-majoritarian devices prevail. Where crude gaming of filibusters and gerrymandering works for them, the crude gaming must prevail. Where fraud and violence work for them, fraud and violence must prevail. And where invoking democratic ideas works for them—well, you can complete the sentence.

How should people who are serious about democratic principles respond to this avalanche of bad faith? Democratic ideals don’t cease to be true just because they can be exploited by dishonest actors. Yet democracy also cannot become an optional principle that authoritarians can use when it suits them and then discard without consequences when it becomes an obstacle to their goals. Democratic systems have constitutions and constitutional remedies precisely to protect themselves against those who toggle in this way between breaking inconvenient rules and demanding the benefit of favorable ones.

A key provision of the suddenly famous Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it applies only to those who previously swore an oath of office. It’s not a general punishment for revolts against legal authority. It is a highly targeted penalty applied to those who—like Trump—try to play the system both ways, swearing to execute the laws and then rebelling against the laws they swore to enforce.

Maybe prudence genuinely does recommend leaving Trump’s disgraced name on primary and general-election ballots. But remember that old joke about the man who murdered both of his parents and then asked for mercy as an orphan? It needs to be replaced by a new joke about the ex-president who trashed democracy when he had the power, and then pleaded for the protection of democracy so he could have one more chance to trash democracy again.

The Most Important Technology of 2023 Wasn’t AI

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2023 › 12 › tesla-chatgpt-most-important-technology › 676980

One day in late November, I cradled a red Samsung flip phone in my hands as if it was a ruby gemstone. To me, it was just as precious. Deep inside an overstuffed dresser in my childhood bedroom, I had spotted the glint of my first-ever cellphone, a Samsung SGH-A707 purchased in the waning days of the George W. Bush presidency. The device, no bigger than a credit card, had long ago succumbed to the spider web of cracks on its screen. For a moment, I was brought back to life before the smartphone, clicking the phone’s plastic keys for the first time in more than a decade.

This device, and every other phone like it, of course, was made obsolete by the touchscreen slabs now in all of our pockets. Perhaps you have heard that we are now on the cusp of another iPhone moment—the rise of a new technology that changes the world. No, not that one. Despite the post-ChatGPT frenzy, artificial intelligence has so far been defined more by speculative hype than actual substance. Does anyone really want “AI-powered” smoothies, sports commentary, or roller skates? Assuming the bots don’t wipe out humanity, maybe AI will take the jobs of high-school teachers, coders, lawyers, fast-food workers, customer-service agents, writers, and graphic designers—but right now, ChatGPT is telling me that Cybertruck has 11 letters. There’s a long way to go.

Meanwhile, electric cars are already upending America. In 2023, our battery-powered future became so much more real—a boom in sales and new models is finally starting to push us into the post-gas age. Americans are on track to buy a record 1.44 million of them in 2023, according to a forecast by BloombergNEF, about the same number sold from 2016 to 2021 total. “This was the year that EVs went from experiments, or technological demonstrations, and became mature vehicles,” Gil Tal, the director of the Electric Vehicle Research Center at UC Davis, told me. They are beginning to transform not just the automotive industry, but also the very meaning of a car itself.

If the story of American EVs has long hinged on one company—Tesla—then this was the year that these cars became untethered from Elon Musk’s brand. “We’re at a point where EVs aren’t necessarily exclusively for the upper, upper, upper class,” Robby DeGraff, an analyst at the market-research firm AutoPacific, told me. If you wanted an electric car five years ago, you could choose from among various Tesla models, the Chevy Bolt, the Nissan Leaf—and that was really it. Now EVs come in more makes and models than Baskin-Robbins ice-cream flavors. We have more luxury sedans to vie with Tesla, but also cheaper five-seaters, SUVs, Hummers, pickup trucks, and … however you might categorize the Cybertruck. Nearly 40 new EVs have debuted since the start of 2022, and they are far more advanced than their ancestors. For $40,000, the Hyundai Ioniq 6, released this year, can get you 360 miles on a single charge; in 2018, for only a slightly lower cost, a Nissan Leaf couldn’t go half that distance.

[Read: Admit it, the Cybertruck is awesome]

All of these EVs are genuinely great for the planet, spewing zero carbon from their tailpipes, but that’s only a small part of what makes them different. In the EV age, cars are no longer just cars. They are computers. Stripping out a gas engine, transmission, and 100-plus moving parts turns a vehicle into something more digital than analog—sort of like how typing on an iPhone keyboard is different than on my clackety old Samsung flip phone. “It’s the software that is really the heart of an EV,” DeGraff said—it runs the motors, calculates how many miles are left on a charge, optimizes the brakes, and much more.

Just like with other gadgets that bug you about software updates, all of this firmware can be updated over Wi-Fi while a car charges overnight. Rivian has updated its software to add a “Sand Mode” that can enhance its cars’ driving ability on dusty terrain. Many new cars are getting stuffed with technology—a new gas-powered Mercedes-Benz E-Class comes with TikTok integration and a selfie stick—but EVs are capable of more significant updates. A gas car is never going to meaningfully get more miles per gallon, but one such update from Tesla in 2020 increased the range on its Model X car from 328 to 351 miles after the company found ways to wring more efficiency out of its internal parts. And because EVs all drive basically the same, tech is a bigger part of the sell. Instead of idly passing the time while an EV recharges, you can now use a car’s infotainment system to Zoom into a meeting, play Grand Theft Auto, and stream Amazon Prime.

The million-plus new EVs on the road are ushering in a fundamental, maybe existential, change in how to even think about cars—no longer as machines, but as gadgets that plug in and charge like all the others in our life. The wonderful things about computers are coming to cars, and so are the terrible ones: apps that crash. Subscription hell. Cyberattacks. There are new problems to contend with too: In Tesla’s case, its “Autopilot” software has been implicated in fatal crashes. (It was the subject of a massive recall earlier this month that required an over-the-air update.) You now might scroll on your phone in bed, commute in your EV, and log into your work laptop, all of which are powered by processors that are constantly bugging you to update them.

[Read: The end of manual transmission]

If cars are gadgets now, then carmakers are also now tech companies. An industry that has spent a century perfecting the internal combustion engine must now manufacture lithium-ion batteries and write the code to govern them. Imagine if a dentist had to pivot from filling cavities to performing open-heart surgery, and that’s roughly what’s going on here. “The transition to EVs is completely changing everything,” Loren McDonald, an EV consultant, told me. “It’s changing the people that automotive companies have to hire and their skills. It’s changing their suppliers, their factories, how they assemble and build them. And lots of automakers are struggling with that.”

Take the batteries. To manufacture battery cells powerful enough for a car is so phenomenally expensive and arduous that Toyota is pumping nearly $14 billion into a single battery plant in North Carolina. To create software-enabled cars, you need software engineers, and car companies cannot get enough of them. (Perhaps no other industry has benefited the most from Silicon Valley’s year of layoffs.) At the very low end, estimates Sam Abuelsamid, a transportation analyst at Guidehouse Insights, upwards of 10,000 “software engineers, interface designers, networking engineers, data center experts and silicon engineers have been hired by automakers and suppliers in recent years.” The tech wars can sometimes verge on farce: One former Apple executive runs Ford’s customer-software team, while another runs GM’s.

At every level, the auto industry is facing the type of headache-inducing questions about job losses and employment that still feels many years away with AI. “There’s a new skill set we’re going to need, and I don’t think I can teach everyone—it will take too much time,” Ford’s CEO, Jim Farley, said in May. “So there is going to be disruption in this transition.” Job cuts are already happening, and more may come—even after the massive autoworker strike this year that largely hinged on electrification. Such a big financial investment is needed to electrify the car industry that from July to September, Ford lost $60,000 for every EV it sold. Or peel back one more onion layer to car dealerships: Tesla, Rivian, and other EV companies are selling directly to consumers, cutting them out. EVs also require little service compared with gas vehicles, a reality that has upset many dealers, who could lose their biggest source of profit. None of this is the future. It is happening right now.

But if EVs are having an “iPhone moment,” we are still in the days when a few early adopters had the clunky, OG version. Most cars you see are a decade old; for all these EV sales, just 1 percent of cars on the road are all-electric. Even if we hit President Joe Biden’s EV target of 50 percent of sales by 2030, the sheer life span of cars will mean that gas vehicles will still greatly outnumber electric ones by then. Gas stations are not closing. Parking garages are not buckling under the weight of EVs and their hefty batteries. Electric cars remain too expensive, and they are limited by janky public chargers that are too slow, assuming they work at all. If you don’t have a house where you can install your own plug, EVs are still mostly just unrealistic. Most alarming might be the politics that surround them: Donald Trump and lots of other Republicans are vowing to stymie their growth. Carmakers are not even hiding that next year’s election might lead them to reconsider their EV plans.

Even so, the transition is not slowing down. Next year, America should hit 1.9 million EV sales, Corey Cantor, an EV analyst at BloombergNEF, told me. Another burst of models is coming: A retro-futuristic Volkswagen van! A Cadillac Escalade with a 55-inch touchscreen! A tiny Fiat 500e for just $30,000! And yes, they are succumbing a bit to hype themselves. In June, Mercedes’s infotainment screen got an optional update. Now you can talk to it through a chatbot.

This story is part of the Atlantic Planet series supported by HHMI’s Science and Educational Media Group.

What Comes Next in Gaza and Israel?

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › newsletters › archive › 2023 › 12 › what-comes-next-in-gaza-and-israel › 676981

This is an edition of The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here.

Nearly three months into the Israel-Hamas war, our writers think through the possible futures that await the region.

First, here are three new stories from The Atlantic:

81 things that blew our minds in 2023 Political accountability isn’t dead yet. The woman who didn’t see stuttering as a flaw

How This Ends

Weeks after Hamas’s attacks on Israel, amid the ensuing war in Gaza, my colleague Franklin Foer published an article titled “Tell Me How This Ends.” “The Israeli operation faces the same question that ultimately vexed the American project in Iraq,” he wrote: “What comes next?”

Two months later, the questions that Frank raised about the future of the region are no easier to answer, and the civilian death toll in Gaza continues to rise. I’ve come back to the guiding inquiry of Frank’s article many times in recent months: How does this end? The reading list below offers a range of perspectives from our writers about what could, or ought to, come next.

Israel’s impossible dilemma: “Israel’s larger stated aim—of utterly eradicating Hamas—is impossible,” the scholar Hussein Ibish argued earlier this month. “If the Israelis stay in Gaza out of determination to deny Hamas a hollow win, they will instead ensure that Hamas gets a political victory that is actually worth something—one that will play out over months and years of further warfare.” The one-state delusion: “Neither Israelis nor Palestinians are going anywhere, and neither will give up their national identity,” the political scientist Arash Azizi argued last month. “Those who truly want peace and justice in the Holy Land should start by recognizing this reality.” A phased diplomatic strategy: Joe Biden “has exercised bold diplomacy in other parts of the world, and it can work here too—advancing the prospects of peace, ensuring Israeli security, and addressing Palestinian grievances,” Daniel Kurtzer, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and Egypt, wrote this month. The day after Netanyahu: “Israel has long succeeded in spite of its leaders, not because of them,” Atlantic staff writer Yair Rosenberg wrote last month. “As Israel’s population steps up where its prime minister and his hard-right allies have failed, the real source of the state’s strength has never been more obvious.” “All my life, I’ve watched violence fail the Palestinian cause”: “In spite of the horrors of recent weeks—or perhaps because of them—many Jews and Palestinians want peace more than ever,” the British Palestinian writer John Aziz wrote last month. “But Palestinians need more than peace. They need leaders who will serve their interests instead of persecuting those—including the LGBTQ and non-Muslim communities—who exist on the margins of society.” A message of peace: “There never has been, nor will there be, a military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian situation,” Ziad Asali, founder of the American Task Force on Palestine, wrote last month. “Israel obviously can, in its campaign against Hamas, flatten Gaza. It has the machines and bombs to do so. But it can’t destroy the Palestinian desire to be free.”

Evening Read

The LIFE Picture Collection / Getty / The Atlantic

How McKinsey Destroyed the Middle Class (From 2020)

By Daniel Markovits

When Pete Buttigieg accepted a position at the management consultancy McKinsey & Company, he already had sterling credentials: high-school valedictorian, a bachelor’s degree from Harvard, a Rhodes Scholarship. He could have taken any number of jobs and, moreover, had no obvious interest in business. Nevertheless, he joined the firm.

This move was predictable, not eccentric: The top graduates of elite colleges typically pass through McKinsey or a similar firm before settling into their adult career. But the conventional nature of the career path makes it more, not less, worthy of examination. How did this come to pass? And what consequences has the rise of management consulting had for the organization of American business and the lives of American workers?

Read the full article.

Culture Break

Dusty Deen for The Atlantic

Listen. The 25 best podcasts of 2023 kept listeners hooked on stories about female adultery, espionage, scamming, and wanderlust.

Read. “Midwinter,” a new poem by Grady Chambers:

“After, with their underwear still tangled / in the top sheet, or just waking / in winter, the stunned trees / thrusting up their arms, / he was always the first to leave the bed.”

Play our daily crossword.

Katherine Hu contributed to this newsletter.

Explore all of our newsletters here.

When you buy a book using a link in this newsletter, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

The Woman Who Didn’t See Stuttering as a Flaw

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 12 › lee-caggiano-didnt-try-to-cure-stuttering › 676954

My friend Lee Caggiano, who died several weeks ago, was not famous. But through her work, she changed one particular corner of the world: Lee made people who stutter, like me, want to talk.

Like 99 percent of the population, Lee was fluent, meaning she never knew what it was like to stutter herself. But her son did. His experience with stuttering made her pivot her life and go back to school. She completed a master’s degree in speech-language pathology in her early 40s and went on to treat patients and teach at NYU and elsewhere.

Her greatest accomplishment, and the reason hundreds of stutterers across the country have been mourning her death, is the profound work she did to de-pathologize this disorder. Lee didn’t see stuttering as a weakness, a failure, a flaw. She didn’t think she could “cure” you. She didn’t try to. She refused to infantilize us because of the way we speak. Do you know how good that feels?

Lee helped me see a purer version of myself, even if it was something I had avoided wanting to see.

There is no shortage of support groups, camps, and conferences devoted to people who stutter, yet the community remains fairly fragmented. Some of these organizations aim to promote self-acceptance while also championing work toward a “cure” … for the very thing you’re supposed to accept. Twenty-six years ago, Lee co-founded Friends: The National Association of Young People Who Stutter. Friends stands out for its unmatched rawness and humanity, and for the way it takes fluency (smooth, stutter-free speech) off a pedestal. It’s a nonprofit organization with a DIY ethos; Lee never even took a salary. The group’s main event is an annual summer gathering. Those three days are infused with a candor that’s hard to describe unless you experience it firsthand.

[John Hendrickson: Why I dread saying my own name]

Lee knew that getting stutterers and their families to talk about the depths of the communication disorder was the only way that stutterers would start to move toward lucidity, toward fluidity. But not fluency: She implored parents to stop caring about the smoothness of their child’s speech. This was a radical message, and she was among the small percentage of speech-language pathologists in the United States who unequivocally embraced this approach. It’s a refreshing perspective if for no other reason than that it expands the worldview of patients and their families: A stutterer can be considered a success if they simply find the courage to live their life.

I came to adopt this perspective later than most. I only learned about the organization in the fall of 2019, when I wrote an article about President Joe Biden’s lifelong journey with stuttering. And I only attended my first in-person Friends convention in the summer of 2021 as part of the research I was doing for my book about stuttering.

I saw how stutterers and their families crammed into a no-frills hotel and faced the reality of this multilayered disorder in drab conference rooms. Here, stuttering was not treated as a “good” or a “bad,” but as something far more complex: an “is.” At many points throughout the weekend, attendees stood up and spoke extemporaneously. You never knew what anyone, child or adult, was about to say when they approached the mic. Often, what came out was profound.

Some people offered a positive, empowering message about stuttering when it was their turn to speak. Others opted for the exact opposite: how draining the disorder is, how isolating it can be, how some people find themselves using alcohol or other drugs to cope. Such moments can be tense. Watching someone else stutter and block, even if you yourself stutter, can be uncomfortable. But, following Lee’s lead, everyone learned to lean into the uncertainty, to the gray area. Though she was technically in charge of the event, Lee had an almost pathological avoidance of policing anybody, especially when it came to the content or form of their speech. She trusted that everyone in the room could handle whatever was about to be said.

I stayed at an Airbnb about half an hour away, rather than at the hotel with everyone else. I spent my days lurking in the back of the conference room, jotting down notes, occasionally finding people to interview. I was careful to keep an emotional distance—playing the role of a journalist on a story, even though I was writing a reported memoir and those rules didn’t necessarily apply.

Lee politely, and then less politely, rolled her eyes at me and, in the space of a few words, asked what my deal was. When I told her, she pushed me to not merely document what was happening but to let my guard down and become part of it. She needed me to understand that I already was part of this community, given the way I talked. She implied that others were waiting for me to put my pen and notebook away. I nodded, but I kept my distance. Then on the final day, I unexpectedly approached the mic and shared something that I had never articulated before: that the fluent people in your life may never truly understand what it’s like to stutter, and that at some point, you, yourself, have to be okay with that. She stood a few feet away from me, looking on, not with a smile or tears, but with a satisfied nod.

The following year, Lee invited me to be one of the keynote speakers at the conference. The speech I wrote was titled “Closing Distance” and attempted to expand on what I had said the previous summer. My parents, my brother, my wife, and my sister-in-law had all come to support me in the audience. I remember taking the elevator up to my room as my time slot approached to rehearse my words and change into nicer clothes. Back downstairs, right before I went onstage, Lee rolled her eyes at me again. “Are you going to wear that blazer the whole time?” she teased. She hadn’t asked to see a copy of my speech in advance, nor had she even wondered what it was about. But she could clearly see that I was still trying to play a part, to put distance between myself and the others, who were dressed more casually. She wasn’t trying to cut me down—she was treating me like she treated everyone: as someone who didn’t need to be given slack, or pitied, or babied. We were all equals. Once again, she was challenging me to see myself as a community member, not as a guest speaker or an interloper.

Lee died a couple of weeks before Thanksgiving, of metastatic lung cancer at the age of 68. She was an old-school New Yorker with a thick Long Island accent, but several years ago she had moved to Colorado to be closer to her adult children. One of them, her daughter, gave birth to a baby girl over the summer, shortly after Lee had received her diagnosis. Many stutterers and therapists saw Lee as a surrogate mother, and she knew this, but she rightly prioritized her own family. She spent the final days of her life stiff-arming texts and calls and emails from the many people whose lives she had changed, because she wanted to spend those last moments with her husband, children, and grandchildren. She died at home in a bed facing a window, looking out at the mountains.

[Read: An ‘absolute explosion’ of stuttering breakthroughs]

Some people are natural community builders and leaders, with a gravitational pull. Lee of course had those qualities, but she also shirked attention. She would have told me that writing about her was a waste of time—that I should be focusing on other, more “interesting” or “important” people. The reality, which I’m not sure she ever knew, and which I now realize I never properly told her, is that she was one of the most compelling people I’ve ever met.

In November, hundreds of stutterers and their families gathered on Zoom for an impromptu memorial. People shared stories and reminisced for hours—parents speaking of how she’d brought them closer to their children, old patients and students noting how she’d reframed their outlook on the disorder. Barry Yeoman, a freelance journalist and longtime leader in the LGBTQ stuttering community, talked about how, at a Friends conference nearly 20 years ago in San Francisco, Lee fostered a space where he could be his full self and encourage others to do the same.

On the first Saturday of December, scores of people flew to Colorado to sit around her home and swap more memories. And a week after that, a group gathered in New York to toast her at a bar. The night ended with karaoke—singing relies on a different neural pathway than speaking, and no one stutters when they belt out songs off-key.

Because of her illness, Lee had missed this past summer’s Friends convention for the first time. She had sent a video message; she hoped to be there next year. Of course, she won’t be, but people will show up anyway. They will walk to the mic, even if they don’t feel ready to, and they will speak.

The Only Thing More Dangerous Than Authoritarianism

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 12 › christian-nationalism-danger › 676974

This Christmas season, I have been reflecting on the words of my favorite author, C. S. Lewis, who once observed: “I have learned now that while those who speak about one’s miseries usually hurt, those who keep silence hurt more.”

Speaking about American evangelicalism was never my intention. Having grown up steeped in Christianity’s right-wing subculture—the son of a megachurch minister, a follower of Jesus, someone who self-identified as “evangelical” since childhood—I was a reliable defender of the faith. I rejected the caricatures of people like my parents. I took offense at efforts to mock and marginalize evangelicals. I tried to see the best in the Church, even when the Church was at its worst.

It took the loss of my father, and the traumatic events surrounding his funeral—as I write in the prologue of my new book, The Kingdom, The Power, and the Glory, which is excerpted in our latest issue—to reconsider the implications of that silence.

The corruption of American Christianity is nothing new: Modern-day pharisees from Jerry Falwell Sr. to Paula White have spent 50 years weaponizing the gospel to win elections and dominate the country, exploiting the cultural insecurities of their unwitting brethren for political, professional, and financial gain, all while reducing the gospel of Jesus Christ to a caricature in the eyes of unbelievers. The resulting collapse of the Church’s reputation in this country—with Sunday attendance, positive perceptions of organized religion, and the number of self-identified Christians all at historic lows—leaves evangelicals estranged from their secular neighbors like never before. Unbelievers might well prefer it this way. They might be tempted to shrug and move along, assuming that the crack-up of evangelicalism isn’t their problem. They are mistaken.

The crisis at hand is not simply that Christ’s message has been corroded, but that his Church has been radicalized. The state-ordered closings of sanctuaries during COVID-19, the conspiracy-fueled objections to Joe Biden’s victory in 2020, the misinformation around vaccines and educational curricula—these and other culture-war flash points have accelerated notions of imminent Armageddon inside American Christendom. A community that has always felt misunderstood now feels marginalized, ostracized, even persecuted. This feeling is not relegated to the fringes of evangelicalism. In fact, this fear—that Christianity is in the crosshairs of the government, that an evil plot to topple America’s Judeo-Christian heritage hinges on silencing believers and subjugating the Church—now animates the religious right in ways that threaten the very foundations of our democracy.

“You sound like a hysterical maniac if you say the government’s coming after us. But I believe they are,” Robert Jeffress, the Dallas pastor and longtime Trump loyalist, told me in the book. “It happened in Nazi Germany. They didn’t put six million Jews in the crematorium immediately … It was a slow process of marginalization, isolation, and then the ‘final solution.’ I think you’re seeing that happen in America. I believe there’s evidence that the Biden administration has weaponized the Internal Revenue Service to come after churches.” (The “evidence” Jeffress cited in making this leap—bureaucratic regulations clearing the way for concentration camps—was nonexistent. When pushed, he mentioned a single court case that was ultimately decided in favor of religious liberty.)  

Mobilizing in response to this perceived threat, the forces of Christian nationalism—those who seek to demolish the wall between Church and state, asserting far-right religious dominion over the government as well as the country’s core institutions—are now ascendant both inside the Church and inside the Republican Party. It is no coincidence that, just recently, Donald Trump began suggesting that he would ban any migrant from entering the United States unless they are Christian. Those who don’t share “our religion,” the famously impious ex-president pronounced, won’t be welcome here if he’s elected again. Many of the people poised to hold high-ranking posts in a second Trump administration don’t view today’s societal disputes through the lens of Republican versus Democrat or of conservative versus progressive, but rather of good versus evil.

Perhaps the only thing more dangerous than authoritarianism is authoritarianism infused with religious justification. It hardly matters whether the would-be tyrant is personally devout; Vladimir Putin’s lack of theology didn’t stop him from partnering with the Russian Orthodox Church to frame the bloody invasion of Ukraine as God’s ordained conquest of a satanic stronghold. To believe that it couldn’t happen here—mass conflict rooted in identitarian conviction and driven by religious zeal—is to ignore both 20th-century precedent and the escalating holy-war rhetoric inside the evangelical Church.

I am a follower of Jesus Christ. I believe that God took on flesh in order to model servanthood and self-sacrifice; I believe he commanded us to love our neighbor, to turn the other cheek toward those who wish us harm, to show grace toward outsiders and let our light shine so they might glorify our heavenly Father. Not all professing Christians bother adhering to these biblical precepts, but many millions of American believers still do. It is incumbent upon them to stand up to this extremism in the Church.

Yet the responsibility is not theirs alone. No matter your personal belief system, the reality is, we have no viable path forward as a pluralistic society—none—without confronting the deterioration of the evangelical movement and repairing the relationship between Christians and the broader culture. This Christmas, I pray it might be so.

The Middle East Conflict That the U.S. Can’t Stay Out Of

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 12 › suez-canal-houthi-gaza-biden › 676973

The sooner President Joe Biden acknowledges that Americans will likely be drawn into a fight to protect shipping traffic through the Suez Canal, the more time the U.S. military has to plan, and the less severe the harm will be to the global economy. For months, ever since a deadly Hamas incursion into Israel triggered a massive Israeli military campaign in Gaza, the United States has sought to deter Israel’s enemies, most notably Iran and its proxy Hezbollah, from spreading the conflict to other fronts in the Middle East.

The administration’s fears are warranted but also moot. The war is already expanding in a way that endangers the global economy—specifically, through attacks by Iranian-backed forces on the crucial shipping lane from the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea. Whereas the U.S. military need not play any substantial role in the war in Israel and Gaza, keeping the path to Suez open and safe is a global priority, and no other country can lead that effort.

[Read: Americans have no idea what the supply chain really is]

Late last month, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in northern Yemen began targeting commercial ships in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which connects the southern end of the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The Houthis claim that they are doing it to support the Palestinians as Israel and Hamas wage war. The Houthis’ first target was the Galaxy Leader, a Japanese-operated cargo ship reportedly owned in part by an Israeli investor. The attackers were able to capture the vessel.

This week, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced a 10-country coalition, led by the United States, to protect the Suez route. The initial plan is to park warships close to the coast of Yemen and use them to defend against any Houthi attack. But more may be required of the American military, including naval escorts for vulnerable ships and air strikes against Houthi military infrastructure.

About 12 percent of global trade, and 30 percent of the world’s container shipping, passes through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the quickest route between Asia and Europe. Subsequent missile attacks have so far caused shipping companies to divert more than 100 vessels from the Suez route, redirecting them around the Cape of Good Hope, at the southern tip of Africa—where the waters are so treacherous that the area is called the “Graveyard of Ships.” That response adds 6,000 nautical miles and perhaps three to four weeks to the journey, thus tying up vessels and disrupting shipping all around the world. Past disruptions in Suez—including an eight-year stoppage after the 1967 Six-Day War and the 2021 stranding of a large vessel that blocked others from passing—show both that shippers can do without Suez and that doing so involves enormous cost and risk.

[David A. Graham: Why ships keep crashing]

The mission to protect ships on the Suez route is called Operation Prosperity Guardiana provocation, arguably, to Western progressives who bristle at the use of military force to protect economic interests. But framing the mission purely as a defense of global commerce is wise. Safeguarding the seas is essential to countries far less wealthy and powerful than the U.S., and denying a small band of rebels the power to choke off a crucial shipping lane is a long-term investment in global security. Until the maritime industry is convinced that the Suez route is safe, the rest of the world will suffer, meaning the United States and its allies will have to strike harder.

The Houthis and, by extension, their Iranian sponsors have had the ability to attack global shipping for years, but presumably refrained for fear of provoking a military response from the United States. Their bet seems to be that the war in Gaza has given them more freedom of action in the Red Sea because Washington is nervous about stepping in.

The Houthis are unlikely to be dissuaded by a perfunctory U.S. effort now. Why would they be? The group thrives at a choke point for the global economy, and for relatively little investment, the Houthis have given themselves leverage in diplomatic talks to end Yemen’s civil war.

Any U.S. strikes on Houthi launchpads in Yemen would carry some possibility of direct conflict with Iran, but the risk is probably overstated. Iran is, after all, already engaged against the interests of the United States and allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. “Compared to the risk of increased engagement between Israel and Iran through Hezbelloh in Lebanon, we aren’t likely to go to war with Iran over U.S. offensive strikes against Houthi launch sites in Yemen,” Eric Rosenbach, a former Pentagon chief of staff during the Obama administration, told me. “The risk is far outweighed by the need to end this nonsense fast.”

Right now a rebel group is dragging down a global economy. A maritime conflict has begun, and the U.S. has little choice but to fight.

The Big Questions About AI in 2024

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2023 › 12 › ai-chatbot-llm-questions-2024 › 676942

Let us be thankful for the AI industry. Its leaders may be nudging humans closer to extinction, but this year, they provided us with a gloriously messy spectacle of progress. When I say “year,” I mean the long year that began late last November, when OpenAI released ChatGPT and, in doing so, launched generative AI into the cultural mainstream. In the months that followed, politicians, teachers, Hollywood screenwriters, and just about everyone else tried to understand what this means for their future. Cash fire-hosed into AI companies, and their executives, now glowed up into international celebrities, fell into Succession-style infighting. The year to come could be just as tumultuous, as the technology continues to evolve and its implications become clearer. Here are five of the most important questions about AI that might be answered in 2024.

Is the corporate drama over?

OpenAI’s Greg Brockman is the president of the world’s most celebrated AI company and the golden-retriever boyfriend of tech executives. Since last month, when Sam Altman was fired from his position as CEO and then reinstated shortly thereafter, Brockman has appeared to play a dual role—part cheerleader, part glue guy—for the company. As of this writing, he has posted no fewer than five group selfies from the OpenAI office to show how happy and nonmutinous the staffers are. (I leave to you to judge whether and to what degree these smiles are forced.) He described this year’s holiday party as the company’s best ever. He keeps saying how focused, how energized, how united everyone is. Reading his posts is like going to dinner with a couple after an infidelity has been revealed: No, seriously, we’re closer than ever. Maybe it’s true. The rank and file at OpenAI are an ambitious and mission-oriented lot. They were almost unanimous in calling for Altman’s return (although some have since reportedly said that they felt pressured to do so). And they may have trauma-bonded during the whole ordeal. But will it last? And what does all of this drama mean for the company’s approach to safety in the year ahead?

An independent review of the circumstances of Altman’s ouster is ongoing, and some relationships within the company are clearly strained. Brockman has posted a picture of himself with Ilya Sutskever, OpenAI’s safety-obsessed chief scientist, adorned with a heart emoji, but Altman’s feelings toward the latter have been harder to read. In his post-return statement, Altman noted that the company was discussing how Sutskever, who had played a central role in Altman’s ouster, “can continue his work at OpenAI.” (The implication: Maybe he can’t.) If Sutskever is forced out of the company or otherwise stripped of his authority, that may change how OpenAI weighs danger against speed of progress.

Is OpenAI sitting on another breakthrough?

During a panel discussion just days before Altman lost his job as CEO, he told a tantalizing story about the current state of the company’s AI research. A couple of weeks earlier, he had been in the room when members of his technical staff had pushed “the frontier of discovery forward,” he said. Altman declined to offer more details, unless you count additional metaphors, but he did mention that only four times since the company’s founding had he witnessed an advance of such magnitude.

During the feverish weekend of speculation that followed Altman’s firing, it was natural to wonder whether this discovery had spooked OpenAI’s safety-minded board members. We do know that in the weeks preceding Altman’s firing, company researchers raised concerns about a new “Q*” algorithm. Had the AI spontaneously figured out quantum gravity? Not exactly. According to reports, it had only solved simple mathematical problems, but it may have accomplished this by reasoning from first principles. OpenAI hasn’t yet released any official information about this discovery, if it is even right to think of it as a discovery. “As you can imagine, I can’t really talk about that,” Altman told me recently when I asked him about Q*. Perhaps the company will have more to say, or show, in the new year.

Does Google have an ace in the hole?

When OpenAI released its large-language-model chatbot in November 2022, Google was caught flat-footed. The company had invented the transformer architecture that makes LLMs possible, but its engineers had clearly fallen behind. Bard, Google’s answer to ChatGPT, was second-rate.

Many expected OpenAI’s leapfrog to be temporary. Google has a war chest that is surpassed only by Apple’s and Microsoft’s, world-class computing infrastructure, and storehouses of potential training data. It also has DeepMind, a London-based AI lab that the company acquired in 2014. The lab developed the AIs that bested world champions at chess and Go and intuited protein-folding secrets that nature had previously concealed from scientists. Its researchers recently claimed that another AI they developed is suggesting novel solutions to long-standing problems of mathematical theory. Google had at first allowed DeepMind to operate relatively independently, but earlier this year, it merged the lab with Google Brain, its homegrown AI group. People expected big things.

Then months and months went by without Google so much as announcing a release date for its next-generation LLM, Gemini. The delays could be taken as a sign that the company’s culture of innovation has stagnated. Or maybe Google’s slowness is a sign of its ambition? The latter possibility seems less likely now that Gemini has finally been released and does not appear to be revolutionary. Barring a surprise breakthrough in 2024, doubts about the company—and the LLM paradigm—will continue.

Are large language models already topping out?

Some of the novelty has worn off LLM-powered software in the mold of ChatGPT. That’s partly because of our own psychology. “We adapt quite quickly,” OpenAI’s Sutskever once told me. He asked me to think about how rapidly the field has changed. “If you go back four or five or six years, the things we are doing right now are utterly unimaginable,” he said. Maybe he’s right. A decade ago, many of us dreaded our every interaction with Siri, with its halting, interruptive style. Now we have bots that converse fluidly about almost any subject, and we struggle to remain impressed.

AI researchers have told us that these tools will only get smarter; they’ve evangelized about the raw power of scale. They’ve said that as we pump more data into LLMs, fresh wonders will emerge from them, unbidden. We were told to prepare to worship a new sand god, so named because its cognition would run on silicon, which is made of melted-down sand.

ChatGPT has certainly improved since it was first released. It can talk now, and analyze images. Its answers are sharper, and its user interface feels more organic. But it’s not improving at a rate that suggests that it will morph into a deity. Altman has said that OpenAI has begun developing its GPT-5 model. That may not come out in 2024, but if it does, we should have a better sense of how much more intelligent language models can become.

How will AI affect the 2024 election?

Our political culture hasn’t yet fully sorted AI issues into neatly polarized categories. A majority of adults profess to worry about AI’s impact on their daily life, but those worries aren’t coded red or blue. That’s not to say the generative-AI moment has been entirely innocent of American politics. Earlier this year, executives from companies that make chatbots and image generators testified before Congress and participated in tedious White House roundtables. Many AI products are also now subject to an expansive executive order.

But we haven’t had a big national election since these technologies went mainstream, much less one involving Donald Trump. Many blamed the spread of lies through social media for enabling Trump’s victory in 2016, and for helping him gin up a conspiratorial insurrection following his 2020 defeat. But the tools of misinformation that were used in those elections were crude compared with those that will be available next year.

A shady campaign operative could, for instance, quickly and easily conjure a convincing picture of a rival candidate sharing a laugh with Jeffrey Epstein. If that doesn’t do the trick, they could whip up images of poll workers stuffing ballot boxes on Election Night, perhaps from an angle that obscures their glitchy, six-fingered hands. There are reasons to believe that these technologies won’t have a material effect on the election. Earlier this year, my colleague Charlie Warzel argued that people may be fooled by low-stakes AI images—the pope in a puffer coat, for example—but they tend to be more skeptical of highly sensitive political images. Let’s hope he’s right.

Soundfakes, too, could be in the mix. A politician’s voice can now be cloned by AI and used to generate offensive clips. President Joe Biden and former President Trump have been public figures for so long—and voters’ perceptions of them are so fixed—that they may be resistant to such an attack. But a lesser-known candidate could be vulnerable to a fake audio recording. Imagine if during Barack Obama’s first run for the presidency, cloned audio of him criticizing white people in colorful language had emerged just days before the vote. Until bad actors experiment with these image and audio generators in the heat of a hotly contested election, we won’t know exactly how they’ll be misused, and whether their misuses will be effective. A year from now, we’ll have our answer.

The Colorado Supreme Court Decision Is True Originalism

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 12 › colorado-supreme-court-decision-originalism-trump › 676934

However troubling its political implications might be, the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling on Tuesday that Donald Trump is disqualified from the state’s primary ballot for having “engaged in insurrection” demonstrates that the judicial system is still functioning in the United States. The reason is straightforward: The court applied the plain language of the Constitution, doing its job with clarity and fidelity to the rule of law.

But perhaps what is most striking about Colorado’s decision was the conservative reasoning the justices employed to reach their conclusion. The four justices who voted in the majority adhered to three stalwart principles of judicial conservatism: textualism (by which judges endeavor to strictly apply the plain text of the Constitution), originalism (by which they refer to historical sources for a contemporaneous understanding of that text), and federalism (by which judges take pains to respect the dual sovereignty of the states alongside the federal government as well as the state courts’ concomitant prerogative to construe their own laws).

This third element is perhaps the most interesting. The Colorado Supreme Court was tasked with interpreting Colorado’s Uniform Election Code of 1992, which contains that state’s criteria for getting on its presidential ballot. It determined that disqualification under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is also disqualifying under Colorado law. And it upheld the lower court’s conclusion, after a multiday evidentiary hearing, that Donald Trump in fact engaged in insurrection. Because he is thus disqualified as a matter of Colorado law, the Colorado Supreme Court determined, “it would be a wrongful act under the Election Code for the Secretary [of State] to list him as a candidate on the presidential primary ballot.”

[George T. Conway III: The Colorado ruling changed my mind]

The U.S. Supreme Court has ignored this sort of reasoning before—and to ill effect. In Bush v. Gore, it ruled in 2000 that manual recounts under Florida’s law regarding contested election results would violate the Constitution’s equal-protection clause, and thus effectively handed the election to George W. Bush by a margin of 537 votes. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens emphasized that “when questions arise about the meaning of state laws, including election laws, it is our settled practice to accept the opinions of the highest courts of the States as providing the final answers.” The conservative justices of today’s Court should bear this example in mind—and the stakes for the Court’s legitimacy—when considering whether the Colorado court got this aspect of its interpretation right.

Next, consider the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which belies a handful of textual ambiguities: What is “insurrection” (and did January 6 qualify)? What does “engaged” mean (and did Trump do it)? And is the president of the United States an “officer” of the United States covered by Section 3? As for the first two questions, President Joe Biden summed things up yesterday, calling it “self-evident” that Trump “supported” an insurrection. Nobody seriously contends otherwise. The rebuttal instead is that Section 3 kicks in only if a jury makes these findings beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to a federal statute that criminalizes insurrections (and which Special Counsel Jack Smith declined to invoke in indicting Trump)—an argument that one of the dissenting justices made as well.

The Colorado Supreme Court elegantly dispensed with that concern. Again, it applied a plain reading of the law, concluding that Congress’s decision to criminalize “the same conduct that is disqualifying under Section Three … cannot be read to mean that only those charged and convicted of violating the law are constitutionally disqualified from holding office without assuming a great deal of meaning not present in the text or the law.” Neither the Constitution nor the statute say anything of the sort. The court thus refused to go where it needn’t by theorizing about inferences buried beneath the plain text, which is precisely how conservative judging, at least in theory, is supposed to work.

On the officer question, the Colorado Supreme Court focused on the Constitution as written, noting that it “refers to the Presidency as an ‘Office’ twenty-five times,” including in connection with the natural-born-citizen eligibility requirement for the presidency (Article II, Section 5), the four-year cap on presidential terms in office (also in Article II, Section 5), and the impeachment clause (Article I, Section 3). It then turned to tools of originalism, observing, for example, that “dictionaries from the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification define ‘office’ as a ‘particular duty, charge or trust conferred by public authority, and for a public purpose,’ that is ‘undertaken by … authority from government or those who administer it.’” The court then reasonably concluded that “the Presidency falls comfortably within these definitions.” Judges make these kinds of interpretative decisions all the time.

Serious constitutional scholars have nonetheless pushed back on the notion that Section 3 applies to presidents, underscoring that prior drafts of Section 3 included references to “the office of the President” but that the language was ultimately abandoned. According to this argument, the framers of Section 3 intended only to prevent insurrectionists from serving in the Electoral College, but left qualified electors free to choose insurrectionists for the presidency. But those distinctions are missing from the actual text. As the conservative scholars William Baude and Michael Stokes Paulsen argued in an exhaustive article, “The substantive terms of Section Three’s prohibition are not themselves difficult or inscrutable.” Even more to the point: Jurists differ over what tools of constitutional interpretation are paramount in construing arcane constitutional terms. The political right, for example, has long assailed progressive judges for emphasizing the purposes behind a law when a plain-text reading would arguably suffice. For conservative justices to abandon that hierarchy now, on a case this consequential, would destroy whatever guise of impartiality the Court has left.

[David Frum: The Colorado Supreme Court just gave Republicans a chance to save themselves]

If the U.S. Supreme Court winds up leaving the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision undisturbed, it will inevitably get GOP voters and politicians very upset with the justices in the majority. It could also encourage states to play fast and loose with Section 3 to keep legitimate candidates off future ballots. But the threat of political retribution is just the sort of possibility that motivated the Framers of the original Constitution to give federal judges lifetime appointments under Article III—they needn’t think about the popularity of their decisions. Moreover, the ostensible point of the so-called conservative judicial philosophies of textualism, originalism, and federalism is to confine judges to the business of judging. That means resolving, on the narrowest possible grounds, discrete disputes affecting the immediate parties, at least one of whom is concretely injured by the other—rather than wading into political or normative policy conundrums in ways that aggrandize their own power relative to that of the other branches of government. If the purportedly conservative members of the U.S. Supreme Court are intellectually honest about their jurisprudential approach to the law, this case should not be hard.