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Joe Biden

The Solar-Panel Backlash Is Here

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › science › archive › 2023 › 10 › solar-power-duck-curve-waste › 675842

In Los Angeles, where I live, the rites of autumn can feel alien. Endless blue skies and afternoon highs near 90 degrees linger long after Griffith Park opens its Haunted Hayride. When the highs dip toward more seasonably appropriate numbers, they’ll be accompanied by one of California’s unfortunate traditions: wasted clean energy.

During the fall and spring, cloudless afternoons produce a spike in solar power at a time when milder temperatures necessitate less air-conditioning. When that happens, the state’s solar farms make more energy than the state can use, and some panels are simply turned off. This maddening problem—a result of what energy wonks call the “duck curve”—has been getting worse as the amount of available solar power outpaces the state’s ability to move that power around. In early 2017, just more than 3 percent of the state’s solar was wasted this way. The total reached 6 percent by 2022, according to California’s grid operator, and 15 percent in the early afternoons of March 2021. Wind power also can be wasted if the weather is especially breezy, and California’s combined curtailment of wind and solar set a new record this April.

Now the state has punted this dilemma to its residents. In December, the California Public Utilities Commission voted to slash the amount of money homeowners with new solar panels can make from “net metering,” the practice of selling your own extra solar back to the power company. Because the math for buying new panels is less favorable, fewer Californians are installing them, according to the Los Angeles Times. Many sunny rooftops that could generate clean energy simply won’t.

California is outpacing the rest of the country in the energy transition, but its misadventures in solar are going national. Moving away from fossil fuels requires a huge expansion of renewable energy in America. One government report estimated that meeting Joe Biden’s goal of supplying half of the country’s energy with solar would mean doubling America’s capacity annually until 2025—and then quadrupling it annually through 2030. But without better ways to transport that solar power or store it for later, California and several other states are already turning off perfectly good solar panels and clawing back incentives that entice Americans to install their own. Far more of America’s sunny potential is about to go to waste.

A little clean-energy wastage is inevitable, Carey King, the assistant director of the University of Texas at Austin’s Energy Institute, told me. Such is the very imperfect nature of integrating unpredictable renewables onto a power grid built for the predictability of fossil fuels. Compared with an inflexible coal or gas plant, solar panels are easier to turn off and on, so they are first to be cut during times of energy surplus. Ideally, we could stash away sun power and use it to light up the skyline at night, but that would require a build-out of big batteries that is still in early stages. Excess solar can be moved to less sun-soaked places to help them burn fewer fossil fuels, but electricity doesn’t just teleport from sunny Palm Springs to drizzly Portland. Moving it across long distances requires heavy-duty power lines and navigating the bureaucracies of various agencies that operate them.

Take Texas: The state’s famously independent power grid has relatively few interconnections with neighboring systems to send spare renewable energy elsewhere. When Texas started making a big push toward renewables in the 2000s, King said, the state began turning off solar panels and wind turbines, and slowing the construction of new ones because it lacked enough so-called transmission lines capable of zipping renewable energy from windy West Texas to the big cities in the east. A state-mandated power-line expansion solved the problem then. Now, as Texas’s total wind-energy capacity leapt from 10 gigawatts in 2010 to 40 gigawatts by 2022, those new wires have reached their limit. In 2022, Texas wasted 5 percent of the wind and 9 percent of the solar energy it could have created. Without another big fix to the grid, those numbers could jump to 13 percent of wind and 19 percent of solar by 2035.

Across the country, clean energy is similarly hemmed in by the limits of transmission lines. Existing plants can’t get all their electricity where it needs to go, because there aren’t enough power lines for them to thrive, says Timothy Hade, the co-founder of Scale Microgrid Solutions, which builds clean-energy systems for homes and businesses. The Biden administration has pledged billions to modernize the grid and expand high-voltage transmission lines, but actually building them is very, very, very hard. As Robinson Meyer wrote in The Atlantic last year, “If you want to build new transmission, then you need to win the approval of every state, county, city, and in some cases, landowner along the proposed route.”

[Read: Unfortunately, I care about power lines now]

The Herculean task of building new transmission lines wasn’t such a pressing issue before the rise of renewable energy. But now solar power is so pervasive that parts of the country have no choice but to turn down the supply. Although that could take the form of fewer industrial-size wind and solar plants coming to fruition, the other option is giving a cold shoulder to people who have their own solar panels and sell it back to the power company through net metering. After all, net metering can create lots of power: California gets more than 15 percent of its energy from big solar farms and roughly 10 percent from residential rooftop panels, according to the EIA.

Like California, other states are choosing the second option. Indiana phased out net metering, and in North Carolina, solar advocates are now suing the state for allowing its giant utility, Duke Energy, to force a minimum monthly bill upon its customers and adjust net metering in a way the advocates say will reduce payouts. Arizona is considering cutting payments for homemade solar, as is Madison Gas and Electric in Wisconsin, according to Energy News Network. A few other close calls show the perilous state of net metering: This year, it has so far survived in New Hampshire, barely, when utilities backed the practice at the last moment. Last year, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis vetoed a bill that would have ended the practice and hit home-solar users with extra fees.

That isn’t to say that the clampdown has happened everywhere. Texas, for example, has allowed Tesla to set up a “virtual power plant” so that people with Elon Musk’s solar panels and batteries can make gobs of money selling back energy whenever they have extra. And there are legitimate fears about using this method as a way to grow the country’s solar supply. Hade calls net metering a “blunt instrument”—too crude an approach for the complex energy system of the future. One major problem is that solar-panel owners tend to be far richer than the average American but don’t pay their fair share for the upkeep of the electrical grid, which is built into the price the power company charges everybody else. The more houses that have rooftop solar, the argument goes, the more that people without solar must pay to maintain all the infrastructure that everyone needs. “Net metering can’t be the end-all solution as we go forward,” King said. “It’s just going to create a little bit too much disparity.”

The growing backlash against net metering isn’t just a response to wasted solar power—it’s also about for-profit power companies wary of rooftop solar panels that don’t make them money. The idea of turning homes, apartment buildings, and businesses with solar panels into mini power plants is a potentially transformative one—and net metering is a big part of how people can afford solar panels in the first place. Solar panels can cost upwards of $10,000, and in California, the extra cash from net metering has helped residents recoup the expensive cost of panels in five to six years. Now it will take up to 15 years, according to one analysis.

In that way, America will end up squandering more potential clean energy down the line. Fewer than 10 percent of U.S. homes have installed solar panels so far. The rest constitutes an enormous swath of untapped real estate—billions of square meters of sun-drenched rectangles that could be making clean energy. Incentives for solar energy still exist from states and the federal government, but the result of slowing down net metering is that residents will put on smaller solar panels that make only enough energy for their own use, Hade told me, because they can’t make much money selling their bonus juice. Or they won’t get solar at all.

The squeeze on homemade solar is a missed opportunity in the making. A retreat from net metering makes solar-panel owners less like mini power plants and more like doomsday preppers, perhaps filling the backup battery in the basement with electricity to get through a blackout but adding nothing to the country’s clean-energy supply. With a more nuanced form of net metering to allow people to sell their surplus, or with the advent of “microgrids” that tie together communities and allow them to share energy, American rooftops could contribute gigawatts toward running the country on clean energy. Such a DIY approach would be a way around our inability to build new power lines, but it is deeply at odds with the way America has operated for a century, and will seemingly operate for many more years to come: The power company sends you the power, and you use it.

Stop Asking Americans in Diners About Foreign Aid

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › newsletters › archive › 2023 › 10 › the-diner-trap › 675841

This is an edition of The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here.

Americans don’t understand foreign aid. Instead of relying on misinformed citizens, we should demand better answers from national leaders who want to cut aid to our friends and allies and imperil American security.

First, here are four new stories from The Atlantic:

Nasal congestion is far weirder than you might think. What Matthew Perry knew about comedy Capitalism has plans for menopause. What financial engineering does to hospitals

Persistent Foreign-Aid Myths

The Washington Post sent a reporter to a diner in Shreveport, Louisiana, last week to talk with voters in the district represented by the new speaker of the House, Mike Johnson. And wouldn’t you know it, they were very happy to see him become speaker, including one voter in the diner who—imagine the luck—just happened to be Mike Johnson’s mother. “God did this,” Jeanne Johnson said of her son’s ascension to the speakership.

I have my doubts about God’s participation in American elections, but she’s a proud mom, and understandably so. She told the reporter that Johnson “began leading as a child,” stepping up at a young age to help the family. That’s nice; my mom, God rest her soul, used to say nice things about me too.

The rest of the article included predictable discussions with the local burghers who hope we can finally overcome all this nastiness in our politics—there is no apparent awareness of how all that unpleasantness got started—and get to work and solve problems under the leadership of an obviously swell guy. (In fact, we are told he even calmed an angry voter at a town hall. Amazing.) Johnson, of course, also voted to overturn the 2020 presidential election, and has many views that would have been considered retrograde by most Americans even 30 years ago, but gosh darn it, people in Shreveport sure seem to like him.

I remain astonished that so much of the media remain committed to covering Donald Trump and sedition-adjacent extremists such as Johnson as if they are normal American politicians. But while Americans pretend that all is well, the rest of the world is busily going about its terrifying business, which is why one comment in the Post article jumped out at me.

“Politics here is personal,” according to Celeste Gauthier, 45. (The Post, for some reason, notes that Gauthier attended Middlebury College for a time—perhaps as a clumsy way of trying to tell us she’s not merely some rough local, and that she returned from Vermont to help run her family’s three restaurants.) She is concerned:

“People really do look at the funding we’re sending to Israel and Ukraine and say, ‘I can’t afford to go to Kroger,’” Gauthier said as she sat amid the lunchtime crowd, some of whom she said had stopped buying beverages because of the cost. “A lot of these customers know Mike Johnson and think we often get overlooked and maybe we won’t anymore,” she said.

I’m not sure what it means to be “overlooked” in a cherry-red district in a state where, as the Post notes, Republicans will control all three branches of state government once the conservative governor-elect is sworn in, but the comment about foreign aid is a classic expression of how little people understand about the subject.

Perhaps Gauthier or others believe that the new speaker—who has been opposed to sending aid to Ukraine—would redirect the money back to “overlooked” Louisianans, maybe as increased aid to the poor. He wouldn’t, of course, as he has already proposed huge cuts in social spending. As for Israel, evangelical Christians such as Johnson have a special interest in Israel for their own eschatological reasons, and Johnson has already decided to decouple aid to Israel from aid to Ukraine. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell—whose understanding of foreign policy is practically Churchillian compared with Johnson’s—is none too happy about that.

Let’s review some important realities.

First, foreign aid is about 1 percent of the U.S. budget, roughly $60 billion. Special appropriations to Ukraine have, over the course of 18 months, added up to about $75 billion, including both humanitarian aid and weapons. Israel—a far smaller country that has, over the past 70 years, cumulatively received more foreign aid from the United States than from any other country—usually gets about $3 billion, but Joe Biden now wants to add about $14 billion to that.

That’s a lot of money. To put it in perspective, however, Americans forked over about $181 billion annually on snacks, and $115 billion for beer last year. (They also shell out about $7 billion annually just for potato chips. The snack spending is increasing, perhaps because Americans now spend about $30 billion on legal marijuana every year.) Americans also ante up a few bucks here and there on legal sports gambling, and by “a few” I mean more than $220 billion over the past five years.

I know suds and weed and sports books and pretzels are more fun than helping Ukrainians stay alive. And I know, too, that supposedly small-government conservatives will answer: It’s none of your damn business what Americans are spending their money on.

They’re right—up to a point. But we are, in theory, adults who can establish sensible priorities. We pay taxes so that the federal government can do things that no other level of government can achieve, and national security is one of them. Right now, the Russian army—the greatest threat to NATO in Europe—is taking immense losses on a foreign battlefield for a total investment that (as of this moment) is less than one-tenth of the amount we spend on defense in a single year. This is the spending Mike Johnson is so worried about?

Of course, we might repeat one more time that much of the food and weapons and other goods America sends to places like Israel and Ukraine are actually made by Americans. And yet many Republican leaders (and their propaganda arm at Fox and other outlets) continue to talk about aid as if some State Department phantom in a trench coat meets the president of Ukraine or the prime minister of Israel in an alley and hands over a metal briefcase filled with neatly wrapped stacks of bills.

We need to stop asking people in diners about foreign aid. (Populists who demand that we rely on guidance from The People should remember that most Americans think foreign aid should be about 10 percent of the budget—a percentage those voters think would be a reduction but would actually be a massive increase.) Instead, put our national leaders on the spot to explain what they think foreign aid is, where it goes, and what it does, and then call them out, every time, when they spin fantasies about it. Otherwise, legislators such as Johnson will be able to sit back and let the folks at the pie counter believe that he’s going to round up $75 billion and send it back home.

That’s an old and dumb trope, but it works. If you’re a Republican in Congress, and if you can stay in Washington by convincing people at the diner that you’re going to take cash from Ukrainians (wherever they are) and give it back to the hardworking waitress pouring your coffee, then you do it—because in this new GOP, your continued presence in Washington is more important than anything, including the security of the United States.

Related:

Yes, the U.S. can afford to help its allies. Why the GOP extremists oppose Ukraine

Today’s News

Israel began its ground offensive in Gaza over the weekend. Tanks and troops continue to push deeper into the city. A trial began in Colorado over whether Donald Trump is ineligible to hold presidential office again under the Fourteenth Amendment. Russian protesters in the largely Muslim-populated area of Dagestan marched on an airport, surrounding a plane that had arrived from Tel Aviv, on Sunday; at least 10 people were injured.

Dispatches

Work in Progress: There’s a secretive industry devouring the U.S. economy, Rogé Karma writes. It’s made one-fifth of the market effectively invisible to investors, the media, and regulators.

Explore all of our newsletters here.

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Culture Break

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P.S.

Back in February, I wrote that I was somewhat mystified when Nikki Haley entered the GOP primaries. I was never a fan of the South Carolina governor, because I reject any candidate who bent the knee to Donald Trump. I described her announcement of her candidacy as “vapid and weightless,” and I expected her campaign to be no better. I assumed that she would be gone early.

Was I wrong? Haley was strong in the GOP debates (such that they were without Trump) and is now surging ahead of the hapless Ron DeSantis as the most credible Trump alternative. My friend Michael Strain today even presented “The Case for Nikki Haley” in National Review, a magazine that up until now has been a DeSantis stronghold. I remain convinced that Haley cannot beat Trump, even if she would be more formidable against Biden than either Trump or DeSantis. But I was too quick off the blocks in my assumption that Haley was going to get bigfooted off the stage by other candidates. Of course, I also didn’t predict that Vivek Ramaswamy would be on that same stage and that he would claim the early prize for “most obnoxious GOPer not named Trump.” I’m a creative guy, but there are limits even to my imagination.

— Tom

In an eight-week limited series, The Atlantic’s leading thinkers on AI will help you wrap your mind around the dawn of a new machine age. Sign up for the Atlantic Intelligence newsletter to receive the first edition next week.

Katherine Hu contributed to this newsletter.

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The Order That Defines the Future of AI in America

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2023 › 10 › biden-white-house-ai-executive-order › 675837

Earlier today, President Joe Biden signed the most sweeping set of regulatory principles on artificial intelligence in America to date: a lengthy executive order that directs all types of government agencies to make sure America is leading the way in developing the technology while also addressing the many dangers that it poses. The order explicitly pushes agencies to establish rules and guidelines, write reports, and create funding and research initiatives for AI—“the most consequential technology of our time,” in the president’s own words.

The scope of the order is impressive, especially given that the generative-AI boom began just about a year ago. But the document’s many parts—and there are many—are at times in tension, revealing a broader confusion over what, exactly, America’s primary attitude toward AI should be: Is it a threat to national security, or a just society? Is it a geopolitical weapon? Is it a way to help people?

The Biden administration has answered “all of the above,” demonstrating a belief that the technology will soon be everywhere. “This is a big deal,” Alondra Nelson, a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study who previously served as acting director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, told us. AI will be “as ubiquitous as operating systems in our cellphones,” Nelson said, which means that regulating it will involve “the whole policy space itself.” That very scale almost necessitates ambivalence, and it is as if the Biden administration has taken into account conflicting views without deciding on one approach.

One section of the order adopts wholesale the talking points of a handful of influential AI companies such as OpenAI and Google, while others center the concerns of workers, vulnerable and underserved communities, and civil-rights groups most critical of Big Tech. The order also makes clear that the government is concerned that AI will exacerbate misinformation, privacy violations, and copyright infringement. Even as it heeds the recommendations of Big AI, the order additionally outlines approaches to support smaller AI developers and researchers. And there are plenty of nods toward the potential benefits of the technology as well: AI, the executive order notes, has the “potential to solve some of society’s most difficult challenges.” It could be a boon for small businesses and entrepreneurs, create new categories of employment, develop new medicines, improve health care, and much more.  

If the document reads like a smashing-together of papers written by completely different groups, that’s because it likely is. The president and vice president have held meetings with AI-company executives, civil-rights leaders, and consumer advocates to discuss regulating the technology, and the Biden administration published a Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights before the launch of ChatGPT last November. That document called for advancing civil rights, racial justice, and privacy protections, among other things. Today’s executive order cites and expands that earlier proposal—it directly addresses AI’s demonstrated ability to contribute to discrimination in contexts such as health care and hiring, the risks of using AI in sentencing and policing, and more. These issues existed long before the arrival of generative AI, a subcategory of artificial intelligence that creates new—or at least compellingly remixed—material based on training data, but those older AI programs stir the collective imagination less than ChatGPT, with its alarmingly humanlike language.

[Read: The future of AI is GOMA]

The executive order, then, is naturally fixated to a great extent on the kind of ultrapowerful and computationally intensive software that underpins that newer technology. At particular issue are so-called dual-use foundation models, which have also been called “frontier AI” models—a term for future generations of the technology with supposedly devastating potential. The phrase was popularized by many of the companies that intend to build these models, and chunks of the executive order match the regulatory framing that these companies have recommended. One influential policy paper from this summer, co-authored in part by staff at OpenAI and Google DeepMind, suggested defining frontier-AI models as including those that would make designing biological or chemical weapons easier, those that would be able to evade human control “through means of deception and obfuscation,” and those that are trained above a threshold of computational power. The executive order uses almost exactly the same language and the same threshold.

A senior administration official speaking to reporters framed the sprawling nature of the document as a feature, not a bug. “AI policy is like running a decathlon,” the official said. “We don’t have the luxury of just picking, of saying, ‘We’re just going to do safety,’ or ‘We’re just going to do equity,’ or ‘We’re just going to do privacy.’ We have to do all of these things.” After all, the order has huge “signaling power,” Suresh Venkatasubramanian, a computer-science professor at Brown University who helped co-author the earlier AI Bill of Rights, told us. “I can tell you Congress is going to look at this, states are going to look at this, governors are going to look at this.”

Anyone looking at the order for guidance will come away with a mixed impression of the technology—which has about as many possible uses as a book has possible subjects—and likely also confusion about what the president decided to focus on or omit. The order spends quite a lot of words detailing how different agencies should prepare to address the theoretical impact of AI on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, a framing drawn directly from the policy paper supported by OpenAI and Google. In contrast, the administration spends far fewer on the use of AI in education, a massive application for the technology that is already happening. The document acknowledges the role that AI can play in boosting resilience against climate change—such as by enhancing grid reliability and enabling clean-energy deployment, a common industry talking point—but it doesn’t once mention the enormous energy and water resources required to develop and deploy large AI models, nor the carbon emissions they produce. And it discusses the possibility of using federal resources to support workers whose jobs may be disrupted by AI but does not mention workers who are arguably exploited by the AI economy: for example, people who are paid very little to manually give feedback to chatbots.

[Read: America already has an AI underclass]

International concerns are also a major presence in the order. Among the most aggressive actions the order takes is directing the secretary of commerce to propose new regulations that would require U.S. cloud-service providers, such as Microsoft and Google, to notify the government if foreign individuals or entities who use their services start training large AI models that could be used for malicious purposes. The order also directs the secretary of state and the secretary of homeland security to streamline visa approval for AI talent, and urges several other agencies, including the Department of Defense, to prepare recommendations for streamlining the approval process for noncitizens with AI expertise seeking to work within national labs and access classified information.

Where the surveillance of foreign entities is an implicit nod to the U.S.’s fierce competition with and concerns about China in AI development, China is also the No. 1 source of foreign AI talent in the U.S. In 2019, 27 percent of top-tier U.S.-based AI researchers received their undergraduate education in China, compared with 31 percent who were educated in the U.S, according to a study from Macro Polo, a Chicago-based think tank that studies China’s economy. The document, in other words, suggests actions against foreign agents developing AI while underscoring the importance of international workers to the development of AI in the U.S.

[Read: The new AI panic]

The order’s international focus is no accident; it is being delivered right before a major U.K. AI Safety Summit this week, where Vice President Kamala Harris will be delivering a speech on the administration’s vision for AI. Unlike the U.S.’s broad approach, or that of the EU’s AI Act, the U.K. has been almost entirely focused on those frontier models—“a fairly narrow lane,” Nelson told us. In contrast, the U.S. executive order considers a full range of AI and automated decision-making technologies, and seeks to balance national security, equity, and innovation. The U.S. is trying to model a different approach to the world, she said.

The Biden administration is likely also using the order to make a final push on its AI-policy positions before the 2024 election consumes Washington and a new administration potentially comes in, Paul Triolo, an associate partner for China and a technology-policy lead at the consulting firm Albright Stonebridge, told us. The document expects most agencies to complete their tasks before the end of this term. The resulting reports and regulatory positions could shape any AI legislation brewing in Congress, which will likely take much longer to pass, and preempt a potential Trump administration that, if the past is any indication, may focus its AI policy almost exclusively on America’s global competitiveness.

Still, given that only 11 months have passed since the release of ChatGPT, and its upgrade to GPT-4 came less than five months after that, many of those tasks and timelines appear somewhat vague and distant. The order gives 180 days for the secretaries of defense and homeland security to complete a cybersecurity pilot project, 270 days for the secretary of commerce to launch an initiative to create guidance in another area, 365 days for the attorney general to submit a report on something else. The senior administration official told reporters that a newly formed AI Council among the agency heads, chaired by Bruce Reed, a White House deputy chief of staff, would ensure that each agency makes progress at a steady clip. Once the final deadline passes, perhaps the federal government’s position on AI will have crystallized.

But perhaps its stance and policies cannot, or even should not, settle. Like the internet itself, artificial intelligence is a capacious technology that could be developed, and deployed, in a dizzying combination of ways; Congress is still trying to figure out how copyright and privacy laws, as well as the First Amendment, apply to the decades-old web, and every few years the terms of those regulatory conversations seem to shift again.

A year ago, few people could have imagined how chatbots and image generators would change the basic way we think about the internet’s effects on elections, education, labor, or work; only months ago, the deployment of AI in search engines seemed like a fever dream. All of that, and much more in the nascent AI revolution, has begun in earnest. The executive order’s internal conflict over, and openness to, different values and approaches to AI may have been inevitable, then—the result of an attempt to chart a path for a technology when nobody has a reliable map of where it’s going.

Where Is Mike Johnson’s Ironclad Oath?

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 10 › the-oath-mike-johnsons-great-great-great-grandfather-had-to-take › 675792

On August 16, 1867, a young farmer named Alfred McDonald Sargent Johnson walked into the courthouse of Cherokee County, Georgia. He had an oath to swear.

The effects of the Civil War were still visible in Canton, a village of about 200 people and the county seat. For one thing, that makeshift courthouse was inside a Presbyterian church—its predecessor having been torched by William Tecumseh Sherman’s men shortly before their march to the sea. For another, Georgia was still under military rule as federal officials debated how best to reconstruct the former Confederate states. How does a government reintegrate the men who, not that long ago, were engaged in a treasonous rebellion?

[Read: Elon Musk’s anti-semitc apartheid-loving grandfather]

Johnson had, like many of his neighbors, taken up arms against the United States. At age 21, he’d joined Company F of the 3rd Georgia Cavalry. The Third had fought in the Chickamauga and Chattanooga campaigns, and Johnson had even been captured as a Union prisoner at New Haven, Kentucky. But he was just a foot soldier in a much larger war. Johnson had not grown up in a stereotypical plantation “big house”; his family’s farm was modest in size and census records do not list him or his father as having owned slaves. He ended the conflict as a private, just as he’d entered it. Johnson might not even have cared much for his war experience; Confederate records list him as having gone AWOL for a period in 1863.

Still, the federal government had decided that even men like him could not return to political power without making at least a gesture of reconciliation. A few months earlier, Congress had passed, over President Andrew Johnson’s veto, an act that required the men of Georgia and other southern states to swear an oath in order to regain their voting privileges. That oath was why Alfred M. S. Johnson was in the courthouse that August day.

There had been much debate in the North, during the war and after it, about how to reintegrate former Confederates into political life—and how forgiving to be of their rebellion. The most radical Republicans wanted to require an “Ironclad Oath” swearing that the prospective voter had “never voluntarily borne arms against the United States” nor given “aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement” to the Confederacy. Such language would have disenfranchised most white southern men.

The Wade-Davis Bill of 1864 would have required a majority of white men in each state to take the Ironclad Oath before full readmission to the union. Lincoln pocket-vetoed that bill, considering it too harsh. He’d backed a much more lenient plan requiring only 10 percent of a state’s pre-war voters to swear an oath before that state could be readmitted. And his version was more forgiving than the Ironclad Oath, requiring only future loyalty—that they would “henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Union of the States thereunder.”

The oath Alfred Johnson would take had been defined in Congress’ Reconstruction Acts, and it was closer to Lincoln’s than to the Ironclad Oath. Like Lincoln’s, it treated the leaders of the Confederacy with less mercy than it did enlisted men. Johnson had to swear that he had:

never been a member of any State Legislature, nor held any executive or judicial office in any State and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof;

that I have never taken an oath as a member of Congress of the United States, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof;

that I will faithfully support the Constitution and obey the laws of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, encourage others so to do.

So help me God.

Johnson had never been a state legislator, or a federal judge, or a member of Congress, so it would not have been a particularly difficult oath to take. The rebellion’s leaders would have to wait a bit longer to be allowed back into full political citizenship.

[J. Michael Luttig and Laurence H. Tribe: The constitution prohibits Trump from ever being president again]

The worst class of rebels, the oath seemed to argue, was those who had joined the attempted insurrection after already been elected or appointed to trusted positions of power—the ones that require an oath to support the Constitution. Both Lincoln and President Andrew Johnson had made similar exceptions for public officials who had rebelled, requiring a more difficult route to amnesty. The Fourteenth Amendment, which was then before the states for ratification, made the same distinction—as Donald Trump is now discovering.

Alfred M. S. Johnson went back to farming after that August day. Not long after, he had a son and named him Andrew Johnson—presumably in honor of the man who succeeded Lincoln in the presidency and had pardoned all ex-Confederates by the end of 1868.

Andrew Johnson eventually moved west to Hempstead County, Arkansas. There, he had a son named Garner James Johnson. As a young man, Garner Johnson left farming and moved to Shreveport, Louisiana, taking a job on the Kansas City Southern Railroad. He begat Raymond Ralph Johnson, who begat James Patrick Johnson, who begat James Michael Johnson.

On October 25, 2023, James Michael Johnson—better known as Mike Johnson—was elected the 56th speaker of the House of Representatives.

[Read: A speaker without enemies–for now]

Like his great-great-great-grandfather Alfred, Mike Johnson was part of an attempt to oust the duly elected government of the United States and replace it with one more to his liking. In Alfred’s day, the tools were secession and battle; Johnson’s were spurious claims of voter fraud and trumped-up legal arguments.

After Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump in the 2020 election, Mike Johnson worked hard to prevent the transition of power. In the days after the vote, he told interviewers that the allegations of rigged Dominion voting machines had “a lot of merit,” that there were “credible allegations of fraud and irregularity,” and that a voting system was “suspect because it came from Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela.”

In December 2020, Johnson organized an effort to get his fellow House Republicans to sign on to an amicus brief for a lawsuit challenging election results in the four states that would, if their votes were thrown out, give Trump a second term. He sent them all an email with the subject line “**Time-sensitive request from President Trump**” saying the president would be watching to see which GOP members of Congress signed on and which did not.

About three-quarters of the House Republicans who objected to the Electoral College count on January 6 cited legal arguments Johnson had made, leading The New York Times to call him “the most important architect of the Electoral College objections.” He gave what one fellow Republican member called “a fig-leaf intellectual argument” for overturning the election.

Johnson’s attempts were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court rejected the lawsuit in a brief, unsigned opinion. The 147 Congressional Republicans who, like Johnson, objected to the electoral vote count were outnumbered in the end.

But America was once again forced to ask: What do you do with men after they have fomented a rebellion against an elected government? After the Civil War, the federal response was generally lenient. Among the Confederacy’s top leaders, only Jefferson Davis served prison time, and then for just two years. President Johnson pardoned the overwhelming share of ex-Confederates barely a month after Lincoln’s assassination; he spent the remainder of his presidency pardoning the rest. Within a dozen years, conservative white southerners once again ruled the South—a control often achieved through great violence by former Confederate soldiers.

Mike Johnson didn’t lead a civil war, of course. But he did try to overturn an election and impose a president Americans hadn’t voted for. And it is striking how small the repercussions have been for those who did likewise. For members of Congress, opposing false claims of voter fraud has been much more politically dangerous than supporting them. Kevin McCarthy, Steve Scalise, Jim Jordan, and Tom Emmer each endorsed Johnson’s spurious legal arguments, and each has been nominated for speaker this year. And now, at the mention of Johnson’s actions, the House Republican caucus does little but laugh and boo.

I keep coming back to Alfred McDonald Sargent Johnson, Mike’s great-great-great-grandfather, and the oath he had to take that day in Cherokee County, pledging not to engage in rebellion again. Mike Johnson wasn’t a lowly foot soldier stuck in a war he played no role in starting. He was its architect, its author and finisher. And yet the only oath he’s been asked to take is as speaker of the House of Representatives.

Dean Phillips Is Primarying Joe Biden

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › politics › archive › 2023 › 10 › dean-phillips-joe-biden-2024-primary › 675784

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To spend time around Dean Phillips, as I have since his first campaign for Congress in 2018, is to encounter someone so earnest as to be utterly suspicious. He speaks constantly of joy and beauty and inspiration, beaming at the prospect of entertaining some new perspective. He allows himself to be interrupted often—by friends, family, staffers—but rarely interrupts them, listening patiently with a politeness that almost feels aggravating. With the practiced manners of one raised with great privilege—boasting a net worth he estimates at $50 million—the gentleman from Minnesota is exactly that.

But that courtly disposition cracks, I’ve noticed, when he’s convinced that someone is lying. Maybe it’s because at six months old he lost his father in a helicopter crash that his family believes the military covered up, in a Vietnam War that was sold to the public with tricks and subterfuge. I can hear the anger in his voice as he talks about the treachery that led to January 6, recalling his frantic search for some sort of weapon—he found only a sharpened pencil—to defend himself against the violent masses who were sacking the U.S. Capitol. I can see it in his eyes when Phillips, who is Jewish, remarks that some of his Democratic colleagues have recently spread falsehoods about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and others in the party have refused to condemn blatant anti-Semitism.

Deception is a part of politics. Phillips acknowledges that. But some deceptions are more insidious than others. On the third Saturday of October, as we sat inside the small, sun-drenched living room of his rural-Virginia farmhouse, Phillips told me he was about to do something out of character: He was going to upset some people. He was going to upset some people because he was going to run for president. And he was going to run for president, Phillips explained, because there is one deception he can no longer perpetuate.

“My grave concern,” the congressman said, “is I just don’t think President Biden will beat Donald Trump next November.”

This isn’t some fringe viewpoint within the Democratic Party. In a year’s worth of conversations with other party leaders, Phillips told me, “everybody, without exception,” shares his fear about Joe Biden’s fragility—political and otherwise—as he seeks a second term. This might be hyperbole, but not by much: In my own recent conversations with party officials, it was hard to find anyone who wasn’t jittery about Biden. Phillips’s problem is that they refuse to say so on the record. Democrats claim to view Trump as a singular threat to the republic, the congressman complains, but for reasons of protocol and self-preservation they have been unwilling to go public with their concerns about Biden, making it all the more likely, in Phillips’s view, that the former president will return to office.

[Read: The case for a primary challenge to Joe Biden]

Phillips spent the past 15 months trying to head off such a calamity. He has noisily implored Biden, who turns 81 next month—and would be 86 at the end of a second term—to “pass the torch,” while openly attempting to recruit prominent young Democrats to challenge the president in 2024. He name-dropped some Democratic governors on television and made personal calls to others, urging someone, anyone, to jump into the Democratic race. What he encountered, he thought, was a dangerous dissonance: Some of the president’s allies would tell him, in private conversations, to keep agitating, to keep recruiting, that Biden had no business running in 2024—but that they weren’t in a position to do anything about it.

What made this duplicity especially maddening to Phillips, he told me, is that Democrats have seen its pernicious effects on the other side of the political aisle. For four years during Trump’s presidency, Democrats watched their Republican colleagues belittle Trump behind closed doors, then praise him to their base, creating a mirage of support that ultimately made them captives to the cult of Trumpism. Phillips stresses that there is no equivalence between Trump and Biden. Still, having been elected in 2018 alongside a class of idealistic young Democrats—“the Watergate babies of the Trump era,” Phillips said—he always took great encouragement in the belief that his party would never fall into the trap of elevating people over principles.

“We don’t have time to make this about any one individual. This is about a mission to stop Donald Trump,” Phillips, who is 54, told me. “I’m just so frustrated—I’m growing appalled—by the silence from people whose job it is to be loud.”

Phillips tried to make peace with this. As recently as eight weeks ago, he had quietly resigned himself to Biden’s nomination. The difference now, he said—the reason for his own buzzer-beating run for the presidency—is that Biden’s numbers have gone from bad to awful. Surveys taken since late summer show the president’s approval ratings hovering at or below 40 percent, Trump pulling ahead in the horse race, and sizable majorities of voters, including Democratic voters, wishing the president would step aside. These findings are apparent in district-level survey data collected by Phillips’s colleagues in the House, and have been the source of frenzied intraparty discussion since the August recess. And yet Democrats’ reaction to them, Phillips said, has been to grimace, shrug, and say it’s too late for anything to be done.

“There’s no such thing as too late,” Phillips told me, “until Donald Trump is in the White House again.”

In recent weeks, Phillips has reached out to a wide assortment of party elders. He did this, in part, as a check on his own sanity. He was becoming panicked at the prospect of Trump’s probable return to office. He halfway hoped to be told that he was losing his grip on reality, that Trump Derangement Syndrome had gotten to him. He wanted someone to tell him that everything was going to be fine. Instead, in phone call after phone call, his fears were only exacerbated.

“I’m looking at polling data, and I’m looking at all of it. The president’s numbers are just not good—and they’re not getting any better,” James Carville, the Democratic strategist, told me, summarizing his recent conversations with Phillips. “I talk to a lot of people who do a lot of congressional-level polling and state polling, and they’re all saying the same thing. There’s not an outlier; there’s not another opinion … The question is, has the country made up its mind?”

[From the November 2023 issue: The Kamala Harris problem]

Jim Messina, who ran Barack Obama’s 2012 campaign, told me the answer is no. “This is exactly where we were at this stage of that election cycle,” Messina said. He pointed to the November 6, 2011, issue of The New York Times Magazine, the cover of which read, “So, Is Obama Toast?” Messina called the current situation just another case of bedwetting. “If there was real concern, then you’d have real politicians running,” he said. “I’d never heard of Dean Phillips until a few weeks ago.”

The bottom line, Messina said, is that “Biden’s already beaten Trump once. He’s the one guy who can beat him again.”

Carville struggles with this logic. The White House, he said, “operates with what I call this doctrine of strategic certainty,” arguing that Biden is on the same slow-but-steady trajectory he followed in 2020. “Joe Biden has been counted out by the Beltway insiders, pundits, DC media, and anonymous Washington sources time and time again,” the Biden campaign wrote in a statement. “Time and time again, they have been wrong.” The problem is that 2024 bears little resemblance to 2020: Biden is even older, there is a proliferation of third-party and independent candidates, and the Democratic base, which turned out in record numbers in the last presidential election, appears deflated. (“The most under-covered story in contemporary American politics,” Carville said, “is that Black turnout has been miserable everywhere since 2020.”) Carville added that in his own discussions with leading Democrats, when he argues that Biden’s prospects for reelection have grown bleak, “Nobody is saying, ‘James, you’re wrong,’” he told me. “They’re saying, ‘James, you can’t say that.’”

Hence his fondness for Phillips. “Remember when the Roman Catholic Church convicted Galileo of heresy for saying that the Earth moves around the sun? He said, ‘And yet, it still moves,’” Carville told me, cackling in his Cajun drawl. The truth is, Carville said, Biden’s numbers aren’t moving—and whoever points that out is bound to be treated like a heretic in Democratic circles.

Phillips knows that he’s making a permanent enemy of the party establishment. He realizes that he’s likely throwing away a promising career in Congress; already, a Democratic National Committee member from Minnesota has announced a primary challenge and enlisted the help of leading firms in the St. Paul area to take Phillips out. He told me how, after the news of his impending launch leaked to the press, “a colleague from New Hampshire”—the congressman grinned, as that description narrowed it down to just two people—told him that his candidacy was “not serious” and “offensive” to the state’s voters. In the run-up to his launch, Phillips tried to speak with the president—to convey his respect before entering the race. On Thursday night, he said, the White House got back to him: Biden would not be talking to Phillips.

Cedric Richmond, the onetime Louisiana congressman who is now co-chair of Biden’s reelection campaign, told me Phillips doesn’t “give a crap” about the party and is pursuing “a vanity project” that could result in another Trump presidency. “History tells us when the sitting president faces a primary challenge, it weakens him for the general election,” Richmond said. “No party has ever survived that.”

But Phillips insists—and his friends, even those who think he’s making a crushing mistake, attest—that he is doing this out of genuine conviction. Standing up and leaning across a coffee table inside his living room, Phillips pulled out his phone and recited data from recent surveys. One showed 70 percent of Democrats under 35 wanting a different nominee; another showed swing-state voters siding with Trump over Biden on a majority of policy issues, and independents roundly rejecting “Bidenomics,” the White House branding for the president’s handling of the economy. “These are not numbers that you can massage,” Phillips said. “Look, just because he’s old, that’s not a disqualifier. But being old, in decline, and having numbers that are clearly moving in the wrong direction? It’s getting to red-alert kind of stuff.”

Phillips sat back down. “Someone had to do this,” the congressman told me. “It just was so self-evident.”

If the need to challenge the president is so self-evident, I asked, then why is a third-term congressman from Minnesota the only one willing to do it?

“I think about that every day,” Phillips replied, shaking his head. “If the data is correct, over 50 percent of Democrats want a different nominee—and yet there’s only one out of 260 Democrats in the Congress saying the same thing?”

Phillips no longer wonders if there’s something wrong with him. He believes there’s something wrong with the Democratic Party—a “disease” that discourages competition and shuts down dialogue and crushes dissent. Phillips said his campaign for president won’t simply be about the “generational schism” that pits clinging-to-power Baby Boomers against the rest of the country.  If he’s running, the congressman said, he’s running on all the schisms that divide the Democrats: cultural and ideological, economic and geographic. He intends to tell some “hard truths” about a party that, in its attempt to turn the page on Trump, he argued, has done things to help move him back into the Oval Office. He sounded at times less like a man who wants to win the presidency, and more like someone who wants to draw attention to the decaying state of our body politic.

Over the course of a weekend with Phillips on his farm, we spent hours discussing the twisted incentive structures of America’s governing institutions. He talked about loyalties and blind spots, about how truth takes a back seat to narrative, about how we tell ourselves stories to ignore uncomfortable realities. Time and again, I pressed Phillips on the most uncomfortable reality of all: By running against Biden—by litigating the president’s age and fitness for office in months of town-hall meetings across New Hampshire—isn’t he likely to make a weak incumbent that much weaker, thereby making another Trump presidency all the more likely?

“I want to strengthen him. If it’s not me, I want to strengthen him. I won’t quit until I strengthen him. I mean it,” Phillips said of Biden. “I do not intend to undermine him, demean him, diminish him, attack him, or embarrass him.”

Phillips’s friends tell me his intentions are pure. But they fear that what makes him special—his guileless, romantic approach to politics—could in this case be ruinous for the country. They have warned him about the primary campaigns against George H. W. Bush in 1992 and Jimmy Carter in 1980, both of whom lost in the general election.

Phillips insisted to me that he wouldn’t be running against Biden. Rather, he would be campaigning for the future of the Democratic Party. There was no scenario, he said, in which his candidacy would result in Trump winning back the White House.

And in that moment, it was Dean Phillips who was telling himself a story.

He didn’t see the question coming—but he didn’t try to duck it, either.

It was July of last year. Phillips was doing a regular spot on WCCO radio, a news-talk station in his district, when host Chad Hartman asked the congressman if he wanted Biden to run for reelection in 2024. “No. I don’t,” Phillips replied, while making sure to voice his admiration for the president. “I think the country would be well served by a new generation of compelling, well-prepared, dynamic Democrats to step up.”

Phillips didn’t think much about the comment. After all, he’d run for Congress in 2018 promising not to vote for Nancy Pelosi as speaker of the House (though he ultimately did support her as part of a deal that codified the end of her time in leadership). While he has been a reliable vote in the Democratic caucus—almost always siding with Biden on the House floor—Phillips has simultaneously been a squeaky wheel. He’s a centrist unhappy with what he sees as the party’s coddling of the far left. He’s a Gen Xer convinced that the party’s aging leadership is out of step with the country. He’s an industrialist worried about the party’s hostility toward Big Business. (When he was 3 years old, his mother married the heir of a distilling empire; Phillips took it over in his early 30s, then made his own fortune with the gelato company Talenti.)

When the blowback to the radio interview arrived—with party donors, activists, and officials in both Minnesota and Washington rebuking him as disloyal—Phillips was puzzled. Hadn’t Biden himself said, while campaigning in 2020, that he would be a “bridge” to the future of the Democratic Party? Hadn’t he made that remark flanked by Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer on one side and future Vice President Kamala Harris on the other? Hadn’t he all but promised that his campaign was about removing Trump from power, not staying in power himself?

[Read: So much for Biden the bridge president]

Phillips had never seriously entertained the notion that Biden would seek reelection. Neither had many of his Democratic colleagues. In fact, several House Democrats told me—on the condition of anonymity, as not one of them would speak on the record for this article—that in their conversations with Biden’s inner circle throughout the summer and fall of 2022, the question was never if the president would announce his decision to forgo a second term, but when he would make that announcement.

Figuring that he’d dealt with the worst of the recoil—and still very much certain that Biden would ultimately step aside—Phillips grew more vocal. He spent the balance of 2022, while campaigning for his own reelection, arguing that both Biden and Pelosi should make way for younger Democratic leaders to emerge. He was relieved when, after Republicans recaptured the House of Representatives that fall, Pelosi allowed Hakeem Jeffries, a friend of Phillips’s, to succeed her atop the caucus.

But that relief soon gave way to worry: As the calendar turned to 2023, there were rumblings coming from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue that Biden might run for reelection after all. In February, Phillips irked his colleagues on Capitol Hill when he gave an extensive interview to the Politico columnist Jonathan Martin shaming Democrats for suppressing their concerns about Biden. At that point, his friends in the caucus still believed that Phillips was picking a fight for no reason. When Biden announced his candidacy two months later, several people recalled to me, some congressional Democrats were stunned.

“Many actually felt, I think, personally offended,” Phillips said. “They felt he had made a promise—either implicitly, if not explicitly.”

Around the time Biden was launching his reelection campaign, Phillips was returning to the United States from an emotional journey to Vietnam. He had traveled to the country, for the first time, in search of the place where his father and seven other Americans died in a 1969 helicopter crash. (Military officials initially told his mother that the Huey was shot down; only later, Phillips says, did they admit that the accident was weather related.) After a local man volunteered to lead Phillips to the crash site, the congressman broke down in tears, running his hands over the ground where his father perished, reflecting, he told me, on “the magnificence and the consequence of the power of the American presidency.”

Phillips left Vietnam with renewed certainty of his mission—not to seek the White House himself, but to recruit a Democrat who stood a better chance than Biden of defeating Donald Trump.

Back in Washington, Phillips began asking House Democratic colleagues for the personal phone numbers of governors in their states. Some obliged him; others ignored the request or refused it. Phillips tried repeatedly to get in touch with these governors. Only two got back to him—Whitmer in Michigan, and J. B. Pritzker in Illinois—but neither one would speak to the congressman directly. “They had their staff take the call,” Phillips told me. “They wouldn’t take the call.”

With a wry grin, he added: “Gretchen Whitmer’s aide was very thoughtful … J. B. Pritzker’s delegate was somewhat unfriendly.”

[Read: Why not Whitmer?]

By this point, Phillips was getting impatient. Trump’s numbers were improving. One third-party candidate, Cornel West, was already siphoning support away from Biden, and Phillips suspected that Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who had declared his candidacy as a Democrat, would eventually switch to run as an independent. (That suspicion proved correct earlier this month.) As a member of the elected House Democratic leadership, Phillips could sense the anxiety mounting within the upper echelons of the party. He and other Democratic officials wondered what, exactly, the White House would do to counter the obvious loss of momentum. The answer: Biden’s super PAC dropped eight figures on an advertising blitz around Bidenomics, a branding exercise that Phillips told me was viewed as “a joke” within the House Democratic caucus.  

“Completely disconnected from what we were hearing,” Phillips said of the slogan, “which is people getting frustrated that the administration was telling them that everything is great.”

Everything was not great—but it didn’t seem terrible, either. The RealClearPolitics average of polls, as of late spring, showed Biden and Trump running virtually even. As the summer wore on, however, there were signs of trouble. When Phillips and certain purple-district colleagues would compare notes on happenings back home, the readouts were the same. Polling indicated that more and more independents were drifting from the Democratic ranks. Field operations confirmed that young people and minorities were dangerously disengaged. Town-hall questions and donor meetings began and ended with questions about Biden’s fitness to run against Trump.

Phillips decided that he needed to push even harder. Before embarking on a new, more aggressive phase of his mission—he began booking national-TV appearances with the explicit purpose of lobbying a contender to join the Democratic race—he spoke to Jeffries, the House Democratic leader, to share his plans. He also said he called the White House and spoke to Biden’s chief of staff, Jeff Zients, to offer a heads-up. Phillips wanted both men to know that he would be proceeding with respect—but proceeding all the same.

In August, as Phillips dialed up the pressure, he suddenly began to feel the pressure himself. He had spent portions of the previous year cultivating relationships with powerful donors, from Silicon Valley to Wall Street, who had offered their assistance in recruiting a challenger to Biden. Now, with those efforts seemingly doomed, the donors began asking Phillips if he would consider running. He laughed off the question at first. Phillips knew that it would take someone with greater name identification, and a far larger campaign infrastructure, to vie for the party’s presidential nomination. Besides, the folks he met with wanted someone like Whitmer or California Governor Gavin Newsom or Georgia Senator Raphael Warnock, not a barely known congressman from the Minneapolis suburbs.

In fact, Phillips had already considered—and rejected—the idea of running. After speaking to a packed D.C.-area ballroom of Gold Star families earlier this year, and receiving an ovation for his appeals to brotherhood and bipartisanship, he talked with his wife and his mother about the prospect of doing what no other Democrat was willing to do. But he concluded, quickly, that it was a nonstarter. He didn’t have the experience to run a national campaign, let alone a strategy of any sort.

Phillips told his suitors he wasn’t their guy. Flying back to Washington after the summer recess, he resolved to keep his head down. The congressman didn’t regret his efforts, but he knew they had estranged him from the party. Now, with primary filing deadlines approaching and no serious challengers to the president in sight, he would fall in line and do everything possible to help Biden keep Trump from reclaiming the White House.

No sooner had Phillips taken this vow than two things happened. First, as Congress reconvened during the first week of September, Phillips was blitzed by Democratic colleagues who shared the grim tidings from their districts around the country. He had long been viewed as the caucus outcast for his public defiance of the White House; now he was the party’s unofficial release valve, the member whom everyone sought out to vent their fears and frustrations. That same week, several major polls dropped, the collective upshot of which proved more worrisome than anything Phillips had witnessed to date. One survey, from The Wall Street Journal, showed Trump and Biden essentially tied, but reported that 73 percent of registered voters considered Biden “too old” to run for president, with only 47 percent saying the same about Trump, who is just three and a half years younger. Another poll, conducted for CNN, showed that 67 percent of Democratic voters wanted someone other than Biden as the party’s nominee.

Phillips felt helpless. He made a few last-ditch phone calls, pleading and praying that someone might step forward. No one did. After a weekend of nail-biting, Phillips logged on to X, formerly Twitter, on Monday, September 11, to write a remembrance on the anniversary of America coming under attack. That’s when he noticed a direct message. It was from a man he’d never met but whose name he knew well: Steve Schmidt.

“Some of the greatest acts of cowardice in the history of this country have played out in the last 10 years,” Schmidt told me, picking at a piece of coconut cream pie.

“Agreed,” Phillips said, nodding his head. “Agreed.”

The three of us, plus the congressman’s wife, Annalise, were talking late into the night around a long, rustic table in the farmhouse dining room. Never, not even in the juicy, adapted-to-TV novels about presidential campaigns, has there been a stranger pairing than Dean Phillips and Steve Schmidt. One is a genteel, carefully groomed midwesterner who trafficks in dad jokes and neighborly aphorisms, the other a swaggering, bald-headed, battle-hardened product of New Jersey who specializes in ad hominem takedowns. What unites them is a near-manic obsession with keeping Trump out of the White House—and a conviction that Biden cannot beat him next November.

“The modern era of political campaigning began in 1896,” Schmidt told us, holding forth a bit on William McKinley’s defeat of William Jennings Bryan. “There has never been a bigger off-the-line mistake by any presidential campaign—ever—than labeling this economy ‘Bidenomics.’ The result of that is going to be to reelect Donald Trump, which will be catastrophic.”

Schmidt added: “A fair reading of the polls is that if the election were tomorrow, Donald Trump would be the 47th president of the United States.”

Schmidt, who is perhaps most famous for his work leading John McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign—and, specifically, for recommending Sarah Palin as a surprise vice-presidential pick—likes to claim some credit for stopping Trump in the last election. The super PAC he co-founded in 2019, the Lincoln Project, combined quick-twitch instincts with devastating viral content, hounding Trump with over-the-top ads about everything from his business acumen to his mental stability. Schmidt became something of a cult hero to the left, a onetime conservative brawler who had mastered the art and science of exposing Republican duplicity in the Trump era. Before long, however, the Lincoln Project imploded due to cascading scandals. Schmidt resigned, apologizing for his missteps and swearing to himself that he was done with politics for good.

[Andrew Ferguson: Leave Lincoln out of it]

He couldn’t have imagined that inviting Phillips onto his podcast, via direct message, would result in the near-overnight upending of both of their lives. After taping the podcast on September 22, Schmidt told Phillips how impressed he was by his sincerity and conviction. Two days later, Schmidt called Phillips to tell him that he’d shared the audio of their conversation with some trusted political friends, and the response was unanimous: This guy needs to run for president. Before Phillips could respond, Schmidt advised the congressman to talk with his family about it. It happened to be the eve of Yom Kippur: Phillips spent the next several days with his wife and his adult daughters, who expressed enthusiasm about the idea. Phillips called Schmidt back and told him that, despite his family’s support, he had no idea how to run a presidential campaign—much less one that would have to launch within weeks, given filing deadlines in key states.

“Listen,” Schmidt told him, “if you’re willing to jump in, then I’m willing to jump in with you.”

Phillips needed some time to think—and to assess Schmidt. Politics is a tough business, but even by that standard his would-be partner had made lots of enemies. The more the two men talked, however, the more Phillips came to view Schmidt as a kindred spirit. They shared not just a singular adversary in Trump but also a common revulsion at the conformist tactics of a political class that refuses to level with the public. (“People talk about misinformation on Twitter, misinformation in the media,” Schmidt told me. “But how is it not misinformation when our political leaders have one conversation with each other, then turn around and tell the American people exactly the opposite?”) Schmidt had relished working for heterodox dissenters like McCain and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Listening to Schmidt narrate his struggles to prevent the Republican Party’s demise, Phillips felt a strange parallel to his own situation.

Back on January 6, 2021, as he’d crawled for cover inside the House gallery—listening to the sounds of broken glass and the gunshot that killed the Trump supporter Ashli Babbitt, overhearing his weeping colleagues make good-bye calls to loved ones—Phillips believed he was going to die. Later that night, reflecting on his survival, the congressman vowed that he would give every last measure to the cause of opposing Trump. And now, just a couple of years later, with Trump’s recapturing of power appearing more likely by the day, he was supposed to do nothing—just to keep the Democratic Party honchos happy?

“My colleagues, we all endured that, and you’d think that we would be very intentional and objective and resolute about the singular objective to ensure he does not return to the White House,” Phillips said. “We need to recognize the consequences of this silence.”

On the first weekend of October, Phillips welcomed Schmidt to his D.C. townhome. They were joined by six others: the congressman’s wife and sister; his campaign manager and one of her daughters; Bill Fletcher, a Tennessee-based consultant; and a Democratic strategist whom I later met at the Virginia farm—one whose identity I agreed to keep off the record because he said his career would be over if he was found to be helping Phillips. Commanding the room with a whiteboard and marker, Schmidt outlined his approach. There would be no org chart, no job titles—only three groups with overlapping responsibilities. The first group, “Headquarters,” would deal with day-to-day operations. The second, “Maneuver,” would handle the mobile logistics of the campaign. The third, “Content,” would be prolific in its production of advertisements, web videos, and social-media posts. This last group would be essential to Phillips’s effort, Schmidt explained: They would contract talent to work across six time zones, from Manhattan to Honolulu, seizing on every opening in the news cycle and putting Biden’s campaign on the defensive all day, every day.

When the weekend wrapped, Phillips sat alone with his thoughts. The idea of challenging his party’s leader suddenly felt real. He knew the arguments being made by his Democratic friends and did his best to consider them without prejudice. Was it likely, Phillips asked himself, that his candidacy might achieve exactly the outcome he wanted to avoid—electing Trump president?

Phillips decided the answer was no.

Running in the Democratic primary carried some risk of hurting the party in 2024, Phillips figured, but not as much risk as letting Biden and his campaign sleepwalk into next summer, only to discover in the fall how disengaged and disaffected millions of Democratic voters truly are.

“If it’s not gonna be me, and this is a way to elevate the need to listen to people who are struggling and connect it to people in Washington, that to me is a blessing for the eventual nominee,” Phillips said. “If it’s Joe Biden—if he kicks my tuchus in the opening states—he looks strong, and that makes him stronger.”

It sounds fine in theory, I told Phillips. But that’s not usually how primary campaigns work.

He let out an exaggerated sigh. “I understand why conventional wisdom says that’s threatening,” Phillips said. “But my gosh, if it’s threatening to go out and listen to people and talk publicly about what’s on people’s minds, and that’s something we should be protecting against, we have bigger problems than I ever thought.”

[Eliot A. Cohen: Step aside, Joe Biden]

It was two weeks after that meeting in D.C. that Phillips welcomed me to his Virginia farmhouse. He’d been staying there, a 90-minute drive from the Capitol, since far-right rebels deposed House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, sparking a furious three-week search for his replacement. The irony, Phillips explained as he showed me around the 38-acre parcel of pastureland, is that he and Schmidt couldn’t possibly have organized a campaign during this season had Congress been doing its job. The GOP’s dysfunctional detour provided an unexpected opportunity, and Phillips determined that it was his destiny to take advantage.

With Congress adjourned for the weekend as Republicans sought a reset in their leadership scramble, Phillips reconvened the kitchen cabinet from his D.C. summit, plus a Tulsa-based film production crew. Content was the chief priority. Phillips would launch his campaign on Friday, October 27—the deadline for making the New Hampshire ballot—at the state capitol in Concord. From there, he would embark on a series of 120 planned town-hall meetings, breaking McCain’s long-standing Granite State record, touring in a massive “DEAN”-stamped bus wrapped with a slogan sure to infuriate the White House: “Make America Affordable Again.”

The strategy, Schmidt explained as we watched his candidate ad-lib for the roving cameras—shooting all manner of unscripted, stream-of-consciousness, turn-up-the-authenticity footage that would dovetail with the campaign’s policy of no polling or focus grouping—was to win New Hampshire outright. The president had made a massive tactical error, Schmidt said, by siding with the Democratic National Committee over New Hampshire in a procedural squabble that will leave the first-in-the-nation primary winner with zero delegates. Biden had declined to file his candidacy there, instead counting on loyal Democratic voters to write him onto the primary ballot. But now Phillips was preparing to spend the next three months blanketing the state, drawing an unflattering juxtaposition with the absentee president and maybe, just maybe, earning enough votes to defeat him. If that happens, Schmidt said, the media narrative will be what matters—not the delegate math. Americans would wake up to the news of two winners in the nation’s first primary elections: Trump on the Republican side, and Dean Phillips—wait, who?—yes, Dean Phillips on the Democratic side. The slingshot of coverage would be forceful enough to make Phillips competitive in South Carolina, then Michigan. By the time the campaign reached Super Tuesday, Schmidt said, Phillips would have worn the incumbent down—and won over the millions of Democrats who’ve been begging for an alternative.

At least, that’s the strategy. Fanciful? Yes. The mechanical hurdles alone, starting with collecting enough signatures to qualify for key primary ballots, could prove insurmountable. (He has already missed the deadline in Nevada.) That said, in an age of asymmetrical political disruption, Phillips might not be the million-to-one candidate some will dismiss him as. He’s seeding the campaign with enough money to build out a legitimate operation, and has influential donors poised to enter the fray on his behalf. (One tech mogul, who spoke with Phillips throughout the week preceding the launch, was readying to endorse him on Friday.) He has high-profile friends—such as the actor Woody Harrelson—whom he’ll enlist to hit the trail with him and help draw a crowd. Perhaps most consequentially, his campaign is being helped by Billy Shaheen, a longtime kingmaker in New Hampshire presidential politics and the husband of the state’s senior U.S. senator, Jeanne Shaheen. “I think the people here deserve to hear what Dean has to say,” Billy Shaheen told me. If nothing else, with Schmidt at the helm, Phillips’s campaign will be energetic and highly entertaining.

Yet the more time I spent with him at the farm, the less energized Phillips seemed by the idea of dethroning Biden. He insisted that his first ad-making session focus on saluting the president, singing his opponent’s praises into the cameras in ways that defy all known methods of campaigning. He told me, unsolicited, that his “red line” is March 6, the day after Super Tuesday, at which point he will “wrap it up” and “get behind the president in a very big way” if his candidacy fails to gain traction. He repeatedly drifted back to the notion that he might unwittingly assist Trump’s victory next fall.

Whereas he once spoke with absolute certainty on the subject—shrugging off the comparisons to Pat Buchanan in 1992 or Ted Kennedy in 1980—I could sense by the end of our time together that it was weighing on him. Understandably so: During the course of our interviews—perhaps five or six hours spent on the record—Phillips had directly criticized Biden for what he described as a detachment from the country’s economic concerns, his recent in-person visit to Israel (unnecessarily provocative to Arab nations, Phillips said), and his lack of concrete initiatives to help heal the country the way he promised in 2020. Phillips also ripped Hunter Biden’s “appalling” behavior and argued that the president—who was acting “heroically” by showing such devotion to his troubled son—was now perceived by the public to be just as corrupt as Trump.

All this from a few hours of conversation. If you’re running the Biden campaign, it’s fair to worry: What will come of Phillips taking thousands of questions across scores of town-hall meetings in New Hampshire?

At one point, under the dimmed lights at his dinner table, Phillips told me he possessed no fear of undermining the eventual Democratic nominee. Then, seconds later, he told me he was worried about the legacy he’d be leaving for his two daughters.

“Because of pundits attaching that to me—” Phillips suddenly paused. “If, for some circumstance, Trump still won …” he trailed off.

Schmidt had spent the weekend talking about Dean Phillips making history. And yet, in this moment, the gentleman from Minnesota—the soon-to-be Democratic candidate for president in 2024—seemed eager to avoid the history books altogether.

“In other words, if you’re remembered for helping Trump get elected—” I began.

He nodded slowly. “There are two paths.”

Phillips knows what path some Democrats think he’s following: that he’s selfish, maybe even insane, recklessly doing something that might result in another Trump presidency. The way Phillips sees it, he’s on exactly the opposite path: He is the last sane man in the Democratic Party, acting selflessly to ensure that Trump cannot reclaim the White House.

“Two paths,” Phillips repeated. “There’s nothing in the middle.”

War in Ukraine: Russia suffering 'significant losses' in new offensive, White House says

Euronews

www.euronews.com › 2023 › 10 › 27 › war-in-ukraine-russia-suffering-significant-losses-in-new-offensive-white-house-says

This latest unveiling of intelligence about Russia's struggles comes as US President Joe Biden is pressing the Republican-controlled House to go along with providing more funding for Ukraine as Kyiv tries to repel Russia in a war that has no end in sight.

Biden Says Goodbye to Tweezer Economics

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 10 › us-economy-biden-administration-tweezers › 675767

If there’s one thing the White House and its critics seem to agree on, it’s that the Biden administration’s approach to economic policy—which it has branded “Bidenomics”—is a sharp break from how things have been done for the past several decades. “Forty years ago, we chose the wrong path, in my view,” Joe Biden said at an event in July 2021. But what exactly was that wrong path—and what is Biden’s economic team trying to do differently?

In the 1970s, policy makers faced a conundrum. The long postwar boom seemed to have sputtered out. Inflation was rising while unemployment remained high—a combination that mainstream economists had previously thought impossible. Political leaders were under pressure to figure out what was holding back the economy.

A group of economists from the University of Chicago believed they had the answer: regulations. According to these theorists, the ideal economy was one in which money and goods flowed smoothly according to the laws of supply and demand. But regulations on American business introduced friction into the gears of capitalism, stifling economic growth. To get the economy growing again, leaders needed to remove those regulatory obstacles. Call it tweezer economics: Pluck out the inefficiencies clogging up the market, and growth would come roaring back.

[Joel Dodge: My hometown is getting a $100 billion dose of Bidenomics]

But the turbo-growth promised by the Chicago-school intellectuals never materialized. And so, in perhaps the most overlooked element of his economic agenda, Biden has thrown out the tweezers. Instead of trying to generate growth by removing micro-inefficiencies, his policies target growth directly through aggressive spending, creating a high-pressure macroeconomy. It’s an ambitious experiment. If that pressure can force businesses to step up their own competitive game and run more efficiently, Bidenomics could best the old order on its own terms.

The ’70s crisis was very real. Many observers on both the left and right blamed the situation on microeconomic conditions: Workers weren’t productive enough, and businesses weren’t growing enough. In the version of the story that took hold on the right, the culprit was a body of regulations that prevented corporations from running at maximum efficiency. An overreaching federal government had empowered favored groups—labor unions, consumer advocates, environmentalists, and racial and ethnic minorities—to get in the way of free-market capitalism.

For the Chicago intellectuals, the worst offender was antitrust policy. In 1958, the economist George Stigler wrote that businesses that reached a dominant position should be presumed to have done so because of their superior efficiency, because competition “sifts out the more efficient enterprise.” The tough antitrust enforcement of the ’50s and ’60s interfered with this process, he argued, prosecuting the very firms that contributed the most to economic growth. Corporations should be left alone to merge and grow large, lest government kill the geese that laid the golden eggs.

The economists Michael Jensen and William H. Meckling extended tweezer economics into a new realm. In 1976, they famously theorized that “agency costs”—the conflict between executives, who managed a company, and shareholders, who owned it—were holding back corporate efficiency. Executives, they argued, would rather go golfing than work to generate value for shareholders. The solution was to put shareholders in control. Executives should be paid in stocks, rather than flat salaries, to align their incentives. Combine that idea with looser antitrust law and there would be an active competition for control of corporations, especially via hostile takeovers. This, Jensen later wrote, would generate “large benefits for shareholders and for the economy as a whole.”

Another key drag on the economy, according to observers across the political spectrum, was the growing rebelliousness of the American worker. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz argued that workers needed bosses to protect themselves from their own free-riding inclinations. For businesses to function efficiently, bosses must be able to intensively monitor workers for shirking, and to fire them unilaterally if they were caught doing so. An obvious implication was that labor regulations—above all, laws protecting the rights of labor unions—had to be curtailed.

These ideas, and others like them, were behind many of America’s key economic policy changes since the ’70s. Stigler’s theory of the efficient monopolist eventually conquered both the judiciary and the executive branch; after Ronald Reagan took office, enforcement dwindled and corporate mergers soared. (This was the focus of Biden’s “wrong path” comments in 2021.) In corporate law, Jensen and Meckling’s doctrine of shareholder primacy is now virtually sacrosanct. Finally, the authority of employers over workers has expanded dramatically.

In short, the Chicago school got virtually everything it asked for. Big firms grew bigger, corporations prioritized their stock prices above all else, and private-sector unions were all but wiped out. But 40 years of tweezing out the inefficiencies allegedly holding back the economy did not revive the growth rates of the pre-stagflation era. The U.S. economy grew an average of 4 percent a year from 1948 to 1973. During the crisis years, from 1974 to 1979, it grew more slowly, on average only 3 percent a year. Then came the tweezers, and growth didn’t budge. From 1980 to 2007, it plodded along at the same 3 percent rate of the crisis years, before falling off a cliff after 2007—all the way down to 1.6 percent from 2008 to 2020.

Instead of prompting a return to growth, the policy revolution has made itself felt in other ways. The death of antitrust enforcement, far from unleashing dynamism and investment, may have held them back. The shareholder revolution helped hollow out the American industrial base and transfer massive wealth to financial engineers. And although the labor movement was defanged, the hoped-for productivity explosion never happened.

The post-tweezer era is just a few years old, but it has already scored some early successes. Most important, growth recovered remarkably quickly from the pandemic recession.The economy returned not only to pre-pandemic trends but to pre–Great Financial Crisis trends as well, suggesting that the prolonged pain of the post-financial-crisis recession was avoidable.

Biden’s first big legislative accomplishment was the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, which unleashed a fiscal fire hose onto the U.S. economy. That law was followed by more legislation that went beyond merely increasing spending. The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act steered investment specifically toward fighting climate change. The law eschews the tweezer of, say, carbon taxes, which leave decisions to the wisdom of the market, in favor of direct federal interventions. For example, while previous policies relied nearly exclusively on the tax code to support investments in zero-carbon energy projects, the IRA contains provisions allowing nonprofit utilities that invest in zero-carbon power generation to obtain federal grants.

The IRA, along with the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, also aims to reduce regional inequalities by directing investments to left-behind rural and deindustrialized areas. That is a decisive break from the Chicago-school faith in letting capital flow to wherever it can generate the highest returns. Projects also get extra credit if they have labor peace agreements, prompting some employers to proactively reach labor contracts with unions in order to be the winning bidder on federally backed projects. These measures have already aided unions in wind-turbine and electric-bus manufacturing. Finally, in a departure from Jensen and Meckling’s doctrine of shareholder primacy, the IRA includes a provision to discourage companies from funneling cash to shareholders in the form of stock buybacks, steering them to reinvest in their businesses and employees instead. In other words, the government is investing with the sorts of “strings attached” that the ’70s generation blamed for inefficiency.

Some critics have questioned the wisdom of trying to satisfy too many constituencies with stimulus and infrastructure policy. They point out that the sometimes conflicting goals of unions, environmentalists, and the companies receiving federal funds may gum up and needlessly complicate policy implementation. In other words, by pursuing too many goals, the administration may meet none of them satisfactorily. That’s a real risk—but the Biden administration seems to be betting that some additional inefficiency is a cost worth paying if it builds new constituencies in support of pro-growth policy. If the administration can bring benefits to unions, environmentalists, and rural voters, it might assemble a lasting political coalition behind its vision of green growth.

[Franklin Foer: Biden declares war on the cult of efficiency]

The inverse is also true, of course. The post-tweezer revolution could all very easily fall apart. By many metrics, the U.S. economy is in spectacular shape—but voters continue to say they’re miserable. If Bidenomics isn’t popular, it’s unlikely to last. Meanwhile, the administration’s efforts to break up corporate monopolies are running into a buzzsaw of hostile judges steeped in Chicago-school doctrines. The Federal Reserve, in its effort to fight inflation, is stymieing new investment in housing, green energy, and more, by making borrowing more expensive.  

Yet the new model holds great promise. For nearly half a century, the government gave corporate America the hands-off policies it preferred, hoping the wealth would trickle down. Now the government is letting strong overall growth set the foundations for more efficient businesses. Corporations are being forced to use capacity more effectively to keep up with demand—and, thanks to a historically tight labor market, to vigorously compete to attract workers. If macro policy can not only generate overall growth but also compel firms to be more efficient, we might discover that the trade-off between economic strength and social welfare was never really a trade-off at all.

‘What Comes Next Will Be … Spectacular’

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 10 › trump-immigration-rhetoric-2024 › 675775

As president, Donald Trump imposed an array of deeply divisive immigration restrictions on both Latinos and Muslims. And yet from 2016 to 2020, he increased his share of the vote among both groups. Even some Latino and Muslim voters who opposed Trump’s immigration agenda moved to support him anyway because of his record on other issues, particularly the economy and conservative social priorities.

Now Trump and several of his rivals for the 2024 GOP presidential nomination are doubling down on the bet that they can target each group with harsh immigration policies without paying an electoral price.

For months, they have proposed an escalating succession of hard-line measures aimed at deterring mostly Latino undocumented migrants from crossing the southern border. And following the Hamas terror attack on Israel earlier this month, they rolled out a wave of exclusionary proposals aimed at Muslims. Trump has pledged that, if returned to the White House, he will restore his travel ban on people from a number of majority-Muslim nations, expand ideological screening of all potential immigrants to ensure that they agree with “our religion,” and deport foreign students in the United States who express hostility to Israel.

Trump and other GOP 2024 candidates such as Florida Governor Ron DeSantis have unveiled these proposals even as many Democratic-leaning activists warn that support for President Joe Biden is suffering in Latino and Muslim communities. Polls have consistently shown widespread discontent among Latinos over inflation and the economy. And many Muslim Americans are angry at Biden for his strong support of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as he pursues his military campaign to destroy Hamas in Gaza. “There is a level of disgust and disbelief and disappointment at the administration’s handling of the crisis so far,” Edward Ahmed Mitchell, the national deputy director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, told me.

The movement of some of these voters away from Biden produces a powerful incentive for Republicans to escalate their rhetorical and policy offensive against immigrant communities. It means that Trump could achieve the best of both worlds politically: offering a harsh anti-immigrant agenda that energizes the most xenophobic white voters in his coalition while still maintaining, or even growing, his support among immigrant communities drawn to him (or repelled by Democrats) on other issues.

That process already seems well under way in the agenda that Trump and other Republicans are advancing about the southern border. The fact that Trump’s vote among Hispanics improved in 2020, even after he implemented such aggressive policies as starting the border wall and separating migrant children from their parents, has undoubtedly encouraged him to go even further with his new proposals for mass deportation of undocumented migrants in the U.S. and military action against Mexico (both of which DeSantis has also endorsed).

Likewise, if Trump wins the 2024 election and more Muslim Americans vote for him than in 2020, despite his threats to target Muslim immigrants, he will undoubtedly feel emboldened in a second term to impose more exclusionary policies on that community. Stephen Miller, the hard-line architect of much of Trump’s immigration agenda as president, offered a preview of the deportation agenda that might be ahead when he posted a video of a recent pro-Palestinian demonstration and wrote that ICE agents “will be busy in 2025.”

Over his four years in office, Trump instituted policies more resistant to immigration than any president had since the 1920s, and repeatedly disparaged immigrants with openly racist language (including calling Mexicans “rapists” and decrying immigration from mostly Black “shithole countries”). He is now pushing beyond even that agenda. “What comes next will be … spectacular,” Miller posted recently.

As just a first step, Trump has proposed to reinstate all of the key policies he implemented that raised nearly insurmountable hurdles for those who sought to claim asylum in the U.S., including the “remain in Mexico” policy that required asylum seekers to stay in that country, typically in crowded and dangerous makeshift camps, while their cases were adjudicated. He’s promised to finish his border wall. And during his CNN town hall last spring, Trump refused to rule out reinstating the separation of migrant children from their parents, his most controversial policy. The Biden administration has reversed all of these policies, and it recently settled a lawsuit in which the federal government agreed not to restore the child-separation policy. Still, experts say that a reelected Trump would almost certainly seek to void or evade that agreement.

After the Hamas attack in Israel, Trump also pledged to bring back his travel ban. A bitterly divided Supreme Court upheld the rule in a 5–4 vote in 2018; if reelected, Trump could unilaterally restore the policy through executive action. “The legal framework,” Mitchell from the Council on American-Islamic Relations told me, “is still there just waiting to be used.”

But Trump has new ideas too. These include ending birthright citizenship (though his legal authority to do so is highly questionable) and launching military actions against Mexican drug cartels. In a speech to a conservative group earlier this year, he promised to “use all necessary state, local, federal, and military resources to carry out the largest domestic deportation operation in American history.”

He is also calling for requiring prospective immigrants from any country to pass intensified ideological screenings: “If you want to abolish the state of Israel, you’re disqualified; if you support Hamas or the ideology behind Hamas, you’re disqualified; and if you’re a communist, Marxist, or fascist, you are disqualified,” he said earlier this month in Iowa. Monday in New Hampshire, Trump raised the ante when he said he would bar entry for those who “don’t like our religion,” without explaining how he defined “our religion.” He’s pledged to deport students and other immigrants who express what he called “jihadist sympathies.”

David Leopold, a former president of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, says Trump’s record as president shows that it would be a mistake to dismiss even the most extreme of these proposals as simply campaign rhetoric designed to stir his crowds. “Every word that comes out of Donald Trump’s mouth ought to be taken seriously,” Leopold told me. If Trump returns to power, he said, we will see a version of his first term’s “anti-immigrant policy on steroids.”

While Trump was president, and his agenda was in the spotlight, most of his core immigration policies provoked majority opposition in polls. In a compilation of results from its annual American Values Survey polls late in Trump’s presidency, the nonpartisan Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) found that just over half of Americans opposed his Muslim travel ban, about three-fifths opposed his border wall, and fully three-fourths opposed the child-separation policy.

But public tolerance for some of these ideas may be growing amid dissatisfaction with Biden’s record in managing the border and immigration. Less than a third of adults overall—and only about one-fourth of independents—said they approved of Biden’s handling of those issues in the latest annual American Values Survey, released yesterday. A recent national Marquette University Law School Poll found that Americans preferred Trump over Biden on controlling the border by nearly two to one.

A recent Quinnipiac University national poll found that a majority of Americans support building a border wall for the first time since the pollsters initially asked about the idea, in 2016. “With frustration building” over Biden’s record on immigration, “it looks to me that some of these more extreme ideas are gaining traction in the country,” Robert P. Jones, the president of PRRI, told me.

Even many in the communities that Trump’s immigration plans would most directly affect appear more focused on other issues. Every major data source on voting behavior agreed that Trump grew his vote among Latino voters from about three in 10 to nearly four in 10 from 2016 to 2020, largely around economic issues, but also because of gains among cultural conservatives. Though the GOP advance among Latinos stalled between the 2020 and 2022 elections, polls continue to record widespread dissatisfaction among them about inflation, which could further erode support for Democrats in 2024.

The Muslim American community is much smaller—Muslims account for only about 1 percent of the total U.S. population—so reliable information on its voting behavior is less available. Youssef Chouhoud, a political scientist at Christopher Newport University, told me that Trump’s vote among Muslim Americans nationwide improved from about one in six in 2016 to roughly one in three in 2020. Key to those 2020 gains, he said, was sympathy to conservative GOP arguments on issues such as LGBTQ rights and discussion of sexual orientation and gender identity in schools.

Now, Chouhoud and others note, those Republican gains are being reinforced by the backlash among many Muslim activists against Biden’s expansive support for Israel in the conflict with Hamas. Waleed Shahid, a Muslim American Democratic strategist who has worked for several liberal groups and candidates, says that leading Democrats are underestimating the visceral anger over Biden’s words and actions. “I think, unfortunately, Democratic leadership has their heads in the sand about this,” he told me.

Both Chouhoud and Shahid told me they believed that Trump’s return to anti-Muslim rhetoric reduces the odds that any significant number of voters from that community will abandon Biden to vote for the former president. But they both said they considered it likely that some Muslim American voters disillusioned with Biden might stay home or drift to third-party candidates. “The fact that this chorus” in the Muslim community “is so loud” in criticizing Biden, “even given the full knowledge” of Trump’s bellicose rhetoric, “is telling you that there is a groundswell of real animosity toward the policies that the Biden administration is enacting right now,” said Chouhoud, who is also a fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, a nonpartisan group that studies issues concerning Muslim Americans. This discontent could matter most in the swing state of Michigan, where Muslims are a sizable constituency: A mobile billboard drove through the Detroit area this week displaying a message proclaiming that “Israel Bombs Children” and “Biden Pays For It.”

Shahid says he fears that the 2024 election won’t look like 2020’s—when Democrats of all stripes unified behind the common mission of ousting Trump from the White House. Instead, he thinks, the next election will more closely resemble that of 2016, when a decisive sliver of Democratic-leaning voters, particularly younger ones, backed the third-party candidates Gary Johnson and Jill Stein rather than Hillary Clinton.

“The Democratic base did not turn out for Hillary in 2016, even though Trump was a right-wing extremist,” Shahid told me. “People somehow have collective amnesia about this. But Biden is historically unpopular with the Democratic base.”

Of course Biden may regain Muslim voters’ trust if he can jump-start renewed negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians after the fighting concludes. Similarly, very few Latinos may now be aware of Trump’s proposals for mass deportation of undocumented migrants and military action against Mexico; if he’s the nominee, that would likely change—and prompt substantial resistance, especially among Mexican Americans.

Still, these tensions reveal a larger dynamic underpinning the potential 2024 rematch between the two men. On almost every front, Trump has formulated a 2024 agenda even more confrontational to Democratic constituencies and liberal priorities than he pursued during his four years in the White House. Yet disenchantment with Biden’s performance could be eroding the will to resist that agenda among key components of the party’s coalition, particularly young people and voters of color.

The pressure that the Middle East crisis is placing on Muslim American support for Biden, even as Trump directly threatens that community, shows how hard it may be for Democrats to maintain a united front—even against an opponent whom they consider an existential threat to all that they value.

Welcome to the Post-Tweezer Economy

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 10 › biden-administration-tweezer-economics › 675767

If there’s one thing the White House and its critics seem to agree on, it’s that the Biden administration’s approach to economic policy—which it has branded “Bidenomics”—is a sharp break from how things have been done for the past several decades. “Forty years ago, we chose the wrong path, in my view,” Joe Biden said at an event in July 2021. But what exactly was that wrong path—and what is Biden’s economic team trying to do differently?

In the 1970s, policy makers faced a conundrum. The long postwar boom seemed to have sputtered out. Inflation was rising while unemployment remained high—a combination that mainstream economists had previously thought impossible. Political leaders were under pressure to figure out what was holding back the economy.

A group of economists from the University of Chicago believed they had the answer: regulations. According to these theorists, the ideal economy was one in which money and goods flowed smoothly according to the laws of supply and demand. But regulations on American business introduced friction into the gears of capitalism, stifling economic growth. To get the economy growing again, leaders needed to remove those regulatory obstacles. Call it tweezer economics: Pluck out the inefficiencies clogging up the market, and growth would come roaring back.

[Joel Dodge: My hometown is getting a $100 billion dose of Bidenomics]

But the turbo-growth promised by the Chicago-school intellectuals never materialized. And so, in perhaps the most overlooked element of his economic agenda, Biden has thrown out the tweezers. Instead of trying to generate growth by removing micro-inefficiencies, his policies target growth directly through aggressive spending, creating a high-pressure macroeconomy. It’s an ambitious experiment. If that pressure can force businesses to step up their own competitive game and run more efficiently, Bidenomics could best the old order on its own terms.

The ’70s crisis was very real. Many observers on both the left and right blamed the situation on microeconomic conditions: Workers weren’t productive enough, and businesses weren’t growing enough. In the version of the story that took hold on the right, the culprit was a body of regulations that prevented corporations from running at maximum efficiency. An overreaching federal government had empowered favored groups—labor unions, consumer advocates, environmentalists, and racial and ethnic minorities—to get in the way of free-market capitalism.

For the Chicago intellectuals, the worst offender was antitrust policy. In 1958, the economist George Stigler wrote that businesses that reached a dominant position should be presumed to have done so because of their superior efficiency, because competition “sifts out the more efficient enterprise.” The tough antitrust enforcement of the ’50s and ’60s interfered with this process, he argued, prosecuting the very firms that contributed the most to economic growth. Corporations should be left alone to merge and grow large, lest government kill the geese that laid the golden eggs.

The economists Michael Jensen and William H. Meckling extended tweezer economics into a new realm. In 1976, they famously theorized that “agency costs”—the conflict between executives, who managed a company, and shareholders, who owned it—were holding back corporate efficiency. Executives, they argued, would rather go golfing than work to generate value for shareholders. The solution was to put shareholders in control. Executives should be paid in stocks, rather than flat salaries, to align their incentives. Combine that idea with looser antitrust law and there would be an active competition for control of corporations, especially via hostile takeovers. This, Jensen later wrote, would generate “large benefits for shareholders and for the economy as a whole.”

Another key drag on the economy, according to observers across the political spectrum, was the growing rebelliousness of the American worker. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz argued that workers needed bosses to protect themselves from their own free-riding inclinations. For businesses to function efficiently, bosses must be able to intensively monitor workers for shirking, and to fire them unilaterally if they were caught doing so. An obvious implication was that labor regulations—above all, laws protecting the rights of labor unions—had to be curtailed.

These ideas, and others like them, were behind many of America’s key economic policy changes since the ’70s. Stigler’s theory of the efficient monopolist eventually conquered both the judiciary and the executive branch; after Ronald Reagan took office, enforcement dwindled and corporate mergers soared. (This was the focus of Biden’s “wrong path” comments in 2021.) In corporate law, Jensen and Meckling’s doctrine of shareholder primacy is now virtually sacrosanct. Finally, the authority of employers over workers has expanded dramatically.

In short, the Chicago school got virtually everything it asked for. Big firms grew bigger, corporations prioritized their stock prices above all else, and private-sector unions were all but wiped out. But 40 years of tweezing out the inefficiencies allegedly holding back the economy did not revive the growth rates of the pre-stagflation era. The U.S. economy grew an average of 4 percent a year from 1948 to 1973. During the crisis years, from 1974 to 1979, it grew more slowly, on average only 3 percent a year. Then came the tweezers, and growth didn’t budge. From 1980 to 2007, it plodded along at the same 3 percent rate of the crisis years, before falling off a cliff after 2007—all the way down to 1.6 percent from 2008 to 2020.

Instead of prompting a return to growth, the policy revolution has made itself felt in other ways. The death of antitrust enforcement, far from unleashing dynamism and investment, may have held them back. The shareholder revolution helped hollow out the American industrial base and transfer massive wealth to financial engineers. And although the labor movement was defanged, the hoped-for productivity explosion never happened.

The post-tweezer era is just a few years old, but it has already scored some early successes. Most important, growth recovered remarkably quickly from the pandemic recession.The economy returned not only to pre-pandemic trends but to pre–Great Financial Crisis trends as well, suggesting that the prolonged pain of the post-financial-crisis recession was avoidable.

Biden’s first big legislative accomplishment was the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, which unleashed a fiscal fire hose onto the U.S. economy. That law was followed by more legislation that went beyond merely increasing spending. The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act steered investment specifically toward fighting climate change. The law eschews the tweezer of, say, carbon taxes, which leave decisions to the wisdom of the market, in favor of direct federal interventions. For example, while previous policies relied nearly exclusively on the tax code to support investments in zero-carbon energy projects, the IRA contains provisions allowing nonprofit utilities that invest in zero-carbon power generation to obtain federal grants.

The IRA, along with the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, also aims to reduce regional inequalities by directing investments to left-behind rural and deindustrialized areas. That is a decisive break from the Chicago-school faith in letting capital flow to wherever it can generate the highest returns. Projects also get extra credit if they have labor peace agreements, prompting some employers to proactively reach labor contracts with unions in order to be the winning bidder on federally backed projects. These measures have already aided unions in wind-turbine and electric-bus manufacturing. Finally, in a departure from Jensen and Meckling’s doctrine of shareholder primacy, the IRA includes a provision to discourage companies from funneling cash to shareholders in the form of stock buybacks, steering them to reinvest in their businesses and employees instead. In other words, the government is investing with the sorts of “strings attached” that the ’70s generation blamed for inefficiency.

Some critics have questioned the wisdom of trying to satisfy too many constituencies with stimulus and infrastructure policy. They point out that the sometimes conflicting goals of unions, environmentalists, and the companies receiving federal funds may gum up and needlessly complicate policy implementation. In other words, by pursuing too many goals, the administration may meet none of them satisfactorily. That’s a real risk—but the Biden administration seems to be betting that some additional inefficiency is a cost worth paying if it builds new constituencies in support of pro-growth policy. If the administration can bring benefits to unions, environmentalists, and rural voters, it might assemble a lasting political coalition behind its vision of green growth.

[Franklin Foer: Biden declares war on the cult of efficiency]

The inverse is also true, of course. The post-tweezer revolution could all very easily fall apart. By many metrics, the U.S. economy is in spectacular shape—but voters continue to say they’re miserable. If Bidenomics isn’t popular, it’s unlikely to last. Meanwhile, the administration’s efforts to break up corporate monopolies are running into a buzzsaw of hostile judges steeped in Chicago-school doctrines. The Federal Reserve, in its effort to fight inflation, is stymieing new investment in housing, green energy, and more, by making borrowing more expensive.  

Yet the new model holds great promise. For nearly half a century, the government gave corporate America the hands-off policies it preferred, hoping the wealth would trickle down. Now the government is letting strong overall growth set the foundations for more efficient businesses. Corporations are being forced to use capacity more effectively to keep up with demand—and, thanks to a historically tight labor market, to vigorously compete to attract workers. If macro policy can not only generate overall growth but also compel firms to be more efficient, we might discover that the trade-off between economic strength and social welfare was never really a trade-off at all.

We’re Lucky Biden’s in Charge

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 10 › biden-foreign-policy-israel-hamas › 675769

President Joe Biden and his national-security team began their time in office in 2021 intending to concentrate on confronting China’s rise. The state of the world has not allowed such a singular focus. First came the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power. Next was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Now Hamas has carried out its barbaric terrorist attack against Israeli citizens, triggering a forceful response from Israel and potentially a major interstate war in the Middle East.

Americans are lucky to have President Biden and his foreign-policy team in charge of national security right now. Their experience and knowledge extends not just to China and Asia but to the world, and they have made smart moves in defense of American interests and values.

From the start, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and President Biden both traveled to Israel to signal strong American support for a democratic ally. In times of crisis, allies need to show up; once there, Blinken and Biden delivered appropriate messages about shared values, Israel’s right to self-defense, and Hamas’s illegitimacy and terrorist intent. Biden also pledged more military assistance to Israel and requested that Congress secure the necessary funds. (It would be nice if the majority in our House of Representatives could show a little more leadership during this time of crisis, but that’s another matter.)

At the same time, the Biden administration has sent well-crafted signals to deter the expansion of the Israeli-Hamas conflict into a larger regional war. The combination of deploying aircraft carriers and battleships to the region, dispatching Blinken to conduct shuttle diplomacy with Arab states, and quietly warning Hezbollah and Iran of the consequences of war (I’m guessing on this last point) is textbook coercive diplomacy.

[Franklin Foer: Inside Biden’s ‘Hug Bibi’ strategy]

Notably, Biden has also worked with Israel and Egypt to allow humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. Obviously, much more is needed. Washington should step up pressure on Israel to provide Palestinians in Gaza with water, electricity, and the means to meet other basic needs. But Biden and his national-security team are doing more to provide relief than any other leader or country. Appointing Ambassador David Satterfield as the special envoy for Middle East humanitarian issues to coordinate these efforts was swift and wise. Satterfield is among America’s most respected and experienced diplomats in the Middle East.

Calling upon the Israeli Defense Forces to abide by the international laws of war was another prudent move on the part of the Biden team. American words of warning have had limited effect to date, however. Too many Palestinian noncombatants are being killed daily. But, unlike other American politicians, Biden has not given the IDF the green light to do whatever it wants in Gaza. Israel’s national-security interests are best served by limiting noncombatant casualties: Killing Palestinian civilians strengthens local support for Hamas and fuels global anti-Israel protests, including in the United States. Washington should continue to press Israel urgently on this front.

Biden and his team have successfully worked to hold back the momentum toward a full-scale Israeli ground invasion of Gaza, in an effort to buy time to get more hostages released. Two weeks ago, Israeli leaflets told Palestinians in northern Gaza that they had just 24 hours to evacuate south. As of now, Israeli soldiers have not begun a full-scale ground assault. In addition to making space for hostage negotiations, delaying the ground invasion could also help reduce the number of civilian casualties.

Finally, Biden has warned Israeli leaders and society not to let today’s rage become tomorrow’s mistake. The U.S. president cautioned his Israeli counterparts to avoid making the same missteps that Washington did after 9/11. I would like to hear more nuance from Biden regarding this analogy. Not all U.S. actions after 9/11 were unsuccessful blunders. Invading Iraq was a mistake, but in Afghanistan, President George W. Bush was right to attack al-Qaeda and its hosts. The overwhelming majority of the American people, and most of the world, supported that military operation. Washington’s biggest mistake in Afghanistan was not securing the total defeat of al-Qaeda in 2001, which allowed the terrorists to seek refuge in Pakistan.

That Hamas may be setting a trap for Israel is a legitimate concern. Hamas wants the IDF to come in big on the ground into Gaza, kill a lot of civilians, get stuck in a losing quagmire, stimulate mass protests throughout the Arab world, and pull other terrorist organizations and countries into war. But doing nothing is not an option for Israel, just as it wasn’t for Bush in 2001—however much al-Qaeda, similarly, wanted to see America bloody itself.

The United States should not have remained at war with the Taliban for 20 years. But were we wrong to try to help build a more pluralistic society and democratic government in Afghanistan? I don’t think so. We failed, but our failure was not inevitable. From this analogy, Israelis should not take the lesson that democracy in Gaza (or the West Bank) is impossible, or that terrorists will always rule there.

Biden has encouraged Israeli leaders to think harder about their end game, rightly asking what happens after they succeed in overthrowing Hamas. Biden has even revived ideas about a two-state solution—a notion buried years ago both by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing allies and by Hamas. As Biden said earlier this month, “There must be a path to a Palestinian state.”

Discussing long-term solutions or promising negotiations might be premature today. But eventually, those who seek a lasting peace must contemplate creative solutions, rather than just hoping that Israel can live securely while surrounded by terrorist organizations that seek its destruction. That strategy has failed. So, too, has the policy of regional and world leaders who ceased to press for the democratic rights of Palestinians and accepted Hamas’s dictatorship as inevitable. Palestinians deserve democratic, sovereign self-rule. To achieve it will require a constructive new policy from Israel and greater engagement from the United States and other regional actors.

[Franklin Foer: Biden will be guided by his Zionism]

Compared with Biden, other alleged friends of the Middle East have done little to provide relief to Palestinians, prevent the conflict from spreading, or come up with proposals for a lasting peace. For years, Vladimir Putin has touted his friendship with Netanyahu and rapprochement with Israel. But in the moment of crisis, Putin did not offer Israel much support in word or deed. Just months ago, many were praising Xi Jinping’s diplomatic victory in getting Iran and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations. Some called it the beginning of a new Chinese era, and the end of American hegemony, in the Middle East. (I had a different view.) However, Xi has done almost nothing to defuse this conflict, prevent its spread, or provide relief to Palestinian civilians. Instead, everyone is looking to Biden for leadership. And he is trying to provide it.

Biden may fail. People judge crises and wars only by how they end. No one will praise Biden and Blinken for their initial efforts if this conflict causes an enormous number of civilian casualties or pulls in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, or, most alarming, the United States. Biden and his team face only hard choices with difficult trade-offs, and no easy diplomatic solutions are in sight.

But so far, I’m impressed with what American diplomacy has achieved, and grateful that this president and this team are in power at this precarious moment in history.