Steve Witkoff says he seeks to assure the Gaza ceasefire deal will reach its second phase, despite Trump's doubts.

Steve Witkoff was little known to the public before he turned out to be a key player in Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks.

Israel and Hamas have reached a hostage-release and cease-fire agreement, offering a measure of relief and hope to the region. But the deal brings no certain closure to the catastrophic Gaza war. It does not guarantee an end to the fighting, a full release of the Israeli hostages, or a lasting political solution for Gaza.

For Israelis, joy at the return of some of the hostages is tempered by trepidation about the fate of the rest. The deal provides for a six-week cease-fire, during which 33 Israeli hostages will come home—some alive, some for burial—in exchange for the release of a much larger number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. A second stage of negotiations will then begin, to include the return of the remaining 65 hostages in Gaza and a lasting cease-fire. The success of those talks is just one of the questions the current deal leaves open.

Another is why the agreement wasn’t reached months ago. The framework appears to be the same one—“but for a few small nuances,” the Israeli ex–cabinet minister and former general Gadi Eisenkot said in a radio interview yesterday—that President Joe Biden presented last spring. Had both parties agreed to these terms then, thousands of Gazans might still be alive, and the recent destruction in the northern Gaza Strip could have been averted. At least eight Israeli hostages—including Hersh Goldberg-Polin, the best-known—might have survived, along with more than 100 Israeli soldiers.

So why was the agreement reached only now? The most significant development in recent days appears to be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s new urgency. This week, unlike in May, he pressed the leaders of his coalition’s two resistant, far-right parties to accept a hostage agreement. One new element is Donald Trump. The president-elect demanded a hostage deal before his inauguration, promising that there would be “hell to pay” otherwise. He sent his own envoy, Steven Witkoff, to Qatar, where the indirect negotiations were taking place. Witkoff went from Qatar to Israel on Saturday and insisted on having a meeting with the prime minister on the afternoon of the Jewish sabbath—a violation of Israeli protocol rudely designed to remind Netanyahu who was the vassal and who was the suzerain.

Israeli government and military sources have tried to explain the timing of the deal to national media outlets by pointing to the death of Hamas’s leader Yahya Sinwar in October; the defeats suffered by its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah; and the devastation of northern Gaza. But the purpose of this account largely appears to be presenting the agreement as the fruit of Israel’s military success—rather than a sharp change of course under pressure. In reality, Hamas managed to sustain its war of attrition despite being weakened.

[Read: Sinwar’s death changes nothing]

Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s willingness to pursue a deal is a major reversal. Last summer, he reportedly stymied progress toward a cease-fire by raising new conditions, which infuriated his then–defense minister, Yoav Gallant. (The dispute was one reason Netanyahu dismissed Gallant in November.)

The Israeli right, which assumed that Trump’s bluster was aimed only at Hamas, is in shock. One clue as to what Trump may have threatened—or promised—the prime minister has come from leaks about Netanyahu’s talks with his finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich. The leader of the far-right Religious Zionist Party, Smotrich is a prominent patron of West Bank settlement. In a meeting between the two on Sunday, Netanyahu reportedly told Smotrich that “we must not harm relations with the Trump administration,” and explained that Trump would help with the government’s designs for “Judea and Samaria”—apparently referring to plans to expand West Bank settlement construction.

That promise did not satisfy Smotrich’s party. After a meeting of its Knesset members today, the party demanded a commitment from Netanyahu that he resume the war “after completion of the first stage of the deal.” This, it said, was “a condition for the party remaining in the [ruling] coalition and the government.” As of this writing, Netanyahu has not responded.

While the ultimatum is unlikely to scuttle the deal immediately, it underlines a central question: whether the first stage will lead to an agreement on the next one and a lasting cease-fire. The previous agreement, in November 2023, furnished only a pause. This one could be similar—a six-week hiatus, after which the fighting and destruction resume, while the rest of the hostages remain in Gaza.

A more lasting settlement would require political arrangements in Gaza that Netanyahu has so far studiously avoided discussing. Gaza needs a new Palestinian governing authority, with its own forces or foreign troops capable of keeping the peace. Without that, Hamas will almost certainly resume control in the shattered territory after Israeli troops pull out—and this war will have been just one particularly destructive round of fighting, but not the last. Israel should have been working with the United States, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to create the framework for a new government in Gaza from the very beginning of this conflict. Instead, by failing to define a policy for Gaza’s future, the Netanyahu government turned the war into a highway to nowhere.

[Yair Rosenberg: Trump made the Gaza cease-fire happen]

Netanyahu’s far-right partners have pledged to reverse the 2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and resume Israeli settlement there. Netanyahu has not endorsed that goal, but he has opposed any governing role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, despite the fact that foreign partners consider its inclusion essential. Outgoing Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized as much in a speech on Tuesday.

For the second stage of the deal to succeed—for the war to end and for the remaining hostages to come home—both Hamas and the Israeli government will have to face the complex problem of Gaza’s future. Anyone who wants an end to the agony of the past 15 months must conjure up at least a quarter measure of hope. But best to hold off on any celebrations until a final deal is reached.

Let us now praise Donald Trump. It’s hard for me not to choke on that phrase. But it was his bluster—his demand that Hamas release its remaining hostages before his inauguration, or else “all hell will break out”—that effectively ushered in a cease-fire, the beginning of the end of the Gaza war.  

Although honesty requires crediting Trump, his success was not the product of magical powers or an indictment of Biden-administration diplomacy. Trump’s splenetic threats injected urgency into floundering talks. And by allowing his envoy Steven Witkoff to coordinate with the Biden administration, the incoming president left Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with an acute sense of isolation.

Over the course of Netanyahu’s long reign, he has transformed his nation’s foreign policy. For much of its history, the Jewish state cultivated bipartisan support in the United States. Netanyahu trashed that tradition; for his own domestic purposes, he has provoked spats with Democratic presidents, bolstering his reputation among his right-wing base. At the same time, he tethered himself to the Republican Party.

As the Gaza war began to meander—and as it became clear that Israel would never achieve the “total victory” that he promised—Netanyahu dipped into this old playbook. In a video he released last June, he accused Biden of denying Israel the munitions that it needed to win the war. That charge was arguably slanderous, given the large sums of money that the United States had spent on arming Israel.

Although that strategy advanced his career, it had an obvious flaw. Because of Netanyahu’s lockstep partnership with the Republicans, he is beholden to the whims of the leader of that party. Once Trump emphatically expressed his desire to end the war, Netanyahu was stuck. To cross the incoming president would risk losing the most important pillar of Israel’s foreign support.

[Read: Trump made the Gaza cease-fire happen]

Some American observers assumed that Netanyahu wanted to extend the war into Trump’s term, during which he would have the Republican president’s permission to behave however he liked. These were, after all, like-minded politicians. But that assessment misread the Netanyahu-Trump dynamic.

Over the past four years, Netanyahu clearly has had reason to feel insecure about his relationship with Trump. Trump reportedly abhorred the fact that Netanyahu called Joe Biden to congratulate him on winning the 2020 presidential election. By acknowledging Biden’s victory, Netanyahu flunked the fundamental Trumpist loyalty test. (As Trump fumed about the episode to Axios’s Barak Ravid, he declared, “Fuck him.”) After October 7, Trump cast blame on the Israeli prime minister for failing to foresee the attack. Given this history, and all the anxieties it must surely provoke, Netanyahu was desperate to deliver for Trump, days before his inauguration, at the height of his prestige.

After months of diplomatic futility, Biden was shrewd to allow Trump and Witkoff to serve as the front men for the talks. Rather than clinging territorially to the office during his last days in power, or invoking clichés about how there’s one president at a time, he invited his successor into an ad hoc coalition in which they operated in sync, sharing the same strategy and applying combined pressure. This moment will be remembered as an atavistic flourish of bipartisan foreign policy, but it also makes me think about Antony Blinken’s eyes.

When I traveled with the secretary of state to the Middle East, and the lights of television cameras pointed at his face, I saw the toils of shuttle diplomacy in the bulging bags beneath his eyes. For months, protesters camped outside his suburban-Virginia house. They hurled red paint at his wife’s car while he kept returning to the region in the hopes of brokering a deal. Indeed, it was those months of excruciating, energetic negotiation that yielded the substance of an agreement, the gritty details of peace. That hard work should be at the center of the narrative, and maybe someday it will be, but right now it feels like a footnote.

On the left, plenty of Biden’s critics are now crowing. Many of those who hate “Genocide Joe” have always claimed that Trump would be better for the Palestinian cause, or perhaps just as bad, which justified a desire to punish Biden’s Zionism electorally. Now that strange faith in Trump will be tested, because the coming diplomacy will be even harder than ending the war. Hamas remains a fact of life in Gaza. For the time being, it’s the government there, and it has every incentive to remain an armed force. Reconstructing the Strip, rescuing it from dangerous anarchy, will require somehow navigating around that fact. I doubt that Trump cares deeply about the future of Gaza, or that he has the patience to maneuver through the tangle of complexities. But if he does, I will be the first to praise him.